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ABSTRACT 
A general review of the literature by academics and practitioners in the field of post-war 
recovery shows that capacity development is considered to be the core activity for economic 
and social recovery and establishing collaborative governance through national reconciliation. 
However, the actual impact of such interventions has not been systematically studied, nor is 
there a body of proven research experience of social impact assessment in the general field of 
development practice on which to draw for methodological approaches to assessing the impact 
of capacity building in post-war development. 
This research was therefore carried out with the aim of testing the assumption of a causal link 
between capacity building assistance and the recovery of good governance and peaceful 
development in war-torn societies. In order to do that it was also necessary to develop an 
appropriate methodology for assessing the long-term social impact of capacity building. 
A generative model of change through the interaction of interventions with context and 
subjects' volition was tested in the crucial case of the Ministry of Education in Mozambique, 
using a composite research methodology involving qualitative field research and analysis of 
secondary data, documentation and literature. A participatory retrospective enquiry with a 
sample of education staff and parents revealed a strong consensus that capacity building had 
been effective when led by government with the participation of the public and invited donor 
support. Failures of governance on the other hand were thought to have contributed to the civil 
war. In these discussions the participants revealed their criteria for good governance, which 
were then applied to contemporary accounts and statistical data of Mozambican society. 
The study concludes that support for capacity building by multiple donor and financial partners 
in Mozambique from 1975 onwards made an essential contribution to the development of good 
governance and eventual sustained peaceful development. However this positive impact was 
achieved because interventions were introduced in the context of a national vision and strategy 
for education as the motor of development, which was shared by government and public. 
These findings confirmed the assumption of a causal relationship between capacity building, 
good governance and peaceful development but revealed that it is conditioned by context and 
the will of recipient governments and people. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the current discourse on post-war reconstruction and development capacity development is 
seen as the core activity whether for economic and social recovery or for establishing 
collaborative governance and national reconciliation. However, a general review of literature 
published by academics and practitioners in the field of post-war recovery, led to the 
conclusion that while there is a general assumption that the restoration and development of 
institutions of government and the civil society are necessary first steps in the recovery of 
societies from war and that they require external assistance for capacity building and 
institutional development, the actual impact of such interventions in war-torn societies is not 
systematically studied, nor is there a body of proven research experience of social impact 
assessment in the general field of development practice that might guide the definition of 
criteria and methods for assessing the social impact of such programmes. 
The research idea for this study was prompted by identifying this gap in the academic and 
practitioner approaches to understanding post-war recovery, combined with the author's own 
experience of working for a number of years in capacity building and institutional 
development in Mozambique. This work was of course based on the assumption that such 
interventions were making a positive contribution to the development of public service 
institutions in that war-torn country. The author first began to examine this issue by making a 
retrospective study of an emergency teacher training programme for RENAMO teacher 
volunteers in post-war Mozambique for her MA dissertation (Chard 2000). This examined the 
issue of capacity building as a vehicle for social recovery. At the same time an unpublished 
pilot study based on focussed interviews was conducted with the British Council and a sample 
of Mozambican post-graduate scholars in British universities. It examined how donor and 
recipients experience and evaluate the impact of capacity building. 
The Research Aim 
As a result of these experiences, it became clear that a core concept of the international 
community engaged in recovery programmes for war-torn societies is the need to establish 
local and national good governance based on developing institutions for collaboration between 
the state, civil society and the market through capacity building. While the concept has been 
transposed from development theory for societies devastated by poverty and recurring natural 
disaster, there is no body of research that confirms its validity in either context. The testing of 
this assumption of a chain of causal links: capacity building - good governance - sustained 
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recovery and development, for war-tom societies is therefore the main theoretical concern of 
this study. 
However, before tackling this theoretical issue, a practical question arises: given the long 
history of basing actions on this assumption without attempting to verify it by research, can it 
in fact be reliably tested? The first concern of this study was therefore to establish the means 
for testing the hypothesis. 
Thus the objectives of the study can be summarised as follows: 
" To answer the question 'How can the impact of capacity building and institutional 
development interventions for the recovery of social institutions in post-war societies 
be reliably assessed? ' 
" To test the plausibility of the assumption of a causal link between capacity building 
assistance and the recovery of good governance and sustainable peaceful development 
in war-torn societies. 
The author decided to relate this concept to her experience of working for the Ministry of 
Education in Mozambique, realising that Mozambique was a country that had pursued 
development goals through mass capacity building in the aftermath and in the context of two 
wars and was now deemed to have achieved a remarkable level of post-war recovery and 
development in a context of emerging good governance. This period of thirty years seemed to 
present a unique opportunity to understand the cumulative and long-term impact of multiple 
interventions by donor partners in support of capacity development in the context of violent 
regime change, revolution, war and recovery. 
The scope of the research 
The scope of the research was limited by two factors. In the first place, the low level of 
resources: it was individual research carried out by one researcher (whose personal capacities 
and limitations determined what was and was not possible) and in a limited time frame dictated 
by cost as well as academic deadlines. The second more significant reason, is its exploratory 
nature. It is considered as first stage research that could (and should) lead to investigation on a 
larger scale involving teams of researchers in different contexts. For this reason, the most 
important outcome of the research should be to discover a reliable methodology for testing the 
nature of the relationship between capacity building interventions and long-term social 
development. Logically if this is achieved, a more solid conclusion can also be reached as to 
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the plausibility of a causal relationship between capacity building, good governance and social 
development 
The Thesis 
The following chapters represent the translation of these ideas into a research study to test the 
assumption of a causal relationship between capacity development, good governance and 
sustained peaceful development, which underlies current theory and practice for development 
and for post-war development in particular. 
Chapter 1 reviews the theory, international discourse and practice of capacity building and 
institutional development, (latterly subsumed in the term capacity development) for the 
implementation of development programmes. The focus is on the period that coincides with 
the post-independence development, civil war and recovery in Mozambique, in order to 
understand the context of ideas and development options that influenced the choices of both 
Mozambique and its partners. 
Chapter 2 on the other hand reviews current understanding of post-war reconstruction, a 
concept, which has only recently been recognised by academics and even more recently 
become the focus of international policy and strategy development, though the practice of 
reconstruction after war and violent conflict has of course always existed. However, the 
evaluation of these earlier experiences that might give some insights into the possible 
outcomes of current practice has never been systematically undertaken, especially within the 
affected nations. 
Chapter 3 therefore explores evaluation practice and, finding that it has no established 
approach to evaluating the long-term impact of development interventions in general and even 
less post-war reconstruction, defines some basic requirements for defining an appropriate 
methodology to evaluate the long-term impact of capacity building. The key conclusion is that 
the crucial evidence for such evaluation has to be obtained retrospectively from the personal 
recall of the subjects of intervention, complemented by contextual secondary sources. 
Chapter 4 describes how such a methodology was developed in order to study the Ministry of 
Education in Mozambique as a crucial case most likely to confirm the assumption of a causal 
link between capacity development, good governance and sustained peaceful development. 
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This rather simple linear model was then refined to take account of the relationship between 
intervention and subject in a particular context. 
Based on the conclusions reached in Chapter 3, the core methodology for examining this 
model was a retrospective participatory enquiry with a sample of education staff and parents, 
complemented by studies of secondary material (literature, statistical data, documentation and 
press reports). It was deemed, on the basis of the field research results, to have been effective 
in providing the evidence to assess the plausibility of the model. The analysis of that evidence 
is then presented in the following chapters 
Chapter 5 reviews the record of the development of education in Mozambique, largely through 
the Mozambican literature and documentation but also that of its principal donor partners. The 
rationale for basing the analysis on these sources, while using published literature from 
external sources only for background information, was again the conclusion reached in 
Chapter 3 on the approach to long-term social impact evaluation. The main conclusion of this 
chapter is to confirm the education sector in Mozambique as a likely case to confirm the 
research model developed in Chapter 4. However, a number of critical issues remained to be 
examined in the light of the research participants' contribution (the author uses the term 
`participant' rather than respondent because of the methodology employed, the rationale for 
which is explained in Chapter 4 and the practice in Appendix 2) 
Chapter 6 analyses the accounts given by the 37 education staff interviewed in respect of their 
own education, professional development and careers in the context of colonial rule, 
revolution, war and recovery. Similar information was collected from a small number of 
parents who discussed both their education and that of their children studying today. The 
purpose of this chapter was to identify the key inputs for personal capacity development as 
understood by the participants and to begin to establish to what extent individual development 
contributed to the development of the institutions of the Ministry of Education (MINED) and 
to the wider society. The sum of their collective experiences clearly supports the concept of 
capacity development as the product of interaction between positive and negative 
interventions, context and the individual's own volition. 
Chapter 7 presents the participants' views on the general development of education after 
independence. They were asked to consider the role of government and that of international 
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cooperation in supporting the development of education, as well as the effects of the war. They 
were also asked what they thought were the fundamental causes of the war. 
These discussions revealed a strong consensus that capacity development was at its most 
effective when led by government with the participation of the public and invited support of 
international partners. The effect of the war was to fragment and divert this effort, throwing 
capacity development into reverse. Nevertheless the national education system survived with 
sufficient capacity to undertake the strategic planning of its own recovery and once again 
enlisted international support to achieve its objectives. In the course of discussing both the 
positive role of the post-independence government and its failures, resulting, as many thought, 
in civil war, the participants also revealed their criteria for good governance, which they 
considered enhanced as a result of the drive to extend participation in education and as a result 
of lessons learned from the breakdown of governance in the war. 
Chapter 8 examines this `folk theory' by using the participants' criteria of good governance 
beside the criteria used in the international discourse discussed in Chapter 1 to explore 
contemporary accounts of Mozambican society, in the press, statistical indicators and 
published reflections on the ten years of peace. In this way, the nature and quality of 
governance that has emerged following the end of the war is assessed and the extent to which 
it has been enhanced compared to the early post-independence period by the impact of 
education and capacity development strategies, and the lessons learned from the war and 
economic collapse. This analysis, like the rest of the study and for the same reasons, relies 
principally on Mozambican sources. 
Analysing these different perspectives together in Chapter 9, the study concludes that capacity 
development in war-torn societies may indeed contribute to good governance and sustained 
peaceful development and that donor support for this activity can be essential. However, as the 
research model suggests, the impact of these interventions is conditioned by the context in 
which they are introduced, crucially the existence of a national vision and strategy for 
development, which is embraced by both government and public. 
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CHAPTER 1 
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT: 
THEORIES, RHETORIC AND PRACTICE 
Introduction 
A review of the extensive literature discussing the related concepts of institutional development 
and capacity building and the many guidelines for practice aimed at operationalising them, gives 
the impression of constantly shifting, unclear and contested definitions of these key terms. More 
recently, new terms such as governance and civil society have become current as a means of 
describing the institutional development and capacity building aims of the international financial 
institutions, donor governments and humanitarian agencies in respect of their assistance to poor 
countries and communities. Thus though these terms are adopted as a common rhetoric in the 
international community, they have often masked divergent approaches to practice. 
Nevertheless, Whyte (2004: 73-4) in a recent review of donor practice for capacity building and 
institutional development concludes that there is now an emerging consensus on the best 
approaches to capacity building, based on concepts that have in fact been around for some 
considerable time. Meanwhile, analysis of actual practice over the last three decades shows that 
with few exceptions, it has shown remarkably little change and continues to adopt inappropriate 
strategies and approaches identified in the late 1970s and again in the early 1990s and the general 
opinion of the donor community is that little progress has been made in achieving the institutional 
capacity that was envisaged at either grass-roots or national government levels. 
This contradiction between rhetoric, principles and practice, points to other factors, which 
significantly influence the way "aid" is negotiated and administrated. First there are deep 
contradictions between what the international community acknowledges as appropriate practice for 
capacity building and the financial and administrative culture of its own institutions. Secondly, 
effective practice is commonly compromised in the pursuit of strategic or ideological objectives 
that contradict declared development principles, in a process that has come to be discussed in the 
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literature, as conditionality. This phenomenon includes both acknowledged and unacknowledged 
agendas on the part of the "givers" of a political, economic or cultural nature. A third factor, 
which is not much examined in the donor literature, is the agenda of the recipients of aid, which 
they naturally pursue within the terms of donor conditionality. 
This chapter will consider each of these points in turn in the hope of clarifying the practical issues 
behind the smokescreen of rhetoric, theoretical debate and exhortations to good practice 
1.1 Defining terms and concepts 
Given the perception expressed in so much of the literature that application of the terms 
institutional development and capacity building in the context of international aid is obscure and 
confused (Austin, 1993, Moore, 1995a, Eade, 1997 and others. ) it seems best to start by 
considering what the key words in these expressions mean in both general usage and the many 
theoretical explanations of the terms when used to define development concepts. 
1.1.1 Institutions 
Like many words institution is used to describe a number of phenomena that are nevertheless 
perceived as sharing significant common characteristics. It can mean 'An established law, custom, 
usage, practice, organisation or other element in the political or social life of a people' or 'An 
establishment, organisation or association instituted (meaning "set up") for the promotion of some 
object, especially one of public utility' (OED, 1965: 1018). 
In these definitions institutions can be both formal and non-formal, organisational and non- 
organisational, but their key characteristics are that they are "established" that is they have both 
durability and legitimacy for a particular population and that they are perceived to meet some 
social need. 
Goldsmith (1992: 582-583) observes that in social science there are 'major divergences' between 
two definitions of the word institution: one that defines an institution as a'role or organisation' and 
the other, which defines it as 'a rule or convention'. One refers to 'deliberately constructed human 
groupings' the other to 'mental conceptions' 'diffused among a multitude of people'. As explained 
above, the common user of the word, does not perceive that these are clearly separate phenomena 
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because of their common characteristics, which Goldsmith describes as 'stability and persistence' 
'value beyond the technical requirements of a task' and 'legitimacy or popular belief in something's 
rightness'. Ostrom, describing the 'de facto rules' of rural communities and 'de jure rules' of 
formally constituted institutions, sees that the two clearly coexist and are in fact inextricably 
'nested' one in another (1990: 51-55). 
Nevertheless, it is the existence of these two types of institution that has led to confusion in the 
discussion of both the theory and practice of institutional development. As Goldsmith describes, 
the tendency of development agencies has always been to focus on 'role orientated institutions' 
because '... administrators needed such bodies to carry out development projects'. This has led to 
equating institutions with organisations, an issue discussed in his article with Brinkerhoff 
(Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 1992: 371-374) where they point out 'not all organizations are 
institutions, any more than all institutions are organizations'. 
An organisation is `an organized body, system or society' (OED, 1965: 1384) but it does not 
necessarily include the attributes of social value, legitimacy and stability, which characterise an 
institution. An organisation can be created by any group of individuals, such as an aid agency. It 
simply needs the means to set it up and obtain the services of a sufficient number of other 
individuals to run it but unless it acquires the attributes of an institution, its continued existence 
will be entirely dependent on maintaining those initial means of support. 
The confusion of equating the creation of organisations with the development of institutions is 
seen by the two authors as the reason why many projects aimed at institutional development have 
proved unsustainable. An organisation only becomes self-sustaining, that is an institution, when it 
is valued by and seen to serve its stakeholders. Similarly, an organisation or organisational culture, 
that ignores existing (but not formally constituted) rule-based institutions, will be unlikely to 
succeed. 
There is therefore a clear theoretical understanding of two distinct manifestations of social 
institutions as well as the essential characteristics that unite them, which can be a powerful tool in 
the design of research and strategic planning in the field of institutional development. 
3 
1.1.2 Capacity 
The aid community's rationale for "building" or "developing" institutions is based on the 
perception that poor communities and national governments are dysfunctional and failing to 
ensure the well-being of their people through lack, or loss of capacity. Once again the many ways 
of using the word cause confusion. Its original literal meaning refers to `a containing space, area or 
volume' but it long ago acquired a figurative meaning of 'Mental receiving power' and later the 
general meaning of 'The power, ability or facility for anything in particular'. (OED, 1965: 260). So 
there are two meanings, one concerned with the holding of matter, the other describing human 
attributes. 
In development parlance, which deals with both material and human resources, lack of rigor in 
specifying in what sense the word is being used has been the source of the confusion described 
above. Moore (1995b: 93) goes so far as to dismiss the use of the term capacity building by 
development professionals as so inclusive in its application as to be 'analytically useless'. Cohen 
(1995: 408 - 409) also complains of the 'Careless use of the concept of capacity building. ' He too 
finds the solution in going back to dictionary definitions of common meanings of the word 
capacity which are 'centred on the ability, talent, competency, efficiency and qualifications of 
people' (emphasis added) and then adopting a working definition of capacity building by Shafritz 
in the field of comparative public administration which '... includes strengthening the capability' of 
administrative and managerial personnel 'to plan, implement, manage or evaluate... programs 
designed to impact on social conditions in the community' as a practical operational concept. 
The idea that capacity is essentially concerned with the ability of people to function effectively to 
influence the conditions of their communities is indeed a practical concept, which has also been 
usefully applied beyond the context of public administration in rural development work with 
grassroots communities. Eade (1997: 1-3) also confines that it 'implies a long-term investment in 
people and their organisations'. 
However, as early as 1980 Coombs (1980: 17) drawing practical lessons from rural development 
case studies noted that skills training for income generation 'was useless' to the women concerned 
unless they 'had access to simple equipment, raw materials, credit and a profitable market'. So 
although capacity building may be concerned fundamentally with investing in the human 
capabilities of an organisation or community, that development also requires the development of 
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necessary resources and conditions. Fiszbein in a study of World Bank support for Local 
Government reform and development in Colombia (1997: 1031) discusses the concept of capacity 
taking these factors into consideration, seeing 'labor, capital and technology' as ' dimensions of 
local capacity'. 'It is the combination of skills and professionalism that determine staff quality' but 
their 'ineffective use' due to inhibiting conditions (personnel policies etc) can also limit capacity. 
Similarly the lack, or poor distribution, of financial resources and equipment or of appropriate 
methods for information gathering, decision-making, evaluation etc. can result in apparent lack of 
personal capacity. Failure to grasp that the capacity, or power, to act effectively is conditioned by 
these circumstances as well as personal knowledge and ability has probably been at the root of 
many difficulties with capacity building programmes, where donors have seen the need to develop 
institutional and personal capacity through "training", while recipients have been focussed on 
accessing financial resources'. In the field of community development, promoting the ability of the 
poor to take control of resources, or empowerment, is also now widely considered as an important 
component of capacity building. (Eade, 1997: 24-25) 
It is probably for this reason that the term capacity development is now preferred because it 
indicates a more holistic approach, which encompasses all three aspects of capacity associated 
with participatory development practice: human ability, material resources and power. (Whyte, 
2004: 19) 
1.1.3 Governance 
In the early 1990s, politicians, and development professionals began to pursue another way of 
'getting out... of the... "capacity and institution building" thicket' (Cohen, 1995: 422). They began to 
describe their development aims for aid recipient countries as promoting good government or 
governance. (Archer, 1994: 10-11) 
Clearly government and governance have the same derivation but the dictionary defines 
government as, `the action of ruling and directing the affairs of state', while governance is simply, 
'The action and manner of governing' (OED, 1965: 816). The World Bank (1992: 1-3) in its 
statement on the issue, defined governance in similar terms to the dictionary definition: 'the 
t Edwards mention of the conflict between SCF and the Mozambican health service on this issue, is a case in 
point (Edwards, 1994: 82) 
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manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social 
resources for development' and sees good governance in essentially pragmatic terms as involving 
'systems of accountability, adequate and reliable information and efficiency in resource 
management and the delivery of public services' recognising that governments play key roles (but 
are not the only players ) in establishing 'rules that make markets work efficiently' as well as the 
'provision of public goods: For the World Bank, good governance is the practical outcome it 
looks for from capacity building. However, the underlying assumption of the Bank's policy 
thinking is that it 'adds up to... the minimum institutional, legal and political conditions of liberal 
democracy, though... never stated this explicitly' (Leftwich, 1993: 610). 
This ideological commitment becomes very clear in World Bank studies of lessons learned from 
its experience in implementing capacity building for local government. Fiszbein in analysing local 
government capacity building in Colombia, describes it as 'a case of democratic decentralisation' 
which 'could ignite a process of local capacity development' and break out of the 'vicious circle of 
administrative underdevelopment - and low capacity -and fiscal poverty' (Fiszbein, 1997: 1030). 
Edralin, looking at general lessons from similar experiences in Latin America and Asia, links 
capacity building directly with good governance: 'capacity correlates with good governance and 
capacity building is the main pillar' and goes on to state that 'Good governance needs to combine 
decentralised management with democratic accountability' (Edralin, 1997: 111-115). She goes on 
to explain in more detail, how democratic accountability should be developed. In the first place, 
capacity building should aim to develop local leadership 'to create opportunities for good 
governance' and 'provide resources to enable local communities'. Local government planning and 
decision-making procedures should then 'incorporate the group process' as well as 'community 
initiative and participation' to 'create a sense of ownership and empowerment', concluding that 
The participation and commitment of NGOs and beneficiaries is another requirement in local 
governance' (Edralin, 1997: 127-132). 
This strategic approach to capacity and governance is closer to the much more explicitly 
ideological definition of what constitutes good governance for the European bi-lateral donors as 
expressed in their Resolution on human rights, democracy and development, which employs quite 
subjective terms even in the description of practical aspects of governance. While paying lip 
service to the right of 'sovereign states' to choose 'their own constitutional arrangements' they 
insist that a number of 'principles' are indispensable for 'equitable development'. These include 
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'sensible economic and social policies, democratic decision making, adequate governmental 
transparency and financial accountability, creation of a market friendly environment for 
development, measures to combat corruption... respect for the rule of law, human rights... freedom 
of the press and expression' (emphasis added). ( European Community Resolution, 1991 quoted by 
Archer, 1994: 8-9). Meanwhile, many international NGOs, unconstrained by diplomatic 
conventions, are prepared to pass judgement in even more explicit terms on the conduct of 
governments, which they deem to be oppressing or disregarding their citizens. (Clayton, 1994: 
120-121) 
Leftwich (1993: 606,611) suggests that these two apparently different meanings of good 
governance, the World Bank's 'administrative and managerial' emphasis and the Western 
governments' 'more political' interpretation, in fact share 'three main components. ' First he sees 
that in 'current usage there is no doubt that good governance means a democratic capitalist 
regime... which is also part of ... the New World Order'. Secondly it'implies a state enjoying both 
legitimacy and authority, derived from a democratic mandate' (this is particularly emphasised by 
Western governments) and thirdly (the World Bank's emphasis) it involves 'efficient, open, 
accountable and audited public service' and 'an independent judiciary' with the particular role of 
arbitrating 'disputes arising in a largely free-market economy'. . 
Meanwhile, NGO representatives (Clayton, 1994: 115) have also embraced the term governance 
but suggest that the donor's definition is still 'too state centric, focussing on the capacity of the 
state to govern'. In their discussions they concluded that a'dynamic concept of governance' needs 
to include 'the market and the wider civil society. Governance can be seen as a relational concept 
involving a complex interplay between government, the market and civil society'. 
All these variations in the application of the term good governance are prescriptive rather than 
descriptive. They go beyond mere definition of terms for the sake of clarity of communication and 
into the arena of conditionality, which explains the preference for governance rather than 
government to express the concept, since its more general application (not specifically relating to 
governments) and focus on practical management of society can appear less threatening to the 
sovereignty of governments, by masking its inherent political agenda. 
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However this chosen vagueness has once again confused the issues affecting development choices. 
Hewitt de Alcantarä, writing some years after the lauch of governance into the 'development 
debate', observed that the 'wide applicability of the term, its reference to basic problems of 
political order (including efficiency and legitimacy), and its lack of any necessary relation to the 
state have made it useful to a growing number of participants' so that now 'governance is being 
used by groups of very different ideological persuasion, for a number of different and often 
contradictory ends' Thus, on the one hand, it can be used as a vehicle for shrinking the state to 
increase the role of the private sector, while often burdening voluntary organisations with public 
service tasks they cannot adequately fulfil, or, alternatively, it can be used to support the capacity 
of the state by encouraging the involvement of non-government entities to tackle problems in 
aspects of society where government should not attempt to play a leading role. (See 1.1.4. below) 
So once again those involved in the study and practice of development find themselves trapped in 
a "thicket" of obscure language, which confuses rather than assists clarity of definition and 
purpose. Before using the term governance and especially good governance in any particular 
context it is necessary to define the criteria by which it is defined. 
1.1.4 Civil Society 
The expression civil society became current in the discourse surrounding development aid with the 
appearance of governance and as used by the international community it is integral to the 
ideologically charged definitions of that term described above. 
In common speech, the adjective civil has the connotation of "ordinary" citizenship as opposed to 
officialdom or authorities while society refers to living in association with others in a defined 
community. So, the phrase civil society can be seen to refer to the general inhabitants or members 
of a particular state in their various social groupings as distinguished from their ruling institutions. 
Robinson's account of the 'liberal' interpretation of the phrase: 'a public realm located between the 
family and the state, consisting of a plurality of associations. ' is close to this general usage, and as 
he points out, the one that 'most aid donors are inclined towards'. However, when it comes to 
considering, what actual associations belong within the definition of civil society they become 
more subjective and 'conceive civil society as an aggregation of organised interests pursuing a 
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benign and rational political agenda' (Robinson 1995: 71) and what is considered organised or 
benign and rational is of course highly coloured by western cultural values and political ideology. 
Kasfir in his critique of the aid community's use of the term civil society forcefully illustrates the 
'narrow and normative' meaning attached to the concept, by examining its application in the 
promotion of democracy in Africa. He asserts that 'for many scholars and donors civil society is an 
instrument... that will make African states more democratic, more transparent and more 
accountable'. However, their perception of the failure of existing African social institutions to 
achieve these goals has led them to'urge African states to adopt a Western version of civil society'. 
As a result 'it is not the social formations that have emerged through the history of their societies' 
but 'a small set of organisations with special characteristics' (most of which are new and all of 
which conform to the western model of civil organisations) that are declared to be'the core of civil 
society'. (Kasfir, 1998: 1-3) 
He goes on to question other inherent weaknesses in the conventional concept of civil society, by 
asking 'how much of the society should be included in the notion of civil society? ' Should it 
include ad hoc activity as well as formally constituted organisations? The present usage excludes 
(on moralistic or ideological grounds) much of traditional African society, which is based on 
ethnic and religious allegiances and by setting the boundaries of civil society activity outside the 
family arena (which is widely extended in African society) it also excludes the struggles of 
women's groups to redefine the roles of men and women in that context. 'Defining civil society as 
confrontational' in its relations with the state also 'creates problems' since... 'the possibility for civil 
society to play a role in the consolidation of democracy evaporates if associations cannot be 
perceived as working constructively with the state as well as opposing it. Similarly the perception 
that civil society means that it should be "civil" (benign in Robinson's analysis) in the sense of 
non-violent and conciliatory in the face of conflicting interests, fails to recognise the'deep political 
and economic cleavages that must be resolved before members of a society are sufficiently at 
peace with each other to work within a democratic system' (Kasfir, 1998: 4-11). 
'Civil society organisations are not inherently benign' in any society, (Eade, 1997: 107), neither is 
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Africa unique in other aspects of its social organisation. 2 Kasfir's exposition clearly demonstrates 
that the definition of civil society adopted by the majority of the aid community, is too prescriptive 
and culturally biased to serve as a useful tool in the development of strategies for democratic and 
social change in any developing countries, since by excluding the majority of indigenous social 
formations (institutions) and denying the role of conflict in social change, it is itself profoundly 
undemocratic. If the particular nature of social organisation in a given country is to be related to a 
general concept of civil society, it seems best to take the more inclusive and culturally neutral 
meaning suggested by common usage as a starting point. 
1.2 Institutional development and capacity building in practice: the 
empirical evolution of best practice concepts. 
Institutional development as a practical activity arose as part of the process of decolonisation. 
Colonisation, had supplanted the original indigenous institutions of government at the highest 
level and had marginalised or simply co-opted institutions of community government (such as 
local feudal leaders or tribal chiefs and elders) at the local level. The colonial powers, in 
contemplating the transfer of power to a national leadership, faced a potential administrative 
vacuum. First, because generations of colonial rule had permanently ruptured the links to the pre- 
colonial forms of government, thus interrupting the evolution of indigenous modem forms of 
government and secondly because the colonial administration was run by and on behalf of the 
metropolitan power, so that in addition to there being no truly national institutions, there were also 
no personnel with experience of governing, policy making or even of administrative decision 
making. 
In most cases, where, after a period of confrontation, a peaceful transition to independence was 
negotiated, this included a period of transitional government during which the colonial 
administration was converted into some kind of approximation of the domestic institutional 
arrangements of the colonial power (some form of "liberal democracy" with a civil service 
bureaucracy) and national political leaders and administrators gradually took over the reigns of 
power. In these cases, capacity building in the form of professional education and technical 
2 There are clear parallels with other countries, for example, Afghanistan. 
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training and assistance were provided to enhance their ability to govern. Where independence was 
resisted until the colonial regime itself collapsed (as in the case of Portugal and its colonies) the 
new nations, while they had the opportunity to think more radically about the kinds of institution 
they wanted, had very limited experience and human resources to put their choices into effect. In 
both cases, the international consensus of the UN and financial institutions, as well as the former 
colonial powers and indeed the newly independent nations themselves was that they required a 
further period of support to strengthen their institutions of government and build the capacity of 
their public servants. This ushered in a long period in the 1960s and 1970s, when international aid 
focussed on meeting this need in the belief that more effective government would bring about 
general improvement in social and economic conditions in these "underdeveloped " nations. This 
belief was shared by both Western and Socialist states, who competed to offer technical assistance 
and rival development models. 
As these decades progressed the assumption that "development" would automatically flow from 
such "institutional strengthening", was increasingly questioned by practitioners in the light of their 
disappointing experiences in the field. Bhattacharya and Sharma (1979) trace the development of 
government administered rural development programmes in India since its independence in 1952, 
from general 'Community Development' policies administered at a macro level to area based 
'Integrated Rural Development' at a micro level noting that none of these various schemes had 
succeeded in altering the balance of advantage from the rich farmers in favour of the rural poor. 
'The strength of the bureaucracy has again and again foiled attempts at restructuring of rural 
institutions' (1979: 87). The institutions of government, centralised and vertically structured had 
indeed been strengthened to the point of being unresponsive to real public needs, simply serving to 
reinforce inequalities. Like many other development professionals around the world, they turned 
to the ideas of the Brazilian Paulo Freire, encouraging 'peoples organisations consisting of the 
target population' which would serve to raise their awareness of their 'rights and privileges' 
(1979: 90). 
A new consensus rejected the conventional , sectoral, top-down delivery of public services and 
the assumption that macro-economic development would have a "trickle-down effect" for the 
poor, advocating an "'integrated. " approach, combined with extensive "community participation". ' 
However, these ' new policy commitments were still at the rhetorical stage as the 1970s ended: 
(Coombs 1980: 1-13). Coombs therefore undertook a review of a number of rural development 
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case studies in the light of this new consensus with the practical purpose 'to discover what concrete 
factors within each program and its environment had helped or hampered the achievement of its 
objective: (1980: 4). He came to a number of empirical conclusions. 
The 'unique flexibility of voluntary organisations' can be used 'to help large scale government 
programs' (1980: 2-3). He was not surprised that government agencies, that had only recently 
committed themselves to this new approach, had as yet no concrete results that he could examine, 
but 'contrary to tradition' he did find that the majority of non-government programmes (such as 
BRAC and SAVAR in Bangladesh, SWRC, India and Sarvodaya. Sri Lanka) that had 
successfully reached the rural poor'contain significant elements of collaboration with government 
agencies, thus enhancing their potential for beneficially affecting larger scale government 
programs'. 
We should 'visualize and analyze any project or program as a productive "system" (A 
concept that later came to be described as "holistic") Another important component of his 
"successful" programmes was "integration" (1980: 15-21) within the programme itself, between 
the programme and its intended beneficiaries and between the programme and the work of other 
agencies (amounting to more than mere coordination). He concluded that 'Many rural programs 
have low effectiveness because they are incomplete systems', for example, '... skill training... is 
only one piece of an employment and income generating "system"'. He also saw that 'planning at 
the national level ' must involve 'a cohesive and unified strategy within which all sectors become 
mutually reinforcing'. He adds that, while an integrated approach to planning came naturally to 
villagers, those organisations and personnel designated to serve them, ' by the very nature of their 
mandate and training', inclined to a narrow specialisation. 
'... a good balance between central control and local initiative and latitude. ' should be the aim. 
(1980: 22) While concluding that it was the highly centralised and hierarchical nature of 
government and other development agencies that made them unresponsive to rural needs and 
therefore advocating that there must be 'personnel at lower echelons capable of exercising 
3 In fact these were so successful, that they virtually became nationwide political movements. 
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responsibility', he cautioned that decentralisation is not 'a panacea'. Leadership at national level is 
still necessary. 
'much of the impetus for change must come from within the community' (1980: 24-25) Participation 
of the rural populations themselves in choosing and developing strategies is important for two 
reasons: the villages (or locations) in which they live are 'not "communities" in the unified sense; 
they are frequently loose federations' of different kinship and interest groups each with their'own 
stake, status and role in the scheme of things' ; 'they also have a very practical sense and a great 
fund of local knowledge that exceeds that of the outsider'. For any intervention to succeed it needs 
to have the endorsement or at least acceptance of all the stakeholders and to be accepted, new 
ideas must be based on intimate knowledge of the local conditions and advice of respected 
insiders. 
Time must be allowed to build trust and facilitate 'a process of self-examination by all the groups 
in the community. ' Looking at the experience of his case studies (1980: 27-28), he observes ' the 
most important and often most difficult task for outsiders... is to win their trust and acceptance by 
convincing all segments of the community that... they are willing and able to provide certain types 
of help over a sustained period... short-circuiting this initial process or hurrying it unduly, can be 
self-defeating'. Most of the ten ways in which he suggests that such a process can be facilitated 
come within the area of practice described as capacity building, including the empowerment of 
disadvantaged subgroups particularly women, whose economic and social roles figured 
prominently in many of the cases studied. 
Development projects and programs should be planned, implemented and evaluated on the basis 
of understanding their context and the impact they have on it, by means of continuous observation 
and information gathering. He adds another important lesson for development agencies, that they 
must change the way they collect and use information to plan and evaluate their actions. (1980: 37- 
39) Evaluation had been given little attention and what it usually amounted to was 'a management 
type post-audit to determine whether the (completed) project kept to its original work plan and 
schedule, stayed within its budget and achieved its initial objectives' regardless of whether these 
had turned out to be appropriate and without assessing the impact on the local situation. As a result 
no lessons were being learned as to the most effective practice. Similarly, too little attention was 
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paid to understanding local contexts before designing projects. The most effective way to do this 
was by largely qualitative methods and, by implication, user participation at every stage. 
Political will to promote equity is essential for sustainable development. Addressing the question 
'Will it be possible? ' to meet the needs of the rural poor by these means he stressed that 'political 
leadership at all levels, genuinely dedicated to these humanistic goals' was 'undoubtedly the most 
fundamental requirement' as well as the understanding 'that without a more equitable sharing of 
the world's goods--both within nations and between them--the security, stability and progress of 
all nations is in jeopardy'. 
Korten writing in the same year and also basing his conclusions on analysis of case studies 
reached much the same conclusions as Coombs, but introduces some useful terms to contrast the 
new concept of best practice, which he calls the 'Learning Process Approach' with the failed 
practice of the "text-book version of ... development", the 'Blueprint Approach'. (1980: 496-499). 
In the former, 'both program and organisation emerged out of a learning process in which research 
and action were integrally linked. ' The latter, is based on detailed pre-planning 'as if knowledge 
were nearly perfect... it assumes that development actions are terminal and temporary 
organisations will suffice and `sharply differentiates the functions and even the institutional 
locations of the researcher, the planner and the administrator'. 
Like Coombs he sees capacity building activities as crucial to the success of development 
programs, not'as if they were writing on a clean slate' but recognising the 'well-established socio- 
technical systems within which the poor have... worked out appropriate methods to meet their 
basic survival needs'. 'The successful programs involved substantial planning with the people... 
Generally they built from and enhanced community capabilities while opening new options'. 
Despite the clarity with which he is able to demonstrate the necessary factors for success, his 
concluding remarks (1980: 502-503) while strongly advocating 'building capacities for action 
through action' and allowing programs to evolve and grow, his assessment of prospects for 
success are not optimistic. Very few centrally planned rural development schemes ever 
successfully match actual needs and equally few'village based... efforts develop into capacities for 
sustained action on a significant scale' due to their failure to learn how to expand their 
organisation. 'A significant barrier to an appropriate response from funding agencies' to facilitate 
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this kind of development is their 'adherence to detailed line item budgets, project plans and 
implementation schedules' (blue prints and limited timeframes) which 'pre-empt the learning 
process by' insisting that' the leadership of the incipient effort act as if it knew what it was doing 
before there was an opportunity for learning to occur'. Unless this organisational culture was 
changed, he saw little hope for reducing rural poverty. 
Some years later, Upoff took up the basic tenets set out by Coombs and Korten, in order to model 
strategies for local institutional development, reiterating a commitment to building on existing 
knowledge and capacities through participation to develop leadership, learning through doing and 
allowing actions to change over time. For example, (1986: 199-200) he concludes that'one of the 
best ways of developing local capabilities and encouraging consideration of what the needs and 
goals of the institution are, is to involve local people in planning and designing their own training', 
though "training" may often not be of the formal classroom type but learning through activities 
with participatory evaluation. In the blue-print model discussed by Korten, both training and 
evaluation are reserved to external 'specialists' and it seems from Uphoffs comments that little had 
changed in this respect over the intervening period. Evaluation exercises had become more 
frequent and extensive in an effort to improve performance, but this had only resulted in 'more 
rigidity' giving 'implementers more reasons to adhere to initial (and usually inadequate) project 
designs'. (1986: 195). 
Uphoff also re-examines the options for relating to existing institutions (1986: 204-211). 
concluding that "introduced institutions" usually do not work, because they lack the "legitimacy, 
support and commitment over time" of "pre-existing institutions" (that is, according to the 
theoretical definitions discussed above 1.1., they are not in fact institutions) he nevertheless sees 
some dangers in co-opting existing institutions directly into development work. First because they 
can have 'some socio-economic or anti-modern biases' and secondly because their legitimacy may 
be compromised through loss of independence of action. Where this is the case, he advocates 
cooperation: working with and building on them but not through them. This naturally implies the 
need for some other 'catalyst' to promote change, which might be individual facilitators or 
'alterative membership organisations' exclusive to certain disadvantaged social groups (poor 
tenants, women etc. ) Several of the successful organisations examined by Coombs followed this 
model. 
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He also confirms the need for local efforts to be integrated in wider institutional and administrative 
systems, advocating 'horizontal and vertical linkages' to 'higher level bodies in the same 
organisation' as well as with other organisations at the same level. This has implications for 
decentralisation: 'Local institutional development involves not just local people learning... but... 
with each gain in local institutional development, there should be some changes in the way in 
which work is planned and carried out at virtually all levels, from the individual up to international 
institutions. ' (1986: 215-220). This message was taken up by the World Bank, when it 
simultaneously reviewed its institutional development practice and its own internal practice and 
culture (Stevens and Gnanaselvam, 1995) and by NGOs such as Oxfam. (Eade, 1997: 195-202) 
Uphoff summarises his conception of best practice for institutional development when he advises 
that 'agencies need to make their contributions additive rather than substitutive or possibly 
subtractive' (1986: 234). 
Classic examples of subtractive interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa had already been described 
by Morss, notably the case of Malawi (Morss 1984: 266-268), which in 1981 'was "benefiting" 
from 188 projects supported by 50 different donors'. Not having the capacity to manage such a 
large number of projects (including the burdensome task of carrying out monitoring and evaluation 
tasks 'tailored to serve the reporting requirements of donors') 'Malawi allows expatriates to take 
line positions in government at all levels. ' The consequence (also observed by this author more 
than a decade later) was that instead of building their own capacity and information systems the 
Malawian public administration was 'diverted... from attempting to determine their own policies 
to simply trying to please their donors'. 4 
In the meantime, Western ideology had moved on to a neo-liberal agenda, which challenged the 
leadership role of the state, not just its inhibiting bureaucratic culture, and promoted privatisation 
and the shrinking of state institutions. Institutional "reform", consisting mainly in reducing 
government personnel and privatising all but core activities, went hand in hand with economic 
"reform" to replace state leadership with "market forces". However, since the overwhelming 
majority of public employees in poor countries work in the public services such as education and 
° This was also a case of'recipient agenda' see 3.4. The emasculation of the administration maintained 
Banda's dictatorial rule. 
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health, which (in the light of the general poverty of the population) are not capable of yielding 
profits or even any significant "cost recovery", the solution on the part of donors was to promote 
social provisions by non-governmental organisations to which funds were channelled on a project 
basis. For many such organisations working at a community level and disillusioned with 
bureaucratic and corrupt government rural development agencies, this seemed like an attractive 
option that gave them the freedom to promote grass roots development at the micro level, free 
from the constraints of trying to work with government. However, in embracing this new 
dispensation, they turned away from several of the "lessons learned" by earlier practitioners 
(Coombs, Korten and Uphoff). They not only ignored the state institutions but also favoured 
'creating' grass-roots organisations without reference to (or even challenging) existing local 
institutions and culture. As we have seen, this lack of integration was unlikely to produce 
sustainable development especially when combined with the donor's continuing funding and 
evaluation culture of pre-planned, fixed-term projects. 
Two case studies described by Howes illustrate the problems inherent in the way this new 
generation of projects was being run. The ACCORD project in Uganda (1997a) was 'an attempt to 
introduce new institutions (credit groups) into a highly volatile environment... in the... aftermath of 
the regimes headed by Idi Amin and Milton Obote. As he describes it, it was an example of a 
substitutive strategy based on an externally formulated blueprint to 'nurture local capacities... 
through fostering the growth of new types of organisation... designed with "poor" and "middle" 
peasants in mind' (though apparently not consulted). The 'chronically weak' state was seen as 
'leaving ample scope for other agencies to mount initiatives of their own' and the emerging local 
institutions, the Resistance Councils, were ignored in setting up the project. as were 'questions of 
economic viability'. The project management also lacked understanding of the social environment 
so that the groups they had targeted did not end up being the main beneficiaries. Howes concludes 
that they 'were ultimately constrained to act... as they did by the requirements of the donors who 
were supporting them. ' That is, by the prevailing culture of pre-planned and timetabled projects. 
In the Kenyan case study of institutional development of membership organisations, similar 
contradictions occurred: 'things worked well, where they happened to cohere with an established 
institution' but this was not part of the original strategy. Participation was limited to a superficial 
PRA (participatory rural appraisal) exercise, in fact 'diverting attention away from difficult 
underlying issues'. 'The case illustrates the problems inherent in attempting to graft institutional 
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development on to a programme which continues... to operate in a conventional funding-and - 
training and technology transfer mode'. (Howes 1997b: 844-845). 
Pratten describes a much happier experience in Ethiopia, where an emergency seed distribution to 
peasants was carried out through existing local institutions, the Kire. Nevertheless, this project was 
not immune to the prevailing project culture of deciding for rather than with its intended 
beneficiaries in the interest of budget control. The project selected and purchased the seed for 
distribution until it was discovered that, because it was not suitable for local conditions, '89 per 
cent of households had exchanged some or all of their seed for locally appropriate varieties' and it 
was concluded that future programmes 'should be based on cash payments to enable farmers to 
purchase seed varieties most suitable for their own areas. ' (1997: 148-149). 
The donor emphasis on creating, and /or promoting organisations that could serve their purpose in 
delivering social services in substitution of state run services came to be justified in the name of 
strengthening civil society but, as we have seen above (1.1.4), only those organisations that were 
able and willing to fulfil donor criteria were included within that definition. This gave further 
encouragement to ignore the lessons for integration and building on existing institutions, with 
predictably unsustainable results. 
Hewitt de Alcantarä (1998: 108) in fact sees both positive and negative ways in which civil society 
is being interpreted in practice, depending on the particular governance agenda that is being 
pursued. On the one hand there is a'reawakening' of civil society 'in the struggle for democracy' 
and 'a process of rethinking the nature of good government... experimenting.. . with new ways to 
collaborate in many areas of common concern' (in a similar way to Coombs' "successful" rural 
development organisations) while in other parts of the 'development establishment... most 
committed to free-market orthodoxy', promotion of civil society has been part of 'an aggresively 
anti-state discourse' based on 'false dichotomies between "the people" and "the state". ' 
By the mid 1990s, the catalogue of institutional development failures had led to reconsideration on 
the part of some donors, of the role to be played by the state. They now recognised that it did have 
to take the lead in creating and regulating policy frameworks so that its actions, and those of other 
actors, could be effective. Voices also began to be raised from the NGO fraternity, warning of the 
'distorting effects of a "patchwork quilt" of different service-providers on the quality and coverage 
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of services', giving 'reason to doubt the efficiency of NGOs in large scale welfare-provision' and 
advocating that NGOs develop constructive relationships with Southern governments'. (Edwards, 
1994: 70). Thus was born the concept of the 'enabling state' (Edwards 1994: 67) as part of the good 
governance agenda and there was a return to institutional development of public administration, 
focussed on decentralisation and local accountability combined with the civil society agenda. This 
represented a return, in principle, to the integrated concept for best practice set out by Coombs, 
Korten, Unhoff and others in the 1980s and once again, in practice, the lessons were ignored or 
applied inconsistently. 
Fuhr (1994: 177-180) describes a World Bank project in Ecuador directed at municipal 
strengthening and institutional reform. The project design failed to apply the principle of 
integration, concentrating its actions for reform at the municipal and national levels, while 
ignoring the intervening provincial level of government that might have influenced the outcome. 
As a result, little 'institutional strengthening' of the type envisaged was achieved as local 
politicians pursued their own agendas. With hindsight he concludes that greater understanding of 
the context and participation in decision-making could have avoided this failure. 
Catlett and Schuftan, (1994) present some more sad lessons from public sector institution building 
in Kenya. Examining in detail the conflicting perceptions and interests of donors, government 
institutions, technical advisors and civil servants involved in institutional development projects, 
they conclude: 'The project approach is clearly not working. ' However, though the logical 
conclusion from their analysis might be that donors should consider how to contribute directly to 
developing this capacity through additive interventions to ongoing systems, the underlying 
assumption is that institutional development has to be instigated from outside and in any case the 
dictates of donor auditing procedures at that time ruled out a strategic approach, so they continued 
to talk in terms of `project design. ' 
However, by this time, a number of major agencies were aware that enormous amounts of effort 
and money had been expended over decades on "institutional development" of public 
administrations and capacity building of personnel and local communities through NGO projects, 
which had resulted in very little improvement in the economic and social conditions of the now 
5 `More than 800 man-years of expatriate assistance' in one year in Malawi. Morss, 1984: 467) 
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called 'developing nations' (Ahmed 1992). They therefore made serious attempts to define 
practical guidelines and working definitions based on lessons learned from that largely negative 
experience. 
Ridker, (1994: 1-6) reviewed the long history of the World Bank's involvement in 'human resource 
development' (HRD) in Sub-Saharan Africa. He found that, TA (technical assistance) is doing 
more to increase dependence... than... to increase local capacity' and 'as long as market incentives 
remain as they are, the inflow of expatriates and outflow of trained Africans is likely to continue'. 
His recommendations to improve the development impact of the Bank's capacity building 
interventions include: periodic and detailed reviews of'all of a country's human resource needs' as 
the basis for planning how 'to improve the situation'; 'the search for more sustained means of 
financing these strategies than... stand-alone projects of limited duration; 'Increased concern for 
balanced, integrated development' of education; 'cost-effective approaches' to meeting the needs 
'of persons unlikely to receive much education through the traditional classroom route' (non- 
formal options); the Bank's own procedures should change and 'consciously promote ownership 
and capacity building. For example, ... refrain from writing reports and studies that should... 
be 
written by domestic personnel. '6 His final recommendation is to take 'assessment, supervision, 
monitoring and evaluation of education and TA projects more seriously... so that the development 
impact of these projects can be assessed' in relation to an 'overall strategy for human resource 
development'. 
Austin, also writing in 1994, reviewed the experience of the ODA and other bi-lateral donors in 
'institutional strengthening projects' and reported the same unsatisfactory outcomes: the majority 
of projects were rated by their evaluators as 'unsuccessful'. He makes a theoretical distinction 
between institutional strengthening (IS) and institutional development (ID). The first 'involves 
seeking to improve the operational efficiency and performance of a given organisational or 
institutional structure' and most donor interventions fall into this category. The second involves 
'asking the prior question... "what sort of organisational framework would be most effective and 
sensible in the particular sector or field? "' Obviously this is less common, since it implies a 
situation in which something is being established for the first time, or, as may be the case after a 
war, re-established in a very new context. However in practical terms the two often co-exist. There 
6 That is, refrain from the 'substitutive' practices decried by Uphoff (op. cit. ) 
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are often advantages in questioning existing arrangements in an ID way before designing IS since 
neither is'an end in itself. (1994: v) 
His check-lists of elements for success and failure derived from examining case studies and donor 
literature, reiterate some familiar themes. Inadequate understanding of the recipient's existing 
capacity, national policy and `the broader environment' by the donor and lack of commitment and 
human or budgetary (i. e. recurrent) resources on the part of the recipient were the common causes 
of failure, all clearly stemming from the fact that objectives had not been mutually agreed as part 
of the initial planning. Projects deemed successful exhibited: 'flexible' planning and 
implementation combined with a 'thorough monitoring system'; 'maximum involvement of the 
intended beneficiaries'; clear objectives agreed with the recipient; and a 'long-term... incremental' 
process approach (1994: 27-32). What are not explicitly defined are the criteria for judging 
'success' other than that these interventions are directed at achieving good governance and as it is 
also clear that all the evaluations were carried out by or for the donors it has to be assumed that it 
was their perspective on this which set the terms by which the projects were judged. 
Moore, (1995: 49-52) in a SIDA Evaluation report a year later, exclaims, 'There is probably no 
other area of development policy where so much money is spent in pursuit of an objective, whose 
very name, as well as content, is subject to such basic and continuing dispute. ' However, his 
analysis reveals that the confusion lies in the rhetoric, since he proceeds to elaborate the same 
catalogue of failures and finds the same answers to 'what aid agencies should best do' with his 'six 
conditions for successful institution building'. He goes on to show how aid agencies wishing to 
fund and/or implement activities on this basis will find that it does seriously challenge their 
'normal mode of operation': the 'blueprint approaches' they adopt for all their disbursements; the 
'logical framework' procedures of'objectives, inputs, outputs and impacts' used to ensure'value for 
money', which create biases 'in favour of short-term results and quantifiable objectives; the fact 
that they choose and pay the expatriate staff, marginalising the institutions' own staff and 
leadership; the demands of their own governments and public for demonstrable results for the 
money spent. 
We can see from this account of the lessons learned by these various donor agencies from their 
(mainly) failed attempts at institution building, that they are essentially those identified a decade 
21 
earlier (by Coombs, Korten, and Uphoff) and Moore, once again points to why it has been so 
difficult for the aid community to actually learn and apply those lessons. 
At the end of the decade, a major NGO, Oxfam, carrying out the same kind of exercise aimed at 
improving practice repeats the same messages: 'true partnership is based on equality'; NGOs can 
contribute positively only if their own relationships are based on mutual trust and two-way 
learning; Northern NGOs should fund the process not direct it'; 'an organisational process can 
only be properly managed and interpreted by people who understand it'; it is more consistent with 
a capacity-building approach to raise financial support for programmes' since the customary two 
year project cycle is inappropriate for a process that may take ten years; funding agents must 
'overcome reluctance' to fund 'core costs' (i. e. recurrent costs). (Eade, 1997: 3,48-49,65-67,201, 
203). In the present decade principles of building on existing capacity and a holistic learning 
approach to capacity development were again reiterated (UNDP and UN quoted by Whyte 
2004: 74). It is clear from such exhortations to adopt these longstanding guidelines for best 
practice in capacity building, so long after they were first discovered, that, however apparently 
acceptable they might be in theory, they are still very far from being universally applied in 
practice. Indeed the well known `subtractive' effects of aid interventions on institution and 
capacity building are also still being noted today: `Aid has often reduced the incentives for the 
state to develop institutional and policy capacity; Indigenous public services have often been 
sidelined by aid interventions; Aid donors may be insufficiently sensitive to current political 
circumstances when intervening to strengthen state capacity'. (Smith, 2005) 
We have to ask, therefore, what inhibits the general adoption of this acknowledged best practice? 
1.3 Barriers to best practice 
Since the consistent failure to apply the lessons learned from practice cannot, after so much 
discussion, be attributed to ignorance, it is necessary to look for other explanations for the 
contradictions that exist between rhetoric (what is advocated) and practice (what is actually done). 
1.3.1 Lack of competence or lack of will? 
Has there been a failure to transfer the necessary expertise to those working in the field? It was 
observed as early as 1992, that those attempting to apply Chamber's `farmer-first' approach, 
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(1983) were failing to promote real participation, reducing practice to'either populist activities' or 
'manipulative endeavours which... put the words of "outsiders" into farmers' mouths' (Villarel 
quoted by Rebien, 1996: 149). In other words, using the rhetoric of participation, without giving it 
time and space to happen. The accounts of similar failings in public administration projects, 
already discussed in section 2, also leave no doubt that aid personnel were not competent in 
applying appropriate methodologies. As recently as 2001 Barakat and Deely (2001: 63) observed a 
lack of competence amongst aid personnel in the methodology of creating conditions for the kind 
of participation and ownership by recipients that is advocated. So lack of competence is certainly 
evident; the question is why, when successful examples of development practice based on Korten's 
'learning process approach' have been recorded and discussed over several decades? The expertise 
was available to be learnt and has been successfully applied by some, but for some reason has not 
been generally adopted. Barakat and Deely, repeating Coombs' observation in 1980, suggest that 
'Political will' is an essential prerequisite. When other more pressing considerations contradict the 
requirements of effective development, that will may be lacking. 
1.3.2 Budgets and accountability 
As discussed above, Korten (1980) identified the prevailing organisational culture of the donors, in 
which financial accountability is tied to the management of short, fixed-term budgets by means of 
measurable indicators of expenditure, as a significant barrier to good practice. The fact that the 
same management culture is just as evident two decades later (Cracknell, 2000: 180-193) despite 
clear evidence of its negative effects on development, is due to the dictates of accountability to 
international and national financial institutions and to taxpayers in wealthy countries. Morally, or 
even in many cases contractually, implementation agencies are accountable to the "beneficiaries" 
for the outcomes of their interventions, but in practice the accounting conditions of the donors and 
their budgetary calendars take precedence. Management is therefore geared to monitoring 
financial probity (that the money has been spent honestly on the resources and activities for which 
it was allocated) and timely disbursement or 'moving the money', rather than the more difficult 
task of measuring the effective use of financial resources through social impact evaluation (that is 
whether the money, however accountably spent, actually achieved any lasting beneficial result for 
the recipients). (Cracknell, op. cit.: 189) 
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1.3.3 Donor conditionality 
Conditions on the transfer of resources from a donor or lending agency to a recipient government 
or institution have always been explicitly or implicitly included in the negotiation of aid. They 
include the explicit contractual arrangements for auditing and monitoring the probity and 
efficiency in the disbursement and application of resources for mutually agreed purposes, within a 
set time frame. The contradictions between these mechanisms and the aspirations of best practice 
have already been discussed above and in section 2. We have also seen how'Donors have always 
used political criteria to govern decisions on aid allocations' (Robinson, 1994: 46) though they 
were often implicit rather than explicit in the process. It is the imposition of this type of condition 
that has come to be referred to as conditionality sometimes clarified as political conditionality. 
The Cold War coincided with the main period of decolonisation of Asia and Africa as European 
powers devastated by the second world war, sought to divest themselves of the cost of empire, 
while at the same time seeking to maintain advantageous trade relations with their former colonies. 
This agenda was an implicit or explicit condition wherever independence was negotiated. It was 
traded for continuing "development assistance" which, in turn, included the institutional 
development and capacity building directed at governments, described above. 
The Cold War confrontation added another dimension of political conditionality in which the 
governments of emerging nations could be required to trade ideological allegiance and/or strategic 
resources for military and economic support, which in turn often enabled them to pursue their own 
regional and internal agendas. However, since there were two rival super-powers at this time, new 
governments and liberation movements could often trade their allegiance or even non-alignment to 
some advantage, initially. ' 
However, although recipient partners have had some scope (by exploiting the strategic interests 
and rivalries of the donors) to impose counter conditions (either contractual or implicit) the 
inequality of the negotiating partners in this kind of deal (as compared to trade deals between 
nations of comparable wealth or strategic advantage) has meant that conditions have fallen most 
heavily on the recipients of "development assistance" whose bargaining stance has tended to be 
7 Mozambique, for example, received aid from Western and Socialist countries in roughly equal measure in 
the early years after independence (Hanlon, 1991: 56). 
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one of defending what they can of their own agenda while conforming if possible, more to the 
letter (rhetoric) than the substance of the donor's demands. In this way, donors have in most cases 
made it clear to those seeking aid, what political stance or economic orientation will be required 
for their bid to be successful and impoverished governments (or communities) seeking aid 
commonly make funding bids, which incorporate donor criteria in some mitigated form. $ 
However, the imposition of explicit political and economic conditions has only become prevalent 
since the end of the cold war and with it the use of the term conditionality. This results from loss 
of bargaining power by recipient nations that can no longer play one power bloc against the other. 
It is now general practice, either by a `positive approach' of rewarding compliant countries with 
aid or the punitive one of suspending or terminating aid, to require political and economic `reform' 
explicitly as a condition of aid. (Robinson, 1994: 46-48). However, these explicit conditions can be 
implicitly waived, when the donor power's strategic interests are at stake. 9 In these cases, a stable 
but undemocratic regime may be supported in contradiction of the 'good governance' agenda, and 
development objectives generally take second place, as they do to financial accounting. 
The actual emergence of the term conditionality to describe and recognise the practice of imposing 
a particular political or economic agenda as a condition for the transfer of aid resources, marks a 
polarisation in attitudes to this longstanding reality of international relations. On the one hand it is 
used pejoratively to condemn the proven negative effects this kind of deal, especially on the poor, 
as in structural adjustment (Archer, 1994: 12) and in the invasion of sovereignty condemned by the 
OAU Heads of State and a group of Commonwealth leaders (Robinson, 1994: 49). On the other 
hand it is set out as a legitimate means for promoting various "good" ends (governance, 
democracy, market economies, poverty alleviation, human rights etc. ) 
For example, the INTRAC discussion groups at the workshop where Robinson's paper was 
presented (Clayton, 1994: 121-127) did not advocate condemning all forms of conditionality as a 
matter of principle. They saw it as a legitimate instrument for promoting change, provided it was'a 
8 The Mozambican government, for example, faced with economic collapse at the height of the civil war, 
pre-empted the imminent imposition of terms by the IMF by announcing its own structural adjustment plan, 
which, while conceding much of what the IMF wanted, included greater safeguards for social programmes 
and resisted privatisation of state industry (Hanlon, 1991: 118-121). 
9 As recently in the resumption of aid to the military government of Pakistan by the United States. 
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more focussed conditionality concerned with benefiting the poor'. The 'problem of asymmetry in 
power relations' in which 'the poor lack power to impose their conditions' was seen as a 
contradiction, since it would basically fall to the aid giver to impose and enforce conditions on 
behalf of the poor. However, this was not seen as an insurmountable obstacle provided 'Northern 
NGOs' had `a strong Southern NGO sector to guide their actions in imposing conditionality'. They 
were apparently unconscious of the cultural conditionality of insisting on non-indigenous (and 
therefore, non-institutionalised) forms of civil organisation to channel the demands of the "the 
poor" to the donors. 
Edwards examining the experience of SCF UK in working with public service programmes of 
Southern governments acknowledges the responsibility and therefore accountability of the state to 
its citizens, compared to the non-accountability of NGOs, but nevertheless believes that the role of 
an international NGO should be to strengthen the state by working both 'from above' in technical 
assistance to the civil service and 'from below' with 'grassroots pressure allied to indigenous NGOs 
and movements' 'to support existing policies' but also 'to influence the direction of government 
policy' and promote a state which is 'accountable, democratic, empowering and technically and 
financially efficient'. So even this careful attempt to avoid the worst pitfalls of conditionality and 
to support genuine capacity building, turns out to be, at least implicitly, prescriptive. (Edwards, 
1994; 65-71) 
It is clear from these discussions that conditionality agendas, even those that purport to be of the 
"people" are externally driven and therefore at odds with the aspirations, customs etc, of 
significant stakeholders in the receipt and management of the aid resources. As such they also 
contradict the main principles of best practice for institutional development and capacity building 
discussed above and must lead us to consider whether this common scenario may not be a major 
factor contributing to the "failure" of institutional development and capacity building 
interventions. It is clear from Edward's experience that the providers of assistance for recovering 
the institutional capacity of devastated countries, despite awareness of this problem, cannot help 
but bring their own agendas to the situation: 'conditionality, it seems, is a fact of life' (Edwards, 
1994: 84). So the real problem is still the lack of bargaining space accorded to the recipients, and 
the consequent weakness of their challenge to such donor agendas. Hanlon (1991,58) examining 
the case of Mozambique, shows how 'So long as (it) paid its bills, it could... set the terms' on 
which it accepted aid because'it could say no... when it faced famine, it had to accept donor terms'. 
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As Hewitt de Alcantarä points out, 'An enormous effort to understand and involve local people is 
required... to avoid imposing inadequate models of institutional reform on prostrate countries. The 
international community rarely has the capacity to make the effort'. (1998: 110). 'It requires time, 
resources, in-depth analysis and, critically, an acceptance that the solutions international agencies 
have in mind are not necessarily what the community will need or want. ' (Barakat and Deely, 
2001: 66) 
1.3.4 Recipient agendas 
As suggested above, the fact that the agendas of recipient stakeholders are disregarded or 
explicitly overruled in the negotiation of aid may also contribute to "failures" of institutional 
development and capacity building interventions precisely because those indigenous agendas are 
not abandoned but pursued within the donor conditionality. 
One way in which this happens is through the persistence of non-formal institutions within 
externally created administrative and political systems, as for example in Robinson's `clearest 
example of success' (1994: 48) in which Kenya was induced to legalise opposition parties and hold 
elections in order to prevent the withdrawal of one billion dollars of aid but nevertheless, the 
recipient elite was still able to manage this semblance of change to maintain themselves in power 
for some more years. 
The INTRAC discussion groups quoted above, concluded that `A problem with aid being made 
conditional on good government is that... Elections may lead to a change of government without 
any improvement in the position... of vulnerable groups, and may even mask non-democratic 
processes and institutions' (Clayton, 1994: 117). In other words, promoting structural 
(organisational) change does not necessarily severely challenge well-established institutions. 
Chabal and Daloz graphically illustrate this phenomenon in relation to Africa, where they 
'conclude that, in most African countries, the state is no more than a decor, a pseudo-Western 
facade masking the realities of deeply personalised political relations' (1999: 16). They go on to 
demonstrate how behind that facade powerful traditional institutions of patronage remain 
unchanged and the'exercise of power rests firmly on commonly recognised and mutually accepted 
terms' which include the 'obligation of personalised and vertical redistribution' of resources 'the 
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imperative of... gift giving', so that `even the lowliest client can expect' (and demand) ' to benefit 
from his affiliation to a patron'. In this way, the wealthy elite, however great the gap in lifestyles, 
can never be dissociated from their supporters and in that sense are seen to represent their 
interests. The relationship between patron and client is always reciprocal, if unequal because the 
leader's prestige and power depends on the number of his clients and they in their turn feel a 
collective prestige in their association with a powerful and wealthy patron. (1999: 37-43). 
It is clear, that where such 'rule based' institutions (see 1.1.1 above) dominate people's perceptions 
of the nature of governance, attempts to empower "the poor" on a class basis in confrontation with 
the elites, will make little sense to them unless by casting the foreign or national NGO in the role 
of alternative patron, with all the expectations that implies to deliver personal benefits in exchange 
for support. Similarly, attempts to improve the quality of government by eliminating entrenched 
"corrupt" practices will fail unless the social imperative to continue distributing material benefits 
and career chances to relatives and supporters is understood and addressed. 
The second way in which we have seen that impoverished governments, institutions and 
communities pursue their needs under the constraints of donor conditions is that of outward 
conformity and minimal compliance as the price for access to resources or influence that can be 
used to support the recipient's own agenda. For example, access to financial resources is clearly a 
high priority for impoverished governments and individuals, who may therefore accept (in their 
view unnecessary) capacity building packages for the sake of the financial resources that 
accompany them. 1° Some of the more common agendas pursued by those seeking aid are 
examined below. 
Cash and resources 
The most common imperative leading governments, institutions and communities to seek aid is 
poverty. However, that poverty is rarely an absolute lack of assets but rather of financial resources 
to exploit or recover (in the aftermath of disaster and war) their (often very rich) existing assets of 
land, population, natural resources and strategic geography. They therefore approach the 
negotiations with the aim of obtaining as much financial aid as possible, while conceding as little 
10 As in the case of SCF and the Mozambican Ministry of Health (Edwards, 1994: 82) 
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as possible of their control over their assets and the management of their affairs. Their more 
powerful bargaining partners, as we have seen, have the opposite agenda of attempting to use the 
leverage of financial assistance to effect radical economic and political change and/or secure 
access to the recipient's resources. While both parties base their approach on an assessment of the 
other's basic interests, because of the inequality between the parties, those seeking aid are obliged 
to go furthest in meeting the other's agenda to reach agreement and receive assistance. This means 
that the assistance received is often not of the kind and quality they require, but is better than 
nothing. 
For example: governments accept assistance in kind (food aid, medicines etc. ) to obtain vital 
humanitarian supplies, knowing that with the equivalent value (or less) in cash they could obtain 
or produce more appropriate means themselves with the added advantage of providing local 
employment. The same pressures affect institutional development and capacity building 
assistance. As we saw from Fitzbein's analysis (1.1.2 above), institutions require not only capable 
personnel but the material means to reward them and to support their work. This is what 
impoverished governments are looking for: the means to keep their personnel working, while 
developing their effectiveness. However, the majority of donors impose a strict rule that they will 
not support the recurrent costs of public services, especially staff salaries (they are often keen to 
reduce the number of public employees), but they are prepared to pay for capacity building 
projects "coordinated" by foreign technical personnel (whose large salaries they are prepared to 
pay). These are accepted in order to obtain the accompanying cash to support existing services, 
obtain useful equipment, supplement the inadequate staff salaries in the form of "expenses" and 
fees and obtain some technical training, which can, it is hoped, be adapted to their staff needs. 
Ridker in his candid review of largely unsuccessful World Bank excursions into "human resource 
development" notes that 'expatriates are often hired to serve operating as well as advisory and 
training functions... when locals with comparable skills are available. ' Amongst the'non-economic' 
reasons for this is the 'donors' interest in having one of "their" people in the field... and 
governments accept them because of their desire for other parts of the package. ' (1994: 38) A 
related tactic is what Cracknell calls 'fungibility. ' A public institution negotiates an aid package to 
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fund an activity that coincides with the donor's agenda in order to release its own funds for 
activities that the donor will not fund. (2000: 189). 11 
Those needing funds for community, family or individual needs have also learnt how to exploit 
donor agendas. Chabal and Daloz (1999: 22-23) note that their research into the proliferation of 
"local" NGOs 'suggests that this expansion is less the outcome of the increasing political weight 
of civil society than the very pragmatic realisation that resources are now largely channelled 
through NGOs' and similarly, 'The use of NGO resources' for patronage purposes 'can serve the 
strategic interests of the classical entrepreneurial Big Man just as well as access to state coffers did 
in the past'. While Chabal and Daloz show that different perceptions exist as to the point at which 
patronage is deemed corrupt and therefore criminal, there is no doubt that criminal aims are also 
pursued by exploiting situations created by donor conditionality. Hewitt de Alcantarä (1998: 112) 
cites the example of Latin America, where 'round after round' of institutional reform of public 
administration, and bypassing the state to channel resources to NGOs has seriously weakened the 
state's ability to govern and 'Powerful drug syndicates are gaining greater control of economic and 
political life. ' 
We can summarise this agenda as the "cash and resources" agenda. It can be pursued for public 
benefit, to obtain resources to defend services and development programmes within a hostile 
economic conditionality, or for personal and clientele benefit to support private or collective aims 
within a donor agenda. 
Recognition and legitimacy 
As discussed above, aid is frequently sought by new governments or those seeking to represent 
countries or communities affected by economic disaster or war. Very often, in these 
circumstances, the political and social movements that emerge to claim the leadership of 
impoverished peoples or to fight for their "liberation" are in contention with or replace a regime 
11 In the author's own experience of working for the Ministry of Education in Mozambique during the 
economic crisis in the 1980s, the overriding need was to cover recurrent costs to keep the service running, 
but since most donor support came in the form of "projects" rather than routine budget support, civil 
servants developed a high level of skill in presenting regular activities as projects to address current donor 
concerns (gender, trauma etc. ) and accepted that "technical assistance" would be part of the deal, whether it 
was actually required or not. 
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which has until then been recognised as the legitimate power or representative of those people by 
the international community. In such cases, an immediate priority of the new leadership or the 
community seeking to secede is to obtain that recognition for themselves. In this case they may be 
prepared to accept a less than satisfactory aid package in respect of resources and attendant 
political and economic conditions, as the price to pay to obtain that legitimacy as a "responsible" 
government or representative organisation. This is then the "recognition and legitimacy" agenda. 
For example a ruler who has taken power by military means, may promise a 'phased return to 
democratic rule'. Recent examples of this scenario are Nigeria and Pakistan. Other concessions 
may be economic, as in the case of Mozambique, which was forced to join the IMF and accept 
structural reform as a pre-condition of bi-lateral donor aid (Hanlon, 1991: 113). 
Power by association 
Another important concern for governments under political and economic threat from powerful 
neighbours or internal conflict, is that of protection. A common tactic in the Cold War/ 
decolonisation era was to seek an association with one or other of the main powers as a means of 
defence in a regional conflict. In that era, the most dramatic example of defence against external 
threat by "power of association" was Cuba, when it allied itself with the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe, and provoked the economic blockade by the United States. In this instance the overriding 
priority was the defence of sovereignty, for which a high economic price had to be paid. In Africa, 
we can look at the superpower support for rival movements in Angola, where ideological 
allegiance bought military hardware, or the cases of dictators such as Mengistu in Ethiopia or 
Banda in Malawi who, by allying themselves with Soviet ideology and Western donor agendas, 
respectively, were maintained in power long after they had lost all credibility with their own 
people. This "power by association" agenda is still pursued post cold war, particularly in the 
Middle East, where several regimes are protected by association with the remaining super power, 
the United States. 12 
So when threatened, devastated and/or impoverished peoples and governments negotiate the 
receipt of aid from richer and more powerful nations or international financial institutions the 
12 The oil-rich feudal regimes in Kuwait (protected against annexation by Iraq) and Saudi Arabia (bolstered 
against internal dissent) as well as the State of Israel, whose existence and survival are guaranteed by 
economic and military assistance. 
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urgency with which they view one or more of these agendas, may lead them to accept conditions 
from the donors that contradict or have no relation to how they wish to run their affairs. These 
contradictions that were not acknowledged in the negotiations, inevitably resurface at the 
implementation stage. Programmes for institutional development and capacity building, which are 
specifically designed to change the way things are done, will naturally be particularly vulnerable 
to the resulting confusions of purpose. 
1.4 Conclusions 
Despite the apparent confusion over the terms used to describe the development of the capacity of 
social institutions there now appears to be a rhetorical consensus amongst practitioners and 
implementing agencies of what they ought to be doing. That is, building on existing capacity and 
allowing time for indigenous solutions to emerge. These aspirations have also been vindicated by a 
significant, if minority, body of successful practice. The sum of what we have learned from 
development practitioners and from academic theory is that 'successful programs' to develop 
institutional and individual capacity 'were not "designed and implemented". They and the 
organisations that sustained them "evolved and grew". ' (Konen, 1980: 501) This is because 
institutions can only be created by those they are to serve and are a product of negotiation between 
different stakeholders. Thus, the fundamental lesson learned from half a century of institutional 
development and capacity building is that it can only proceed from understanding the nature of the 
society it hopes to serve, because it must build on existing capacity and take account of existing 
institutions, whether formal or informal. In particular, those rebuilding their society need to 
critically examine themselves before they can usefully accept the assistance of others. 
However, in spite of the evolution of this body of theory and proven practice, the perception is that 
most capacity building and institutional development activities have failed to meet these criteria. 
There is a constant "mantra" of "no blue-prints, no deadlines" and yet these are everywhere 
apparent: all major donors talk of programme support, while funding implementing NGOs on a 
project basis. In this regard, we have seen that a number of other financial, strategic and political 
interests of both donors and recipients constitute barriers to the adoption of what is known to be 
best practice for development. In particular, there are strong pressures for short-term and 
externally pre-determined strategies to be imposed by donors due to the asymmetrical relationship 
of power between donors and recipients. The recipient institutions, as we have seen continue to 
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pursue their own agendas within the constraints of donor conditionality and eventually grow up 
and transform themselves within whatever structures are imposed from outside. 
As Whyte (2004: 9-11) suggests, `donors have paid relatively little attention' to evaluating capacity 
building interventions, largely because it is a `long-term process that is not easily attributed to one 
intervention, ' but it still `lies at the heart of what most donor agencies do' and determines how 
they define their mission and programmes. A striking aspect of the discourse is that though donors 
talk in terms of building on existing capacity, the role of recipients in developing their own 
capacity or their evaluation of capacity building assistance has hardly been considered. This 
imbalance stems from the fact that recipient institutions and governments have rarely researched it 
themselves, since they lack the time, money and personnel to do so independently. Thus, the 
literature discussed in this chapter has been generated directly or indirectly by the donor 
governments and international financial institutions, because evaluations of programmes, even if 
they are "participatory, " are commissioned by the donors. They define the criteria for judging 
success and it is hardly in the interests of the recipient evaluators to present dissenting opinions. 
These issues are examined in Chapter 3. 
Finally, it is clear from the forgoing analysis that the involvement of donors and their agents in 
managing and directing the affairs of nations, institutions and communities, increases in direct 
proportion to their vulnerability. At the extreme are those states and administrations that are 
deemed to have become totally dysfunctional, usually as a result of war allied to underlying 
problems of poverty, social inequality and /or discrimination. It is in these contexts that the 
barriers to best development practice are most evident and most challenging to those who strive to 
deliver assistance on the basis of an understanding of capacity building and institutional 
development as key processes for the consolidation and evolution of stable governance and civil 
participation. The following chapter, therefore, examines current attitudes and approaches to 
recovering and building the capacity of war-torn societies. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT: 
EXPERIENCES OF WAR-TORN SOCIETIES 
Introduction 
As we have seen, the international aid community has largely failed to meet the development needs 
of poor nations and communities. In the last quarter of the 20th century their poverty has grown, not 
diminished, and has been exacerbated more and more frequently by violent conflict and war, often 
itself a product of the lack of equitable development. ' The operational reasons for the failure to 
address development needs appropriately, as we have seen, seem to be well understood, but this has 
had little impact for change. In this chapter, we look at how institutional development and capacity 
building are being attempted in already poor countries devastated by war. 
Summarising the lessons learned from the War Torn Societies Project (WSP), Stiefel (1999: 15) 
states, 'The challenge of rebuilding after war is essentially a development challenge in the special 
circumstances of a war-tom society. ' What this statement emphasises is not a qualitative difference 
between war-tom societies and other impoverished nations, but one of degree. The development 
needs are the same and need to be tackled using the same `learning process' approach discussed in 
Chapter 1. The circumstances of a war-torn society are only 'special' compared to those of countries 
devastated and impoverished by economic crisis or natural disasters, in one key aspect: the extent of 
the damage done to social relations by the violence and therefore the fragility and fragmentation of 
its institutions, from the family, the organisation of local communities to the institutions of 
government. One immediately obvious aspect of the breakdown of organised activities is of course 
the fact that transfer of knowledge and organisational culture (informal and formal education) 
between the generations has broken down, leaving a human resource deficit. The other less tangible 
but more significant aspect is the breakdown of trust in human relations and confidence in planning 
for the future. However, it is never the case that no social institutions or capacities survive, though 
often it is the rule-based informal institutions that are the strongest, while the organisational 
1 The early 1980s witnessed the largest number of civil wars in history. There were also more conflict 
terminations during this period; 56 conflicts ended between 1989-2000, 'pointing to a critical mass of post- 
war situations' (Mac Ginty, 2003: 602). 
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structures they once inhabited may indeed have broken down. Nor is it the case that social 
institutions, human capacity and trust in the future are not undermined by other circumstances than 
war. The difference between working for development in war-tom countries and merely poor 
countries is not qualitative but rather a matter of the degree of social and physical devastation. As 
Stiefel suggests in his statement above, the lessons learned about best practice for development are 
applicable and indeed even more necessary in post-war recovery. 
However, if we refer again to our observations in Chapter 1, on the effects of asymmetric power 
relations between international agents and nations they seek to assist, we can see that in the case of 
countries devastated by war, where both the economy and state institutions may be deemed to have 
"failed", the imbalance of power is much greater since the capacity to exploit even the small 
bargaining space available to poor nations in their relations with international partners, is eroded. 
The internal authority of governments emerging in post-war societies also tends to be fragile. 
Negotiating an end to violence, making arrangements for participation in governance, even signing 
a detailed peace accord, as in the case of Mozambique, still leaves much work to be done to 
consolidate peace and earn the trust of different constituencies. This means that policy development 
can only proceed at the speed it takes to overcome mistrust and secure the consent of all parties. 
The rules by which this process takes place are also untried, not yet institutionalised. Such 
transitional governments cannot assert national interests with the confidence that comes from a 
secure constituency in their own society. Indeed, it may take some time for a clear vision of what 
the collective national interest is, to emerge. 
The fixed-term pre-planned project culture that (as we have seen) characterises most donor funded 
interventions is therefore particularly unsuited to the circumstances that obtain in a society in 
transition from a way of life dominated by violence and uncertainty to one of purposeful progress in 
conditions of personal security. It allows no space for solutions to evolve as people recover their 
confidence, understand their changed circumstances, identify possible courses of action, and thus 
become able to make choices about what they need in order to pursue their goals. In this apparent 
hiatus of indecision, the donor haste to see recognisable organisations in place restoring "normal" 
life, often marginalises the remaining social assets instead of building on them. 
It is this desire for rapid results that Degu suggests leads to the neglect of education as a crucial 
component of post-war recovery, not only to restore the human capacity deficit described above, 
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but often as a vehicle for conflict resolution. In multi-ethnic societies, failure to meet educational 
needs of disadvantaged groups is frequently one of the causes of conflict 2 Educational reform 
should therefore be `part and parcel of the post-conflict development process' (2005: 130-141). 
However common practice is to ignore the importance of developing a relevant and inclusive 
education system as the foundation for long-term capacity development and concentrate on rapid 
school building in order to see children sitting in classrooms. Meanwhile the generation of young 
adults who missed their general education are offered `skills training' projects, which take no 
account of economic realities or their social context. (Coelho and Vines, 1994) 
Thus, the same contradictions that were identified in development practice, so many decades ago, 
are evident in contemporary practice in post-war reconstruction. The lessons learned by WSP (War- 
torn Societies Project) from its experience of conducting participatory action research in four war- 
torn societies, (Stiefel, 1999: 16-19) have a familiar ring to development practitioners: 'Local 
solutions and responses to rebuilding challenges are often more effective, cheaper and more 
sustainable'; 'Women provide the backbone of survival economies' and 'often... the only social 
safety networks during and after war'; 'the state plays a crucial role and must be strengthened and 
supported'; 'Private sector actors... are among the most dynamic forces.... but they can support 
conflict as well as peace'. Many of the latter are linked to profiteering and criminal activities, but on 
the other hand the development of the informal sector is often an important contribution to 
economic recovery. 
Discussing how operational practice can be reformed, Stiefel (1999: 30-33) draws attention to the 
need for 'in-depth intimate knowledge and understanding of local and national actors, forces and 
dynamics' and for 'far-reaching changes... to administrative rules... and accounting and financial 
procedures' to allow 'flexibility' and 'delegation of authority'. He points to the fact that 'The failure 
of external assistance projects is often due to wrong timing' especially short-termism. He advocates 
'Promoting local or national ownership' that ' goes beyond participation' and 'implies transferring 
control from donors to recipients' and finally advocates that criteria for measuring success should 
look at the 'indirect', social impact of interventions rather than concentrating on cost-efficiency. All 
of these conclusions match the findings of Coombs, Korten and Uphoff in relation to general 
2 Degu discusses cases in Africa, but the case of the Tamils in Sri Lanka or the indigenous populations in 
Latin America also come to mind. 
36 
development practice, discussed in Chapter 1, as did the WSP experience of trying to apply these 
lessons in practice in war-torn countries. 
Like many other development practitioners, WSP itself found that, after four years of working in 
Eritrea, Guatemala, Mozambique and Somalia, it too had failed to fully meet the standards of best 
practice. Understanding was lacking: 'In Mozambique as in Eritrea, it was evident that the internal 
and external actors... had different approaches to the topics to be studied' (Kane, 1999: 31). They 
also had different time frames and objectives. The external actors were still 'too donor driven and 
had not taken enough time to train the researchers' or allow time to 'take account of political and 
human realities on the ground'. While the donor project had a fixed term, with a vague aspiration of 
'starting a process', the internal actors had very specific long-tern objectives such as (in 
Mozambique) the creation of a research institute. 
The WSP is a very recent example of a serious attempt to improve the practice of external 
assistance in the most testing of conditions, that of post-war recovery, and yet it is still tackling, but 
only partly succeeding in addressing, the same failures that have bedevilled development aid over 
several decades. It is clear from the extensive literature of the practitioners added to that of 
academics that the ability to analyse the ingredients for success and failure is not lacking, 
nevertheless, 'At the field level, little has changed in the operational reality of aid. ' (Stiefel, 
1999: 21). 
2.1 Post-war reconstruction: a holistic development process 
Lessons learned from the many experiences of international interventions to assist the recovery of 
war-torn nations, particularly the many intra-state conflicts fuelled by the Cold War or triggered by 
its end in the collapse of the Soviet Union, have been summarised by Barakat (2005a). The key 
message is that, as a development process, post-war reconstruction has to address all aspects of a 
society's recovery simultaneously. This requires that the efforts of diverse actors within the society 
and the international community are coordinated within the framework of a shared national vision. 
As we have learnt from general development practice that vision cannot be imported from outside, 
it needs to evolve through a process of negotiation within the affected society by means of its 
institutions of governance. However, the `special circumstances' of a society emerging from 
prolonged conflict noted by Stiefel, mean that the conditions in which that process can take place 
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have first to be created. Participation of all stakeholders is essential, but there are obstacles to be 
overcome. 
Barakat suggests that experience of reconstruction in many countries following the end of the Cold 
War leads to the conclusion that `long-term recovery is dependent on the existence of effective 
systems of governance. ' This means that the development and implementation of a vision for 
reconstruction must go hand in hand with ensuring `the existence, and as soon as possible, of a 
strong state structure that enjoys `legitimacy' and has the `capability' to deliver the post-conflict 
dividends equitably. ' It is also suggested that to function effectively such a state must not only be 
representative but be able to draw on the collaboration of a diverse and organised civil society. It is 
tempting for donors, international agencies and financial institutions to bypass the necessarily 
incremental and at times frustratingly slow process of developing such `collaborative governance' 
by using their own well established bureaucracies and contracting (usually foreign) private and non- 
governmental organisations to implement reconstruction programs on the ground. However, though 
this may deliver short-term practical results, as it is not aimed at developing the institutional 
capacity of government and civil society to sustain these gains, it has often led to longer-term 
dependency or collapse of services. 
As a first step towards the participation necessary for creating collaborative governance, personal 
security has to be guaranteed and mutual trust restored. Thus it is necessary to restore order, not 
only by effective policing and the restoration of an impartial and protective legal system, but by 
reconciliation that addresses the question of justice both for the initial causes of the conflict and 
crimes committed during its course. Equity and inclusion of all stakeholders are therefore key 
issues for any society emerging from violent conflict, which is so often the result of exclusion of 
particular social groups or regions from full participation in their society. This commonly takes the 
form of unequal distribution of wealth, political power and access to public services such as health 
and education, under manifestly unjust and often repressive regimes. It can also occur, where 
regimes are driven by a strong ideological or religious vision, which excludes the expression of 
alternative ideas or seeks to achieve social and economic equality by means of uniformity that takes 
no account of different needs. 
If these have been the causes of a resort to violence, then it is also clear that the pre-war governance 
did not include satisfactory mechanisms for negotiating solutions to conflicting interests and ideas 
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within the society or that they had broken down under external economic or political pressures. The 
conflict itself, by its resort to violence, will also have further undermined the structural fabric of the 
society: its institutions of civil governance; its formal and informal economic networks that support 
livelihoods; its infrastructure and public services. This is why post-war recovery programmes are 
commonly referred to as reconstruction. It is not possible to merely restore the pre-war conditions. 
They were almost certainly unsatisfactory in some key aspects and in any case they have been 
irretrievably altered. As Stiefel suggests, a development process is required, starting from an 
understanding of the society, as it is when it emerges from war. Thus Barakat too, cites 
`understanding the context' in which reconstruction is to be attempted, as one of his four `key 
tenets' of reconstruction. 
A crucial aspect of that context is almost invariably, the breakdown and distortion of normal 
economic activity, as a result of the violence itself (agriculture and food production are particularly 
vulnerable) and the channelling of resources and labour into economic activities to sustain the war. 
In addition, a prolonged conflict tends to bankrupt legitimate business, which is replaced by 
informal and unregulated trade. This combined with the threat and use of violence creates 
opportunities for enrichment through various forms of illegal profiteering. This is the context for 
`inducing development' which is Barakat's fourth `key tenet' for post-war reconstruction. As with 
the creation of a national vision and collaborative governance, economic recovery is an incremental 
process that has first of all to include all stakeholders in sustaining economic activity. A first 
priority is to the maintenance and restoration of livelihoods and the inclusive distribution of 
economic benefits flowing from the redirection of resources from war to peace. Just as vision and 
the governance to deliver it go hand in hand, so the motivation and capacity to participate in 
dialogue for reconciliation and the restoration of governance is governed by freedom from 
destitution and economic dependence and a belief in the benefits that can flow from the `peace 
dividend'. 
Thus, while it is essential to promote economic growth, that in itself is not sufficient to bring about 
sustainable economic development. In conditions of high unemployment, subsistence activities and 
the decapitalisation of national enterprises, a sudden rush to a liberal market economy exposed to 
global market forces can increase exclusion and poverty. These in turn are likely to destabilise the 
political and social reconstruction processes. President Chissano reflecting on the experience of 
Mozambique at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2004, made a clear connection 
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between capacity to benefit from economic growth, general development and good governance: 
`... where your people are illiterate and none of your citizens even owns a corner shop, I don't see 
how from one day to the next you can take advantage of this market economy. ' Even nations that 
`are called developed today, needed time... for their peoples to master the art of running businesses 
before they could derive any advantage from this... Good governance is also a product of 
development itself which is partly a consequence of time. ' 3 The underlying link in his analysis and 
that of the authors cited above is that reconstruction, as a development process, has to be 
underpinned by strategies to increase human and institutional capacity, which take time to produce 
results. 
As discussed in Chapter 1 development is essentially about developing the capacities of people and 
their institutions to meet their social, economic and political needs. Capacity building is therefore 
seen as the key to the post-war reconstruction process and it is argued that how institutions, 
infrastructure, the economy and public services are reconstructed, is more important for peaceful 
and sustainable development than what is achieved in terms of material and organisational 
transformation. That is, (using Uphoff s terminology) the implementation of reconstruction 
programmes should be `additive' in terms of the capacity of national and local institutions to 
continue to deliver benefits in the future and of the capacity of individuals and local and national 
enterprises to generate wealth. In the uncertain conditions of a transition from war to peace, this 
will dictate an incremental approach to reconstruction rather than a "quick fix" driven by external 
agents. 
It is clear that these ideas are not just part of an academic discourse. They have emerged from the 
interaction between practice and academic study of post-war reconstruction over the past decade 
and have been internalised in the thinking of international operatives and institutions. This why, in 
2002, following the defeat of the Taliban regime, the UN Coordination Office for Afghanistan 
spoke of treading with a `light footprint' in Afghanistan, recognising the need to allow Afghan 
institutions `to assume greater ownership of externally assisted programmes. ' (ITAP 2002: 47). 
Nevertheless, as Barakat (2002: 808) pointed out, this was not the way the international community 
responded in practice. He noted that the programme contained `surprisingly little reference to any 
3 Mozambique News Agency AIM Reports No. 269 3`d February 2004. 
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Afghan institutions, such as government ministries, having any significant role in the sector plans' 
even though as Evans et al (2004) demonstrate, the public administration capacity had survived the 
war and various regime changes to a remarkable degree. Barakat also noted that `The UN's 
characteristic sectoral approach... shows serious evidence of fragmentation and contradiction, 
where... an integrated and holistic approach is needed. ' (op. cit. 809). Importantly, as Suhrke et al 
(2002) point out, the Bonn Agreement that established the current administration, was only a first 
step in a peace process that is still continuing. It is particularly significant that the Taliban are so far 
excluded from any negotiation and military operations against them continue. This contradicts the 
key principle of inclusion as a necessary condition for post-war reconstruction. 4 
The results of this failure to address all the key areas of reconstruction holistically are highlighted in 
the first National Human Development Report after the fall of the Taliban regime, which stresses 
the need for `human security', recognising that the failure to complete the process of negotiating 
and consolidating peace was jeopardising all the other efforts for reconstruction. Referring to 
Barakat's work and to the experience of the international agencies with government, the report 
therefore reaffirms, `Reconstruction must necessarily be a continuous process of negotiation 
between diverse interest groups as well as between them and political actors' and concludes that 
`research does show that certain levels of achievement and improvement in conditions of life - such 
as economic well-being; freedom and choice; stability and social justice; trusted mechanisms of 
open, responsive governance; and the respect of individual and minority rights - do ultimately tend 
to support peace. ' (UNDP 2004: 223-226). 
Nevertheless, the same report reveals a continuing ambivalence in the acceptance of the 
development approach to post-war reconstruction, when it states, `Institutional capacity-building is 
needed, but this is a long-term project. In the short term, the immediate needs of the people include 
human rights, security and jobs, imperatives that cannot wait for the building and strengthening of 
new institutions. ' (UNDP op. cit) Once again a desire to see short term alleviation of the 
consequences of conflict, conditions that Afghans have lived with for decades, is driving the 
international agencies to try to pre-empt the slow and painful process of reconstructing the 
4 Lakhdar Brahimi reflecting on this outcome remarked that the absence of the Taliban 'the main 
protagonists' from the Bonn Conference, though for `very obvious reasons, meant that total victory was... 
handed over to one side which did not deserve it. ' (2004b: 3) 
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underlying fabric of the society, which Afghans have to undertake to guarantee a secure and 
prosperous future. 
2.2. Revisiting the Barriers 
As the above accounts suggest, the same barriers to best practice that hinder effective development 
work in peaceful conditions, affect the work of post-war recovery. If anything, their impact is even 
greater in war-torn contexts. In the first place, development work in a war-tom context such as 
Afghanistan, requires, not only knowledge and understanding of the society involved, but a constant 
awareness of how particular interventions are affecting the consolidation of peace and long-term 
social recovery as well as the delivery of material benefit. Inclusiveness, ownership and 
participation are important in any development programme. In post-war development they are vital 
building blocks for restoring trust and enabling divided communities to live together and any 
perception of exclusion or inequity can be a trigger for a return to violence. At the same time the 
civil and governmental institutions that might ensure equitable development are either lacking or 
seriously weakened or compromised. Working in such an environment requires great sensitivity and 
patience and a high degree of competence in development practice, so there is plenty of room for 
error and no process will proceed without setbacks. 
Lack of Competence ? 
Nevertheless, proven practice does exist in the methodology of creating conditions for the kind of 
participation and ownership advocated by Stiefel. One such example has already been quoted. By 
applying the principles of good development practice in a war-torn context, the International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies was able to identify and support both existing 
health professionals and community leaders in Puntland, Somalia, to restore a public health service 
despite the absence of a functioning central government and in the context of continuing conflict. 
(Barakat and Deely 2001). Once again, we have to conclude that it is not lack of understanding or 
practice that stands in the way of adopting this approach more widely in war-affected contexts. The 
WSP action research project itself set out to do just that and was to a degree successful. However, 
by its own admission it was driven by donor criteria and timeframes to fall short of its own 
standards. 
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Budgets and Accountability 
The fact is that, post-war reconstruction programmes are under even greater pressure from the 
prevailing management culture dominated by budget deadlines and accountability procedures than 
the general development work discussed in Chapter 1. The main reasons for this are, first, the 
perception that war and post-war contexts are `emergencies' and secondly, that in the absence of 
stable conditions of governance there is a heightened risk of financial waste due to corruption 
and/or incompetent management. Both of these perceptions have some basis in fact. 
It is true that incidents of humanitarian emergency are a common feature of war-torn countries. 
However, using the term emergency to describe conditions of war, that have gone on so long that 
they have become a way of life, ignores the fact that for the most part, populations in such countries 
have found ways to survive, if not to prosper. Even in war, capacity for delivering support and 
relief to fellow citizens can also be identified in the war-affected society itself. Instead of being 
ignored in the rush to deliver relief "efficiently", they can be developed so that a permanent 
emergency response capacity is created in the indigenous society. A case in point is the role played 
by UNDP in Mozambique during the most difficult years of the civil war, in strengthening the 
government relief agency's capacity to coordinate powerful, and in some cases unwilling, relief 
agencies in a single strategy (Barnes, 1998). The government's ability to mobilize and manage 
international relief in an emergency, evidenced during the1999 flood disaster, owed a lot to that 
experience during the war. At the local level, as the WSP concluded, immediate coping strategies 
are often headed by women. Barakat and Wardell note that in Afghanistan, women, as well as 
traditionally playing a key role in `brokering peace and in mobilisation (or de-mobilisation)' of 
their menfolk, have also learnt new decision-making roles in fending for their families alone in 
refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran. (2002: 920-921). These are the kind of capacities on which the 
successful development strategies discussed in Chapter 1. were built. However, despite the 
understanding that this development approach is also appropriate in war-torn countries, 
international agents have been reluctant to adopt it. The false sense of urgency remains. Post-war 
reconstruction is perceived as requiring an emergency response, using external means that can be 
rapidly assembled, to restore necessary conditions before development can be tackled. 
This attitude is then reinforced by the second concern, which is for meeting the obligation for 
financial accountability in an environment of perceived high financial risks in unstable post-war 
conditions. Again there is truth in this perception. War economies have always bred corruption, 
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cross-border smuggling and black-marketeering and in the aftermath of war, public administration 
and legal systems that would normally control them, are chronically weak or no longer functioning. 
In these conditions, international operatives themselves are also not necessarily above temptation, 
as post-conflict "chaos" affords ample opportunity for bending the rules or covering up 
incompetence. There is therefore enormous scope for financial mismanagement. However, from the 
development point of view, this is a reason, not for less participation but for strengthening the 
involvement, and therefore control, by the intended beneficiaries, in order to defeat the war 
entrepreneurs and lay the foundations of future civil governance. It is also a reason to change the 
budget culture discussed in Chapter 1: not to reward aid operatives for the efficiency with which 
they "move" large amounts of money within a fixed timeframe but for the longer-term 
effectiveness of their interventions in producing sustained benefits to war-affected communities. 
In fact it is the pressure to spend large amounts of money within a fixed period (rarely more than 
two years and often less) that has led time and again to misspending of financial resources, which 
can range from the merely inappropriate to major corruption. Common examples of the former are, 
purchase of expensive equipment, which cannot be used in the prevailing conditions of uncertain 
power supplies and lack of skilled personnel, funding expensive training courses without ensuring 
that conditions exist to apply the skills acquired in the labour market, and the construction of 
infrastructure such as schools and health centres to meet the needs of expected returning refugees, 
who subsequently choose to settle elsewhere, where they can get work. 5 Meanwhile, the 
incompatibility between the need to spend quickly and the difficulty of deploying resources 
effectively, encourages a slide into petty forms of corruption, such as awarding inflated perks and 
expenses to staff, and facilitates criminal alliances between aid administrators and the corrupt 
national entrepreneurs, who flourish in times of war. 6 
S The author witnessed numerous incidents of this type, occurring within all types of agency (UN, bi-lateral 
donors, NGOs) and their counterpart institutions, during and after the civil war in Mozambique. Observing 
this waste aroused strong feelings of resentment amongst national public servants, and poor communities, 
especially when supplying their low-cost resource needs was often deemed not to be `cost-effective' in 
relation to project overheads. The experience is not unique, as others working in the field around the world 
can testify. 
6 Two such major corruption scandals are being investigated at the present time in respect of Iraq: the UN Oil 
for Food Programme by an independent committee of enquiry headed by Paul Volcker (Nile Gardiner April 
13`s 2005 www. heritage. org/Research); the financial management and the awarding of contracts by the 
Coalition Provisional Authority by US Auditors (Larry Margasak www. truthout. org January 30th 2005 and 
Griff White www. washinptoni)ost. com March 15th 2005) 
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Donor conditionality 
These problems are even more evident at the macro-economic level where large amounts of finance 
are pledged in the initial post-war period by the international community, at a time when the 
recipient nation's capacity to use it usefully is at its weakest. Faced with the fragility of post-war 
institutions of government, the United Nations agencies, the international financial institutions and 
bi-lateral donor agencies, charged with disbursing this finance, have increasingly pursued a policy 
not just of conditionality but of direct intervention, involving themselves in the day to day 
administration of a country, by substituting the role of government at the central level (as recently 
in Kosovo and East Timor) or through "technical assistance" strategically placed in key institutions 
in order to promote good governance. Similarly, NGOs, now increasingly sub-contracted by the 
donor and UN agencies, have justified setting up and running new organisations to deliver 
humanitarian and development assistance to "the poor" on the grounds that there are no local 
institutions with the capacity (or right attitudes! ) to do it. 
This is clearly contrary to the way in which development agencies now believe they should operate. 
If it is difficult to avoid imposing external solutions that undermine capacity, within aid 
partnerships between functioning governments and donors, how can it be avoided in the case of 
emergent institutions in a post-war society that is being virtually run by a consortium of donors and 
financial institutions, in a transition to "democratic rule"? The scenario is remarkably similar to the 
decolonisation formula discussed above (Chapter 1.2) and of course, where institutions are deemed 
to have failed, it involves institutional development, or where a government is considered more or 
less functional, institutional strengthening along the lines of Austin's definition (Austin, 1994). 
Meanwhile, civil society, whose institutions have often ceased to function as a result of war, or 
been replaced by informal, criminal or paramilitary forms of organisation, is often promoted by the 
creation of "local NGOs" in the manner criticised by Kasfir (1998). 
2.2.1 Recognising the problem, still looking for the solution 
Experienced development agencies such as UNDP and leading INGOs are fully aware that this 
contradicts what they have learnt about development best practice, but see it as a necessary 
transitional phase from relief to development in war-torn contexts. They are facing a real dilemma 
and seek to explore ways of reconciling the need to take charge of situations where the collapse of 
civil rule is causing prolonged suffering with the need to restore and develop the capacity for civil 
governance in post-war societies. We can best understand how difficult this process is by 
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examining some examples of how prominent development agencies are trying to resolve this 
dilemma by adapting their operational practice and institutional arrangements. 
Substitution or partnership? 
The practice of direct intervention for war-torn countries under the auspices of the UN has 
prompted the UN's development agency, UNDP to review its practice in the light of the 
contradictions it perceives between its traditional role as a development partner of governments and 
civil society organisations and the "substitutive" role it finds itself playing in post-conflict contexts. 
For example, in the Transition Recovery Programme in Eritrea, UNDP was working by `Direct 
Execution' of programmes largely funded by donors and managed through an interagency steering 
committee with subcontracting of implementation mainly to large INGOs. A mid-term review 
(Mengistu et al 2002) identified four gaps in performance that seriously compromised the 
development impact of the programme. First a communication gap between the well integrated 
policy-making steering committee liaising with central government and those implementing the 
programme on the ground. Second, a lack of horizontal coordination at the implementation level, in 
particular the INGOs were not involved or directed in any way to ensure the development of local 
government capacity to take over and sustain public services after the end of the Transition 
Programme. The third major gap has already been mentioned as inherent in all post-conflict 
contexts: the lack of formally constituted and operational civil society institutions, led the INGOS to 
replicate the `direct execution' at the local level and not attempt a capacity-building role. The final 
gap was that there was very little sharing of knowledge and skills (communication of best practice 
for example) within the aid community. Thus a UN development agency found itself presiding over 
a programme that contradicted many of the main tenets of development practice (horizontal and 
vertical integration, the central role of capacity building etc. ) because post-war conditions imposed 
constraints for which it had not found an appropriate institutional response. 
As part of a consultative process to explore ways of tackling these contradictions, in 2002 UNDP's 
Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery, in conjunction with other UNDP bureaus involved in 
post-conflict work, organised a workshop in Nairobi with their country office staff and national 
NGO partners from fourteen war-torn countries in Africa. The details of this encounter are 
discussed in Barakat and Chard (2005), but the key conclusions of the participants (both NGO and 
UNDP country office staff) reinforce the case for institutional change on the part of international 
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agencies and their INGO partners in order to address the capacity building needs of emerging 
national civil society organisations (CSOs). 7 
The participants asserted that procedural changes, though necessary, were not enough. Rather `a 
complete change in organisational culture' was required to establish genuine partnership 
relationships with national civil organisations, based on mutual trust, interdependence and 
transparency. They recognised the weakness of the national organisations and the need for technical 
and organisational learning, but saw capacity building as also encompassing empowerment, both 
within the partnership with UNDP and in establishing their legitimacy vis-ä-vis their own 
governments. Exchange of knowledge both with UNDP and horizontally with other actors working 
in conflict was also seen as building the capacity of national and international agents to respond to 
the needs of war-affected populations. They were also at pains to stress what they could contribute 
to such a partnership: greater access to and understanding of local communities than outside 
agencies and the ability to mobilise local resources and find flexible low-cost solutions, for 
example. They argued that above all, the existing practice of sub-contracting them to carry out 
limited short-term operations, reflected both a lack of trust in their potential and little understanding 
of their priorities and mandates. It neither took advantage of what they had to offer nor afforded 
opportunities to increase their capacity by being able to retain and develop staff, and improve their 
organisation. On the other hand a commitment to a long-term developmental relationship would 
permit both parties to benefit from `complementarity and shared responsibility. '(Barakt and Chard 
2005). 
It is important to note that the majority of the participants in the workshop who made this plea to 
approach the reconstruction of war-torn communities through partnership and capacity building, 
were working directly with local communities in conditions of on-going conflict or partial and 
tenuous peace settlement similar to that in Afghanistan discussed above. Thus they were advocating 
adopting this approach in the most challenging contexts in which to apply development practice. ' 
The response of the UNDP bureau staff at the workshop was indicative of the gulf between the 
understanding of post-war reconstruction needs emerging from the operational level and the 
7 That is both formally constituted NGOs and the community based organisations they serve. 8 NGO and UNDP country staff at the workshop were working in Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Somaliland. 
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institutional culture at the managerial level of these large international agencies. Most were startled 
by the participants' conclusions, some were outraged. A minority then reacted by recognising that 
they must take these messages on board, but the majority reacted defensively to defend their 
existing institutional status and practice. As we saw in Chapter 1 and as Barakat and Chard 
concluded in this case, there is a long time-lag between accepting the need for a change of 
organisational culture, whether of post-war governments or international agencies, and actually 
achieving it. (Barakat and Chard 2005) 
Creative ways of beating the budget deadlines 
Steps have also been taken by the international institutions to break the mould of fixed-term budget 
accounting. In order to facilitate an incremental approach to reconstruction, while taking advantage 
of the donor community's willingness to donate funds in the immediate aftermath of conflict, the 
World Bank in partnership with the UN have organised the setting up of trust fund facilities, first in 
East Timor, then Afghanistan and now Iraq. The concept is that donors should deposit the funds 
they customarily pledge in the immediate post-war period in a trust fund administrated by the 
World Bank, UN and donor partners to disburse funds for government programmes as these are 
negotiated and the capacity to implement is developed. The intention is thus to secure financial 
control while providing the necessary flexibility to allow time to develop policy and 
implementation capacity within the emerging government's institutions before making major 
investments. In this way though the bulk of the finance may be deposited in the usual post-war 
pledging round, it can be spent some years down the line when it can be much more effectively 
used. On the face of it, the scheme is clearly a creative way of applying development principles at 
the level of macro-economic management while taking into account the fragility of post-war 
governance and the need to give it time to develop. However, a number of obstacles make this 
difficult to achieve in practice. 
For example, The Joint Reconstruction Fund for Afghanistan, while fulfilling the criteria for 
gradual controlled disbursement of funds, was structurally non-participatory as far as the Afghan 
Goverment was concerned. The management structure vests total control in the hands of the 
international donors and financial institutions, casting the Government in the role of an applicant 
submitting proposals to a committee of donors who are the ones to make recommendations to the 
World Bank representative responsible for approving or rejecting them on financial grounds. In 
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other words, unlike fully sovereign governments, the Afghan government cannot negotiate directly 
with its banker, even in partnership with its donors. (World Bank, 2002) 
In the event, despite being afforded this high level of control, the donors themselves did not 
participate fully. Only 18% of funding donated to Afghanistan was channelled through the Joint 
Trust Fund by October 2002, as the donors preferred to continue to work independently. 9 When it 
came to setting up a similar fund in Iraq, the World Bank, apparently learning from the less than 
satisfactory experiences in Afghanistan, following a joint needs assessment with UNDG, (2003) re- 
emphasised the need for an incremental, capacity building approach to economic recovery and 
transformation. The management structure also reflects an enabling approach to the administration 
of the fund, putting Iraqi entities in the lead. Thus the Strategic Review Board `provides overall 
policy guidance for donor assistance' and the Iraqi Ministry of Planning and Development 
Cooperation has `an endorsement/refusal role with respect to proposals seeking funding from the 
Facility' and chairs the coordination committee, which presents proposals to the joint UN/World 
Bank Facility Committee for financial scrutiny. (World Bank 2004: 5). However, in this case, the 
more considered, evidence-based and participatory approach of the international institutions had 
already been pre-empted by the rapid implementation of a pre-determined programme for economic 
transformation by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) (see below). 
Recipient solutions 
This brings us finally to consider the issue of conditionality and conflicting agendas discussed in 
Chapter 1. In fact in the special circumstances of aid to war-torn countries, both during the course 
of a war and in assisting post-war recovery, these contradictions become more acute. 
Conditionality, as we have seen in the case of `Direct Execution', is asserted unapologetically by 
the aid "givers" and accepted with little demur by recipients in the face of their extreme 
vulnerability and virtual lack of bargaining counters. On the other hand, the disorder and 
administrative weakness as well as the lack of clear public authority inherent in these situations, 
make it potentially much easier for the recipients to evade the donor's conditions in pursuit of their 
own agendas. In Chapter 1 we saw how Hewitt de Alcantara (1998) described the criminal agendas 
of drug syndicates have found fertile ground in the instability created by institutional reform 
9 In East Timor the figure was a more satisfactory 50%. Personal information Sarah Cliffe, World Bank. As 
will be discussed in case of the Ministry of Education in Mozambique, below, it can take as long as 10 years 
to convince donor partners to participate in joint funding schemes even when dealing with well-established 
and accountable government institutions. 
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programmes in Latin America. Afghanistan has afforded the same opportunities for opium 
production and trafficking by the warlords co-opted to overthrow the Taliban regime and in Iraq, 
smuggling has reached new heights following the opportunities for organised looting afforded by 
the breakdown in law and order following the invasion. In all of these cases the profits generated by 
these activities are used to promote the continuation of violence, which undermines the 
reconstruction process. (Herring and Rangwala, 2005) 
We can conclude then, that the tension continues between prescriptive interventions by the 
international aid community, geared to producing rapid visible transformation, and the need for 
time, open-ended dialogue, experimentation and learning that are required in the process of 
restoring the institutional life of peoples devastated by misfortune. In fact it is in the aftermath of 
war, when the fragility of human relations is most evident, that the donor community is most 
assertive and least inclined to engage in 'a learning process' on the grounds that visible normality 
and order must be restored. Development theory and practice, discussed in Chapter 1 lead us to 
expect, therefore, that these interventions will "fail" in their own terms like the majority of those 
that went before, though it may be the case that the recipients (or sectors of the recipient 
population) may succeed in turning them "successful" in their terms. 
These contradictions in the post-war context have also revealed another barrier to the international 
community's ability to apply best development practice to the difficult conditions of war-torn 
countries. As we have seen (Chapter 1 section 2) the international institutions have taken on board 
Uphoff s message that good development practice requires institutional development and adaptation 
on their part as well as within the countries and communities they are called on to assist. 
Nevertheless, the UN and the international financial institutions are finding that changing the way 
they operate is much more difficult than merely recognising the need to do it. 
2.3 New barriers 
In the meantime, while the international development institutions were grappling with these 
contradictions and trying to adapt their own institutional response to apply principles of 
development to post-war contexts, this new-found consensus was being challenged by contrary 
doctrines driven by geo-political concerns for world security and global economic stability. It has 
become increasingly recognised that extreme poverty and poor governance have repercussions 
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beyond the borders of affected countries. Mass economic migration, violent conflict and terrorism 
are therefore seen as direct and destabilising consequences of the international community's failure 
to address these problems. In response various forms of pre-emptive and externally determined 
intervention have begun to be applied. 
Pre-emptive economic strategies 
The international financial institutions as we have seen above, have always been inclined to think 
globally and to devise models for universal application, rather than assisting the generation of 
internal systems adapted to particular contexts. Indeed, in the present conditions of globalised trade 
and communications, the need for overarching frameworks to govern economic relations seems 
compelling. However, while the belief in free market relations as a desirable objective is 
undimmed, the World Bank in particular is a learning institution and has come to realise that the 
transition from absolute poverty and poor governance to full participation in the global economy 
has to be assisted. 
While, as we have seen when faced with a post-war situation it has moved towards an incremental 
approach to reconstruction and development, recognising poverty and poor systems of governance 
as potential root causes of violent conflict it has also begun to think pre-emptively. As a result it has 
developed strategies with the donor community and international financial institutions designed to 
simultaneously reduce poverty and promote good governance to prevent economically and 
politically unstable countries from descending into violent conflict in the first place. HIPC (Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries) programmes were established in 1996 as a joint collaboration between the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and also involving bilateral creditors. They are 
offered to countries with a `good track record of reform' but whose development is hampered by 
huge debt burdens, often incurred as a result of internal conflict or earlier failures of governance. In 
this case, debt relief is offered in exchange for implementing poverty reduction strategies and 
public administration reforms that conform to the international model. Thus reform is not merely 
rewarded in the 14 countries already granted debt relief but promoted in the I1 `pre-decision point 
countries'. This clearly involves a high degree of conditionality, but gives recipient governments 
some scope for adjusting the detailed implementation to their own conditions, especially if, as we 
will see in the case of Mozambique discussed in subsequent chapters, they have already developed 
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poverty reduction strategies of their own. What it does not do is support the development of 
completely internal solutions to the problems of poverty and governance. 10 
Pre-emptive war and reconstruction 
As we saw in Chapter 1, probably the biggest barrier of all to effective support for post-war 
development through capacity building and institution building is that the international response to 
these contexts is dominated by the perceived strategic interests of powerful nations. In recent times, 
there has been a progression from military intervention, with grudging endorsement from the UN, 
to take control of an on-going conflict perceived as a threat to world peace (as in Kosovo, or 
Afghanistan) to `pre-emptive' (preventive) unilateral intervention, contrary to the terms of the UN 
Charter with a view to changing a regime viewed as only potentially dangerous (the case of Iraq). " 
This development has profound implications for post-war reconstruction practice as we are now 
witnessing. 
Iraq since 1990 has been the subject of both post-war intervention by the international community 
and direct military interventions. However, unlike other countries which have recently been the 
subject of such direct interventions, it was neither poor and underdeveloped, nor a failed state. It 
was an aggressor in two wars against its neighbours and governed by a repressive and brutal 
regime, but it has great wealth from oil, which by the 1980s had been used to create a modern state 
providing high levels of public service, especially in health and education. However, following its 
defeat in the Gulf War, in order to contain (and punish) its aggression and military ambition it was 
subjected to an extreme form of conditionality by the international community: the imposition of 
the most strictly enforced sanctions regime in the history of the UN and of war reparations on a 
scale not seen since the end of the First World War. (Niblock 2001) 
The effects of this intervention have been documented by many researchers, but can be summarised 
as follows. Rather than weakening the power of the regime or inducing a change of governance, the 
effect of sanctions, by undermining legitimate business, by under resourcing the public services and 
by isolating the professional classes and Iraqi intelligencia from external contacts, had a profoundly 
10 The World Bank Group Debt Department http: //web. worldbank. org 09.05.2005 
11 The war 'was not in conformity with the UN charter ... 
from the charter point of view it was illegal. ' Kofi 
Annan interviewed by the BBC 16.09.2004 
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`substractive' effect on the governance of Iraq. For example, Niblock (2001: 156-7) records `Any 
attempt on the part of the Iraqi government to plan effectively.., was undercut by the sporadic and 
unpredictable arrival of goods' due to the vetting of imports by the sanctions committee and the fact 
that the quite sophisticated `systems of data-gathering and monitoring ... 
in existence prior to 
1990... had broken down' due to lack of resources, which in turn led to a deterioration in the 
delivery of public services. As International Crisis Group (ICG) researchers (2002: 10-11) noted, it 
was the `large educated and salaried middle class that once formed the regime's social base' which 
was `hardest hit by sanctions... given the dilapidated state of the education system and the 
withering of public sector employment' and the fact that their wages had been devalued to a level 
that only provided subsistence. (ICG 2002: 10) Faced with the undeniable suffering caused to the 
Iraqi public as a consequence of its actions, the UN merely mitigated the effects of the sanctions 
regime through a relief operation (The Oil for Food Programme). This arrested the deterioration in 
nutritional status but, it has been argued, actually entrenched the regime and exacerbated its poor 
standards of governance. 
Sanctions not only had a devastating effect on all aspects of individual human development'2 but 
drastically undermined the very civil elements in society which had acted as a restraint on the 
personal power of Saddam Hussein and preserved a reasonable standard of governance in the day to 
day management of public affairs. Since legitimate trade and public administration were severely 
restricted, nepotism, corruption and profiteering by an elite group close to the regime were rife. 
Those in this inner circle prospered while legitimate business was subjected to appropriations and 
some merchants were even executed for profiteering. (Niblock 2001: 170-20, ICG 2002: 10). 
As Saddam's regime came under greater international pressure, he also defended his grip on power 
by marginalising existing seats of institutional power inherited from previous regimes: the Baarth 
12 Oil for food did little more than halt the deterioration in nutritional status. UN surveys after 1996 still 
reported malnutrition in over 14% of infants and in children under five at over 20%. Babies underweight at 
birth had increased by nearly 20% since 1989.1.2% of the total value of oil for food contracts approved up to 
2000 were spent on education the result was falling enrolment in schools, low teacher morale, intellectual 
isolation in Universities and the doubling of adult illiteracy compared to 1989. Less than 5% of approved 
contracts were for inputs to agriculture. As a result, despite increasing the land under cultivation in an attempt 
to increase food self-sufficiency, without the necessary spare parts for plant and machinery and agricultural 
inputs '20-25% of the potential crop yield was being lost by the end of the 1990s' (Niblock 2001: 142-154). 
The lasting effects of sanctions are reflected in the post-war needs assessments and surveys of social 
indicators: Nutritional status survey of under five children in Baghdad - Iraq 29April -3 May 2003 UNICEF, 
United Nations/World Bank Joint Needs Assessment October 2003. At a Glance: Iraq UNICEF 2004. 
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Party apparatus and the regular army. These were subverted by 'a sophisticated security apparatus', 
'a vast network of informers' and a 'myriad of civil police forces and paramilitary militias'. As a 
result, by the late 1990s all the social groups and key institutions that had previously provided 
checks and balances on the exercise of absolute power had been emasculated. In October 2002, ICG 
concluded that despite evident dissent and resentment expressed by individual Iraqis, 'there is little 
to suggest that the Iraqi regime might fall in the absence of outside intervention' because 
'Manipulation of rationing and subsidies, hoarding and the establishment of monopolies run by 
Saddam's inner circle help sustain the regime... making it no longer merely a dictatorship of force 
but also a "dictatorship of need". ' (2002: 10-11). International conditionality had thus fostered, not 
development and good governance but extreme powerlessness and economic dependency. 
The decision, by the US and its allies to overthrow the regime by force (though not endorsed by the 
UN) took this process to its logical conclusion. The conditionality strategy of sanctions had failed to 
change the regime, therefore it had to be done by force. " The military occupation was described as 
pre-emptive, that is it was taken, not because there was an immediate threat to the United States or 
its allies, but because there was the potential that the regime might pose a threat in the future. In a 
similar way the reconstruction strategy was planned in some detail in advance within the US 
administration and therefore without the kind of collaborative involvement of national (Iraqi) 
stakeholders discussed above. The vision that motivated the US led invasion in 2003 was therefore 
that of dismantling the despotic regime and replacing it with a liberal democratic/market economy 
system as a prelude to rolling out a `democratic revolution' in the whole Middle East. 14 
As discussed in Chapter 1 when examining the issue of governance, experience has shown that 
imported models of government and socio-economic organisation are unlikely to succeed. The 
experience of post-Saddam Iraq seems to be providing another clear confirmation of that 
conclusion, not least because the approach adopted by the US led Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA) contradicts each of Barakat's key tenets for post-war reconstruction. 
13 That regime change was the desired outcome was made clear as early as 2002 by President George W. 
Bush in his State of the Union Address and by Dick Cheyney in Remarks to the Veterans of the Korean War. 
29th August 2002. 
14 Remarks by President George W. Bush at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for 
Democracy, United States Chamber of Commerce November 6 2003. 
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Since the detailed plans were drawn up in advance in Washington and implemented with scant 
adjustment in the light of conditions encountered after the invasion, there was little or no 
understanding of the context. There was a vision, but it was the vision of the invaders not the shared 
vision that is evolved through dialogue between all stakeholders (though this may be what Iraqi 
leaders are now, following the elections in January 2005, trying to initiate); despite the undoubted 
administrative and technical capacity of Iraqi professionals, there was a policy of direct execution 
rather than any attempt to promote collaborative governance (the running of ministries and control 
of the oil revenues for example were under the direct administration of US personnel); rather than 
induce incremental development by concentrating on retaining and creating livelihoods, as 
advocated by the World Bank cited above (2004), there was an immediate move to privatise state 
enterprises and create a free-market economy and huge reconstruction contracts were awarded to 
US companies with no obligation to employ or sub-contract Iraqi personnel. The unemployment 
created by this policy was also compounded by the disbanding of the army and removal of large 
numbers of civil servants from their posts under a blanket policy of `debathification. ' These two 
measures resulted in a breakdown in law and order and a marked deterioration in the delivery of 
basic services. As in many other contexts, the sense of powerlessness and economic and political 
marginalisation felt by many as a result of this style of governance have fuelled continuing armed 
conflict rather than facilitating processes of reconstruction. (Barakat 2005a) 
Nevertheless, as in other war-tom contexts, violence is not the only reaction to the situation. There 
have been concerted moves by Iraqi religious and secular leaders, since the invasion to regain the 
political initiative from the occupying powers in order to shape the future of the country in a way 
that meets their needs. '5 There is a `recipient agenda' in this context as in others. The holding of 
elections in January 2005 was crucial for US vision of reconstructing Iraq in the `democratic' 
mould, but it also afforded an opportunity for Iraqis, by meeting the conditionality of the invaders, 
to create a space in which to negotiate their future governance, hence the higher than expected 
participation in this deeply flawed process in those areas where conditions allowed it, and the 
protracted negotiation of the division of power between the elected parties and between them and 
the excluded Sunni. 16 If this process eventually culminates in the establishment of democratic 
15 For example, the concerted opposition led by the Shia religious leader, Sistani against the proposals by the 
CPA and its Interim Iraqi Governing Council for the formation of an Interim Government in October 2003 
(Brahimi 2004a. ) 
16 see Lucy Williams http: //newsvote. bbc. co. uk and Peter Baker and Robin White www. washingtonpost. com 
for example. 
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governance, a resumption of national sovereignty and therefore economic recovery, to what should 
we attribute this "success"? To the intervention by external powers or to the resilience of the Iraqi 
social fabric and long cultural history? Or the interaction between the two? 
2.4. Assessing the outcome 
The invasion of Iraq prompted several American analysts to examine past experiences of US 
`nation building'. While Pei and Kaspar (2003) affirm, `What is most notable about the use of 
interim surrogate regimes in nation building is its record of complete failure, ' others looked back to 
post-war Germany and Japan to see if these "success" stories do not vindicate the imported model 
approach in the long-term, despite the initial suffering. However they did not find an unequivocal 
answer. Dobbins et al (2003: 161-166) attempt a long-term comparative evaluation exercise by 
examining the relationship between the `effort' in terms of time and resources (also a reflection of 
political will) invested by the external powers and the success in terms of their desired outcomes of 
stability, democracy and per capita income in the affected countries. However, while they did find a 
high degree of correlation between greater effort and better outcomes, there were clearly other 
factors in play. Noting for example, that Japan and Afghanistan received about the same amount of 
post-war investment but that the outcome in terms of compliance with the post-war settlement is 
very different, they conclude that other, what we may term contextual factors, such as how the 
conflict ended (negotiated ceasefire or total capitulation for example) and the homogeneity of the 
population affect the acceptance of the imported solutions. Barakat (2005b) examining 
reconstruction post world war II, also points out that the Marshall Plan (only introduced after an 
earlier more heavy handed approach was on the brink of failing) was at least at government level, 
participatory, which must account in some part for its success. The reconstruction of Japan on the 
other hand, under the benevolent dictatorship of General MacArthur, was far from participatory and 
is rightly described by Salvatore Jennings as change `by fiat'. Nevertheless, its success is also 
attributed to the legitimacy conferred on the reforms by the Emperor's compliance and public 
endorsement. (Salvatore Jennings 2003: 15-19). Thus all of these analyses point to an interaction 
between external and internal agendas. 
In contrast to the American debates, it is notable that little public discussion of the long-term impact 
of these post-war strategies imposed by the victorious powers has yet taken place in either country. 
Do they attribute their present state of prosperity and democratic governance to the efforts of the 
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conquering powers, or to their own efforts to recover from defeat and destitution within the 
conditions set by the victors? What led to positive results for their society and what had lasting 
negative effects? How do Germans evaluate the division of their country for more than a generation 
and its continuing effects? Is it viewed differently in the East and West of the country? How do the 
Japanese assess the effect of MacArthur's selective dismantling and purging of their ruling 
institutions, which left the Emperor as titular head of state, or the many imposed democratic 
reforms and civil liberties on the one hand and censorship of unwelcome criticisms on the other? 
(Salvatore Jennings op. cit). How do they think this shaped the development of their post-war and 
post-imperial governance? 
2.5 Conclusion 
These unanswered questions underline the fact that, although a body of practical experience has led 
us to conclude that long-term recovery and development following violent conflict and repression 
will be achieved by building the capacity of peoples to manage their own affairs, rather than 
imposing external conditions for political and economic governance, there has in fact been no 
objective evaluation of the ultimate impact of post-war interventions by international actors in those 
contexts. 
Empirically, both the advocates of `pre-emptive' reconstruction and those who support the 
development approach have assumed that there is a direct connection between post-war 
interventions for reconstruction and final outcomes in terms of sustained peace and good 
governance. However, it seems that this has not been tested by any systematic evaluation in those 
societies that are sufficiently distanced from the aftermath of war and defeat to provide the 
evidence. 
This brings us to the issue of how we are to judge interventions by the international community, 
undertaken with the aim of bettering the lives of impoverished and particularly war-devastated 
nations. How do we evaluate practice in order to decide what is the best approach. The following 
chapter looks at how we customarily evaluate our actions to see whether we have the necessary 
means to learn what the ultimate outcomes of our actions may be for those we seek to assist. 
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CHAPTER 3 
EVALUATION: 
TAKING THE LONG VIEW 
Introduction 
As discussed in previous chapters, capacity building and institutional development are considered 
to be the key to post-war reconstruction and development and they are carried out with long-term 
social and political aims summarised in the term good governance. However they are usually only 
evaluated in terms of their success in achieving specific short term objectives and their immediate 
impact on intended beneficiaries, that is their 'proximate effects'. This practice excludes any 
consideration of both wider impact at the time of the intervention (benefits and disbenefits to other 
groups and contexts outside the framework of the intervention) and long-term social impact, that is 
the'ultimate effects'. (Cracknell, 2000: 263). 
The lack of adequate evaluation, and therefore understanding, of the longer-term effects of 
institutional development and capacity building interventions on the social development they 
purport to promote, has been repeatedly cited as one of the factors contributing to a perceived lack 
of "success" in this area of development work (see Chapter 1.2.1). 
This chapter will first look briefly at the evolution of evaluation theory and practice in general and 
the extent to which aid evaluation has followed the same path or developed differently in response 
to the specific conditions of international donor/recipient relations. The chapter then looks in some 
detail at aid evaluation practice to see where it is failing to deliver an adequate understanding of the 
impact of institutional development and capacity building on the social institutions of impoverished 
and war-torn societies. It then identifies those social research methods and approaches that seem 
most likely to meet the need to assess these interventions both in general and in the context of a 
war-torn society, concluding by defining basic principles for a research approach to evaluating the 
impact of aid for social development. 
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3.1 Meanings of evaluation 
Rebien (1996: 1) points out that ` "Evaluation" in its usual sense is basically a reflexive process 
which every human is engaged in every day' and in common usage it is usually calculated in terms 
of `material or monetary worth'. It has a broader meaning of `that which is worthy of esteem' or 
`has intrinsic worth, ' (OED, 1965: 2332). While the first interpretation is usually quantifiable and 
can be perceived as objective, the second is by definition unquantifiable and subjectively and 
culturally determined. It is a value that is "in the eye of the beholder". 
In seeking to define the academic discipline Rebien then quotes Rossi and Freedman, `Evaluation 
research is the systematic application of social research procedures in assessing the 
conceptualization, design, implementation and utility of social intervention programs' but adds his 
own caveat, `that evaluation is not merely the application of research methods in order to uncover 
facts about social interventions but applied science with a managerial and political purpose' 
(Rebien, 1996: 13. ) [emphasis added]. The emerging academic discipline of evaluation was, 
nevertheless, grounded on the belief that it could be objective in the attribution of value to social 
interventions by standing apart from the everyday personal judgements of individuals. It was 
therefore, for a long time only concerned with the attribution of the first kind of quantifiable value, 
but as the aims of social interventions came to be increasingly defined in qualitative terms, so 
evaluation now seeks to enter the difficult terrain of trying to determine what is 'worthy of esteem' 
or has 'intrinsic worth' while, nevertheless, believing that this can, and must, be objectively 
determined in order to provide normative guidance for future work. 
However Rebien (1996: 18) in his discussion of value in relation to evaluation, points out that 
'Value, moral and ethical considerations are inherent to all ... decisions' in the evaluation process 
from the choice of intervention strategies and definition of priorities, through the choice of 
evaluation methods to the use of the results. 'In short, evaluations are not value-free. In practice, an 
evaluator must therefore decide whether to base an evaluation on a prescriptive or descriptive 
strategy. ' The contradiction between the subjective attribution of value and the desire to reach 
objective conclusions as to the benefit of undertaking social interventions underlies the evolution of 
evaluation theory and practice discussed below. 
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3.2 The origins and evolution of the discipline of evaluation 
Evaluation has its origins in two other disciplines from the field of applied social science: 
economics and education. The first of these, economics, holds out the promise of being able to 
provide the objective basis for attributing a measurable material value to the results of social 
programmes. Inputs of a certain monetary or equivalent value can be matched against measured 
outcomes also expressed in terms of their material value. For example, a programme of agricultural 
extension, whose costs are known, is compared to subsequent increases in farmers' incomes. 
Evaluation thus becomes an exercise in monitoring controlled inputs in relation to the achievement 
of predetermined goals (outputs). At its most crude, this can simply be an accountability exercise to 
justify the expenditure of certain sums of money on one particular exercise, that is, a kind of audit. 
However, evaluation as an academic discipline is undertaken with an eye to testing whether a 
particular type of intervention not only works in one case but can be adopted as a general practice 
and is therefore concerned 'to demonstrate an unequivocal causal relationship between program and 
outcome' (Pawson and Tilley, 1997: 31). This is why evaluation methodology has traditionally been 
dominated by experimental or quasi-experimental design aimed at controlling for 'extraneous 
variables', those other factors surrounding the intervention but which are not part of it. From this 
perspective, it becomes crucial to be able to quantify variables in order to be able to assign them a 
material value as a means of comparison. 
The other discipline with an early association with evaluation is education. It too evolved 
quantitative systems for measuring, in this case, pupil achievement in respect of specific short-term 
goals (grades and marks) but was, it was later realised, in fact evaluating process not outcomes. 
Exam results represent only staging posts in a continuum, which is expected to last for the subjects' 
entire lives. They are, in effect, a proxy for determining if pupils have acquired sufficient skills to 
go on learning and applying knowledge in managing professional and personal situations in a future 
which is largely unpredictable. Teachers and educationists have always known that the impact of 
formal education in an individual life is difficult to trace and can emerge in unexpected ways after 
many years. Similarly, the learning process itself is notoriously subject to many kinds of 
'extraneous' factors (health, nutrition, motivation, parental and peer pressure etc. ) which interact 
with each other and the inputs of teachers and formal learning programmes in such a way that they 
are virtually impossible to isolate. Very few firm conclusions have been reached either as to the 
general impact of education programmes on society. Perhaps the only generally accepted 
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conclusion (though still disputed by some) of a causal nature, is the importance of basic education 
for fostering social and economic development (Psacheropoulos and Woodhall, 1985: 314-315). 
In practice, of course, these two approaches to evaluation have never been entirely divorced from 
each other. There is a long tradition of experimental research in education aimed at establishing 
measurable effects of curriculum or teaching inputs, while large areas of economic activity which 
are, for example, particularly relevant to economic and social recovery of impoverished disaster- 
prone societies, such as subsistence farming, female and child labour, informal marketing or natural 
resource conservation, have proved invisible to conventional economic measurements of value such 
as GDP, because there is no mechanism for attributing value outside the formal market economy 
(Waring, 1988). 
A number of authors trace the interaction of these traditions in the historical development of the 
discipline, which they divide into 'generations''stages' or 'phases' (Rebien, 1996, Cracknell, 2000). 
While each of these can be seen to have emerged in sequence, earlier approaches have not been 
replaced by more recent ones, since all are still evident in the repertoire of present day evaluation 
practice (Rebien, 1996: 33) so we might more appropriately use the term 'perspectives' (Pawson and 
Tilley, 1997: 4 ). 
Rebien, using Shadish, Cook and Leviton's typology, divides the development of approaches to 
evaluation into three stages and incorporates a critique of Guba and Lincoln's four 'generations' of 
evaluation (principally derived from the field of education) into his analysis. (Rebien 1996: 19-40). 
First generation evaluation, termed by Guba and Lincoln the 'measurement' generation, prevailed up 
to the early 1930s and perceived the evaluator's role as a purely technical application of appropriate 
instruments for measuring individual results, with the aim of discovering if programmes had been 
effectively implemented (or learned, in the case of school pupils). In the second 'description' 
generation after the Second World War, the concern was to evaluate the effectiveness of social 
programmes (such as a school curriculum) delivering desired outcomes in society. By the 1960s 
and 70s the 'judgement' generation evaluators were required to go beyond description of 
achievements and 'grade interventions according to merit or value and against criteria external to 
the intervention itself. Rebien groups these three 'generations' within his stage one in which 
'evaluation is based on the social engineering model' that assumes a linear and causal relationship 
between an intervention and its outcomes and that decision-making is rational and therefore 
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automatically uses all available objectively generated data from evaluations to improve 
performance (Rebien, 1996: 171). This is what Pawson and Tilley see as the 'experimental' 
perspective and which they term a 'heroic failure' because of its obsession with ever more refined 
research instruments for isolating and measuring the variables contributed by social intervention in 
relation to measurable outcomes while ignoring their interaction with context and subjects' own 
volition (1997: 4-11,30-54). 
The first stage approach has been called into question from two of Pawson and Tilley's 
perspectives, the 'pragmatic' and the 'naturalist', which coincide with Rebien's 'hermeneutic' stage 
two, where it was recognised that 'decision-making is not rational and available evaluation 
information often remain unused' (Rebien, 1996: 171). Pawson and Tilley (1997: 11-17) see the 
pragmatic role of evaluation as based on the acknowledgement that 'the very act of engaging in 
evaluation constitutes a political statement' which led (as Rebien also notes) ' from a knowledge- 
driven to a use-led model of research' in which evaluation research provides 'ammunition for debate 
and intraorganizational arguments' or for the purposes of legitimation. Pawson and Tilley's 
'naturalist' perspective is the alternative approach to evaluation that Guba and Lincoln proposed in 
1989 for their 'fourth generation'. It was part of the general constructivist trend in social science 
which, rejected the notion of single verifiable realities in favour of 'value pluralism'. The belief that 
the diverse stakeholders in a social programme each have their own construction of reality, which 
they bring to bear in the negotiation of outcomes, also led to a focus on the use of evaluation 
information as empowerment. 
As Rebien suggests (1996: 32-34) while its implicit claim to be the definitive solution to all 
evaluation problems cannot be accepted, Guba and Lincoln's approach did a great service to the 
discipline by providing a critique of the stage one 'positivist' approach, and providing 'an 
epistomological framework for formative and stakeholder based evaluations, with a detailed 
elaboration of how to conduct such evaluations in practice'. Pawson and Tilley (1997: 17) think that 
it led to an important development in the discipline by effecting a 'transfer of gaze from outputs to 
process'. 
Both Rebien and Pawson and Tilley, see the next stage in evaluation (stage three or the 'pluralist' 
perspective) as one which combines elements of both previous stages and they take Cronbach as the 
main proponent of matching research evaluation approaches to the circumstances and purposes of 
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each specific intervention, or as Cracknell puts it, 'Methodological Pluralism' and 'Horses for 
Courses' (2000: 43-49). 
Rebien (1996: 13-16) identifies three distinct purposes of evaluation which are defined as: 
Accountability which is the requirement to show to those funding social interventions that the 
funds have been spent as intended and achieved the desired results. 
Implementation which is concerned with performance evaluation in order to improve the 
management of the implementation process more effectively. 
Strategy/policy in which evaluation is used 'to accumulate knowledge in order to make informed 
decisions regarding future policies and strategies. ' 
He then suggests that these are pursued by the application of five different categories of evaluation 
research: 
Process or formative evaluation is concerned with ongoing management, planning and 
organisational activities as well as the interaction of the different stakeholders and their respective 
capacities. It generally takes place during an intervention. 
Effectiveness or summative evaluation is the 'classic evaluation category'. Its purpose is to measure 
the effects of a social intervention and determine whether the inputs have led to the desired outputs. 
So it must collect information about the situation before, during and after the intervention. Rebien 
suggests that this category is also termed 'impact evaluation'. However, as discussed below (3.5), 
this term is commonly and confusingly used to refer to two distinct types of evaluation. 
Monitoring 'is an ongoing activity administered by the personnel working on or with the 
intervention'. It is usually concerned to track progress in relation to pre-determined indicators. 
Evaluation synthesis is the comparative analysis of the findings of previously completed 
evaluations of several interventions in a given field for the purpose of deriving general conclusions. 
Meta evaluation is 'complex, scholarly investigation into the methods and procedures used in 
evaluations and their quality. ' That is the scholarly evaluation of evaluations. 
Rebien acknowledges that there is no consensus with regard to this categorisation and given the 
heterogeneity of the discipline (and the technical and political arenas in which it operates) it could 
well be extended or modified, but his central point that without such a typology, researchers cannot 
make soundly based choices of research purpose, focus and methodology, is crucial to an 
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understanding of the nature of the discipline. Aid evaluation, in particular, often lacks focus 
because it attempts to serve several purposes at once (Rebien, 1996: 52). 
Picciotto (1999: 7-11) makes a similar point taking Eleanor Chelimsky's three purposes of 
'evaluation for accountability', 'evaluation for development' (as in institutional development) and 
'evaluation for knowledge' as his starting point and suggests that 'evaluation can be evaluated in 
terms of its contribution to three classes of social functions: (a) collective action; (b) participation; 
and (c) coordination. His choice of this particular framework for analysis is clearly dictated by the 
fact that he is considering the role of evaluation as 'part of the overall governance framework' 
discussed in Chapter 1, involving institutional, market and civil society development. He also 
distinguishes two current 'cultures' or 'orientations', which are reflected in methodological choices 
for evaluation: that of economists 'who base their recommendations on predictive models' and those 
he terms 'evaluators' who 'prize "rich description" and manipulate "dirty" data. ' These are essentially 
the two influences identified as the starting point for the development of the discipline, but which 
continue to function side by side. The first seek to limit and control their data collection in order to 
achieve and validate 'clean models' while the second try to accommodate and interpret multiple 
perspectives. He sees them as using 'different lenses to examine public policy and generate 
complementary analyses for use by policy makers. ' 
This brings us back to third stage 'pluralism' which seeks to combine these two approaches rather 
than allowing them to simply continue in tandem. Evaluation, because it does nevertheless need, as 
its raison d' titre, to attribute value and influence practice, is necessarily concerned with causation. 
As we have seen, Pawson and Tilley suggest that the constructivist generation went down a blind 
alley in rejecting this role while justifiably seeing the need to examine the process of how 
stakeholders interact with social interventions, just as the 'experimentalist' generation pursued the 
issue of causation by such a narrow input/output route as to exclude most of what is relevant to the 
way change occurs in society. They pick up Harre's distinction between 'successionist' and 
'generative' theories of causation to build a framework for their 'realistic evaluation' (1997: 32-34). 
Briefly, the successionist approach coincides with the experimental method of controlled 
observation of preconditions, application of 'treatment' and postconditions in an experimental 
group, which is simultaneously compared with a control group. Causation is thus seen as a linear 
'succession' brought about and observed externally. Generative theory of causation sees change 
taking place both internally (by volition of the subjects for example) as well as externally. Change 
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is the result of a combination of potential or opportunity with conditions internal to the social 
context and the subjects of the intervention. Logically this requires not restriction of the information 
base but greater breadth and depth of understanding. The issue of causation is thus not irrelevant 
but infinitely more difficult to determine than the successionist model suggests. 
3.3 The evaluation of aid in development practice 
Cracknell (2000: 39) suggests that 'From the start ... aid evaluation 
had a strong pragmatic character, 
with the emphasis on the practical usefulness of the results in improving aid operations'. It did not 
concern itself with theoretical considerations discussed above, but in the first instance only with the 
effectiveness of a particular project or programme in achieving its goals or producing benefits. As 
such, it is a type of case study or quasi-experiment of the 'first stage' type. However, as with other 
case studies, it 'is concerned not just with whether the policy or programme has worked in the case 
investigated, but also whether it would work elsewhere' (Gomm, Hammersley and Foster, 2000: 99). 
So what aid evaluation has traditionally sought to do is essentially to attribute value to the outcomes 
of particular interventions (usually in comparison with the value of the resources invested in them) 
with the implicit assumption that this will provide some lessons as to how to proceed with similar 
cases in the future. 
At first therefore, and largely still, aid evaluation was geared to the economic discipline, seeking to 
relate inputs to outputs in social engineering models (the blue-print approach) but often so 
conditioned by the budget culture and the accountability purpose of evaluation that it became little 
more than an audit. As Cracknell (2000: 134) points out, 'the reassessment of the objectives, is one 
of the factors that most distinguishes the evaluation function from auditing' and this is not even 
considered when the scope of an evaluation is confined to monitoring the achievement of 
predetermined objectives in relation to inputs. Carlsson, Kölin and Ekborn (1994: 176-7) suggest 
further, that achieving 'organizational objectives' such as 'fulfilling of aggregate lending plans' is at 
least as significant as concerns for 'programme goals' in determining how evaluations are carried 
out. 
1 The approach adopted by Dobbins et al (2003) in their evaluation of post-war nation building discussed in 
Chapter 2, for example. 
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Aid evaluation, then, was initially a tool for measuring the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of the 
delivery of aid and as such was closely associated with economic theory and auditing. It was in 
these early stages that a base-line survey followed by the statistical monitoring of selected 
indicators and a final ex-post evaluation exercise, was the standard method for evaluating 
effectiveness, that is, the 'experimental' perspective dominated. 
However, as the aims and objectives of aid programmes, evolved to encompass broad social issues 
such as, poverty alleviation, good governance, institution building, community empowerment, 
drawing, as we have seen in Chapter 1, on some philosophical strands from adult and community 
education, so logically, the aid world was led to consider other styles of evaluation, for example, 
participatory evaluation, using PRA methods or action research. Participatory planning and 
implementation, for example, logically demand participatory evaluation. So as the focus of aid 
shifted from economic to social development aims, this demanded 'an approach which is ... capable 
of picking up and explaining the qualitative change which may have taken place' and the 
methodological concepts of evaluation changed to include the whole range of qualitative methods 
appropriate to the 'second stage' evaluation focus on process and use (Oakley, Pratt and Clayton 
(1998: 48-49). 
The new goals for social development are therefore, qualitative, long-term, holistic and political. At 
the same time they are not specific and so not easily measurable by conventional input/output 
methods conducted during and immediately after the completion of projects or programmes. This 
has induced recognition of the need to assess wider social and political impact, not just measurable 
and immediate socio-economic outcomes. The wider impact study (WID) concept for example, 
'seeks ... to detect and... describe the causal relationship between the intervention and the changes 
that may have occurred' and is 'supposedly highly participatory' in its approach (Oakley et 
al, 1998: 59). 
Finally, aid evaluation has also moved in the direction of a mixed method or pluralist approach 
which uses different methods to reveal the views of different stakeholders and recognises different 
evaluation purposes, including the need for long-term social impact assessment (Cracknell's 
'Emergence of Methodological Pluralism' cited above). This has involved a shift from emphasis on 
accountability in the particular case to the need to assess general applicability of aid strategies. 
'Synthesis studies' of a number of theoretically selected cases have become the common approach 
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to finding answers to this concern. They are in essence, comparative studies using secondary data 
from programmes implemented in different regions by the same agency or a number of 
collaborating donor agencies. 
Thus far, aid evaluation, albeit with little explicit theoretical grounding, appears nevertheless, to 
have kept in step with the different developments in the general discipline. Oakley et al in 
reviewing current thinking on evaluation practice for social development, identify different levels 
(global, national and programme) and different stages of intervention (inputs/outputs, direct effects, 
wider effects and impact) which are covered by three different stages of evaluation each with a 
different purpose: first to evaluate efficiency; second to evaluate effectiveness; finally to evaluate 
impact (1998: 26-35). This is essentially a scheme similar to Rebien's or Picciotto's applied to the 
specific context of aid for social development. 
However, in fact evaluation practice lags behind the lessons learned for development practice, 
which as we saw in Chapter 1 are by no means universally adopted. Oakley et al note that the 
'evidence suggests that development agencies... are stronger on issues such as outputs, effort and 
activities' (efficiency) 'but less strong' in 'determining ... the result' (effects) of their actions or 
understanding change (impact). It is particularly the assessment of impact, 'the last stage' which 'is 
rarely reached' (1998: 35). Several other authors (Cracknell, 2000: 245, Snyder and Dunn, 1995, 
Forss and Carlson, 1997) concur in the assertion that impact evaluation is on the whole rarely 
carried out and when it is 'the results seldom lived up to expectations' (Carlsson et al, 1994: 197). 
The explanation for this state of affairs is seen by most authors as inherent in the context in which 
aid is delivered. Rebien, for example, suggests that aid evaluation operates in a context that is 
significantly different in certain respects from national public service and social programme 
research. It is concerned with accountability for the 'use of taxpayers' money outside national 
borders'. It 'is implemented in a structural frame of international politics-economics and private 
sector interests.... it is difficult for evaluation recommendations to transgress these structural 
conditions'. It contends with various difficulties arising from the physical and cultural distance 
between the commissioner (donor headquarters) and the intervention (recipient country). Finally it 
'is an arena for partisan politics' in the donor countries, where demands in respect of single 
'fashionable' issues such as gender, human rights or environmental protection can distort evaluation 
exercises (Rebien, 1996: 173). Carlsson et al (1994:. 34-38) see that the aid organisations 
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themselves, as a result of these conflicting external demands, are particularly prone to internal 
contradictions leading to 'political games and power struggles'. It is these realities rather than 
objective criteria that determine, 'what is to be evaluated, the method to be used and the conclusions 
to be drawn'. That is, the 'petty political' nature of all evaluation noted by Pawson and Tilley 
(1997: 11-12) is greatly exacerbated by the international aid environment. Samset demonstrates 
further, that an organisational culture exists within aid agencies, that focuses on'elimination of both 
uncertainty and risks' punishing 'failure even if it is caused by unforeseen events' (1998: 18) so that 
although, as he demonstrates, the real incidence of genuinely unpredictable factors and project 
failures are not significantly greater in development projects than in public projects in industrial 
countries, the perception exists that it is higher and development agencies seek to protect 
themselves from visible (and therefore politically sensitive) failure by an ever more prescriptive 
planning and accountability regime. 
Noticeably, the above analysis makes little mention of the involvement of the nationals of countries 
where interventions take place, except in the role of recipients. Participatory evaluation is a 
common concept in the present day literature on aid but as Chambers comments (1998: xiii) '... as 
usual with concepts which gain currency, rhetoric has run far, far ahead of understanding, let alone 
practice'. Samset in examining four case studies, also raises the question of which criteria may be 
used to measure the "success" of projects and demonstrates that different criteria deliver different 
verdicts on success and failure. For example, his second case study, The Refugee Enterprise project, 
was highly efficient and effective and so successful in donor terms, however from the recipients' 
point of view, it was found to be'not relevant' and so unsustainable, with no lasting impact, in other 
words, a "failure". (Samset, 1998: 122-123)2 
Here we could usefully look at an analysis by Arnstein quoted by Rebien (1996: 58) of the real 
nature of eight types of activity commonly labelled as 'participation' in the context of public 
programmes in the United States (see Figure 1. ). Only three, those that involve 'various degrees of 
citizen power' are deemed to involve 'real' participation. Some (numbers 4 -6) make participatory 
gestures without substance, while two are either philanthropically or cynically manipulative. If this 
scheme is related to the conditions in which aid interventions and evaluations take place, we can see 
that of the three 'real' kinds of participation, only the third, 'partnership' is legally possible. The 
2 This is particularly relevant to the issue of how post-war reconstruction is evaluated retrospectively by 
different stakeholders, raised at the end of Chapter 2. 
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givers of aid are accountable to citizen control, but in their own country, no control can be 
exercised directly by the citizens of recipient countries. Similarly, no power can be delegated by 
donors, accountable to their own citizenry, to those of another state. Aid is therefore given and 
received on the basis of partnership but as has already been shown, it is a very unequal partnership 
in which the 'various degrees of... power' exercised by recipients can be very limited. Participatory 
aid evaluation is therefore also subject to the contradictions of the donor-recipient relationship 
discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. It cannot ever achieve the same levels of participation that could be 
open to citizens in relation to their elected and directly accountable government. In practice, much 
'participation' in aid programmes and their evaluation, does not even aspire that far. Consciously or 
unconsciously, it is limited to tokenism or descends into manipulation. 
Figure 1. Eight types of participation 
1. Citizen control 
Various degrees of citizen power 2. Delegated power 
3. Partnership 
4. Placation 
Various degrees of tokenism 5. Consultation 
6. Informing 
7. Therapy 
Non-participation 8. Manipulation 
Source: Arnstein, 1971 
As a result, although 'donors claim to be linking participatory development directly to state 
accountability, empowerment of local groups and transparency of decision making' in the recipient 
country (as part of governance conditionality) '... much of this increased accountability is focussed 
upwards (towards the donors), rather than downwards (towards local people), thus placing greater 
pressure on public agencies to perform to donor-defined standards'. (Thompson, 1998: 109). 'A 
"participatory" emphasis ... may thus serve to give a democratic veneer to views which are at heart 
external and imposed' (Brown, 1991: 261) and the plea, articulated by Vargas Vargas (1991) for 
evaluation to be in fact the participatory learning process advocated by so much development 
literature, is generally ignored in practice. 
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Rebien (1996: 51) and Cracknell (2000: 48-49) dialoguing on the progress of aid evaluation 
thinking see that it is now 'at the crossroads'. Having moved on from the apparent certainties of 
input/output calculations and accountability auditing, through the uncharted territory of multiple 
constructed realities and the contradictions of participation, evaluation researchers are faced with a 
number of choices. What is it appropriate to evaluate in a particular case? Outcomes or process or 
both? Who evaluates and for whom? If evaluation is in essence a judgement of value, whose 
criteria of value should be applied? Hallam (1998: 90-91) looking for answers to such questions, 
suggests that the recently devised Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief and the development standards of the SPHERE 
project 'will provide a 'benchmark against which performance in certain sectors can be measured' 
but recognises that it will not be applicable to many outcomes of humanitarian assistance and 
should also 'not take attention away from the beneficiary perspective. ' We can see from this that 
those concerned with evaluating humanitarian and development interventions, have increasingly 
come to recognise that the answers they give to questions of purpose and value in respect of a 
particular evaluation will directly influence the choice of methodology adopted. However this 
recognition is still far from being translated into a consistent approach to the design of evaluation 
research. One can even question if the term 'evaluation research' is not itself somewhat 
contradictory. If research claims to be objective, by definition it should not be based on 
predetermined value systems such as the Code of Conduct. (Rebien (1996: 12-13) as we have seen, 
claims that though evaluation uses research theories and methods, the discipline has managerial and 
political purposes that are different from the aims of academic research. 
In this debate, it is particularly the recognition of the need to evaluate the long-term social impact of 
interventions that has yet to give rise to the development of a body of practice involving evaluators 
from recipient countries. Cracknell cites this at the end of his book on aid evaluation as the next big 
challenge facing the profession (2000: 357). 
3.4 The challenges of evaluating social impact 
In Chapter 1, it was shown that many practitioners and implementation agencies feel that 
evaluations of institutional development and capacity building interventions are generally 
unsatisfactory for two reasons: first, they are more concerned with budgetary control than social 
impact; secondly, they are constrained by fixed-term management cycles. As a result, evaluations 
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have been based almost entirely on easily quantifiable indicators that are normally determined in 
the initial planning process as a means of monitoring the achievement of pre-set project objectives 
and since they are designed to assess the immediate outcomes of any intervention, only in terms of 
what was planned, they rarely record either unplanned outcomes or any wider and longer-term 
impact. Oakley et al (1998: 52-53) describe a typical case, the Lutheran World Federation planning 
and monitoring system, in which suggested specimen 'progress indicators' covering input, output, 
effect and impact are applied across all projects. 'The system is comprehensive, demanding and is 
intended to ensure effective control of field level operations. It is also openly biased towards the 
quantitative' and in their view 'would have difficulties in effectively monitoring the true nature of 
social development projects. ' 
The reasons for this continuing 'first stage' approach, fall into three categories. First, there are the 
administrative difficulties of cost and the long time lapse between the termination of an assistance 
programme and the appropriate moment to assess its impact. Brown (1991: 260) suggests that'it is 
questionable whether the time-frame within which most agencies (particularly NGOs) must work is 
sufficient to permit meaningful evaluation of a process which is... long-term and ... only evident 
in 
retrospect. ' Secondly, there is a question of political will. Both Cracknell (2000) and Khan (1998) 
suggest that, logically and practically, the assessment of impact should be led by researchers from 
the recipient country. Oakley et al (1998: 38) regard any attempt to understand and explain social 
impact without direct involvement of stakeholders as 'futile'. Carlsson et al (1994: 184-5) also point 
out that because 'the recipient's capacity to absorb aid is one of the critical factors determining 
effectiveness and impact, an evaluation which largely excludes the recipient... must be regarded as 
dysfunctional'. They suggest that the reasons for almost universal non-involvement of recipients 
include lack of resources on the part of the recipients themselves, who may also have other 
concerns and priorities for the use of the resources they do have, and the fact that donors, concerned 
mainly with satisfying the accountability claims of their own public with the short-term evaluations, 
have little incentive to promote the transfer of these means to recipient institutions and are reluctant 
to surrender control of the process. The recipients therefore remain passive because they regard 
evaluation as a donor accountability exercise, because they are afraid of 'jeopardizing the aid flow' 
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and because project evaluation, uncoordinated with their normal fiscal year cycles, is an 
administrative inconvenience'. 
Finally there are the very real methodological problems, which are the main subject of the rest of 
this chapter. For example, practitioners perceive intuitively from experience that there is a causal 
link between the capacity building inputs and the subsequent development of social institutions 
effectively serving their communities, but the time frame and the number of other variables that 
must also be deemed to combine to influence that outcome make it impossible to test this 
relationship by conventional quantitative methods alone. As Cracknell points out (2000: 357), it is 
the current emphasis on long-term social and political aims (such as good governance, institution 
building and policy development) and the need to move away from project aid to sector and 
programme support that is creating unease about how to evaluate the effectiveness of aid. For that 
reason, many avoid the issue by adhering to strategies that are susceptible to the kind of evaluation 
they understand. For example, only providing 'narrowly based training for a specific skill, usually 
for personnel associated with large aid-funded projects' (Cracknell, 2000: 264) even though it is 
clear that a much more general professional education through a combination of experience, 
supervision, professional exchange and formal learning is required to build the human capacity of 
the institutions necessary for the desired good governance. An equivalent evaluation strategy to 
match this development approach is largely lacking. 
The first problem is that an impact study has to be retrospective over a long time period. Even if the 
need for eventual impact evaluation is recognised at the outset and impact monitoring data 
collection systems put in place (which is unlikely, as responsibility would have to rest with the 
permanent institution, that is, the recipient, whose management capability, at that stage, is limited) 
it would be impossible to know in advance all the factors which might turn out to be significant in 
situations which have not yet arisen, and trying to isolate the effects of one variable (such as 
capacity building) from numerous others that might be influencing the outcomes by quantitative 
multivariate analysis without comprehensive and compatible longitudinal data sets is unreliable. 
There is also the perennial problem that even if significant correlation is demonstrated, it does not 
prove a causal relationship. The best that can be achieved is confirmation of the plausibility of the 
3 The Review of the DAC Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance 1998: 74-75 discusses this 
issue. Sweden's contribution notes ... 'partners were involved 
in the inception of the evaluation in somewhat 
less than 40 per cent of cases, that they were only seldom engaged in the process, and that they received a 
draft report to comment on in only 50 per cent of the cases. ' 
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causation theory. MacPhail's description (1991) of the 'socio-economic' survey approach to impact 
evaluation in World Bank agriculture and rural development projects, is a case in point. This type of 
evaluation based on a quantitative survey methodology even when it includes 'qualitative' indicators 
such as 'perception of project services and benefits' are still concerned with the direct and short- 
term effects of specific interventions and, however well-conducted, cannot offer understanding of 
social change because they generally stop short of considering the meaning behind observed 
change, that is the interaction between the opportunity created by the intervention and the volition 
of its subjects discussed by Pawson and Tilley (see above) as well as wider contextual factors. 
The alternative, or more likely complementary, approach is qualitative, seeking to 'prove or 
disprove [causal claims] by exploring and analysing the meanings and justificatory frameworks that 
those involved attach to their actions' (Conolly, 1998 quoted in Gomm, Hammersley, Foster, 
2000: 237). As already mentioned, this kind of investigation needs to be informed and preferably 
led, by researchers from the recipient society. In the case of aid evaluation, this comes up against 
the inherent contradictions of the 'participatory approach' discussed above, as well as the resources 
gap in the recipient countries. 
3.5 Clarification of common categories and terms in aid evaluation 
Before trying to arrive at a research strategy to address this difficult area of evaluation, we should 
take Rebien's advice and clarify our typology of purposes and categories of aid evaluation. As with 
much international aid work, the field of evaluation is littered with common and potentially useful 
terms that are loosely and often interchangeably applied to different situations. It is necessary 
therefore, to consider how they should be deployed. 
The objective of evaluation as we have seen is to define the value of the outcomes resulting from 
intervention. It is therefore completed after the conclusion of an intervention or phase of 
intervention. In the 'blue-print' approach this is taken literally: teams of 'independent' evaluators 
descend on the institution or community that has hosted a particular project and proceed to carry out 
surveys and interviews to establish the outcomes achieved in relation to the initial plan and baseline 
data. Where a learning or process approach to implementation is applied, so the gathering of 
information and its interpretation is ongoing throughout the implementation, but culminates in a 
final participatory evaluation exercise when the programme is completed. However, whichever 
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style of evaluation is applied, it has to proceed from an understanding of the pre-existing context 
and conditions, so it is in fact initiated before implementation. The studies undertaken to evaluate 
the potential benefits of undertaking particular interventions and which form the basis for planning 
them, are known as appraisals, though of course they are a category of evaluation. The primary 
users of evaluations and appraisals have, up to now, been the funding agencies that commission 
them. 
Next we can look at assessment and evaluation, as commonly used in conjunction with impact, 
sometimes to refer to activities with different scope and purpose, but at other times apparently to 
describe the same activity. Impact itself is used at times interchangeably with effects, or immediate 
outcomes, and at other times to mean a much more long-term and diffused outcome of social 
development interventions, covering both predicted and 'unanticipated changes' in the lives of 
intended beneficiaries and others, which can of course be either positive or negative. According to 
Oakley et al., assessment and evaluation of impact are theoretically distinct activities, in a similar 
way to appraisal and evaluation, one looks forward and the other backwards. Impact assessment is 
'predictive' while impact evaluation is 'retrospective'. However, in common usage amongst aid 
agencies, they appear to be used interchangeably. (Oakley et al, 1998: 36) 
It is probably pointless to attempt to impose any linguistic conformity on this confusion° but it is 
possible to make a practical conceptual distinction between two distinct categories or subjects of 
evaluation (serving different purposes) that can be applied whatever the terms used to describe 
them: 
1. Effects/immediate outcomes/'early impact%proximate effects' (Oakley et al 1998. Cracknell, 
2000). 
These are the main subject of most aid evaluation. The terms refer to changes that occur during a 
social intervention and are detectable during and shortly after the intervention. They are closely 
linked to individual project or programme objectives (nowadays normally formulated in a log-frame 
plan) and to the contemporary context in which the intervention was made. Roche (1999: 20-21) 
gives two definitions of this type of impact: 'sustained changes in people's lives brought about by a 
° The OECD/DAC Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Management (1991 Revised 1998) has 
brought some order to the situation but it is still necessary to say in what sense some of these terms are being 
used. 
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particular intervention' or 'significant' [but not necessarily lasting] 'or lasting changes in peoples 
lives brought about by a given action or series of actions'. Both express a direct causal relationship 
between a given outcome and a specific intervention. Evaluation of these outcomes then, even when 
applying 'participatory' methods is essentially from the 'experimental' perspective, described by 
Pawson and Tilley, that is, concerned primarily with internal validity and direct causation. The 
context of the intervention is appraised and measured (usually by base line survey) before the start 
of the programme. Selected indicators of the desired results are monitored during the intervention 
and measured again after its conclusion in an ex-post study. The essential purpose of the evaluation 
is to give an account (Rebien's first purpose accountability) of the effectiveness of a discrete and 
targeted action to those responsible for funding and implementing it. (Rebien's second category of 
evaluation, see above). DFID's OPR (Output to Purpose Reviews) described by Oakley et al 
(1998: 53-54) constitute a clearly defined approach to this kind of evaluation designed to meet 'four 
key purposes': ' to provide a strategic overview... to assess progress... to reassess assumptions and 
risks ... to provide recommendations and agree the way 
forward for the project'. Though the word 
'impact' is frequently used in this scheme, 'The focus of an OPR is on both 'evolving outcomes' and 
`early impact. ' That is, it is covering the same ground as McPhail's studies discussed above, though 
it employs a mixed quantitative and qualitative methodology and falls within Roche's second 
definition. 
While this category of evaluation is, as we have seen, often not as adequately carried out in practice 
as these two schemes suggest it could be, it is realistic to expect that aid agencies do account for 
their activities and improve their performance in this ways It is what they can reasonably and 
appropriately be held responsible for carrying out. It is interesting to note here, the five commonly 
adopted criteria for project and programme evaluation listed by Samset (1998: 24-25: 
'1. efficiency (the delivery of the project in terms of cost, timing and quality) 
2. effectiveness (the extent to which the project goal has been achieved) 
3. impact (the sum of positive and negative, planned and unforeseen changes and effects of the 
projects in society) 
4. relevance (the degree to which the project respond(s) to real needs and priorities in society) 
s The DAC Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance (OECD 1991) describes the main purposes 
of evaluation as: 'to improve future aid policy, programmes and projects through feedback of lessons learned; 
to provide a basis for accountability, including information to the public' In the review carried out in 1998, 
this statement remained essentially unchanged. 
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5. sustainability (the extent to which the positive effects of the project will continue in the future) 
[emphasis added] 
Lines three and five are instructive as they clearly show that the evaluation is circumscribed in 
scope and time, focussing on attributable results of a specific action within a short period following 
the intervention, in which it is only possible to assess the potential for sustained change. This then 
is the brief for best practice in the evaluation of aid adopted by general consensus amongst aid 
agencies and it does not cover the issue of long-term impact. 
2. Impact/long-term impact/ 'ultimate effects' (Oakley et al 1998. Cracknell, 2000) 
These terms refer to changes which are: 
a) cumulative - they are evident five, ten or more years after the events of the intervention, 
though they may begin to appear during the period of the intervention and even be evident in 
some effects/outcome monitoring or be specifically monitored in impact monitoring exercises, 
they are fully apparent much later. For example in the case of staff training discussed by 
Cracknell (see above) the benefits of such capacity building only become evident over the whole 
career of individuals and in the development and performance of the institution over a number of 
years following the intervention. 
b) diffused - they are not directly linked to specific aid project or programme objectives 
(though these may contribute to changes) but to more general social goals (such as good 
governance) and are the result of programme outcomes (planned and unplanned) interacting with 
factors in the wider society, many of which may even first occur after the intervention. (As in 
the generative concept of causation discussed above. ) For example, if we consider capacity 
building activities carried out in a specific institution in the context of war, the subjects of that 
programme may be found after the war applying their knowledge (or not) in a completely 
different context due to the demise or transformation of institutions or their personal migration 
and economic imperatives. 
Evaluation of such 'long-term social impact' relates to Chelimsky's 'evaluation for knowledge' 
purpose or Rebien's 'strategy/policy' purpose discussed above. As such, they do not feed directly 
into the decision-making process of individual organisations, but rather through the 'diffuse and 
undirected infiltration of research ideas into their understanding of the world' (Pawson and Tilley, 
1997: 13). However, if the purpose of impact evaluation is clear, the type or category of evaluation 
appropriate for its pursuit is still unclear. 
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3.6 Implications for impact evaluation 
We have to conclude, first of all, that the impact of social development aid is proving both difficult 
to identify and virtually impossible to measure. Indeed aid interventions in general have provoked 
cries of frustration such as: 'we really do not know anything about aid impact in Africa and the 
Middle East' (Forss and Carlson, 1997: 498); '... the problem with discussing the impact of 
international assistance on the people of Afghanistan is that none of us can really claim to know 
what the impact has been' (Donini quoted by Hallam, 1998: 79). Furthermore, social development 
interventions are also undertaken '... with goals that are inherently non-material, and hence not 
amenable to understanding through the use of surrogate economic indicators. ' (Brown, 1991: 259). 
Hallam then (1998: 79) identifies 'three principal challenges for those wishing to measure the impact 
of an humanitarian intervention' which as will be shown below are equally applicable to social 
development: 
'i) a lack of consensus on what constitutes a desirable outcome 
ii) the problems of data collection and data availability 
iii) attributing impact to an intervention' 
Considering these in reverse order, it is possible to make the following observations. An important 
consideration in attributing impact to particular social development interventions is that significant 
extraneous variables often only emerge or become apparent after the intervention ends, so that the 
extent and nature of the impact goes beyond limited project objectives, spilling over (negatively or 
positively) into other contexts. As a consequence of that, there is then no readymade baseline 
information on these aspects for purposes of comparison (point ii). Contemporary records 
(including pre-programme appraisals etc. ) can be used to establish the context in which the 
intervention was made but will not necessarily cover aspects which subsequently prove significant. 
Even if we 'rediscover the baseline' as Oakley et al suggest (1998: 140-143) with a view to 
accumulating relevant information for subsequent impact evaluation, we run the risk of pre-empting 
decisions about which questions it is appropriate to ask. In the end, we have to rely on a 
combination of inadequate baseline information and retrospective reflection (and attribution of 
value, see point i) by diverse, but mainly recipient, stakeholders, as the case studies they present 
clearly illustrate. 
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Piccioto ( 1999: 16-17) summarises the methodological dilemma as follows: 'evaluations carried out 
many years after a program has reached maturity are more reliable since they offer the possibility of 
capturing the full impact of program actions. ' However, '... the longer the time elapsed, the greater 
the costs associated with information retrieval... and the greater the threat to relevance' due to 
intervening 'experiences'. He concludes that 'A mix of evaluation processes... may be needed to 
overcome this dilemma. ' 
Another clear implication is that impact evaluation has to reach beyond the parameters of a single 
programme or project and this leads to the conclusion that it is probably not feasible or useful to try 
and distinguish the impact of one particular intervention. Rather we need to consider a broad 
spectrum of interventions (of various agencies over time) in a particular area of social development 
(Oakley et al, 1998: 147). This, in turn, strongly suggests that impact evaluation is a job for 
independent researchers and that it cannot be tackled as an add-on to individual aid programmes. It 
is certainly not something that the operational departments of aid agencies can be expected to do or 
even, except in a wider collaboration with other actors, their evaluation units. Cracknell (2000: 242) 
suggests that 'It would not be reasonable, or even possible... to expect these wider impacts to be 
studied as a matter of course. ' but only if they are likely to be 'unusual' or 'highly significant'. In 
other words, if they may serve to answer a specific research question. 
The discussion of the nature of social impact and participation above also leads to the conclusion 
that ideally, recipient stakeholders would commission such research from in-country academic 
institutions (though they might include researchers from donor country institutions in the research 
team). However, as we have seen above, they almost never do this due to two factors: their own 
lack of financial capacity and the donors' unwillingness, having carried out their obligations to their 
own public, to offer to meet this need; their lack of research capacity or more correctly, limited 
capacity and other priorities for its use. Nevertheless, it is obviously the case that 'local actors 
evaluate what is going on' (Carlsson et at, 1994: 183). They do make value judgements on the 
efficacy of different aid interventions and reach conclusions as to the value (to them) of certain 
types of donor intervention, since these judgements inform the way that they negotiate further aid 
but it is more akin to evaluation in the 'everyday' pragmatic sense discussed by Rebien or the type 
of processes described by Hallam (1998: 27) as 'Reviews' which are'more regular [than evaluation), 
less onerous, and sometimes purely verbal. '. They 'seldom launch evaluations in the traditional 
sense of the concept'. (Carlsson et at op. cit. ) 
78 
It is clear that judgements are made on both sides as to the value of certain interventions, but, as we 
have seen these are not based on any wide ranging systematic analysis of relevant information. 
Both aid givers and recipients could therefore benefit from an informed understanding of the impact 
of certain types of aid interventions on social development, rather than relying on the present 
practice of giving and receiving aid on the basis of untested assumptions about its long-term 
benefits or as Brown (1991: 262) describes it, '... resting more upon the faith of the true believer than 
on a coherent body of practical methodology. ' 
Given the limitations on both sides, discussed above, an alternative strategy could be for an 
independent researcher to facilitate or act as catalyst for a reflective retrospective evaluation by 
recipient stakeholders, using the 'participatory enquiry' approach (Oakley et al, 1998: 45) (discussed 
in detail in Chapter 4. ). This could then be combined with analysis of contemporary records and 
documentation, including that from individual project and programme monitoring and evaluation, 
to achieve the 'pluralist' approach discussed above. Piccioto also suggests that where the'transacting 
parties have widely divergent interests and perspectives... independent evaluation may help to 
mediate... agreements. ' (1999: 12). 
3.7 Evaluation of aid to war-torn societies 
The most common application of research in relation to armed conflict, is to meet the information 
needs of those involved in planning and implementing interventions in specific situations, usually 
with donor assistance. The main focus is on reaching general conclusions about the most efficient 
and effective ways to deliver humanitarian aid to war-affected populations, though this may often 
be done on the basis of assumptions of its causal relationship to various social objectives such as 
'sustainable peace' 'good governance' 'social recovery' etc. ' Research takes place not to allow 
external actors to intervene in a conflict, but to determine the direction and commitment of that 
involvement' (Marriage, 2000). Thus, evaluation research in areas affected by armed conflict, is still 
largely carried out to evaluate and justify the delivery of aid, (Rebien's first two purposes: 
accountability and implementation) since policy and strategy decisions have often already been 
taken on other grounds, such as political expediency. The common pattern is a combination of 
mainly 'stage one' strategies with 'pragmatic ' gestures towards participation derived from 'stage 
two' approaches. A less common and much more difficult exercise is that of deriving general 
lessons about the nature of conflict and the impact of different types of intervention on the conflict 
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itself and its underlying causes and so, while there are 'very few examples of successful evaluation 
of the impact of social development programmes' in peaceful contexts (Oakley et al, 1998: 37), 
impact evaluation is almost non-existent in the case of war-torn societies. 
However, there are very good reasons for attempting research to ascertain the impact of policy 
responses in these contexts, by looking beyond making recommendations for improvement in the 
on-going delivery of relief aid, towards the promotion of conflict resolution and reconstruction. 
Once a violent conflict is in progress '... research may achieve little in curtailing the battle between 
protagonists, however it can at least assist in the process of recovery and reconstruction following 
war, and this where its value truly lies' (Baraket and Ellis, 1996: 149). 
The tendency to confine evaluation of aid to war-tom societies to the accountability and 
implementation functions can also be attributed to the 'risk averse' culture of the aid agencies and 
their personnel. As Samset demonstrated (1998, Annex 5), their perception is that 'contextual 
uncertainty' is much higher in developing than in industrial countries, whereas much of this 
'uncertainty' could in fact be either mitigated or at least predicted. When it comes to operations in 
war-tom countries, the perception is of even greater uncertainty leading to an assumption that social 
development activity, including research, has to be put on hold until the 'emergency' is over, even 
though the reality is that many infra-national conflicts in the world today persist for generations and 
bear no relation to the temporary crisis implied by the term 'emergency'. This reflects a refusal to 
admit that war and its economic and social consequences constitute a way of life whose negative 
effects on the majority involved in it, can only be permanently alleviated by significant social 
development. 
As in development contexts not affected by armed conflict, the first stage in developing 
intervention strategies is to understand the society as it is. The researcher (or evaluator) is looking 
at a range of social and economic phenomena, which at face value should be similarly susceptible 
to investigation by available tried and tested social science research methods, from large scale 
quantitative surveys to small scale qualitative studies. For example, methodologies have been 
developed for studying various types of violent behaviour such as that of criminal gangs or social 
dissidents. Nevertheless, researching the nature of armed conflict and its social and economic 
aftermath is deemed by some to present special difficulties that actually call in question its validity 
and usefulness due to the prevailing 'contextual uncertainty'. 
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It is certainly true that in the conditions commonly prevailing in areas of on-going armed conflict or 
its aftermath, the methodological challenges multiply in comparison with those of researching in 
developing or industrial countries. Situations are shaped by the traumatic conditions that have 
affected people's experiences and may also inhibit their ability or willingness to communicate 
them. There is fear of repeated violence, mistrust of others and uncertainty about what the future 
might bring. The physical destruction and social damage (death and separation of family members, 
unaccompanied children, homelessness) affect the subjects of research to a greater or lesser degree, 
so that field-based research in these conditions is often dangerous to both researchers and 
respondents. While each of these conditions can be found in other research contexts, they are 
unlikely to occur simultaneously and with the same degree of intensity as in war-affected contexts. 
As in social research in general, challenges to the conduct of research fall into three main areas: 
methodological, ethical and logistic but it is the number and combination of these threats that make 
research in conflict areas particularly difficult. Nevertheless, as has been argued, it is still a 
necessary pursuit and as Barakat and Ellis suggest, the difficulties should be seen as a challenge to 
the researcher's ingenuity, rather than a reason to desist. 
For example, one immediate casualty of armed conflict and violent social upheaval, is what we call 
'the truth'. We can no longer assume the existence of a body of objectively verifiable facts about the 
situation. 'During moments of crisis... rumors composed knowledge. Not only were rumors the only 
source of information... but the conflicting nature of competing rumors made plain... ' that they were 
rumours. Research is inclined to believe that they 'were manufactured: But by whom and why? In 
fact they may simply be the product of individual attempts to make sense of events in which 
'facts... linked up haphazardly' on the basis of the fragmented information available. (Simmons, 
1995: 43). Steering a course through such a climate of deliberate and accidental confusion is not 
easy but a solution lies in accepting the 'plurality of values and arguments available for thinking 
about any specific policy' as the basis for systematic 'discourse analysis' (Hallam, 1998: 29) 
involving multiple sources and methodologies. 
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3.7.1 The 'composite approach' to research in war-torn societies 
As already discussed above, even in mainstream social research applied in relatively stable social 
conditions (absence of armed conflict, at least) for the purposes of evaluation, no single 
methodological approach has been found to be entirely self sufficient. Progress towards social 
understanding lies in their complementarity. 6 Acknowledging that complementarity in the choice of 
research strategies in conflict situations is also a key to meeting the many challenges discussed 
above and has been summarised as the composite approach (Barakat, Chard, Lume and Jacoby, 
2002) in which the strengths and limitations of different research styles and techniques are assessed 
in relation to particular research aims and conditions and combined in an optimal research design 
for that situation. 
In the conditions discussed above, an ethnographic approach, with its ability to use multiple sources 
and methods and respond to changing conditions, is likely to be the core response, but 
quantification and generalisation, necessary for planning appropriate actions, require the use of 
surveys and in some specific instances, quasi-experiments. Ethnography can identify the range of 
response to and perception of important variables and relationships etc. while survey can test them 
more widely and validate them as general conclusions. Alternatively, ethnography can find the 
meaning behind correlations identified by survey (Gomm et al 2000: 236-237). Where it proves 
difficult to obtain certain information directly in the field, or to access a representative sample of 
the war affected populations, the use of a review of relevant literature, together with an analysis of 
secondary data can be used to build 'a narrative history ... through which to view what 
is to be 
understood and explained'. (Hallam, 1998: 32) 
3.7.2 Methodological issues 
Barakat, Chard et al (2002) identify four key methodological issues that present particular 
difficulties for the researcher in conflict situations. The first is that of gaining access. Negotiating 
access to information, to research settings and to respondents is a sensitive activity in setting up 
any social research. In the context of armed conflict, the process of gaining trust and securing 
access to sources of reliable information is beset by many obstacles. Some of these are essentially 
practical but from a methodological point of view, the main concerns are with neutrality and 
6 For example, this was one of the main theses of the recent symposium 'Celebrating Classic Sociology: 
Pioneers of Contemporary British Qualitative Research' which brought together many leading social 
researchers at the University of Essex in July 2001. 
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representation. Understanding an armed conflict requires access to all the groups involved in or 
affected by it but for those engaged in armed conflict, neutrality is difficult to accept. Access to 
one group is often bought at the expense of denial of access to their opponents. It is often 
extremely difficult to even identify truly representative informants. Many people disguise their 
identities or claim leadership or spokesperson status that they do not in fact enjoy while some 
vulnerable groups remain deliberately invisible under threat of reprisal or a general fear of 
strangers. The methodological challenge is to find ways to mitigate and compensate for these often 
severe limitations to access. 
The second problem is in achieving a valid sample. In any research the credibility of the results 
depends on the criteria and procedures for selecting what is to be studied. The instability of 
populations and conditions in war-torn contexts are such that any plan that relies, for example, on a 
fixed sampling frame for the purposes of selecting a random sample is unlikely to be reliable and is 
more often simply not feasible. Selection of settings for qualitative research are often conditioned 
more by what is practically possible (in terms of access and security) than a theoretical analysis of 
their typicality and selection of further case studies is similarly constrained. ' Even within the 
chosen research setting, clear categorising of the different population groups, stakeholders and 
belligerents for the purposes of sampling can be difficult for the reasons discussed above. The 
challenge is to not to abandon all criteria but to develop strategies to identify and mitigate the 
consequences of the inevitable (that is certain, not uncertain) gaps and failures. 
The third concern lies with the need to generalize, which as we have seen is a key objective of 
impact research to fulfil the policy/strategy purpose of evaluation. In war contexts, the researcher 
may succeed in gaining privileged access to intense human experiences of particular groups of 
actors' but the experience of the same conflict by other groups in even in the same location can be 
so radically different that generating general hypotheses from case studies is extremely problematic 
While ' there is no reason in principle why case study research should not provide the basis for 
empirical generalization... It is important to recognize that the greater the heterogeneity of a 
7 As in the case of Nordstrom's'runway anthropology' conditioned by the destination of relief supply planes 
which were the only means of access to small rural towns in Mozambique (1995) a Such as the remarkable study by French anthropologist, Christian Geffray of the experience of the armed 
conflict amongst the Erati people in two districts of northern Mozambique during the civil war which also 
engulfed all the many other ethnic and social groups in the country for sixteen years. Although he had worked 
for three years with this small population before it was affected by the war, which facilitated access and 
cultural understanding, the fieldwork for this study was an intense time sample of one month. (Geffray, 1991) 
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population the more problematic are empirical generalizations based on a single case'. Ideally the 
study of one case should be related to others selected on the basis of theoretical criteria or to 'a 
substantial body of relevant secondary data' about the general population of which it is a part. 
(Gomm et al. 2000: 104-105) In conditions of war, none of these options can be applied with any 
rigor and yet the ability to generalise is no less crucial to the purposes of research in armed conflict 
than to research in non-violent contexts. 
Finally, there is the issue of recognising and mitigating bias, which is central to the validity of any 
research exercise but presents a greater degree of difficulty in war-torn contexts. Clearly the risk of 
bias is inherent in the difficulties in gaining access, sampling and attempting to generalise discussed 
above, but the most critical sources of bias when researching in areas of violent conflict occur at the 
interface between the researcher and the researched at the field work level where the potential for 
misconception and mistrust, (cultural bias and reactivity) is exacerbated. There are also some 
commonly used research techniques, which simply cannot be employed with research subjects 
encountered in these conditions. Generally speaking, it is the more structured and formal 
approaches, which are likely to provoke suspicion and rejection of the researcher, which adds to the 
difficulty of conducting, for example, any kind of quantitative survey. Traumatised individuals do 
not readily give coherent or complete accounts of their lives. Even routine factual information of 
the type listed at the beginning of so many survey forms, such as where they were born or live can 
be problematic, especially in answer to direct questions from strangers. They are more often moved 
to communicate fragments from their past unsolicited, in moments of trust one to one with an 
individual who is perceived as posing no threat. 
The motivation of the respondents to cooperate honestly with the researcher is also influenced by 
what they perceive as the researcher's intentions or potential usefulness. That is they may mistrust 
the aims and credibility of the process, or they may seek to use it for their own material or 
propaganda purposes. In either case, the information they give may be false or incomplete. ' 
9 Hallam's example of Talking to beneficiaries' during the war in Mozambique (1998: 77) appears to the 
author to be a case in point. In a rapid rural appraisal exercise for a'few days' with one community one 
finding was the statement 'school rehabilitation, strongly promoted by the government was not supported by 
the local population' who gave priority to school books and teachers. In fact government policy and practice 
coincided with this community's, as with many others', priorities, it was the donors who were more anxious to 
spend money on cement than teachers. Either this was an untypical community with a particular local 
problem or, like others, they were looking for a euphemistic way to make a protest. 
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Maintaining a constant vigilance and sensitivity to multiple sources of bias and devising ways to 
reduce or counter them is the principal challenge for fieldwork in the context of war. 
3.7.3 Ethical concerns 
When researching devastated and vulnerable individuals and societies involved in destructive 
conflict, a minimal moral obligation is to ensure that the research should not do any harm by 
abusing the time and energies of vulnerable people, exacerbating local tensions, raising 
expectations of immediate material assistance or causing further psychological damage10. There is 
also a moral responsibility for how information may be used once it is in the public domain. 
Respondents may be vulnerable to violent reprisals and the nature of their experiences, even if they 
are able to communicate them in private, may destroy fragile identities if revealed in public. 
However in the face of extreme mass suffering, the moral obligation goes beyond merely doing no 
harm. It is not morally justifiable in such situations to conduct research which does not aim in some 
sense to benefit the researched population and in such a way that they are aware of that benefit. 
Often there may be a social benefit in telling their story to some one who is willing and able to 
listen. Many respondents also perceive a moral benefit in helping the researcher to understand what 
happened, in order to set the record straight or to contribute knowledge that may prevent others 
suffering in the same way. Fully participatory research, where the results are at the disposal of the 
groups and communities involved, as a resource for their own use, may contribute to restoring their 
formal or informal institutional capacity. 
A particularly difficult moral issue is that of neutrality (in addition to the methodological problems 
for access and representative sampling discussed above). Is neutrality in the name of objective 
investigation always morally tenable? Is it even possible for the researcher in all honesty to suspend 
moral judgement that may colour his or her analysis? The better course may be to self-critically 
examine and declare a moral standpoint, as part of a wider discourse analysis rather than leaving it 
as a submerged assumption. 
10 Children in Afghanistan and Tajikistan for example, suffered damaging effects when pressed for oral 
history accounts of their experiences (Sellek, P. 2000) and victims of rape in Croatia interviewed by 
journalists and researchers'... are raped again' (Olujic 1995: 197). 
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These many moral concerns surrounding the conduct of research in armed conflict are one of the 
key constraints that may oblige the researcher to reject those research strategies that seem most 
appropriate from a methodological and theoretical point of view and try to meet research criteria by 
less conventional means. 
3.8 Conclusions for impact evaluation in war-torn societies 
Turning now to the issue of research for impact evaluations in war-torn societies, it is true that this 
must normally take place some time after any intervention and normally in the wake of the events 
that prompted it. In these more stable conditions, the research environment is more akin to other 
development situations, except for two points. First that the contemporary documentation required 
for secondary research (public records, project evaluations etc. ) was collected during armed conflict 
and subjected to its disruptive effects described above. This means that any surviving data sets may 
have been partially destroyed, or inconsistently maintained or be very limited in scope. In addition, 
the political and social context, which led to their design, may also have been so radically 
transformed as to limit their relevance for understanding post-war conditions. For example, huge 
demographic shifts may make reference to base-line data in a particular location irrelevant when the 
original population has been replaced by a different composition of ethnic or economic groups. 
Secondly, the informants approached to cooperate in a retrospective reflection and evaluation of the 
intervention, are still living with the imprint of violent events, which may affect how they 
remember the past. In addition, due to differential survival rates, they may not be representative of 
the original target group. Both of these factors require the researcher to understand and be able to 
evaluate the sources of bias inherent in these situations. 
The principal challenges affecting impact evaluation research in war-affected countries can thus be 
defined as follows: 
- Differential survival and rapid and unpredictable changes result in data gaps and 
inconsistencies. As a result, even if baseline data sets exist, they are even less likely than in 
societies with political stability and social continuity, to relate to many of the most 
significant factors for evaluating impact. 
- The sensitivity of issues and the drama and trauma of events, make it difficult for those 
involved to examine certain subjects critically or put events into perspective, especially in 
the immediate aftermath of violent conflict. Thus taboos on open discussion can constitute a 
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limitation on retrospective evaluation by recipient stakeholders to a greater or lesser degree, 
depending on the social issues concerned and how central they were to the conflict. " 
Individual interventions during and in the immediate aftermath of a war are often 
interrupted and uncoordinated. As a result, their impact on subsequent social development is 
cumulative, indirect and not easily attributable 
These factors actually reinforce the points made above in respect of the evaluation of the impact of 
aid in general: 
a) the crucial evidence has to come mainly from personal recall (despite its limitations) due to 
the scarcity of relevant baseline information. That is, a present-day judgement or 
perspective is sought on a historical process. 
b) a reflective process well after the events is required. A mainly qualitative and participatory 
methodology has to be developed to achieve this but it will be enhanced by the use of other 
complementary methods, which the particular context may allow. 
c) a coverage of a broad spectrum of inputs to a particular area of social development is 
appropriate. 
These conclusions as to the challenges to impact evaluation in war-torn contexts, and for the 
general approach to impact evaluation, were taken as the basis for developing a research strategy to 
examine the impact of capacity building on the post-war development and governance of social 
institutions, which is the subject of the following chapter. 
11 For example, according to Hallam (1998: 21) The term'complex emergency' was coined in Mozambique'to 
avoid reference to 'civil war' and 'conflict' while recognising that 'humanitarian assistance needs were being 
generated by armed conflict' combined with 'natural disasters'. So, nearly ten years after the end of that war, 
the Prime Minister, Pascoal Mucumbi, speaking in a debate on education in the national parliament in reply to 
a question by the RENAMO opposition on the number of children still without school places, referred to the 
well-attested destruction of schools by RENAMO only obliquely, saying 'the war of destabilisation' destroyed 
50% of the primary schools existing in 1983 (Mozambique News Agency AIM Report No. 231 May 7th 
2002). 
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CHAPTER 4. 
THE METHODOLOGY: 
TRANSLATING THEORY INTO PRACTICE 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters, we have looked at our understanding of the capacity of individuals and 
institutions and how interventions have been made to strengthen the capacity of those affected by 
destitution and violence. We have then realised that the way we evaluate these efforts does not tell 
us what the lasting impact of these interventions has been. There is a problem in making a direct 
causal link between specific interventions and changes perceived many years later, and yet our 
instinct has been to assume a connection. At the end of the last chapter we established three 
principles that could lead us to a practical methodology for evaluating long-term impact. First, the 
main evidence will have to be from the personal recall of individuals exposed to the interventions. 
Second, this reflective process has to take place well after the events. Third, the cumulative effects 
of a range of interventions across a whole sector of social development is the appropriate scope for 
such a study. 
Some practical lessons were also drawn on how to approach evaluative research in war-tom 
contexts. The need to establish criteria of value by means of `participatory enquiry' but at the same 
time to compensate for the gaps and distortions in the data from such environments, by adopting a 
composite methodology and choosing research instruments that do not rely on random sampling, 
which requires stable sampling frames. The study would therefore adopt a descriptive rather than 
prescriptive strategy with the intention of deriving lessons for future practice from the analysis of 
the reality discovered. 
It was from this starting point that the researcher set out to develop and test a practical strategy to 
answer the question "How can we evaluate long term impact? " The result was a research design 
which, when implemented, produced the kind of testimony and secondary data that it was believed 
could enable us to answer the theoretical question behind the research, whether capacity building 
interventions can be demonstrated to contribute to good governance and sustainable recovery from 
88 
war, as it is assumed they do. This chapter takes the reader through that process from first thoughts 
to final outcomes. 
4.1 Reviewing the options 
The first consideration was to review what it would be appropriate to study. Some rather specific 
criteria had already been established. Contexts to be studied had to be in societies that had 
experienced both war and significant inputs to capacity building and institutional development 
followed by demonstrable sustained recovery. The research could not therefore be carried out in the 
immediate aftermath of a war but only when a society had reached a point where reflection is 
possible and cumulative diffused impact might be evident. On the other hand it still had to be 
possible to reach a sample of individuals able to recall it. 
The author had had the case of the education sector in Mozambique in mind and ten years after the 
end of the civil war it looked like a strong candidate, but one would normally expect to verify the 
findings of one case with comparative studies of others. The view is that a single intensive study of 
one case (case study) exploring and comparing different perspectives can establish with an 
acceptable degree of certainty that a particular correlation is causal, but many would argue, only in 
that particular case. Most would therefore agree that a generally applicable 'causal attribution 
necessarily depends on comparative analysis' (Gomm, Hammersley and Foster, 2000: 239). That is, 
the comparison between a representative sample of similar cases either by analytic or enumerative 
induction or a combination of these methods or failing these by secondary analysis of previous 
research (especially if raw data is archived). However, there are considerable methodological 
difficulties inherent in trying to both find and reliably investigate the range and number of cases 
necessary to test any hypothesis. It may be that case studies 'capture strong possibilities rather than 
deterministic or even probabilistic outcomes', nevertheless, the comparative case study approach 
remains the best option in most cases (op. cit. 106-108,250). 
However, having chosen to study a very large entity (MINED) over a long period of time, the 
question arose whether, from a practical point of view, one researcher could carry out research in 
sufficient depth to address the research question in say two completely unknown cultures as well as 
the one familiar one. The researcher decided to explore the validity of tackling the issue through a 
single in depth case study of the education sector in Mozambique. 
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Eckstein (2000) makes the case for specifically excluding from the general principle of carrying out 
comparative studies, what he calls'macropolitics'. That is, the study of the behaviour of nations and 
large institutions. It is arguable that the issue of aid partnerships for institution building for the 
purpose of good governance comes into this category. Eckstein's view is that in these cases there is 
no possibility to carry out reliable comparative studies for two reasons: first that it is highly unlikely 
that even two sufficiently similar and contemporary cases can be found, let alone a representative 
sample; more importantly, he argues that the special cultural understanding necessary for the study 
of such large and complex units is difficult to acquire in respect of one case and impossible for any 
researcher to achieve for many cases. (Eckstein, 2000: 150-151). This leads to the conclusion that 
international comparative studies cannot investigate complex theories of social causes without 
being hopelessly compromised by cross-cultural bias and/or superficiality. 
His solution is what he calls a crucial study, a study of a case, which is selected, not for its 
typicality (which, as we have seen, is difficult to demonstrate in macropolitics) but for its 
explanatory value. That is, because it is either'most likely' or'least likely' to validate a given theory. 
His contention is that a single case study can invalidate a theory if it is found inapplicable to that 
case. If the theory is applicable, on the other hand, strong probability, rather than proof is the 
outcome. Nevertheless, it has more value for empirical prediction than any other method in these 
circumstances. 
4.2 Research Design 
Coming then to the research topic under investigation, the following analysis first examines three 
critical methodological questions in the light of Eckstein's arguments: 
9 Does the donor assumption of a causal relationship between capacity building, 
governance and recovery amount to a theory capable of being tested? 
" Is this investigation within the field of 'macropolitics' and if it is, do the reservations 
about comparative studies apply? 
" Is Mozambique (and the Ministry of Education within it) a crucial case that can test the 
theory of a causal relationship between capacity building governance and recovery? 
Then on the basis of the results of this analysis, a research strategy is outlined. 
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4.2.1 Assumption or theory? 
An assumption is defined as: Taking of anything for granted as the basis of argument' 'a 
supposition' (a supposition being' something held to be true and taken as the basis of an argument') 
(OED: 112 and 2087). It is by its nature implicit rather than explicit, since it is believed to be self- 
evident or self-explanatory. A theory on the other hand is '... A scheme or system of ideas... a 
hypothesis that has been confirmed or established by observation or experiment and is propounded 
or accepted as accounting for the known facts;..: (OED: 2167). 
For social scientists a theory is '... an integrated system of hypotheses put forward to conceptualize 
and explain a particular class of phenomena' (Jupp and Miller, 1989: 35) or it is interchangeable 
with a'model' as : 'an attempt to conceptualize some aspects of the world and to put forward a causal 
mechanism by which the concepts are related' (Open University, 1989: Block 1: 96). A theory is 
then a set of ideas that has been explicitly formulated and stated and then subjected to scrutiny and 
comparison with observed facts in order to explain them. 
As has already been discussed the international aid agencies' assertion of the importance of capacity 
building and institutional development interventions for post-war recovery is apparently based on 
the notion that intervention of a certain type (capacity building) can reverse a negative downward 
trend towards social and economic disintegration by developing good governance. However, while 
individual components have been explicitly stated (as for example in Edralin's assertion that 
'capacity building correlates with good governance and capacity building is the main pillar' (1997: 
111) the whole framework remains implicit and unchallenged in most discussion of post-war 
recovery. It is therefore essentially a set of assumptions used not to explain, but more commonly to 
envision desirable outcomes and so justify certain actions. 
On the other hand, while no one has set out to test these assumptions, they are based on a 
considerable body of circumstantial evidence contained in the evaluations of capacity building and 
institutional development activities (not withstanding their limitations discussed above), in the 
empirical experience of practitioners and in exploratory research into the causes of conflict and 
social deprivation. It does therefore have the makings of a plausible theory based on observation, if 
not rigorous testing. It is what Pawson and Tilley describe as 'the policy-maker's overarching 
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program theory' based on 'notions' of 'how the program will generate benefits'. The intervention 
itself can then 'be construed as a conjecture. The evaluation is a test of it'. (Pawson and Tilley, 
1997: 202). 
The international aid agencies"notion' is thus a rather simple linear model': 
Figure 2. Simple linear model 
I capacity good 10 sustained building -ý governance - post-war 
intervention recovery 
The whole scheme, though now made explicit, is obviously still far too unfocussed and begs 
questions such as: Where? For whom? In what conditions? A theory needs to be both explicit and 
tightly defined if it is to be testable (Eckstein, 2000: 148). In other words are there not some other 
intervening factors (variables)? The crucial relationships that need to be tested are the three links in 
the chain: the supposed causal links between capacity building, good governance and sustained 
post-war recovery and development, because it is on these assumptions that capacity building and 
institutional development are implemented but they cannot be treated as occurring in a vacuum. 
One immediate problem is that no possible interaction with other contributing variables is 
acknowledged. Capacity building may be necessary but is it sufficient for achieving good 
governance? What other conditions may be necessary? Good governance could be essential for 
sustainable post-war recovery and development but is it sufficient by itself? 
A more realistic model might be that shown in Figure 3. 
1 Independent variable: capacity building; intervening variable: good governance; dependent variable 
(outcome): sustained post-war recovery. 
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Figure 3. Linear model with contributing variables 
contributing other 
variable: capacity contributing 
building variables 
good other 
governance contributing 
variables 
sustained post- 
war recovery and 
development 
However this is unwieldy and there is a further problem, the assumption that the sequence of 
causation is linear from capacity building to good governance to recovery. The possibility that the 
reverse may occur or that the three variables may simultaneously reinforce each other has not been 
entertained. A correlation has been observed and interpreted as a simple sequence of causation, or 
as Pawson and Tilley describe it, a 'successionist' concept of causation. As discussed in chapter 3, 
they suggest that when seeking to evaluate the impact of a particular intervention (programme) in a 
particular social context a 'generative' concept of causation is more appropriate, since it accounts for 
the interaction between the intervention and the social context with its various stakeholders. 
Applying this logic and using their basic model (Figure 4. ) we can represent the 'notion' to be tested 
thus: 
In the time (TI) before the interventions (for capacity building) a number of mechanisms (MI) 
(such as illiteracy or lack of experience, ) are interacting in a violent post-colonial and post-war 
context (CI) with the will and aspirations of individuals and affecting the incidence (rate or 
regularity RI) of the desired `outcome pattern' of good governance and sustained development (0). 
The effect of intervening over time (T2) to develop capacity through education (M2) is to reduce 
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the effects of M1 and increase the incidence of good governance and development in a transformed 
context (C2) of peace. 
Figure 4. A generative model of change 
M, 
T, C, M, 
, 
MI C2 
T2 
Ri 
º/\. 
Rz 
0 
Based on Pawson and Tilley figure 3.8 1997: 74 
This concept recognises that 'Programs are always introduced into pre-existing social contexts and 
... these prevailing social conditions are of crucial importance when it comes to explaining the 
successes and failures of social programs'. They also note that while interventions may be made in 
organisations such as prisons, hospitals or schools, 'it is the prior set of social rules, norms, values 
and interrelationships gathered in these places' (the rule-based institutions discussed in Chapter 1) 
'which sets limits on the efficacy of program mechanisms. ' (Pawson and Tilley, 1997: 70) Later 
(op. cit.: 114) they conclude that 'Outcomes only follow when particular mechanisms have been 
triggered in particular contexts and they will only reveal themselves when an investigation has 
traced them through the same pathway' [emphasis added]. This last recognition has important 
implications for designing a research strategy to test our core assumption. 
The next question, given the long history of basing actions on this concept without attempting to 
verify it by research, is, can it be reliably tested? After all if it were methodologically possible, 
surely it would have been done. 
4.2.2 Macropolitical theory? How can it be tested? 
If we accept that Figure 4 represents a possible model of the effects of a particular type of (usually) 
international intervention on the social development of war-torn nations, then it must certainly fall 
94 
within the category of'macropolitical' research, which deals with the behaviour of nations and large 
institutions. Eckstein contends that this field of research is the exception to the rule that social 
theories should be tested by comparative studies, precisely because of the insurmountable 
methodological difficulties. He first of all points out that 'Samples of macropolitical units are 
always likely to be poor and highly uncertain in result' because few contemporary cases exist for 
direct comparison and access to even these can be restricted by political and logistical 
circumstances. Added to that is the variable quality and lack of compatibility of quantitative data 
sets. These problems alone lead to compromises in case sampling and data collection, which 
compromise the reliability of the results. However a much bigger 'problem in comparative research 
involves special knowledge of the cultures being studied'. That is, ' "social facts", personal or 
collective, are embedded in widely varying, even in each case unique, cultural systems of meaning 
and value'. This imposes the need to acquire, or already possess' a great deal of cultural Verstehen' 
in respect of any case studied. Acquiring this level of social knowledge for each of a representative 
sample of large complex macropolitcal cases is impossible to achieve. Attempting it can only result 
in compromised validity. (Eckstein, 2000: 150-151). 
If we now apply this reasoning to the research hypothesis outlined above, it is clear that in addition 
to the problems of finding enough representative cases, gaining comparable access and finding 
reliable data (all of which are infinitely more difficult in war-torn societies than those that remain 
stable over long periods of time), this particular study requires retrospective historical analysis in an 
attempt to explain the present. In the absence of predetermined indicators or data sets designed to 
answer the research questions' such a study must rely on the perceptions and testimony of those 
who lived through the events to interpret such records and data sets as survive. The 'understanding' 
required of a researcher in this case has not only to include existing cultural meanings but try to 
reconstruct meanings attached to processes and events in the past. Achieving this in respect of one 
society is a daunting task and impossible to realise fully. It is inconceivable to attempt it in a 
sufficient number of cases to test a theory by comparative study. 
Even if it was determined now for all future capacity building interventions to set up longitudinal 
studies to monitor their impact, for example to chart the post-war development of Afghanistan, it 
would be impossible to set up a recording system that covered all the aspects that may prove to be 
2 This issue was discussed above in Chapter 3 
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significant ten years from now, which is when we could hope to glean some answers. It would also 
be extremely costly, and the Afghans and their donor partners, might understandably have little 
patience for such an apparently academic exercise in the face of so many other pressing priorities. 
It is presumably these problems of method, cost and priorities that have led the international aid 
community to rely on their intuition on this issue and continue to support capacity building as if its 
worth had been reliably proved. Would it be prudent to adopt the same response or is there some 
way of tackling the problem? Eckstein suggests that there is one particular method the crucial case 
study that can overcome these difficulties: 'Inquiry into macropolitical units involves problems of 
scale and of sound comparison that point strongly toward crucial case study as the preferable 
method' (Eckstein, 2000: 149). 
His guidelines for recognising a crucial case for testing a particular theory include: that the case is 
chosen, not because it is typical (this is generally impossible to prove due to the problems of 
comparative analysis discussed above) but because it appears to 'closely fit' the theory and cannot 
be shown to fit equally well any rule that contradicts the theory' In order to assess this 'fit' the 
researcher must already possess sufficient understanding of the context and culture of the unit to be 
studied to make that judgement. His practical suggestion for identifying a crucial case is to 
determine whether it is 'most likely' to validate the theory or 'least likely' to validate it. In 
operationalizing the theory the attempt will then be to falsify the theory. Falsifying a 'most likely' 
case disproves the theory, while falsifying a 'least likely' case strongly confirms it. Validating a 
'most likely' or a'least likely' case however, can only confirm a strong probability that the theory is 
true, which in the end is usually the best result that can be achieved in social research. (Eckstein, 
2000: 148-149). 4 
So how should we choose a crucial case to test the research hypothesis outlined above? The ideal 
case might be a 'least likely' case: an example of good governance apparently occurring without 
capacity building or sustained recovery and development without good governance would disprove 
the hypothesis but either would be difficult to find. As we have seen the circumstantial evidence is 
against it occurring. Is there a developing or war-affected country, which has not implemented 
capacity building programmes with at least some external inputs? Is there a regime characterised as 
3 This is similar to Pawson and Tilley's arguments against a search for 'typicality' in favour of'theory- driven 
data collection'. (1997: 119-121,155) 
4 Schofield has a similar concept that of investigating a case at'the leading edge' of change (Gomm et al 
2000: 107) 
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manifesting 'poor governance' which has achieved stable social and economic development without 
capacity building? While some dictatorial regimes (whose governance was perceived to be'poor' in 
most aspects) have been remarkably stable by relying on severely restricting capacity even within 
the privileged elite, (Salazar Regime in Portugal, Franco's Spain, Banda in Malawi) they have either 
not survived the death of the dictator or eventually broken down under the social conflict generated 
by lack of economic and social development for the majority of their citizens. 
As we saw above (4.1) there are more candidates for being 'most likely' to fit the theory, though 
still too few to sustain reliable comparison. However, it seems that if the theory is to be tested by a 
crucial case it is this type that we should select while bearing in mind that it cannot do more than 
establish a strong probability that the key causal relationships exist if found to validate the theory. If 
it is falsified to the extent that the simple causal relationship is disproved and a modified 
explanation for the correlation is found, the result may still provide a more reliable basis for 
planning assistance for social recovery. In the (on present evidence, unlikely) case of the hypothesis 
being totally falsified, of course, the edifice of donor assumptions would collapse like a pack of 
cards. 
4.2.3 A 'most likely' crucial case? 
Following Eckstein's guidelines for recognising a crucial case, the first condition is that it has to be 
one that is understood in some depth, over time by the researcher, which is why the Ministry of 
Education in Mozambique (MINED) was confirmed as the candidate at this point. The researcher 
first worked during the civil war from 1983-1989 in the National Directorate of Adult Education in 
the Ministry of Education. The main function of the Directorate was of course, capacity building 
and the researcher's role in that context was supporting the professional development of its staff at 
all levels. The researcher worked for a second period in Mozambique from 1992-1998 (the period 
covering the preparation and implementation of post-war recovery strategies) this time employed by 
donor agencies in bi-lateral capacity building programmes with provincial public administrations, 
especially education services and in the appraisal (at various stages of its development and at 
different levels of the service) of the education sector strategy plan. While the experience and 
understanding of any outsider observing events affecting a community whose culture and history 
she does not share is necessarily limited and biased, it is considered that the long periods of contact 
and close collaboration within the institution at all levels and in most areas of the country afford 
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sufficient insight to assess the suitability of the case for testing the research hypothesis. The 
researcher also had the advantage of being able to conduct the research in the working language of 
the institution, Portuguese. 
The second consideration was to assess whether the case did in fact'closely fit' the theory and could 
reasonably be expected to validate it. That is whether it is in fact a'most likely' case for confirming 
the validity of the hypothesis: capacity building leads to good governance, which ensures sustained 
post-war recovery and development. A detailed study of the creation and development of the 
Ministry of Education through nearly three decades in the context of war and recovery from war is 
the main subject of the following chapter and forms part of the research strategy for testing the 
hypothesis, so at this point it is sufficient to simply outline the researcher's understanding of the 
main components of that history, which are considered to justify its selection as a crucial case for 
this investigation. (Appendix 1 also gives a chronology of the key events in the modem history of 
Mozambique. ) 
The Ministry of Education was created by the first independent government of Mozambique formed 
by the nationalist guerrilla movement FRELIMO after ten years of war against the colonial power, 
Portugal. The new government was acutely aware of the lack of capacity to manage the affairs of 
the nation at all levels of society resulting from the exclusion of more than 90% of the indigenous 
population from education and career opportunities during colonial rule. Redressing this deficit was 
a central plank of their post-independence policy and one of the main demands of the public. 
However, the deficit was so great that external technical assistance was immediately invited to 
tackle the problem. Agencies such as UNESCO provided advisors to assist in the creation of the 
Ministry of Education and foreign technical staff (known as 'cooperantes') were recruited 
individually and through bi-lateral agreement with (mainly) socialist or non-aligned countries, in 
some cases to fill crucial administrative gaps while Mozambicans took up overseas scholarships or 
followed part-time courses, but mainly to shadow inexperienced and unqualified Mozambican staff 
at all levels of the public services and industry as a capacity building strategy. 
Meanwhile, the country was still at war, supporting the Zimbabwean forces against the settler 
regime in their country and allowing ANC units a base from which to organise resistance to the 
Apartheid regime in South Africa. By 1980 civil war had also broken out in central Mozambique. 
As discussed in the following chapter, the internal causes of this conflict have been attributed to 
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both a legacy of unequal development and repression by the colonial power and failures of 
governance by the new government both by omission and by abuses of power. Whatever the precise 
nature of these internal difficulties, there is no doubt that they were exploited by their external 
enemies in the region and used in the proxy struggles of the cold war. 
By the mid 1980s, the war affected the whole country, which was in a state of economic collapse. 
This was the start of what Hanlon calls the 'aid invasion' (1991: 54). The bulk of this aid, for another 
decade consisted of humanitarian relief, but a strong component of capacity building was 
maintained and even incorporated in the relief operations themselves (Barnes, 1998) 
In October 1992, after a lengthy process of negotiation, a peace accord was signed by the armed 
opposition movement, RENAMO and the government. From there on the progress of recovery from 
the war is widely considered successful and after nearly a decade, sustained: three peaceful 
democratic general elections have been held; despite some bitter disputes neither party has reneged 
on the basic commitment to the terms of the accord; economic recovery has also been outstanding, 
with growth in excess of 10%; public institutions, notably the Ministry of Education have 
successfully developed and implemented internally generated sector strategy plans to develop and 
expand public services. 
It is clear from this brief historical outline that the emphasis on capacity building by the government 
and its donor partners stemmed from a belief that it would improve the quality of governance and 
the post-war development of the country. This makes it highly plausible that the high priority given 
to building the capacity of both the general public and public servants was a significant contributory 
factor in that recovery, difficult though it may be to trace the interaction of this mechanism within 
the context of a country torn apart by war and relate it to present outcomes. Nevertheless, the basic 
premises of the hypothesis, that capacity building contributes to good governance and that good 
governance underpins sustained recovery and development does still appear to be a plausible, if 
oversimplified, explanation for the sequence of events described above, and for this reason, the 
Ministry of Education in Mozambique (1975-2000) can be considered as a crucial case for testing 
that plausibility. 
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4.3 Operationalizing the design: research strategies. 
Having opted for the crucial case study as the vehicle for testing the hypothesis, the next step 
involved applying the logic of Pawson and Tilley's model to it. That is the research would have to 
be able to study not only capacity building interventions and supposed outcomes but also the social 
context into which they were introduced, particularly the nature of the interaction between the 
interventions and their subjects. The criteria established in the study of approaches to long-term 
impact evaluation discussed above were also going to be essential to the design of a practical 
strategy for studying the impact of capacity building on the development and governance of the 
Ministry of Education and the wider Mozambican society retrospectively over this long period of 
time. 
This led to the design and operationalization of the research strategy. The results of the research 
presented in the following chapters demonstrate that the strategy was highly successful in obtaining 
a large quantity of relevant first hand qualitative data, basic statistical data, and an equally large 
quantity of secondary material which were first analysed separately and then comparatively in an 
application of the composite research approach described in Chapter 3. The rest of this chapter is 
devoted to tracing how and why the research strategy was developed in this way and defining its 
strengths and limitations as a reflexive process for this research but also with the aim of considering 
its replicability in other contexts. 
4.3.1 The general approach 
It was clear from the above analysis, that although there is strong circumstantial evidence for the 
relationship between capacity building, good governance and the recovery of social institutions in 
Mozambique, the exact interaction of these three variables and full range and complexity of factors 
affecting that relationship are far from being defined. In addition, although some reliable 
contemporary records exist, reaching an understanding of the impact of capacity building over time 
would depend largely on retrospective evaluation by those directly involved. For this reason, 
although some quantitative data was analysed, the research strategy adopted was essentially 
qualitative and cumulative 
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This was clearly going to involve collecting the reflections of Mozambicans on their experience in 
education from the creation of the Ministry of Education in 1975 to the present and as such would 
constitute a form of oral history or retrospective survey. Paul Thompson in his classic analysis of 
the methods and applications of oral history, describes its role in revealing social conditions and 
processes that are rarely documented, for example, `the political attitudes and personal lives of the 
more typical unknown activists and equally of the unorganised, quiescent majority of the 
population' (2000: 94). Amongst the unrecorded (because often illiterate and/or powerless) 
populations, whose role in history has been revealed by oral testimony, he refers to the growing use 
of oral history in recovering the experiences of colonialism and post-colonial development by 
peoples in Africa and other developing countries. He concludes that `Oral evidence, by 
transforming the `objects' of study into `subjects', makes for a history which is not just richer, more 
vivid and heart-rending, but truer'. In his following chapter, he tempers this enthusiasm by giving 
some useful practical advice on the nature of retrospective oral testimony, not only its strengths but 
its pitfalls and limitations. 
He first of all points out the partial nature of documentary evidence: it is both fragmentary and 
created for particular administrative and personal purposes, mostly by the privileged and powerful, 
and this applies equally to the collection of social statistics. All these sources represent `the social 
perception of facts; and are ... subject to social pressures 
from the contexts in which they are 
obtained' (ibid. 124) Again this accords with experiences in war-tom contexts discussed in Chapter3 
above. Oral history therefore provides a vital counterbalance as suggested by the composite 
approach. But, as Thompson goes on to describe, it too has its limitations, particularly due to its 
generally retrospective nature. This has to do with what we know of the workings of memory, 
especially the `process of discarding' which research has shown is highest is the first nine months 
after events, though thereafter very slight. In fact after the initial loss of much detail, accuracy in 
retrospective interviewing is found to increase over time as general recall remains accurate and the 
need to hide that recall diminishes. This bodes well for the use of retrospective recollections as 
evidence of long past and contested events, but there are other factors at work. Research by 
Halbwachs, for example, demonstrates that memory is collective as well as individual, that is, 
particular social groups tend to share perceptions and interpretations of past events. As already 
stated, traumatic events have particular distorting effects on recall and in every case the context in 
which remembering takes place, including for example, the presence of a stranger as interlocutor or 
the presence (or authority if absent) of other members of a family or social group and the location 
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(home, workplace etc. ) all influence what is recalled and how it is expressed. However if these 
issues are taken into account in the way the research is carried out and analysed, comparison 
between oral history interviews, contemporary reports and statistical data in a number of social 
history studies has demonstrated `that the retrospective survey can provide social information which 
in its broad divisions is reliable' (Thompson op. cit. 130-145). 
The second concept that underpins the research design is that of `cumulation' as defined by Pawson 
and Tilley in their study of evaluation: `(C)umulation is a matter of deepening, specifying, 
focussing and formalising our understanding of program mechanisms, contexts and outcome 
patterns.. .a matter of increasing understanding of how these elements are connected' and `will thus 
often involve weaving the results of other forms of empirical research into the evaluation cycle'. 
They contend that cumulation differs from traditional approaches to generalization for the purpose 
of transfer of learning from one case to another (a common objective of evaluation) because it is 
concerned with `theory development' not `understanding the typicality' of a case. `We move from 
one case to another, not because they are descriptively similar, but because we have ideas that can 
encompass them both. ' (1997: 116-119) This approach seemed to accommodate both the choice of a 
`crucial' (but not necessarily typical) case for study and the need to understand the relationship 
between observed and recorded phenomena such as the quantitative development of the Ministry of 
Education, the provision of capacity building support by donors and features of post-war 
governance with a view to developing a theory that can encompass the diversity of other post-war 
contexts. However, in looking at the `prospects of retrospective cumulation' through 'meta- 
evaluation' they find this has proved unsatisfactory due to the `raw materials' ... 
`the difficulty 
being that the quasi-experimental evaluations ordinarily used... are... very poorly placed to provide 
the vital explanatory clues. ' (op. cit. 148-9) This too reinforced the need to look for those 
explanations in the retrospective perceptions of those who experienced the events. They describe 
how this was operationalized in research into an adult education programme conducted in prisons, 
which began with a period of `theory development derived from qualitative investigation in which 
educators were interviewed to elicit realistic theories on program mechanisms... These `folk 
theories' were then used to interrogate a range of data' acquired from other sources (op. cit. 1997: 
87-88). 
Finally like Thompson, they list the limitations of the approach (in fact limitations that apply to any 
social enquiry). First, people `create and recreate their social worlds' and `are able... to act 
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reflectively. ' This puts limitations on the `predictability of future conditions, for these conditions 
are the creation of social actors'. Secondly, `Change is endemic. ' External events '-political ... or 
even climatic sources can subvert (or enhance) the mechanism firing potential of a program. 
Context for action are thus intrinsically uncertain. ' Thirdly `any particular program is embedded in 
an almost infinite range of assumptions about how the social world works. ' We may conclude that 
program outcomes depend on a range of preconditions but `None of this can ever be fully 
articulated, yet the operation of any program is ultimately dependent on it. ' These caveats are once 
again a warning against the blueprint approach to transfer of knowledge from one context to 
another and `cumulation is not a matter of discovering the immutable, timeless laws of social 
programming' but of finding `a family of answers' and `the means of passing on this further 
accumulation of knowledge to the next generation of initiatives'. 
4.3.2 Putting it into practice 
Armed with these ideas and accumulated experience of empirical research in education contexts in 
Mozambique, the researcher conceived an outline strategy that was to involve three main data 
collection methods. 
1. Study of secondary sources 
The first was the study of a variety of documentary sources such as the evaluation reports and other 
documentation produced by donors, the public records and databases of the Ministry of Education, 
published academic literature with particular emphasis on Mozambican sources; a contemporary 
press review as well as some archive material. Some analysis of this type of data in advance of and 
during fieldwork, was necessary for similar reasons to those outlined for its use in criminology by 
Fielding (2001). That is it can fill gaps where the researched population may be 'illusive or 
disturbed' (as can be the case with post-war societies, but also with any attempt to contact 
participants in historical processes retrospectively). He also suggests that it avoids 'unnecessary 
exposure', of the researcher to risk, but it could equally well be seen to reduce the exposure of the 
respondents to the researcher's questioning by establishing a factual narrative of events in advance 
and using the time they can make available to fill gaps, seek corroboration and solicit interpretation. 
The researcher is 'asking well-informed questions, placing the subject in a position to give even 
better-informed replies. ' (Pawson and Tilley 1997: 182) 
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2. Individual semi-structured interviews 
The second and most important research strategy, was to be individual interviews with a sample of 
Mozambican respondents selected on a quota sample basis (see below) and a small sample of key 
person interviews with donor representatives. These were to be conducted using 'cue ' questions 
(Davies 1997: 146-8) to initiate a discussion by the respondent of his or her views of the aims and 
expectations (public and personal) and actual outcomes of capacity building at different stages of 
the period of study. The interview approach was to be more focussed than the oral history tradition 
described by Paul Thompson, (though taking note of his lessons about the nature of retrospective 
evidence discussed above) because its purpose was more specific, that of policy evaluation. In this 
regard the 'teacher-learner' strategy of Pawson and Tilley, in which `The interviewer teaches the 
subject ... what the interview is designed to find out. '(1997: 167-176) seemed to offer an approach 
that would cast the respondent in the role of participant, consistent with the `participatory enquiry' 
concept of evaluation discussed in Chapter3. In this scenario the researcher would set the topics but 
leave the participants to decide how to handle them. 
3. Interactive workshops 
The third idea was to hold workshops bringing together groups of Mozambican participants in a 
series of interactive exercises and debates focussed on issues of change and the impact of change 
(Roche 1999: 235). The intention was to be able to compare collective and individual responses, 
bearing in mind that these are known to produce different results (Thompson 2000: 140). The 
number size, and location of these workshops was to be determined by the availability of the 
participants as discussed and negotiated in the initial stage of the research. In the event this method 
was first of all modified to consist of a series of small group discussions and then abandoned on 
advice from key informants except for one focussed group discussion with parents. The majority of 
education staff are doing second jobs and making time for any meetings beside their regular staff 
meetings is extremely difficult, even when they are motivated to do so. In addition, Mozambican 
colleagues felt that this approach was closely associated with donor projects and would be likely to 
create problems of reactivity. 
4.3.3 Refining the strategy 
It was to eliminate these kinds of problems by developing a research approach with Mozambican 
participation that the researcher then carried out an exploratory phase of research before making the 
final plans for the main study. This time was used to gauge what it would be possible to carry out 
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successfully in order to abandon risky or impractical approaches, as well as to explore and refine 
the issues, choosing appropriate instruments and procedures for their study. The researcher, familiar 
with the working culture of the Ministry of Education, (a combination of clear definition of goals 
and principles and a `crisis management' style of implementation, forged to cope with the 
uncertainties of the last decades and largely responding to person to person interaction rather than 
written communication) was also acutely aware of the need to put the key elements of the plan in 
place with the Ministry planners and administrators by the end of this phase, to ensure 
implementation, while leaving the detailed arrangements to be made as the work progressed. This 
was the approach adopted in designing the sample. 
4.3.4 The interview sample 
The researcher had sent a proposal in advance based on the following requirements and perceived 
constraints. The sample of Mozambican respondents should cover as wide a spectrum of those 
involved in and affected by capacity building as possible. Sampling must cover the different phases 
of the development of the education system and its pursuit of capacity building (early development 
of the MINED, the civil war and increased donor intervention, post-war recovery strategies etc. ) as 
well as the location (different areas of the country and rural and urban contexts) and function of 
different actors in the system. Personal attributes such as age, gender, political allegiance and 
ethnicity are also relevant. 
Sampling this range of respondents by means of a random sample is considered unsatisfactory in 
the general case of retrospective studies (Thompson, 2000: 145-6) because it will produce too many 
gaps in response, first because of the non-existence of a satisfactory sampling frame and secondly 
because of differential survival and incidence of migration between sample groups. In the specific 
case of MINED, systematic data sets relating to participation in capacity building are fragmented 
especially in the period of multiple donor interventions and certain groups such as rural teachers 
were primary targets for assassination and kidnapping as well as sharing the fate of the millions of 
forced migrants. The combination of two non-random sampling strategies as described by Paul 
Thompson (2000: 151) was therefore proposed in addition to informal interviews with key 
informants: quota sampling of teachers (based on categories defined on the basis of documentary 
study, the researcher's own experience and views of key informants) and a 'stratified community 
sample' of the administrative personnel of the Ministry. At this point the use of Pawson and Tilley's 
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analysis of different stakeholder levels: 'policy-maker' 'practitioner' and 'participant' seemed to be 
an appropriate way to conceptualise the different actors (1997: 208-209). 
However since this would depend on both detailed knowledge of the composition of the subject 
population and practical issues of access, the researcher needed to validate and plan the details of 
the sample with key informants in the institution. The National Director of Planning, who was the 
main sponsor of the research in the Ministry, was therefore involved in setting up the sample frame 
during the exploratory phase and provincial staff and head teachers assisted in selecting the quotas 
locally based on age, gender, career pattern, area of work etc. The sample that was adopted (see 
Appendix 2) did meet the main criteria, with the exception of adequately covering rural populations 
and parents/former pupilss. It was recognised from the beginning that working with parents would 
be difficult to achieve within the time frame and it was decided that attempting to work in truly 
rural contexts would be both logistically difficult and also beyond the research capacity of a non- 
Mozambican researcher lacking knowledge of local languages. (Use of translators would introduce 
sources of bias in this part of the sample that would not arise with the groups accustomed to 
communicating easily in Portuguese, in which the interviewer was also fluent). A considerable 
merit of the sample design was that it could be carried out with a high degree of confidence of 
success (which proved to be justified in the implementation) so that despite its limited scope it did 
not suffer from unreliability. The validity of the sample in representing such a diverse society as 
Mozambique is discussed below and in Appendix 2. 
4.3.5 Adjusting procedures, instruments and approaches 
The period between the two phases of the field research was used to readjust the original strategy 
procedures and instruments. In particular, while the discussion groups were to be only a useful extra 
source, if they happened at all, the researcher decided to make more systematic use of daily field 
diary entries to record observation, including a media watch, and informal conversation and 
comments to provide another source of validation and interpretation of the interview data in 
addition to the secondary documentation. A conscious watch was to be kept on possible sources of 
5 Ad hoc strategies for including this group were devised in the field with the help of education personnel (see 
Field Research Report. ) 
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bias in the sample selection and conduct of the interviews and recorded in the diary so that they 
could be assessed later in the light of other sources. ' 
4.3 6 The interview format 
As described in the field research report, the interview format had been further discussed and 
refined in discussions with Mozambican key informants in the exploratory stage of the research. In 
its final form it was conceived as follows. The first stage, in semi-formal survey format, asking for 
factual details of upbringing, education and career (modified to cover education of children by the 
parents group), with invitations/space for comment, had two functions: to collect relevant 
biographical data in order to analyse common and divergent experiences across the sample groups 
and relate these to historical studies in the literature; to engage the interest of the participants in the 
research topic by focussing on their experience as a starting point for reflection on the wider 
picture. (Following the well-tried educational principle of proceeding from the particular to the 
general, from the familiar to the less familiar). For this reason the first invitation to `evaluate' ("at 
were the key moments/influences in your professional development? ) asked them to reflect on the 
personal experiences that they had just recounted. ' The second phase of the interview was 
designed to encourage the participants to reflect and talk about their view of the development of 
education since independence, assessing the respective roles played by government and 
international cooperation, the effects of the war on that development and their view of the current 
state of the sector. This was achieved by means of three `cue' questions, that is, questions designed 
to set the participants reflecting and talking on these broadly defined topics, if possible, without 
further intervention from the researcher. These were the same for all groups in the actual interview, 
although the policymakers group had received a more detailed guide in advance to ensure best use 
of the time they could make available. A fourth question, In your opinion what were the 
fundamental causes of the war? was introduced rather cautiously in the early interviews, in some 
cases not at all, as the researcher had no means of knowing how participants would react to it. 
6 For example, as the research proceeded the researcher noticed an apparently disproportionate number of 
participants from Inhambane province in the sample but was reassured by a Mozambican colleague, that that 
province had indeed supplied larger numbers of personnel to the Ministry in the early years due to greater 
educational opportunities in the colonial period. The sample was reflecting a genuine bias in the institution. 
The 1997 Census also recorded levels of literacy and knowledge of Portuguese in excess of the national 
average in this Province. 
The inclusion of this question was one of the ideas contributed by a Mozambican colleague in the 
exploratory research phase. It seems to have been another familiar form of enquiry, since it was later used in 
an interview with Cardinal Alexandre dos Santos in the Sunday paper Domingo 03.08.2003. 
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Unlike the other topics including the effects of the war, which the researcher had often heard 
discussed informally and in the media, the question of why the war happened was not referred to 
except in oblique or formulaic terms. However, like the other three questions, it did function 
effectively as a cue to reflection for the majority. 
4.3.7 Mitigating Personal Bias 
At this stage final decisions were made on research procedures. In addition to the general approach 
discussed above (3.7.2), the author was concerned to adopt research procedures that would 
minimize reactivity, since it was clear that it would only be possible to meet with the majority of 
participants once and, given the subject matter it was necessary to be able to quickly establish a 
relaxed but purposeful working relationship. Once again, the author's familiarity with the working 
culture of the Ministry was invaluable. The experience of conducting numerous local and national 
`enquiries' (inqueritos) with education staff and parents was used to devise a form and style of 
semi-structured interview that conformed with familiar methods of information and opinion 
gathering within the education sector. Both the semi structured `survey type' interview schedule, 
used to record the personal curricula and the `cue' question method8 for the discussions, had the 
advantage of being familiar social enquiry methods at least to many of the participants, having been 
used extensively, especially in adult education work, in Mozambique. 
While the researcher's ability to enter into the culture of the research subjects, helped by the 
informal discussions in the exploratory phase, was clearly instrumental in increasing validity, she 
was aware that it also carried with it dangers of over-identification and loss of objectivity. She 
therefore consciously used two key research strategies to mitigate this potential bias. First by 
adopting the composite approach combining different types of data and sources. Personal testimony 
from the intimate context of the interviews could be evaluated in the light of statistical data, media 
accounts, Mozambican literature (both academic and literary) and general observation recorded in 
the field diary (Barakat, Chard et al 2002). Secondly the `cue' question method is specifically 
designed to keep the interviewer's intervention (and therefore potential manipulation) to a 
minimum. As discussed above, the researcher's aim was to understand the participants' own `folk 
theories' of what had contributed positively and negatively to the development of post 
independence governance, and the role played by education. The cue questions therefore directed 
8 Known as `perguntas chave' or key questions. 
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them to topics but avoided specifying how they should approach them. The researcher also applied 
a strict rule of avoiding prompt questions and if they were used they were recorded. Informants said 
as much or as little as they chose in response to a particular question. If they chose to range over all 
the topics without further questions, that was accepted and also recorded. Diary entries and notes to 
the interview texts also recorded the facility with which the participants approached different 
questions. Non-intervention was particularly strictly adhered to when respondents were asked if 
they had any conclusions about the causes of the war. 
The decision to write down the respondent's replies rather than tape record them was contrary to 
current methodological norms (Thompson 2000: 126) and so was not adopted lightly. However it 
served two purposes. It was familiar to education personnel and therefore not intimidating 
(whereas the use of tape recorders in enquiries is unfamiliar) but at the same time it introduced 
some formality and distance to the proceedings, the sense of contributing information of historical 
importance, that led the informants to consider their responses, while the researcher was kept busy 
recording their contributions. This reduced the temptation on both sides to lapse into chat or 
`collusion' (Thompson 2000: 140) during the actual interview (though social interaction was of 
course important when introducing and ending the interview). It has to be remembered that this was 
not a classic oral history study in which respondents are interviewed discursively and at length over 
several meetings. The sessions had to strike a balance between facilitating free expression and 
imposing a degree of focus and discipline, and this seemed an unobtrusive way of achieving the 
latter. There was also some concern that the pre-questionnaire agreed to with the policy makers 
might be too directive - but again, the researcher's previous experience had been that the typical 
Mozambican `dirigente' once she or he has grasped what you want to know, has no inhibitions 
about selecting and ordering what they wish to say in the way they wish to say it, using the 
researcher's cues only if they find them useful, and the experience was repeated in this case. That is 
to say it successfully applied Pawson and Tilley's `teacher - learner' approach, setting out the 
researcher's purpose and then allowing the respondents to elaborate on it. 
4.3.8 Confidentiality 
In the light of the discussion of ethical issues in 3.7.3 above, another issue that needed to be 
clarified with the participants was to what extent they required confidentiality and what 
mechanisms would be acceptable for securing it. It was clear that the curriculum survey presented 
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no problems since the basic information was already in the public domain and they were free to 
comment as much or as little as they chose. However it was decided that the opinions given in 
response to the cue questions would be archived separately and in the form of a synthesis by 
category. This was explained to the participants at the start of each interview, but most showed 
little concern about confidentiality. The researcher attributed this to a number of factors: this 
method of safeguarding confidentiality was familiar to many of them; they were free to say as much 
or as little as they chose; they were mostly not afraid to be associated with the opinions they 
expressed. 
4.3.9 Conclusions 
From a methodological point of view, the research has demonstrated that this kind of evaluation can 
achieve significant and valid results, at very low cost, within a reasonable time frame, provided that 
the research design and implementation is based on detailed local knowledge and understanding. 
Such knowledge can be acquired in advance by experience, but also by study of secondary sources, 
including media coverage, by daily observation and by working closely with national personnel. 
Working in the national language was also important for the communication process. Conversely, it 
would have been difficult (and therefore not attempted) to work with parents and communities in 
the remoter rural areas, without knowledge of the local language and culture. 
What has been achieved is a small window on experiences that affected thousands. The result is 
therefore authentic and as far as was possible representative, but incomplete. In particular by 
working mainly with education personnel and committed parents, the study was not able to access 
those who attacked the government and its schools and teachers during the war, to ascertain their 
present attitude. Documentary and media sources, as well as the researcher's previous work and 
research in the recovery of education services post-war in former RENAMO areas9 provide some 
circumstantial evidence that these rural communities are mostly favourable to the establishment of 
schools for their children, but remain sceptical about what they are likely to be taught there. 
For these reasons, from the point of view of studying the Mozambican experience, the research can 
be considered a successful pilot experience that would justify further research by a team of mainly 
9 MA Dissertation 2000 
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national researchers from diverse backgrounds that would enable them to capture the diversity of 
Mozambican society. 
However for the purpose of answering the first of the researcher's two questions: `How can the 
long-term impact of capacity building be reliably assessed? ' the experience did prove to be 
satisfactory. There were inevitably some lacunas in the implementation, and as stated, the scope of 
the research was limited from the start. Nevertheless the field research strategy was, with minor 
lapses, carried out as planned and proved to be broadly successful in achieving its purpose which 
was to facilitate a retrospective reflection by those affected, on the impact of capacity building 
during the turbulent first 25 years of Mozambican Independence and at the same time collect 
secondary data and other material to compare with it. In order to see if this experience had 
answered the question `How can we evaluate long-term impact? ' it was necessary to proceed to the 
next phase, that of data analysis. 
4.4 Analysing the Data. 
Prior to carrying out the field research, the only firm decision taken regarding data analysis was the 
agreement with the Mozambicans that the curriculum data would be archived as individual 
testimonies while the opinions expressed in response to the cue questions would be preserved in 
synthesis by category to preserve anonymity. However, the researcher intended to analyse the 
personal histories looking for common and divergent experiences and as a means of knowing the 
population whose views were being solicited, and then to post-code the interview data by 
participant category (policymaker, practitioner, participant) before considering it as a whole and in 
relation to the secondary data which would also have been reviewed separately. The researcher had 
used these methods on a number of occasions to analyse the results of semi-structured interviews 
carried out in Mozambique and with a sample of Mozambican post-graduate students in Britain and 
expected it to be applicable in this case. 
The basic method adopted was to collect together the responses of all the participants in each 
category on a particular topic, irrespective of which cue question had prompted them (as in previous 
studies they might range over several topics, since they were not interrupted once the cue question 
had been put). The comments were then coded, each new idea on the topic being given a new code. 
When all the responses in one category had been coded, the next was examined, using the same 
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codes if they applied or adding new ones. At the end of the process the codes were re-examined to 
see if some could be amalgamated, where for example the same view was being expressed by 
different participant but in different terminology, as is often the case where different age groups and 
levels of formal education are involved. The final coding list then represented the full range of 
responses to a particular topic. The final stage was to quantify the responses, not to try to convert 
qualitative data into pseudo-quantifiable variables10, but to facilitate the comparative process by 
identifying some key commonly held perceptions and critical minority opinions. A rough division 
was made between `all' `majority' `more than half `less than half 'a few' `one response' `none'. 
As expected, while the same views might be expressed in all groups they could be significantly 
more prevalent in one group than another. 
At a mid point in the field research the method was tried out on the data collected to that point to 
see if it was applicable or needed adjustment. A number of refinements suggested themselves. First, 
although the data was to be synthesised in its final form, it would be useful to keep it in the form of 
individual responses with some identifying markers during the analysis stage. The respondents were 
therefore given a number and gender code (M, F) within their category. Second a separation into 
teaching and administrative staff (although the latter had all been teachers and were often still 
teaching part-time) in the `practitioner' category suggested itself and it was also decided to analyse 
these two categories initially by region (North/South). It had also become clear that there were 
some similarities and differences in the use of key descriptive words, for topics such as `the role of 
government' or `the effects of the war'. It was decided to start the coding by collecting these 
expressions as a key to attitudes and perceptions, characterising each coded idea. The full 
transcripts were then reanalysed using this instrument. It was also decided to keep the responses to 
the `causes of the war' question tied to the particular participant and his or her history while they 
were analysed, though it was essential that this connection should not be retained in the archive. (it 
was also possible to trace other comments back to individuals through the number codes at this 
stage if necessary). The final stage of the analysis was to translate the descriptions of the coded 
responses into descriptive summary phrases in English for the purpose of writing up the analysis, 
while also including translations of examples of responses (see Chapters 6 and 7). 
10 Frank Beckhoffer cautioned strongly against this practice at the Qualidata Symposium `Celebrating Classic 
Sociology', University of Essex July 2001. 
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Meanwhile, the analysis of the documentary material (presented in Chapter 5) had used a number of 
approaches from historical literature review to instruments such as Rebien's evaluation criteria (see 
Chapter 3) the methods used by Forss and Carlsson for the evaluation of evaluation reports (1997) 
to raise questions about the development of the education sector. The final stage was to apply 
Pawson and Tilley's methodology for `interrogating' the documentary record (1997: 88). 
Contemporary accounts and statistical records were examined using the results of the stakeholder 
interviews and applying the criteria they had used to evaluate their experiences of governance and 
capacity building. That analysis is presented in Chapter 8. 
4.5 Conclusion 
As the reader can imagine, from the above account, analysing the large quantity of data generated 
by the field research and documentary searches was a laborious task, especially as the participants 
had been free to order their thoughts around the topics as they saw fit. The upper limit set by the 
researcher of 40 interviews was probably as many as could be conveniently processed in this way, 
but the results indicate that it was a sufficient number to produce a representative result (within the 
set parameters) and it undoubtedly produced the insights that were sought into the relationship 
between capacity building, post-war recovery and institutional development. At the end of the 
process, the researcher was convinced that this was a feasible way to evaluate the long-term impact 
of capacity building interventions and it was not in fact costly in terms of time or money. 
Clearly, if the researcher had had the resources to work in a team with one or two Mozambican 
researchers, it would also have been possible to cover the un-represented rural populations and with 
a little more time, the under-represented parents. However, the following chapters in which the 
results of the research are presented demonstrate, that the approach was certainly effective in 
answering key questions about the crucial case study of the Ministry of Education and the context, 
Mozambique, in which it was created and developed. That is, it was capable of developing 
explanatory theory in that case. The wider applicability of both the methodology and the theory it 
generated are considered in the final chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
INTRODUCING THE CASE STUDY: EDUCATION IN 
MOZAMBIQUE 
Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the choice of the Ministry of Education in Mozambique (MINED) as a 
crucial case study, was based on the fact that it was created in the belief, held by government and 
public, that education was the key to building national capacity for governance and for socio- 
economic development. It was supported by many diverse international partners who held the same 
view, and events seem to suggest that, despite the breakdown of social and economic order during 
the civil war, the investment in education eventually paid off in successful recovery and emerging 
good governance. The chapter examines the history of formal education in Mozambique through 
the study of published literature by Mozambican educationalists, MINED's own documentation and 
that of its donor partners. It begins by tracing the origins of the Mozambican conviction that 
inclusive education programmes are essential for socio-economic development and good 
governance in their pre-colonial and colonial history as well as in the external philosophies and 
experiences on which they drew in shaping their education system. The application and 
modification of the revolutionary education strategy in the context of internal conflict, external 
destabilisation, economic collapse and political transformation within the shifting agendas of global 
politics are examined in the two following sections, still largely from the Mozambican point of 
view. Mozambique's international partners' motivation, theoretical underpinning of their 
participation in the education sector, as well as their evaluation of the outcomes are also considered 
on the basis of literature and documentation as well as interviews with a small sample of current 
representatives of donor partners of the MINED. The chapter is essentially used to present the case 
study to the reader by means of the results of a number of secondary enquiries that were used to 
understand the context in which the main field research was to take place, in conformity with the 
composite research approach. Thus the conclusions are presented in the form of a number of queries 
raised by this exercise, which it was hoped the participatory enquiry might answer. 
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5.1 Experiences of education before independence. 
In considering the central role that was attributed to education in post-independence development 
strategies in Mozambique, it is necessary to try to understand how formal education of children in 
schools and school equivalent education for adults come to be seen as the key to personal and 
national development and empowerment. 
In Portuguese (Mocambique Editora 2001) the word education (educacäo) still has the meaning in 
common parlance, which it has largely lost in English: the development of the whole person, 
physically, intellectually, morally and socially, and the objectives of the national education system 
of independent Mozambique were to be defined in these idealistic terms. That is they expressed not 
simply narrow sectoral aims but embodied the aspirations for creating a new society made up of 
`new' people (Homen novo). ' Academic teaching and learning (ensino-aprendizagem) was only 
part of the concept. 
5.1.1. Traditional education 
Ideas for the transformation of society are of course never completely new. They have their origins 
in the interaction between the culture of the home, life experiences and exposure to other cultures 
beyond the home environment. Mozambique is a multi-ethnic society that has also had a long 
history of interaction with foreign cultures (see Appendix 1). This has resulted in great diversity of 
language, beliefs, social custom and economic activity. Traditional education naturally reflected 
this diversity in terms of the content of what it was deemed necessary to transmit to the new 
generation. Nevertheless, as Mozambican authors Cipire (1992) and Golias (1993) demonstrate, it 
is possible to discern some common characteristics. The first of these is that traditional forms of 
education were holistic and addressed all types of knowledge and skills in an integrated way. For 
example, the initiation rites at puberty, not only transmitted sexual knowledge but the moral, 
cultural and historical traditions of the society. Secondly, traditional education was intimately 
related to the activities of daily life and much learning was by doing. As Golias suggests, it is also 
pragmatic, `the child was taught the essential, the indispensable for life. '2 Thus an enormous body 
of empirical knowledge about the immediate environment was passed on orally in songs and stories 
as well as practical activities. Part of that indispensable knowledge for living was also being 
Sistema Nacional de Educagao Lei n° 4/83 de 23 de Margo (National Education System Law No. 4/83) 
2 Author's translation of Golias 1993,28: 'a crianga era ensinada o essencial, o indispendvel para a vida. ' 
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inducted in separate roles and areas of activity based on gender and age. Thus in the traditional 
education girls and boys were educated separately by adults of their own sex and even as young 
adults were expected to defer to the judgement of the elders. Thus traditional education was 
designed to socialise young people in a particular set of relationships, which institutionalised the 
dominance of male over female and age over youth as a means of securing the collective well being 
of the whole social group. 
Until the last years of the 20th century, these forms of education shaped the lives of the 
overwhelming majority of Mozambicans, including those who were destined to become 
revolutionaries, priests or teachers. 3 For much of the older rural population, concepts of education, 
within the family and in society are still influenced by it as they try to rebuild their community life. 
5.1.2 Imported Education 
The advent of foreign traders and mercenaries and their integration in Mozambican society in the 
early modern period (see Appendix 1) also exposed a minority of the population to either Koranic 
or Catholic education. However, formal state regulated schooling was a rarity before the 20`h 
century and did not reach some areas of the interior before the late 1960s and even then only 
catered for a tiny minority of the indigenous population. 4 
The first legal provision for public schools in the Portuguese colonies was made in 1845 but 
although a handful of primary schools were established by decree in Mozambique in 1854, it was 
evident ten years later that they still only existed on paper. By 1873 there were no more than 400 
pupils enrolled in all the schools in Mozambique. By the early 20th century there had been little 
expansion (48 primary schools for boys and 18 for girls in 1909). The overwhelming majority of 
pupils were settlers, only 1,195 were African and of these the majority attended mission rather than 
public schools. The first and only secondary school to exist for many years was opened in Lourenco 
Marques (now Maputo) in 1912 and by 1918 there were still only 25 `official', that is public, 
primary schools in the whole country and 100 `rudimentary' schools designed to promote the 
3 The early auto-biography of Eduardo Mondlane Chitlando filho de chefe (Khambane and Clerc, 1990) 
written under a pseudonym, graphically illustrates this point. 
4 The District of Maringu6 in the central province of Sofala, which later became the military headquarters of 
RENAMO, had no schools before 1969. (Personal information from local informants, 1995) 
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`cultural assimilation' of the African population while `educating' them for a life as labourers. 
(Buendia Gomez, 1999: 39-41). 
We can discern even at this early stage the key elements that were to underpin the Portuguese 
concept of the role of education in its colony until its demise in 1974. In the first place it was 
discriminatory: different types of education were reserved for different categories of people: the 
official schools catered for the colonial elite (all but a very few from settler families); rudimentary 
schools run by the missions which, though they provided instruction in basic literacy and numeracy, 
had the primary aim of `domestication' of the native population through the medium of religious 
teaching. (Golias, 1993: 57-9). As in traditional education, the sexes were taught separately, but 
unlike traditional education not in equal numbers: very few girls attended. It too had the purpose of 
socialising and inducting individuals into pre-determined roles but in an alien hierarchy of race and 
culture designed to keep the majority in a subservient role, while a tiny minority might gain a small 
degree of privilege by assimilation to the ruling culture. Thus unlike the holistic traditional 
education it created discord between different kinds of learning in the home and school 
environments and exacerbated social divisions. 5 
In addition, the system was not only discriminatory but in practice non-inclusive. There continued 
to be a gulf between what the colonial authorities decreed ought to happen and what actually did 
happen. Buendia Gomez (op. cit. ) concludes that in the first 25 years of the 20th century the public 
education system was to all intents and purposes as yet an `unreality'. 
5.1.3. Education and the Estado Novo 
Following the military coup in 1926 the Estado Novo under Salazar set about bringing order and 
moral direction to the perceived chaotic administration of the Republic. However it did not 
essentially alter the concepts of the role and educational needs of the indigenous population, merely 
sought to regulate and implement the previous aspirations. The colonial enterprise was therefore 
justified as a mission to bring civilization to the African populations. Logically, for this to be 
realised, there had to be a functioning education system for the native population and this `civilizing 
mission' was quickly entrusted to the Catholic Church. It assumed responsibility for `indigenous' 
S In 1987 a Mozambican colleague of the author, educated at a Jesuit mission by teachers he clearly found 
intellectually stimulating, described his childhood divided between the mission and traditional society as 
`schizophrenic'. 
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education under the terms of the 1930 Colonial Act, with the declared purpose to `lead the native 
from the savage life to the civilized life. ' In return the Church was to receive material support and 
privileged status over other denominations in the overseas territories. 
At the heart of this scheme was the concept of assimilation, that the African population would 
eventually assume the Portuguese culture and Catholic values and abandon their own language and 
culture. The more immediate political goal was that of `nationalising and moralising the natives' 
while inculcating habits of work that would benefit the colonial economy. Nevertheless, the status 
of `assimilado' was defined in law as well as the steps to be taken and criteria to be fulfilled to 
achieve this status. The candidate for citizenship had to have command of written and spoken 
Portuguese, be financially stable and express a determination to abandon native customs and live in 
a European manner. The citizenship obtained if these conditions were fulfilled was in practice 
second-class. Access to all but the lowest grades of public service jobs was still denied and 
discrimination in the private sector limited jobs and business opportunities. Nevertheless it 
conferred some useful privileges such as: civil recognition with the right to identity cards and 
passports (and therefore the right to travel); that their children could attend official schools without 
first completing indigenous schooling; that they were exempt from the hut tax and instead paid 
income tax. However, very few Mozambicans were able to avail themselves of this opportunity: by 
1960 less than 1% of the indigenous population had achieved assimilado status (Buendia Gomez 
1999: 53). The first step in the process, indigenous education was neither universally available nor 
designed to facilitate any but the most intrepid learners. 
Rudimentary primary education for the indigenous population was entirely in the hands of the 
Catholic Church. It followed a separate and restricted syllabus in which the core subject was the 
catechism. Portuguese language, arithmetic and measurement, the history and map of Portugal, 
drawing and manual work, physical education and hygiene, moral education and choral singing 
made up the rest of the syllabus which was delivered in three years or grades. Transition from one 
grade to the next was dependent on passing tests. It was only after completing this curriculum, often 
repeating more than one grade, that the most successful pupils were eligible to start the first grade 
of the official primary syllabus, which took a further four years without repetitions. The second 
stage of the indigenous system was `Normal' education for the training of teachers for indigenous 
6 Only international Christian churches were admitted. African churches were suppressed as well as African 
mosques and Koranic schools. Foreign Muslims were allowed to practise their religion. 
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schools. The Church, once it accepted the ordination of African priests, also directed bright pupils 
to seminaries where they completed secondary education up to 9`h grade before going on to train as 
priests. Completing secondary education in an official school was a remote possibility, given that 
after completing both indigenous and official primary schooling, most would be over 15 and 
therefore ineligible to enrol on the grounds of age. 
By the 1960s as other African nations were proceeding to independence, the Portuguese colonial 
policies and practice came under severe international criticism. In response, the separate 
`indigenous' status of the African population was abolished and efforts were made to extend the 
school network. Other international Christian mission schools were tolerated but not officially 
recognised and in 1966, legal restrictions enforcing separate education for Africans were removed. 
Indigenous education was renamed `adaptation' and restructured to allow an easier transition to the 
official system. Different treatment was now justified on the need to prepare indigenous children to 
participate in the official system. Education was also declared `obligatory. ' (Golias 1993, Buendia 
Gomez, 1999). 
However, the disparity between the regime's declarations and the reality on the ground persisted. It 
is true that the number of schools and pupils attending them increased, but on the eve of 
independence it is estimated that only about 5% of the Mozambican population was literate, less 
than 1% had completed secondary education and in 1973 only 40 out of 3,000 university students 
were African (Johnston, 1984: 21). The reality was that no schools existed for the majority of the 
population especially those in the rural areas. Even where schools were available, children were 
excluded by family poverty, age limitations and other bureaucratic hurdles so that the much vaunted 
obligatory schooling was essentially `fictitious'. These facts suggest that the colonial government 
had little commitment to the development of the black population despite the repeated declarations 
to the contrary in official documents. Colonial education in practice continued to be discriminatory, 
paternalist, tied to religious instruction and only available for a tiny, mainly urban minority. (Golias 
1992: 57-61) Eduardo Mondlane, the first president of FRELIMO, described this combination of 
official prejudice, indifference and incapacity that kept the majority of Mozambicans in a state of 
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ignorance to the end of colonial rule as `diligent neglect' (diligente negligencia). (Mazula, 
1998: 108)' 
What answers can we find in these experiences to our initial question about the central role 
attributed to mass education in the Mozambican revolution? The leaders of that revolution all came 
from the tiny group of assimilados who had experienced both traditional educational values and 
been exposed to world knowledge through the prism of Christian missionary teaching (in some 
cases non-Catholic) in a European language. This difficult rite of passage, requiring them to 
abandon their cultural identity, did not, however, admit them to full citizenship in colonial society. 
Their formal education was at the same time intellectually liberating and humiliating. It promised 
integration and moral values based on the Christian ethic but delivered exclusion from colonial 
society while demanding alienation from their own society! The Portuguese assimilation policy 
largely failed in its declared aims because of this contradiction. It fostered not an educated elite 
groomed to take over the administration in a smooth transition to neo-colonial rule, but a 
revolutionary movement. The leadership of that movement as a result of their experience of 
colonial education, understood the importance of formal education and the scale of the deficit of 
knowledge that had to be bridged if Mozambicans were to take charge of their own affairs. At the 
same time they continued to value aspects of the holistic education rooted in the social and 
economic life of their own people. 
As we have seen, the overwhelming majority of the Mozambican population had no direct 
experience of formal education but continued to educate their children according to traditional 
custom. However, the traditional forms of governance and economic activity for which that 
education had been developed had been irreversibly ruptured by the imposition of colonial rule. The 
indigenous majority was powerless, subject to taxation, forced labour and other arbitrary acts of 
authority without any right to redress or even protest, and they perceived that access to the pyramid 
of privilege that oppressed them and denigrated them for their `savagery' and ignorance was 
7 Education as a privilege of the elite and diligent neglect of the education of the rural peasantry were equally 
characteristic of government in Portugal itself, where over 25% of the adult population was illiterate at the 
time of the coup in April 1974. Many of the white settlers and later army conscripts sent to fight the 
nationalists were themselves illiterate, though by virtue of their race privileged in the colonial context. 
8 Mondlane's account of his early years as the son of a chief, induction in the male-bonding rites of the cattle 
herders, schooling and recruitment to the Swiss mission which sponsored his education abroad but which he 
later abandoned to pursue a political career in the UN before returning to lead the nationalist movement, 
encapsulates all the elements of this experience. (Khambane and Clerc, 1990) 
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through school education. Thus they too experienced colonial education as an instrument of 
exclusion and humiliation and in the new order, equated school education with economic and social 
empowerment. 
Thus the perspective of the nationalist intellectuals and the uneducated masses converged in 
attributing importance to education as a means of taking control of both personal and national 
development. The point at issue was what form that education should take, since neither of the 
existing models could meet the needs of an independent nation in the modem world. 
5.1.4 Education in the liberated zones. 
The unification of the various nationalist parties in the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique 
(FRELIMO) for the launch of the armed struggle was forged by the recognition that the primary 
objective was the overthrow of the colonial power. However, it also marked the beginning of an 
ideological debate over the nature of the society that was to be reconstructed once independence 
was achieved. A debate, which has continued ever since, at times contested creatively and at others 
destructively through violence. The establishment of `liberated zones' in the north of the country 
where the guerrilla fighters were hosted by deeply traditional rural communities, who had 
themselves engaged in recent bitter confrontations with the colonial authorities, immediately raised 
the issue of governance: how were these areas to be governed in order to support the common cause 
of liberation? Thus as Buendia Gomez points out the Liberated Zones became `a space for the 
construction and political definition of FRELIMO' 9 
The key ideological issue was whether to simply maintain the existing administration by merely 
`africanizing' the colonial hierarchy or to take the radical option of creating a popular 
administration or `Peoples' Power' (Poder Popular) (Samora Machel 1980 quoted by Buendia 
Gomez 1999: 117). In this power struggle the revolutionary line was promoted by an alliance of 
intellectuals, led by Mondlane and the guerrilla fighters, whereas their opponents allied themselves 
with traditional chiefs. At the Second FRELIMO Congress in 1968, the revolutionary line prevailed 
but as Machel reflected in 1980, this was not an end to the matter. New contradictions were bound 
to emerge as circumstances evolved. (op. cit. 1980). Nevertheless the liberated zones were to be a 
testing ground for implementing the new concept of `Peoples' Power'. 
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... um espaco de construcäo e de definicäo politica da FRELIMO'. 
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In this socio-political experiment, education was seen from the beginning as essential not only for 
the training of cadres but for the inclusion, participation and enlightenment of the masses. The first 
Congress in 1962 already defined three key objectives: to promote the rapid training of cadres; to 
promote the social and cultural development of women; to promote literacy for the whole 
population (including adults) creating schools wherever possible. The key role of education for 
political, social and economic development was constantly reiterated and refined in later documents 
as experience was gained in translating ideas into practice. (Buendia Gomez 1999: 130) 
The administration of the liberated zones including the development of community-based education 
was thus a kind of `pilot project' for national governance to come. However, as Buendia Gomez 
cautions, a pilot project when generalised frequently loses its character. 1° He also asks to what 
extent the revolutionary project, as distinct from the armed struggle to overthrow the Portuguese 
regime, was assumed by the rural populations in these zones as well as the leadership. (1999: 120). 
Similarly, we may question whether the undoubted desire for access to schooling amongst the 
illiterate population can be equated with a full understanding and endorsement of the revolutionary 
role attributed to it by the leadership. 
5.2 Education as Revolution , 
When FRELIMO came to power in 1975 following the collapse of the Portuguese regime (see 
Appendix 1) it had developed a clear ideological vision of the kind of society it wanted to create, 
which was based on both the grass-roots experience of the liberated zones and a fusion of ideas 
gleaned from international Marxism, particularly its interpretation and application to the liberation 
struggles of other peasant societies. Nevertheless, having thrown off the imposition of one alien 
culture there was a strong determination to `avoid mechanical and damaging transpositions' of such 
experiences in order to preserve `the originality of our personality'. " (Machel 1979: 17) 
However, the legacy of colonial `diligent neglect' combined with the abrupt transition to power left 
the new government with a huge capacity deficit when it came to scaling up the experiences of the 
liberation war to create a framework of national governance to deliver the social revolution they 
1° As Korten noted (see Chapterl) scaling up village-based development projects is rarely achieved 
successfully. 
11 `... evitaremos transposicöes mecänicas e nefastas de experiencias, e saberemos salvaguardar a 
originalidade da nossa personalidade. ' Samora Machel 1974 (text published 1979). 
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envisaged. Fully aware of this deficit, they were nevertheless uncompromising in pursuing their 
revolutionary vision, while taking a pragmatic and strategic approach to mitigating their lack of 
human and institutional capacity. 
5.2.1 `Making the school a base for the people to take power' Fazer da escola uma base 
para o povo tomar o poder. Samora Machel (1979) 
Nationalising key social and economic assets (education, health, housing, funeral services and land 
see Appendix 1) within weeks of the declaration of independence was a dramatic demonstration of 
an ideological commitment to social inclusion, which also sought to redress the humiliation 
experienced by the general population under colonial rule. It also immediately presented huge 
practical challenges as to how these services could not only be administered but rapidly expanded 
to meet the expectations raised. 
One of the key lessons of the liberated zones was that at the community level, collective and 
participatory methods of working could go a long way to compensate for lack of experience and 
knowledge. At the same time, there was no doubt that the lack of technically qualified personnel 
could not be substituted by enthusiasm alone. Thus from the first days of the armed struggle, the 
education of cadres (in the FRELIMO secondary institute in Dar-es-Salaam and some early 
scholarships for higher education) was also a priority. This twin strategy was now applied to 
developing the national education strategy, which was essentially conceived as a nationwide 
capacity building exercise as a catalyst for development. 
In the first five years after independence the government fostered a euphoric expansion of primary 
education based on self-help, especially in the rural communities who enthusiastically constructed 
classrooms using their traditional materials and methods. Mazula (1995: 147) suggests that the 
education campaign met with a largely spontaneous response from the public fired by the euphoria 
of independence and the strong desire (noted above) to overcome the backwardness in which they 
had been confined by colonial rule. That backwardness, of course, also left a legacy of an acute lack 
of properly qualified teachers, which was exacerbated by the mass exodus of Portuguese teachers 
who only remained long enough to complete their contractual obligations under the transitional 
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arrangements. Self-help and participatory working methods were brought to bear on that problem 
with the slogan, `Let's make the whole country a school where we all learn and we all teach. ' 12 
Those with basic education of at least four years schooling were co-opted as teachers or literacy 
volunteers and those with teaching qualifications organised to train them in emergency courses, 
through collective preparation and staff collaboration in the schools, collaboration between schools 
(school clusters known as ZIPs) and through roving advisory teams (CAPs). As a result by 1981 the 
majority of children were able to enrol in the first grades of primary education (the gross enrolment 
rate was 93%) (MINED, 1998: 9) About half a million adults mainly in the urban and semi-urban 
areas, also acquired basic literacy and numeracy between 1974 and 1978, the year in which the first 
nationwide campaign was launched. While much of this activity was promoted through the party 
mobilisation, the establishment of the Ministry of Education as a public service institution also took 
place during these years. It had been formally constituted during the transitional government and its 
future direction debated in a national seminar led by its first minister Graca Simbine Machel in 
January 1975 six months before the declaration of independence. (Mazula 1995: 151). 
Despite the emphasis on self-reliance there was no doubt that technical assistance and assistance for 
the education and training of professionals to develop the Ministry of Education would be essential, 
not only for its own sake but because education also had to be the vehicle for developing human 
resources for all the other sectors vital for national development. In parallel with the mobilisation 
of national human resources the Ministry recruited foreign personnel through the UN (UNESCO 
advisers for example advised on the setting up of the Ministry), by bi-lateral secondment 
arrangements with mainly socialist countries and by contracting international volunteers through 
western solidarity organisations. These were designated as `cooperantes' or co-operators. While 
some, especially in secondary teaching and technical training were essentially filling skills gaps 
until Mozambican staff could be trained, the majority were experienced professionals whose 
primary role was to work alongside Mozambican managerial staff in order to build their capacity. 
Unlike the technical assistance model adopted in many other developing countries, they were not 
placed in actual decision-making or managerial positions, and in the Ministry of Education they 
were briefed to work with department or section leaders or with school directorates, to develop the 
capacity of their work teams. Naturally enough given the huge gap in qualification and experience 
12 Facamos do pais inteiro uma escola onde todos aprendemos e todos ensinamos Speech by Samora Machel 
when launching the first national literacy campaign. July 3`d 1978 
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that often existed between the cooperantes and their Mozambican counterparts and the huge tasks 
being undertaken, there were varying degrees of success in achieving a balance between facilitating 
and doing, and between leaving space for Mozambican decision making and stepping in to `get 
things moving'. In the Ministry of Education, since those involved on both sides were 
educationalists, they did generally succeed in creating a learning environment. The strategy was 
less successful in some other sectors. 13 
The second type of international capacity building assistance, which had already been initiated on a 
small scale during the liberation war, was the provision of scholarships to study in bi-lateral partner 
countries or with UN funding in other countries. In the early years after independence, the priority 
given to basic education meant that neither financial nor human resources were available to increase 
the totally inadequate number of secondary places at a rate that would ensure sufficient graduates to 
meet the need for candidates for technical and professional training, including teacher training. The 
ability to expand higher education was also similarly limited and yet graduates were desperately 
needed in all sectors of government and the economy. Thus in these years thousands of young 
Mozambicans studied in specially created secondary schools in Cuba and East Germany and 
thousands more studied for higher degrees and professional qualifications in socialist and western 
countries before returning to fill posts in public administration and services, training institutions and 
industry. (see 5.5. l. below) 
A third capacity building strategy was the promotion of school equivalent education for adults who 
were already in the workforce, in order to equip them to follow in-service vocational and 
professional training. The National Directorate of Adult Education in the Ministry promoted and 
managed: night schools as well as literacy classes for the general public; statutory literacy classes in 
workplaces, which later led to the development of workplace schools for primary and secondary 
education; residential accelerated learning courses for key rural cadres and community leaders. 
This work too was supported by the capacity building combination of cooperante support, part-time 
continuing education in county and overseas education of Mozambican staff who then returned to 
take up management and teaching positions. 
13 Information Elisabeth Sequeira (National Director of International Cooperation 1975-1988) interviewed in 
2003. 
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These strategies were extraordinarily successful in extending access to basic education and rapidly 
raising the general education and qualification level of education staff. The result was a significant 
impact in redressing the imbalance between urban and rural provision and between male and female 
participation. The preparation of qualified staff combined with the cooperante strategy also 
succeeded in creating an institutional framework for the development and management of public 
education. In less than a decade public education, neglected for so long, had been implanted in the 
whole country. However, this rapid and euphoric expansion of provision, while it met the demand 
for inclusion in terms of numbers, still left much to be done in terms of the quality and relevance of 
teaching and learning. 
5.2.2 Recognising limitations 
After five years of exuberant expansion and `learning by doing' it was recognised that there was an 
issue not just of the quantity but of the quality of education that was being provided. Some schools 
were clearly too small and too poorly staffed to provide an acceptable standard of learning and local 
education staff were failing to supervise them adequately. There was clearly a need to consolidate 
the management of the system by rationalising some of the institutional provision and regulating for 
minimum standards of quality. 
A far more complex issue was that of the relevance and appropriateness of what was being taught 
and the manner in which it was being transmitted. This was largely due to the problems noted by 
Buendia Gomez of scaling up a community-based experience to the national policy level. 
The pedagogy developed in the liberated zones and FRELIMO schools was based on linking the 
teaching of theoretical ideas to practical activity. Manual activities, especially agricultural work, 
had been part of the missionary education, but only in a few enlightened cases was it used as a form 
of practical application of knowledge learned in the classroom14 and manual labour was often 
experienced as punishment or exploitation. The FRELIMO schools aimed to break down these 
barriers by applying best practice from the missions, and rural education in developing socialist 
countries such as Cuba, or their neighbour, Tanzania. The lack of qualification or even experience 
of this kind of learning on the part of the rapidly recruited teachers after independence meant that 
14 Father Vicente, a catholic missionary and enlightened and gifted educationalist, who after independence 
headed the school production department of the Ministry of Education, was one. 
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for the most part passive and non-participatory learning prevailed in the new schools and manual 
activities continued to be regarded as forced labour. 
Linking education and community (LEC) was another key departure from colonial education that 
had been developed in the liberated zones. It established the principle of community ownership of 
the school and a mutual exchange of knowledge and support. These ideas were a reaction against 
the separation between school learning and the culture and daily activities of the home that 
characterised most schooling in the colonial system. The nationwide initiatives after independence 
to build and maintain classrooms were a clear outcome of this policy, as well as the institution of 
parent associations, but cultural separation could not be so easily bridged. The linguistic and 
cultural diversity of Mozambican rural populations and their lack of formal education meant that 
facilitating their meaningful participation in developing a relevant curriculum required not only 
capacities, which were mostly lacking, (for cultural and linguistic research followed by bi-lingual 
curriculum development and the elaboration of text books) but also the time for dialogue, and this 
too was not available under the pressures of escalating external and internal conflict. 
That the discrimination by the colonial government against what they dismissively termed `dialects' 
excluded the majority of the population from learning and participation was recognised by the 
independent government and moves were made towards a greater role and status for what were now 
recognised as `national languages'. Local radio began broadcasting in local languages and research 
began to define and `codify' the 24 or more languages so that written forms could be used. 
However, this involved first creating the national capacity for this work by higher education 
training of linguists. Meanwhile, the government priority was to consolidate national unity which it 
addressed by declaring Portuguese the language of national unity and, as we have seen, confronting 
the issue of inclusion by massively expanding access to education in that language. Nevertheless by 
the early 1980s, it was evident from the experiences of the literacy campaigns, that Portuguese 
represented a very real barrier to literacy for the adult rural population, especially women! This in 
turn limited their capacity to support their children's schooling. 
15 Information Teresa Veloso, National Director of Adult Education. 1984-1990 
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5.2.3 The National Education System 
In the aftermath of the Third FRELIMO Congress, which publicly espoused Marxist Leninism as 
the guiding philosophy of the party, and in the face of growing external and internal threats, there 
was a shift in government policy towards a more centrally controlled administration. This coincided 
with the realisation discussed above, that it was necessary to consolidate and regulate the exuberant 
experiences of the first years of independence. By 1979 the Ministry of Education was therefore 
engaged in the process of rationalising the number and distribution of schools and in formulating a 
national education system (SNE) consisting of a regulatory framework and comprehensive national 
curriculum and examination system. The Minister, Graca Machel, aware of the difficulties 
emerging across the country, and true to the vision of the liberated zones, intended that this should 
be an evolutionary and consultative process, seeing it as `essentially a cultural challenge' to ensure 
that the education system could reflect the nature of the society as a whole. (Mazula 1995: 165) 
However, as in the rest of government, a much more technical and bureaucratic vision based on 
central planning gained the ascendancy in the Ministry. The SNE passed into law in 1983 and the 
national curriculum introduced successively grade by grade over the next years reflected this. The 
conceptualisation of the system was supported in particular by advisors from the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) and the curriculum development teams by the technical assistance of 
many foreign cooperantes. The system that emerged was unnecessarily rigid and centralised but 
technically well developed and a considerable achievement for the Ministry and its partners less 
than a decade after independence. It was in any case envisaged that its implementation would be 
monitored and adjusted as it progressed but that aspiration was to be overtaken by events. 
5.3 Holding on - war and economic crisis 
1983, the year in which the SNE became law was also the year in which civil war engulfed the 
whole country and the development gains made since independence began to be reversed. 
Economic growth sustained up to 1982 began to decline, for the first time western humanitarian aid 
was sought to meet the needs of thousands of starving peasants in the southern province of 
Inhambane where the effects of drought were exacerbated by war, though over 100,000 died before 
it was delivered (Hanlon 1986: 144-5). 
Over the following years over 50% of rural schools were closed and rural literacy work virtually 
stopped. Some of the displaced pupils crowded into urban schools, which introduced a three-shift 
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day. The collapse of the economy, the diversion of resources to the war effort and finally the 
structural adjustment conditions imposed by the IMF reduced the resource base for education from 
17% - 19% of the recurrent state budget up to 1986 to 9% of a drastically reduced budget in 
1987(UNDP 2000: 42). Textbooks and basic school materials such as paper and pens became 
scarce or in some areas virtually disappeared. Boarding schools, which had previously grown their 
own food, became dependent on food aid, formed student militias for self-defence or were 
evacuated to makeshift accommodation in safer areas. 
The attacks on schools by rebels were not random. Schools were both symbols of FRELIMO's 
success in meeting the aspirations of the public and of the dissemination of its ideological 
messages. They and their staff were primary targets for rebel attacks in rural areas along with 
government and party offices. As a result many teachers and pupils were killed and abducted 
reducing even further the human capital of the nation. 
As the crisis deepened and the country became dependent on international humanitarian aid to 
secure the survival of the displaced and impoverished rural populations, MINED lobbied to get 
international aid to sustain the education system, arguing that for yet another generation of 
Mozambican children to be deprived of education was part of the humanitarian crisis. As a result, 
the supply of textbooks, exercise books and pens free to primary pupils was funded as relief aid by 
donor agencies led by UNICEF. Meanwhile under the structural adjustment conditions, other 
sectors of the education system were cut back or unsupported. Western donors, if they supported 
educational activity at all did so on the basis of individual and largely uncoordinated projects. The 
strategic capacity of the Ministry was thus severely undermined. For example, the fact that training 
of new teachers and in-service training of existing teachers was severely curtailed as a result of 
attacks in rural areas and lack of funding was particularly damaging at the time and had long term 
repercussions for post-war recovery. The National Directorates for Adult Education and Staff 
Development (Formacäo de Quadros) the main capacity building sections of the Ministry were also 
eventually disbanded with similar effect. 
However, remarkably, the education service established under the SNE, though severely reduced 
and damaged, survived in all but the core areas controlled by RENAMO in the central provinces 
and even there efforts were eventually made to run schools along similar lines to the national 
schools (Chard, 2000). This survival was due in large part to the depth of the commitment of both 
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public and education staff, particularly that of the teachers and parents. Displaced teachers and 
pupils reassembled with the support of parents and continued their activities wherever they found 
themselves and were able to maintain contact and obtain support from local education staff and the 
Ministry. 16 This crisis management was greatly facilitated by the administrative structure put in 
place by the SNE which proved sufficiently robust to function under pressure and included a simple 
but efficient information system, that enabled the centre to remain in minimum contact with the 
grassroots. This support took place within the framework of district and provincial public 
administration, which also retained a foothold in most districts defended by the army. Local 
military units therefore, in so far as they were capable, provided protection, security advice and 
training for self defence to vulnerable civilian populations, which included schools. 
Though the effort of the Ministry in the war years was concentrated on damage limitation and 
survival, there were also areas of development. The systematic upgrading of senior management 
staff and higher education teachers through part-time degrees, overseas scholarships and 
professional training continued with little disruption. Limited education research and development 
also continued supported by intermittent project funding, so that although systematic monitoring 
and evaluation of the whole SNE could not be carried out, lessons were being learned that would 
later be applied in post-war recovery. One important area of policy research was the issue of 
language. As the war reached its most devastating phase, in 1989, the linguistic research and 
codification of the national languages was completed and the understanding had been reached that 
initial literacy in the mother tongue would be beneficial to children as well as adults. Bi-lingual 
literacy programmes for adults then children were piloted so that by the time the war ended the 
knowledge and expertise to generalise the practice already existed. " 
Nevertheless the impact of the war should not be minimized. It was a great achievement to keep so 
many in school but the quality of the education they received was drastically impaired. Meanwhile 
the admissions rate for primary schooling was reduced from almost universal access in 1982 to 
about 60% by the end of the war (UNDP 2000: 43) a statistic which does not reflect the backlog of 
many thousands who failed to enrol when of school age or dropped out during the war and were 
therefore still functionally illiterate at its end. Similarly we have to recognise that while the MINED 
16 Uniquely MINED sent teams to support the resumption of schooling in the refugee camps in Zimbabwe and 
Malawi as well as to those displaced internally. 
17 Information Teresa Veloso former National Director of Adult Education, 2003 
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had the institutional strength to survive, its effort and strategic capability were fragmented and its 
powers of decision severely compromised by dependence on unpredictable and uncoordinated 
donor funding. 
5.4 Education for All 1990-2000 
In 1990 as the geo-political context that had sustained the war changed and the internal efforts for a 
settlement led to the first face to face negotiations between the warring parties (see Appendix 1). 
Political reforms carried out by the government were an important component of the dialogue for 
peace. Following the ratification of a new constitution, reform of the legislative framework of the 
education sector necessarily followed. The revised SNE was passed into law in May 1992 a few 
months ahead of the signing of the general peace accord. The main ideological shifts were to 
remove Marxist rhetoric from the stated objectives and to remove the state monopoly of education 
provision, recognising that community organisations, religious organisations and commercial 
providers could work in partnership with government within the regulatory framework of the SNE. 
Other changes to the statute were a product of the reflection on the SNE, evolution of ideas and 
practice that had continued despite the effects of the war, such as: a commitment to the introduction 
of the use of national languages in education; the redefinition and clarification of the roles of pre- 
school, special, non-formal, vocational and distance education; establishing the autonomy of the 
universities. However, many of the clauses of the law especially the core objectives and approach 
were unchanged and have never been challenged by the opposition. '8 
A much greater challenge than the review of statutory law, as before, was how this vision could be 
translated into reality. The devastation of the war had added even greater challenges to achieving 
that goal. The first enormous task was to simply recover the level of provision that existed up to 
1982. Beyond that were the unresolved issues of the quality and relevance of the education 
provided which still had to be addressed. '9 It was clear that the systematic consultation of the public 
on these issues, abandoned ten years earlier, had to be implemented. Meanwhile the Ministry of 
1$ For example: that education is the right and a duty of all citizens; that education is public and secular; that 
education should develop the whole personality integrating all aspects of development, linking theory and 
practice and the school to the community. Boletim da Republica: Lei N° 6/92 de 6 de Maio 
9 As one parent put it in a public meeting the author attended in Sena in 1995 `We (the school and 
community) are producing a generation of useless people. ' He saw that the school did not prepare them 
adequately for the modern world but since they spent most of their time in school, parents no longer had the 
time to teach them the practical skills they need to survive in the rural life. 
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Education itself, habituated to crisis management on the basis of uncoordinated project funding 
from multiple donors, had to begin once again to plan strategically and recover the policy initiative. 
Compared to 1975, it had considerably less autonomy, but two distinct advantages: an institutional 
presence and structure throughout the country; a body of well qualified and experienced staff at the 
central policy-making level and in some key provincial posts. 
At the beginning of the school year in 1992, MINED with the support of UNICEF produced a 
discussion document, "Education for All in Mozambique: An Emerging Strategy" which set out the 
issues for basic education raised by the Jomtien Conference on Education for All in 1990 (UNICEF 
1991) relating them to the process of review underway in Mozambique. The Portuguese version of 
this document with a number of case studies from other developing countries (notably BRAC 
community schools in Bangladesh and Colombia's Escuela Nova) was circulated for discussion in 
provincial forums of education staff, teachers, local government staff, religious, community and 
NGO representatives. Consultations continued after the signing of the peace accord and resulted in 
the formulation of the first post-war policy and implementation strategy document. (Republic of 
Mozambique Council of Ministers, 1995). 
Over the next years many of the strategies outlined were evolved in practice and refined. Economic 
growth and the switch of resources from military to social expenditure began to produce a peace 
dividend for education20 but recovery of the education service at the provincial and district levels 
continued to depend on bi-lateral project funding in which one main donor took responsibility for 
supporting recovery in each province. This minimised co-ordination problems but led to disparities 
in provision and approach. However, MINED was able to use this mode of funding combined with 
the placement of returning graduates, to build the capacity of the provincial directorates. This in 
turn facilitated decentralisation of executive functions to the provinces, which made them more 
effective for recovery and had long-term benefits for efficiency and accountability. Again there was 
considerable variation in levels of capacity achieved by different provinces. 
At the policy level, the donors and banks continued to support activities with earmarked project 
funding on the basis of their own priorities rather than those of the national government. Primary 
education up to grade 5 was both a donor and government priority and well supported, but stage 
20 A growth rate of 7% and an increase in Education's share of GDP from 3% to 17% (Nellemann with 
MINED, 1998: 13) 
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two primary education got less support and secondary education, needed, apart from any thing else, 
to produce graduates to train as teachers, had no donor funding earmarked by 1998. Teacher 
training itself was supported in a piecemeal fashion despite its strategic importance. Considerably 
more funding was allocated to construction and rehabilitation of infrastructure than to human 
resource development, though some capacity building schemes were supported. Some donors such 
as France and Great Britain were mainly involved at this stage in promoting the teaching of their 
national languages. The nationwide curriculum development process received support from 
UNESCO and SIDA but its crucial component, the development of bi-lingual education including 
the preparation of teaching materials, despite the new law stating that children had the right to learn 
(MINED data 1997 in a language with which they were familiar, was only sporadically supported21 
and MINED 1998). 
It was decided to develop an integrated Education Sector Strategy Plan (ESSP) which would 
incorporate all the ongoing development strategies within one policy and financial framework. The 
evolution of this plan took the form of a consultative process both at different levels of the Ministry 
of Education (in school ZIPs and a district directors' national conference for example) between 
MINED and other ministries, including a close collaboration with the Ministry of Finance over the 
financial plan, and with the Ministry's donor partners. The aim was to produce a policy framework 
to facilitate the balanced development of the education sector both in terms of expanding access 
(quantity) and improving internal efficiency and relevance (quality) (MINED 1998: 14-25). It was 
thus to be a tool for education personnel and at the same time a coordinating mechanism for 
distributing both government and donor resources effectively. The first hurdle once it had been 
agreed internally within the Ministry and by the Council of Ministers was to get the donors and 
financial institutions to endorse it and agree to work within it. This was eventually achieved in 1998 
at the Joint Appraisal Meeting between donors and government, even though it was clear that not 
all the components of the plan were fully developed (critically teacher training strategies lacked 
coherence and were clearly going to be inadequate to meet the needs of the ESSP and the 
curriculum public consultation exercise was still in progress). The donors were persuaded to accept 
the plan not as a blue print but as a `rolling plan' where the policy direction and strategic approach 
was defined, but the rate of progress and detailed implementation of individual components would 
21 It finally became a reality in 2004. 
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be determined by the economic context and capacity development. (Joint Appraisal Meeting of the 
Education Strategic Plan, 1998). 
As a result of the improved economic situation, MINED was also able to take a more flexible 
approach to budgeting. The Financial Plan (Nellemann with MINED 1998) predicted that 60% of 
the budget could be met from government revenue, leaving 40% to be contributed by donors while 
the World Bank offered a back-up lending facility. Meanwhile the Ministry planners were able 
demonstrate, that if the optimum funding was not obtained for the first five year period, the 
implementation would simply proceed more slowly. As a result of this strong bargaining position 
they got most of what they wanted. However, their plea to donors to switch from earmarked and 
project funding to budget support in a common funding pool, though accepted in principle by most 
donors, was not implemented at this stage. 22 
The National Human Development Report 2000 (UNDP, 2000) was devoted to the education sector 
and reviewed the achievements and continuing problems of a decade of recovery. The partnership 
of government and donors, however imperfect had produced results. Enormous progress had been 
achieved in restoring the school network. In absolute terms the number of pupils enrolled in EP1 
(first level primary) exceeded that in 1981, but due to population growth this did not yet represent a 
restoration of the level of access in relation to the total school age population and universal access 
was still not in sight. The geographical and gender disparities in school attendance and literacy, 
exacerbated by the war after the initial gains in inclusion were again being redressed but still 
significant. The prospect of introducing primary teaching in national languages following 
successful piloting was haled as an important step towards inclusion. Of the other levels of 
schooling, secondary education was described as `The most worrying problem' due to its `low 
quality and efficiency'. (Teaching standards were poor and the curriculum described as `over 
academic and encyclopaedic') Enrolment rates of 6% for junior secondary and 1% for pre- 
university grades were clearly totally inadequate in relation to both the school population and the 
skills needs of the country. Teacher training and the effective deployment of those already in post 
were also a continuing concern23 The MINED compilers of the report urged that `the debate on 
22 A limited facility involving most but not all donors came into operation in 2003. See Chapter 7. 23 A special contribution to the report by Dr. Carlos Machili Rector of the Pedagogical University lists `The 
13 Gaps in Teacher Training'. UNDP 2000: 63-64 
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education should be more participatory and democratic' so that it might `represent a true national 
undertaking which goes beyond government mandates. ' (UNDP 2000: 42-62) 
This account in 2000 of the state of education in Mozambique, illustrates a common aspect of many 
post-war societies. The challenge is not merely one of restoring what was destroyed by war but of 
resuming the struggle to overcome an earlier legacy of underdevelopment and inequality while 
facing new problems created by post-war demographic, economic and political changes. The 
general conclusion is that Mozambique and its education service have shown remarkable capacity 
and achieved a fair degree of success in meeting these challenges. The question raised by this study 
is to what extent that capacity can be attributed to the efforts of its development partners. 
5.5 Multiple Donor Partners and Perspectives 
As described in Chapters 1 and 2, concepts and approaches to capacity building aid have shifted 
several times during the last thirty years. In addition the delivery of aid, especially in conflict 
situations, is often determined more by strategic interest than best practice. This pattern is clearly 
evident in Ministry of Education's relations with its international partners. During the first decade 
of its development, western and socialist development strategy was still largely focussed on 
strengthening the state in post-colonial societies. Aid to MINED therefore took the form of direct 
assistance for capacity building based on government needs assessment. Ten years later the 
dominant ideology was that of shrinking the state and allowing market forces and non-state actors 
to govern development. This conditionality imposed by the international financial institutions as a 
result of war and economic crisis, dictated a suspension of development in the education sector and 
concentration on humanitarian relief and encouraged delivery of piecemeal support through 
projects. In 1990 international effort once again focussed on education as a key development 
responsibility of governments and MINED was able to base its recovery strategy around the 
international theme `Education for All'. Its post-war struggle to regain the strategic initiative was 
similarly matched by an international consensus that aid should move from project to sector 
planning (the Sector Wide Approach Process (SWAP) initiative) and this too is reflected in its 
dealings with its donor partners and in their literature (SIDA 2000,2001 for example). Finally as 
financial institutions, especially the World Bank, recognised the negative social impact of structural 
adjustment policies on the public services of poor countries, education was recognised as a key 
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component for poverty reduction and included in the cross-sectoral strategic concept of HIPC 
(described in Chapter 2) and MINED has once again to tailor its own strategic aims to fit this bill. 
5.5.1 MINED's development partners 
Before examining the cumulative effects of this experience from the point of view of those who 
lived through it, the Mozambicans interviewed in the course of the field research, we need to briefly 
examine their main development partners. 
Ideological partners 
Unlike most other newly independent African states, due to the total collapse of the colonial regime 
and rejection of its education policies, support for education was mostly not sought from the former 
colonial power, but chosen by the new state on largely ideological grounds mainly from amongst its 
socialist bi-lateral partners. The German Democratic Republic (GDR) was the main partner in the 
development of the general education system, including crucial support for developing teacher 
education. Cuba provided technical assistance from its own experience for the development of adult 
education. Both these countries provided secondary and tertiary education for Mozambican students 
in their own countries on a considerable scale24. Other socialist block countries were involved on a 
lesser scale for specific purposes (for example. the USSR provided adult further education advisors 
and technical education teachers, Bulgaria provided the first scholarships during the armed 
struggle 25 and supported the adult pre-university foundation faculty FACOTRAV). 
If we examine this cooperation in the light of the analysis in Chapter 1, Mozambique's `recipient 
agenda' is very clear but what was the agenda of its socialist partners? Howell suggests that the 
GDR like most donors had mixed motives for its overseas aid: an ideological commitment to 
building `a new socialist international order'; gaining international recognition; strategic advantage; 
and as its own economy foundered, increasingly, economic advantage. However, it also declared a 
belief in aid as mutual benefit, and respect for national sovereignty. (1994: 305-6) 
24 1105 Mozambican students, 899 of them at secondary level and the rest tertiary, studied in the GDR up to 
1989. (Any still studying at the time of reunification completed their courses in the reunified Germany). 10875 
Mozambicans studied in Cuba mainly for secondary education but some stayed on for technical and higher 
education courses. The last of these returned in the early 1990s. Data from MINED archive 2003. 2$ The beneficiaries are now senior staff in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Information Elisabeth Sequeira 
2003. 
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In the field of education development, naturally enough, the ideological and idealistic motives of 
solidarity, mutuality and respect for sovereignty predominated, especially in the minds of the 
technical assistance and teaching personnel, who were also of a high professional calibre. 26 
Nevertheless, in addition to this undoubted idealism there were also career and financial advantages 
for those from socialist countries who volunteered for international service, as well as the adventure 
of foreign travel. Much the same mixture of motivations was evident in the cooperantes recruited to 
fill teaching gaps and to provide technical assistance, by non-governmental solidarity organisations 
in western countries, from socialist African countries such as Tanzania and Guind or the political 
exiles from South Africa and Latin America. 
UN partners 
UN agencies have generally been less prominent than bi-lateral partners and financial institutions in 
the development of MINED, but often provided support at crucial moments. UNESCO technical 
assistance supported the setting up of the Ministry and at other times conducted reviews of its 
institutional performance and supported the post-war curriculum review. In the early years 
cooperantes from developing countries were also funded. UN agencies were important to the 
survival of education in the war years. World Food Programme supported boarding institutions and 
UNICEF supported the continuation of primary education with the provision of books and materials 
and assisted the development of special education capacity to handle child trauma. It then supported 
the early development of recovery strategies under `Education for All, ' continued to support basic 
education in selected districts, funded professional courses in Portugal and supported the 
`Mainstreaming Gender' component of the ESSP. UNDP in the 1990s was an implementing partner 
for in-service teacher training and school building for the World Bank funded education project and 
played a crucial role in getting the ESSP accepted by the donor community. Thus UN support has 
mainly been delivered through earmarked funding customarily tied to time-limited projects, though 
often linked to current thematic concerns of the international community, which MINED has been 
able to use to its advantage (MINED data 1997). 
26 This was the author's experience of working alongside both GDR professionals and those from other 
socialist countries (USSR, Bulgara, Cuba etc. ) see also Howell op, cit. 327. 
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Western Donor partners 
During the first decade of MINED's development few western donors were involved. However, 
SIDA (Swedish International Development Agency) was a significant partner from the beginning 
and has continued to be the lead agency to the present. In the early days it funded the placement of 
cooperantes (of various nationalities not necessarily Swedish) and provided project funding for the 
development of literacy programmes (materials, a training centre, higher education courses) and 
technical training (Lind, 1985). Like MINED's socialist partners, Swedish involvement was and is 
ideologically motivated by a commitment to basic education for children and adults both as a 
human right and a necessary factor for development. It has also believed in supporting partner 
countries' own education programmes so that its projects were planned within MINED strategy and 
in the post-war period, SIDA has been the lead agency in the education sector supporting both the 
ESSP and the common funding pool. (Cruz et al. 1995 and SIDA 2000,2001). Having said that, it 
has not been immune to the contradictions of the donor recipient relations discussed in Chapter 1, 
particularly the selective and therefore distorting effect of project funding and the temptation to 
assert its own analysis of priorities 27 As a medium-sized neutral European state, Sweden is also 
clearly motivated in its overseas development policy to enhance its international standing but the 
idea of mutual benefit from aid is not acknowledged. 28 
Britain was another early partner of MINED, but with a completely different level and type of 
engagement. British Council was the first western agency to provide higher education and 
professional training scholarships, starting from 1983. As a service provider the Council responded 
to requests from Mozambican institutions and individuals made through donor partners (largely the 
British Foreign Office and ODA/Df D, but also other bi-lateral donors and UN) and based the 
allocation on needs assessment, relevance of the courses offered (most in the UK but also in 
regional and third country institutions) and the availability from other providers (bursaries for 
education courses were not funded for example until the GDR provision came to an end). 29 
27 For example, in the 1980s literacy work was generously supported but not post-literacy and further adult 
education. A recent example was the insistence on a capacity building project for education management in 
MINED for the implementation of the ESSP. Mozambican staff and the end of project evaluators found that it 
was not relevant and that financial management and district level capacity building should have been the 
priority. SIDA 1985 SWEDEC 2003 SIPU International 2003 
$ This was made clear by Karin Sverken SIDA Coordinator for Education Programmes in Mozambique 
interviewed in 2003. 
29 Information Elisabeth Sequeira, former National Director of International Cooperation and Simon Ingram- 
Hill Director British Council Mozambique. 2003. 
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Britain's interest in Mozambique throughout most of this period has been mainly strategic. There 
was a shared interest in securing an end to violent conflict with negotiated transition to majority 
rule in both Zimbabwe and South Africa. Aid including that provided through the British Council 
reflects this perception of mutuality. It was responsive to requests for scholarships and training to 
meet the capacity building needs of the administration, industry, law and banking and linguistic 
studies and the number of bursaries was at its peak in the final years of the war, reflecting both 
Mozambican and donor anticipation of human resource needs for post-war recovery, but the main 
support has been in the area of English language teaching, which was of strategic interest to both 
parties (see Appendix 6). It was only when British international development policy shifted towards 
poverty reduction in the 1990s that DfID finally became directly involved in mainstream education 
under the ESSP, supporting the development of distance secondary education. 
These examples represent the two poles of engagement amongst the western donor partners of 
MINED which at the time of the preparation of the ESSP numbered thirteen including the European 
Union 30 
Financial partners 
Following the introduction of structural adjustment under IMF rules the World Bank became 
MINED's main financial partner 31 and provided the largest share of the funding for the education 
sector in the post-war recovery period through a series of five year programmes for general 
education development, infrastructure rehabilitation and capacity building. It put its weight behind 
the adoption and funding of the ESSP by the donors, while being prepared to provide back-up 
funding for any shortfall and facilitated its implementation by carrying out a detailed costing of the 
whole plan on behalf of MINED and the donors. As a development bank it clearly identifies 
education as a key input for development to which it takes a strategic and comparatively long-term 
approach and its interventions are thoroughly researched and evaluated. In this regard its aims and 
general approach are compatible with the Mozambican strategic view of education. However, it is a 
bank and as such is in the business of providing investment loans for which it has to account to its 
shareholders. Therefore as described in Chapters 1 and 2, it is driven by shifts in global economic 
30 Finland, Canada, Great Britain, Sweden, Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, France, Portugal, Australia, 
Ireland, Italy, European Union. (MINED data 1997) Other countries such as Brazil and India were 
implementing partners for components of the donor funded projects. 31 Support from the African Development Bank and OPEC are listed in 1997 
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ideology as well as the pragmatic lessons learned from its systematic evaluation of its programmes. 
It has moved at a policy level from strict application of structural adjustment rules, to a recognition 
of the importance of social programmes for poverty reduction, but as Klees (2002) suggests 
continues to deal in global or at best regional strategy development and on the ground its staff still 
tend to deliver blueprints rather than support evolving national strategies 32 (Human Development 
Network, World Bank 2002) 
5.5.2 What kind of partnership? 
It is evident that MINED could count on a fair degree of good will from its partners who in the 
main supported its premise that education was crucial to recovery and development. At the same 
time, as in every aid partnership, genuine solidarity was not unmixed with self-interest and 
ideological or humanitarian perspectives that were at odds with Mozambican reality. The diversity 
of partners and the geo-political upheavals in the wider world that impacted on Mozambique's 
development also resulted in variable levels of funding and support for MINED's needs and 
objectives and inconsistent approaches both between and within organisations. 33 As discussed in 
Chapter 1 and 2, organisational learning is often interrupted by short-termism and distracted by 
external pressures. It was concluded that these failings are probably inevitable unless the recipient 
partner has the capacity to develop its own agenda and negotiate and coordinate donor support for 
it. When evaluating the capacity building support for Mozambique's education development, we 
therefore have to consider not only how it was offered and delivered, but the extent to which 
MINED, in very difficult conditions, was able to make the best of imperfect assistance that was 
nevertheless largely offered in good faith. 
5.6 Conclusions 
This review of the literature, documentation and personal recall of aid partners relating to the 
development of education in Mozambique, reveals a process of capacity development which was 
deliberately initiated and supported as a collective learning process, which was retarded but not 
abandoned during the war years and reasserted in the post-war period, despite the transformation of 
32 For example, attempts to introduce cost recovery from Mozambique's absolute poor or cut the salaries of 
already underpaid teachers. 
33 The interviews with donor representatives confirmed the author's previous experience, that agency staff are 
rarely briefed or have access to records of their organisation's partnership with MINED for more than the 
previous five years and often simply receive a briefing from the previous incumbent. As a result 
organisational memory and historical perspective are lacking in their relations with the education sector. 
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the political and economic conditions. Education in Mozambique is therefore confirmed by this 
initial scrutiny as a crucial case of the successful application of Korten's `learning process 
approach' to capacity development. 
However this study of the secondary material raised some issues that needed to be clarified by 
analysis of the testimony of the Mozambican interviewees in the field research. 
Capacity building of education professionals, both in-service and through scholarships was the 
main development strategy supported by the donor partners. Several donor representatives 
interviewed in 2003 expressed the view that as a result MINED had some very able management 
staff, but continues to be institutionally weak34. This raises two queries. First: what are the actual 
institutional strengths and weaknesses of MINED? The literature suggests that it demonstrated 
institutional strength in surviving the war, but the quality and grassroots delivery of service was 
seriously weakened. Seondly: can individual capacity building lead to institutional 
strengthening/development of itself and if not what other conditions are necessary ? 35 
MINED demonstrated considerable capacity for strategic planning for recovery in the post-war 
period. Is this attributable to the success of the early capacity building assistance and its 
continuation through the war years or to post-war donor support? That is, was the strategic recovery 
a product of Mozambican initiative in taking advantage of policy shifts in the international aid 
community or was it driven by them? 
In the post-war recovery period MINED and its partners worked to achieve a unified strategic 
approach to the education sector. To what extent was this achieved and how advantageous has it 
proved to be? 
In order to answer these tactical questions, we need to address the more fundamental issue of the 
nature of the relationship between the national leadership and its strategic vision for education, its 
34 British Council, SIDA and DFID representatives interviewed in Maputo 2003. The donor community has 
spent much time over the past decades advising on the restructuring of the central Ministry. The latest effort 
by the consulting firm Ernst and Young was underway at the time of the author's field research in 2003. 
However despite the fact that it was the local structures that were least developed and worst affected by the 
war, capacity building support at this level has not had consistent support. 
35 My thanks to Agneta Lind Regional Education Adviser SIDA, for making this query at an early stage of 
the field work. 
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technical and financial assistance partners and the Mozambican public aspirations and participation. 
Was the core concept of the role of education for personal and national development (despite 
ideological and cultural difference) shared? Was it that that sustained education provision 
throughout all the political changes and multiple donors? What were the real outcomes of this 
national capacity building exercise? Did the government strategy meet the expectations of the 
public? Did it create conditions for personal development? Did it create conditions for national 
development? Was it inclusive and equitable? Did it contribute to good governance and peace in the 
long term? 
All of these issues were touched on by the Mozambican participants as they reflected on their 
personal experiences, which are the subject of the next chapter. In the second stage of the 
interviews they were asked to discuss the role of government, international cooperation and the 
public as well as the impact of the war in order to shed more light on the nature of these 
relationships and their impact on capacity development. These testimonies are analysed in Chapter 
7 and the concepts they reveal are used in Chapter 8 as yardsticks for analysing the nature of 
governance in contemporary Mozambican society. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT THROUGH REVOLUTION, 
WAR AND PEACE. 
Introduction 
The macro-picture of the development of the education system during the crucial period of recovery 
from colonial underdevelopment and the war for independence, descent into civil war and economic 
collapse and the second period of recovery and development in the 1990s, are chronicled in Chapter 
5. This chapter seeks to understand that experience from the inside through the experience of 
individuals involved in learning and working within the institution charged with building the 
capacity of the emerging nation while at the same time creating itself. It is therefore the personal 
data recorded in response to the first stage of the interviews with the sample of education personnel 
and parents in the field research that provide the material for the analysis. 
As described in Chapter 4, one idea that emerged from the exploratory research was to ask 
education staff to describe the key moments and formative influences for their development as 
education professionals. The parents group, though not asked this specific question, also 
volunteered comments in the course of their discussion of their experience of education. Their 
reflections graphically demonstrated the fact that the capacity of individuals evolves as a result of 
the complex interaction between individuals and the social, economic and political context in which 
they find themselves. This chapter starts by examining these personal experiences through the 
participants' own evaluation and then examines their factual accounts of their education and career 
in response to the curriculum questionnaire, which was the starting point for each interview. 
We can start by reminding ourselves of who the participants were: a quota sample of staff from all 
levels of the Ministry of Education, both teachers and administrators and a small group of parents 
contacted on a more ad hoc basis (see Chapter 4 above). Crucially, as we will see in more detail 
below, all these individuals had direct experience of learning and developing a career during these 
crucial years, as well as being significant actors in the learning and development of other 
individuals and education institutions. What did they see as the most significant influences directing 
them along this path? 
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6.1 Key moments and influences. 
In the following analysis the participants' responses when asked to describe the key influences in 
their career have been grouped in four types of positive influence in developing a career in 
education and a fifth group of negative experiences, that held back professional development often 
by their psychological as well as practical impact. 
6.1.1 Personal influences. 
25 participants from all four categories (including 5 in the parents' group) mentioned the personal 
influence and intervention of older people at critical stages for their educational and professional 
development. Parents and other close family members were the most commonly mentioned, 
particularly by those who attended school before Independence. 
They did not study, but they had the courage to send us to school 
Category D. (Child of illiterate parents). [f] 
They gave importance to education - they had 8 sons and daughters and they all studied 
Category B (Child of illiterate parents) [m] 
Others mentioned the influence of a teacher or the critical intervention of a friend, priest or 
colleague. 
I was stuck (at home) until Don Alexandre' (then a priest, now archbishop) saw this and asked my father to 
send me to a training college. 
Category C. [f] 
There were people who were role models - teachers and others 
Category B. [m] 
The person who influenced me most was a white accountant - my boss but also a friend - it was he who 
persuaded me to study and paid the enrolment fees. 
Category D. [m] 
1 Don Alexandre dos Santos, the first black Mozambican priest and now first Cardinal. A generation older 
that the senior education staff interviewed in this study (age 79) he pioneered the path from a rural peasant 
home through mission school and seminary to a career in the priesthood and as a lifelong educator. He also 
played a crucial role as mediator in the peace process. Interview in Domingo 3`d August 2003 to 
commemorate his 50 years as a priest. 
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A maths teacher in 9h grade. I like maths and I like teaching maths. 
Category C. [f] 
Several senior Mozambican colleagues (including two national directors interviewed in the study) 
were mentioned as key influences for career development by 6 of the education personnel. 
My head of department, Brazäo Mazula2, who was always concerned about the professional development of 
his subordinates, giving them opportunities to gain experience and assume greater responsibilities. 
Category A. [m] 
I went to work in the... National Directorate for Primary Education, with the late Dr Manuel Golias' - an 
important influence. 
Category B. [m] 
The then Director of the Faculty, now National Director... was my teacher - she was very good and a very 
good, simple person 
Category C. (Had to interrupt a degree course for family reasons. )[m] 
Four interviewees also mentioned the importance for professional development of living and 
working with fellow students and colleagues. 
Through keeping company (that was the style of my parents) with many people - colleagues -I learnt a lot. 
Category B. [f] 
2 Brazäo Mazula , Rector of the University of Eduardo Mondlane, His path also led from mission school to 
the priesthood and a career in education and public service. After Independence he left the priesthood and 
worked in the Ministry of Education and Culture. Like many of his contemporaries in the Ministry, he studied 
abroad on a scholarship, in Brazil, where he completed a doctorate in 1993. Returning to Mozambique in 
1994, he was appointed President of the Electoral Commission, which ran and supervised the first multi-party 
election following the Rome Peace Accord. Mazula, 1995 Cover note on the author. 
3 Manuel Golias was mentioned by more than one interviewee with some emotion, due to his recent sudden 
death. His career was also typical of his generation of senior education staff. From a rural peasant home in 
Tete, he went to mission school and then 'Normal' training college in the colonial period. He was one of the 
first group to study for a bachelor degree in education at the University of Eduardo Mondlane, immediately 
after independence. Having worked as a teacher at all levels of the SNE, he held various posts in MINED up 
to National Director. He then obtained a masters degree in education from Sussex University, through the 
British Council and after a period teaching in the Higher Education Institute (ISP) played a crucial role (as 
senior project officer for GTZ/PEB)), in the post-war recovery and development of education in Sofala 
Province. Golias, 1993 cover note and personal information. 
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Living a lot in boarding hostels... companionship with other people, learning many things, which otherwise 
(coming from a remote area) I would not have learnt. 
Category C. [m] 
6.1.2 Personal motivation 
Personal motivation was undoubtedly essential to the success of all the interviewees and was 
referred to in one way or another by 22 of the education personnel and two parents. 
Determination, the desire to learn... working as administrative staff with grade 11,1 understood that what I 
knew was not enough.... always wanting to learn more. I made applications to get scholarships. 
Category A. [m] 
I'm not yet satisfied with the work ! am doing - being a teacher was to get employment - I'm content but ! still 
have the goal to achieve higher education - always struggle to progress. 
Category C. [m] 
Motivation was often expressed as pride in achievement, (mentioned by 10 interviewees). Three of 
the interviewees, two administrative staff and one science teacher, were proud to have written 
textbooks. 
The pride of having a better education than my parents. 
Category D. [m] 
The graduation ceremony - as a mother of four - when I received the paper in front of my children, I felt 
everything is possible. It was an incentive for the children to take more responsibility to manage to study, now 
that their mother managed it while working. 
Category B. ( receiving a Licenciatura certificate at the Pedagogical University) [f] 
The second most commonly cited motivation in all groups of education personnel was a love of 
study for its own sake. Several apparently stayed in the teaching profession or valued it because of 
the access it gave to higher education. 
From 6`" grade I was interested in school (before I just went because my parents sent me). When I was placed 
in Namaacha (training college) I was interested in studying -I wanted to be an economist because I always 
liked mathematics. 
Category B. (Currently applying for a place at the Pedagogical University. ) [fl 
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I like to study and learn new things. In 19901 was the only one to ask to study (for a degree at the Pedagogical 
University) 
Category C. [m] 
The UP was the culmination... one learnt new things about Portuguese... it was achieving the maximum. I was 
49 years old -I studied with youngsters I had taught in grade 9. 
Category C (referring to a Licenciatura degree at the Pedagogical University)[m] 
For three who struggled out of the most disadvantaged childhoods earning a first salary and 
realising they had left absolute poverty and dependence behind was a seminal moment. 
When 1 started work, I had no salaryfor six months (this bureaucratic delay was normal) then I began to live 
at my own expense for the first time. 
Category B. [f] 
6.1.3 Working experience 
More than half the education personnel described particular working experiences that increased 
their professional commitment and capacity. For many, especially the senior staff, it was their early 
experiences of working (often compulsorily, see below) in education. 
Perhaps it was my first pupils when I was sent to Beira - in the difficult conditions of that time -I felt I 
couldn't fail them. 
Category A. [f] 
The first (influence) was when I started my career. It was the first time to work with people better qualified 
than me - the classes were very undisciplined, agitated - it was a learning process. 
Category B. [m] 
When I started teaching grade 7... Lesson planning was an extremely important activity, every Saturday, and 
the more experienced teachers contributed their experiences. It was training on the ground - but complete. 
Category C. [m] 
Many others referred to challenging assignments, that they were at first not sure they could handle, 
but which in the end increased their confidence and capacity. More senior staff clearly relished 
these situations as opportunities. 
When I was called on to be pedagogical director, I felt I couldn't do it, but a (woman) teacher gave me 
support in learning the work and then proposed me for the job. 
Category C. [m] 
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The (secondary) network is not sufficient to absorb the graduates from basic education - above all there is a 
lack of space, lack of classrooms... the furniture is insufficient and the pupils move the desks from one 
classroom to another leading to their rapid deterioration - you need a new capacity to manage this situation. 
Category C. [m] 
When I was appointed as director of the school.... it was a school with many problems, with the teachers and 
so on -I felt I was not capable but 1 accepted the challenge and at the end of seven years I was happy to leave 
the school in a different condition... the teachers were more friends than colleagues. 
Category B. [f] 
Being Provincial Director is what I really like ... it is a rare opportunity to 
develop some things, ideas that 1 
have. 
Category A. [f] 
Six practitioners mentioned that their personal development and job satisfaction came from 
teaching and contact with their students. Many other interviewees at all levels mentioned that they 
enjoyed teaching and contact with students while recounting the details of their curriculum. 
After this (pedagogical degree) course I can now give lessons at night... As a person I gained confidence (I 
used to be a timid person) - and greater facility in speaking. 
Category B. [f] 
The positive thing (about teaching) is the company of the pupils, getting to know different personalities. 
Category B. [m] 
I still like working with children. (after 29 years) 
Category C. [f] 
I like working with children. 
Category C. (in first job) [f] 
Four from all three categories, mentioned involvement in activities outside their education duties as 
formative experiences. As the largest group of educated personnel in the country education staff 
have frequently been co-opted to assist in various national programmes, especially in the two 
critical development periods, post-independence and post-war. More recently, young professionals 
have had a range of experiences as students. 
Participating in the country's development programmes (the general census, electoral bodies etc). 
Category A. [m] 
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The Circle of Peace (for reconciliation) -a course on theatre actors as a means of communicating the peace - 
that made a big impression on me - the National Dance Company was involved... 
Category B. [m] 
In the year when I couldn't study (gap between school and university) I worked as a teacher in a community 
school. I did a course in IT and bookkeeping and worked in the Catholic Church's Radio Manica. 
Category C. [f] 
6.1.4 Institutional measures for capacity building 
The formative experiences most commonly cited all education personnel and by four parents are not 
surprisingly formal education and training and capacity building organised by the Ministry of 
Education. 
Doing grade 6 after Independence? Everything was brand new - we had the will to study and do what the 
teachers said -there was the will to educate the children. 
Category D. [f] 
I did grades Ito 3 in the colonial time, 4 and S in the time of the arrival of FRELIMO - in the colonial time I 
would not have studied to grade S. 
Category D. [m] 
Going into grade 5 (1977). 1 never expected that I could enter grade S. It was the first time to pick up a 
dictionary and books. 
Category B. [m] 
The introduction of the SNE. (National System of Education) 
Category A. [m] 
These parents and education personnel clearly felt they owed their development to the extension of 
access and development of the national education system by the national government after 
independence. 
Although the majority of older personnel were directed or induced to teach soon after independence 
(see section 6.2.3 below) only 5 mentioned it as a critical moment, clearly because they thought that 
they would not otherwise have gone into education. One provincial head of department seems to 
have seen it as positive: 'at times it is not a bad thing to be directed, without that I would not have 
made it'. The others were at best sceptical but mostly negative. However, they seem to have 'got to 
like it' or made the best of it. The fact that they remain, mostly in senior posts, and have not left 
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education, as many of their contemporaries have, suggests that it was in the longer term a positive 
influence. 
The needs of the country - that directed me to a teaching career- at the beginning I was revolted by it - but 1 
got to like being a teacher -I don't that much like being in the Ministry. 
Category A. [f] 
Not having a choice at the beginning of my career. I had the luck (but against my will) to go for teaching -I 
wanted to be an economist - others went to the army. It derailed my career, but I got to accept it. My present 
work is more like what I wanted. 
Category B. [m] 
Being a teacher was compulsory - but I got to like it, but it was not my decision. Even the subjects were 
decided on the basis of grades - that is why today the majority of the education cadres are not in education. 
Category C. [f] 
When they called me to be a teacher in 1979 when I was still studying - to help the school - it seems I showed 
some aptitude for teaching biology and from there I was directed into the teaching profession. But in the 
Faculty instead of doing biology I did history. In principle I did not want to be a teacher, but I always liked 
teaching. 
Category C. [m] 
Having entered the education service, certain opportunities for further formal academic and 
professional training were regarded as very important formative experiences, while others were not 
mentioned as significant and appear to have been just something they did for career reasons. (No 
one in the A group for example mentioned an overseas MA as a key experience. ) Often it was the 
first, sometimes emergency, training, or the first experience of higher education that was seen as the 
most significant. In other cases the opportunity to study to update professional skills after many 
years in service was greeted with enthusiasm. 
Since the majority of the education personnel received professional and academic training in the 
Mozambican institutions created after independence with the support of foreign technical assistance 
and funding, it is not surprising that these experiences are the most commonly cited by individuals 
in all groups but predominantly by the teachers, whose initial training was provided in country and 
who often returned to formal study at a much later stage in their career as these institutions 
expanded their provision. 
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Being sent (free) to the university and directed into the teaching profession. 
Category B. (referring to the University of Eduardo Mondlane (UEM) bachelor of education degrees in the 
early post-independence period. ) [m] 
The course in the Faculty (UEM bachelor degree) was very important - it threw me out of a difficult life - to 
develop academically and culturally. 
Category C. [m]. 
The history and geography course - learning methodologies, how to elaborate texts and get more out of 
reading. 
Category B. (mid-career (Licenciatura at the UP) [f] 
This last training opened me more, with methodologies at a higher level - the training as a 'professor de 
posto' (colonial teacher training) - at the time was the best, but!!!! (a gesture indicating no comparison) 
Category C. (recent training in a pedagogical institute) [f] 
When I went to the IMP, where I learnt psychology, pedagogy and methodologies, - it was very important - it 
opened my eyes. 
Category C. (mid career training in a pedagogical institute) [m] 
Some individuals in all groups (but no women in groups B and C) studied abroad on scholarships 
provided by the host countries or by UN agencies. As described in Chapter 5, for the first ten to 
fifteen years after independence, this measure was used to expand access to secondary and higher 
education and rapidly to produce qualified cadres to develop the national institutions. Senior staff 
were also sent for strategic training later in their career. For some, these were key opportunities that 
allowed them to develop intellectually or professionally. 
Having gone from here -- I would not have managed to study here, although it was dijfIcult to be out of the 
country. In Cuba we suffered a lot but it did for the purposes of getting an education. 
Category C. (secondary and technical education in Cuba) [m] 
Going to Cuba -a big moment in my life - the first time away from the family -a very different style of 
education. 
Category B (completed second level primary to degree level in Cuba) [m] 
The life of a student abroad in Europe (I never expected to study abroad) - it was difficult (studying in a 
language as hard as German) but good in the end. 
Category B (Diplom graduate from the DDR) [m] 
The formation in Paris, which apart from being good (technically) was multi-cultural and comparative 
because it brought together students from many countries. 
Category A (sent by MINED to a specialist one year course at UNESCO) [m] 
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Learning to share power, the distribution of tasks - to come back with a concept of how to direct. School 
directors are so often not trained but are punished for their shortcomings. 
Category A. (Sent by MINED on a four month course in school administration and management in Portugal) 
[m] 
Experiences of in-service capacity building and non-formal training, by Mozambican colleagues or 
foreign technical assistance, were clearly regarded as just as important, (some times more 
important) for professional development as formal study, by fourteen of the interviewees. However, 
as with their formal education, some donor funded training was simply listed in response to the 
questionnaire as something they had attended and others failed to mention it at all until prompted. 
Cuba where I learnt (in-service tutorials while teaching in the Mozambican school) that the teacher is 
supposed to enable the pupils to pass not make them fail! 
Learning in service, first from the Mozambican boss... second by daily work with two 'cooperantes; (Spanish 
and German) both people with much experience (in age over 50) and high academic qualification .. The 
combination was a very effective form of capacity building. 
Category A [m] 
The short up-grading courses in the years 78/79 - they helped me a lot. It was the first time in my life to learn 
these things. 
Learning with the Brazilians, the pedagogy of texts, we didn't have formal training but following them we 
were doing it. 
Category B. [f] 
Short in-service training courses: 15 days in 1987 (that made a big impression on me) a course on 
methodologies for community education (interviews, context studies etc. ). It was led by Judith Marshall, a 
Canadian cooperante;....... 1995, working with Teresa Veloso4 on the preparation of literacy materials in the 
Macua language... 1996 Training about gender led by Bridget Walkers 
Category B [m] 
The many possibilities to take part in capacity building courses. Category B [m] 
In-service training - it created new habits in my work - it was positive for my career - it is an addition, 
addition. to that which I learnt in the training centre, which already had assistance from OSUWELA6 in 1998. 
Category C. [m] 
4 Former National Director of Adult Education, now PROGRESO. 
s MINED/UNICEF consultant. 
6 Project in Nampula funded by the Netherlands Government. 
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I like the books and seminars for exchange of experiences with other teachers organised by education. I 
really liked the distance learning - we want more! ... Its the only way to study 
for those with small children 
and families. 
Category C. [f] 
6.1.5 Negative experiences. 
More than half the education personnel mentioned negative experiences which affected their 
personal development or their work and career. However, it was clear from other sections of the 
interview, that there were others who were deeply affected by certain experiences, which they 
alluded to elsewhere but did not choose to mention explicitly in response to this question. Others 
clearly excluded personal experiences which they recounted elsewhere, from consideration in this 
context. Those who felt satisfied with their achievements, such as the obviously highly successful A 
category did not dwell on whatever disadvantages they had overcome on the way or saw 
overcoming them as positive formative experience. Two of the interviewees for example at the start 
of their career, had worked in Beira, during the war, when the city was without power and water. 
One quoted above, sent against her will, discovered a vocation for teaching in the experience, the 
other, who had idealistically volunteered to go there, found he could not cope. 
Direct experience of war was of course the most commonly cited and the most deeply felt negative 
influence. Eight practitioners, often working or studying in the rural districts at the time, referred to 
war experiences at this point. Another referred to the assassination of his father when discussing the 
causes of the war. Two others, perhaps the most deeply affected, did not at any point describe 
exactly what had happened to them. 
In Monapo, the effects of the war: receiving many children from different areas - receiving the parents with 
the children - we had to convince them to allow the children to stay in the school - they were afraid to 
separate from them (even for the hours of school) - and then there were refugee teachers as well. We had to 
receive and support them. 
Category B. [f] 
What affected me most were experiences of war -I almost didn't escape -I was struck in the chest... and fell, 
the bandit turned his attention to others and 1 crawled into hiding, but many others were taken away, some 
died on the journey. 
Category C. [m] 
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Military life was the hardest, after having been abroad -1 was ready to kill myself but others counselled me 
that everything would come to an end - and I came out unscathed, thanks to God The war derailed my 
career. 
Category C (sent for military service after schooling and technical education in Cuba) [m] 
In the time of the war, learning was very disturbed, receiving the influx of pupils from the districts -a difficult 
time - the money for salaries always arrived late - many couldn't cope and abandoned education. 
Category C. [m] 
Other negative experiences are of a kind that occurs in any society but where the quality of the 
institutional response is an indicator of an organisation's capacity to 'cherish' its valuable human 
resources. Five practitioners expressed frustration at the lack of resources and opportunities to 
progress in their work or career at the present time. This feeling is clearly a result of higher 
expectations and demands post-war which far exceed resources and the ability to distribute them 
equitably. In the war, the lack of resources and opportunities was clearly much worse, but 
7 understood to be beyond anyone's control now it leaves education personnel feeling unappreciated' 
Today there is the frustration at not having the means to work - without a computer for the department and 
working with a single typist not trained in IT. 
Category B. [m] 
There's a lack of promotions - it's slow, it takes many years of not being re-graded - you're not appreciated, 
only when you are about to leave (i. e. retire). 
Category C. [m] 
After 29 years I have the same salary as a new teacher - there is no longer a long-service bonus. Even if the 
government doesn't have (means) it should make an effort to provide incentives. 
Category C. [fl 
I'm trying to get into the UP -I did the exam but for any specialty there are 15 vacancies and 2000 
candidates. 
Category B. [fl 
7 The parents group in Machava expressed a very clear view that the government had to start rewarding 
teachers and other public service employees better if they wanted, not only to retain them but also preserve 
high standards of professional conduct. (See discussion below, section. 6.2.6 on the reasons for post-war 
overcrowding and shortage of funds). 
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Five other practitioners had experienced difficulties in working relationships that had seriously 
affected their career and work, in the two cases below, as a result of criminal behaviour that was 
difficult to prove. Only the second most recent case was dealt with promptly and supportively. 
A bitter experience in the 1990s... the whole exam commission was investigated (for fraud), arrested by the 
police... handed over to the PIC (investigative police).... it was a long worrying process and the one who was 
guilty only stayed in prison for a month (because he had means) but was dismissed from his job... and later 
committed suicide. 
Category B. [m] 
I started to work well in the other school... but this year there were problems -I didn't feel good - it was 
(sexual) harassment, the head made dijftculties for me... I went to the ZIP and the coordinator resolved the 
problem and I was transferred. 
Category C. [f] 
Clearly, all the participants who lived through these turbulent years pursued their education and 
careers while coping with many family responsibilities. Most of the women mentioned pregnancies 
and childcare while explaining their curriculum (including interrupting courses, not taking up 
scholarships etc. ) but did not refer to it here as a significant influence on their career development. 
Some men referred to terrible events that overtook their close relatives in the war, but also did not 
relate it to their careers. However four men in the education service and one parent described 
periods when they felt under pressure because of their responsibility as head of family. 
Many sad deaths of relatives between 1992 and 2000.1 was very much alone with the responsibilityfor the 
immediate family. 
Category C. [m] 
It was difficult at the UP to leave the family in Nampula at ad cult time - it affected me psychologically and 
for that reason I interrupted the course. 
Category C. [m] 
6.2. Education and Careers. 
Many of the particular circumstances mentioned by some as key influences, are evident in the 
factual accounts and comments given by the others in response to the general questionnaire. The 
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parents group, who were not questioned in detail on this, gave similar accounts when considering 
their own education and that of their children (6.2.6). 
6.2.1 Childhood and family background. (education personnel) 
The age group of the sample at once indicates that the majority in all groups spent all or part of their 
childhood under colonial rule and pursued their careers after independence. Only a few of the 
younger teachers, three who reached school age at or shortly after independence and five who were 
born about that time, started school in the national education system, mostly before 1980 and spent 
their formative years in this period of social revolution and then war. 
Place of origin 
As described in Chapter 5, there was a strong urban bias in the provision of education in the 
colonial period, a rapid expansion of basic education to the rural areas after independence, followed 
by a retreat to the urban areas during the war. The rural/urban ratio of the different age groups 
reflects this. Of the policy-makers in the Ministry, who had all made a head start in education in the 
colonial period, three were raised in urban areas, and the other two were only able to pursue their 
education by lodging in a city. In the B group, on the other hand, which includes a significant 
number who completed their schooling after independence, the proportion of those from rural areas 
(70%) is closer to the proportion (80%) in the general population. In the teachers group, C which 
includes the younger age group, the proportion of those from rural areas is just over half. Bearing in 
mind that the schools sampled were urban biased, the under-representation of rural backgrounds 
probably also reflects the effect of the war in closing rural schools and training colleges and driving 
the rural population into the urban areas. 
The tiny minority of the population educated in the colonial period also came from quite a limited 
number of advantaged locations, the cities and certain rural centres with missions or in a few cases, 
company schools. ' This was the bias which the post-independence government tried to address by 
distributing better qualified staff from different regions around the country and to the central 
ministry. The staff interviewed in MINED (category A and B), who were all recruited in the early 
8 For example, in the central provinces, outside the cities there were important missions in some areas such as 
Buzi, and Amatongas where some of our sample studied but no school in, for example Maringu8 (which later 
became the headquarters of the rebel movement) until the colonial government opened one-teacher schools in 
1969. (Internal research undertaken by the author for DPE Sofala , 1974) 
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years after independence, seem to reflect this policy: only one comes from Maputo itself, the others 
from provinces in the south and north. Almost half the education staff in all categories in the 
southern provincial authorities are from other provinces in the south and centre of the country. 
However, in Nampula only three of the 13 interviewed came from the neighbouring province of 
Zambesia: two from Gurue, where the tea company provided schooling in the colonial period and 
one from Quelimane the provincial capital. 
Language 
As already discussed, language has also been and remains, a cause of disadvantage in the education 
system, starting with the colonial insistence on Portuguese as the language of instruction and 
'civilization' and continuing after independence with the decision to promote Portuguese as the 
'language of national unity. ' It is not surprising, therefore that over half of our sample, who became 
successful pupils and then teachers, either spoke Portuguese at home or had started to learn it 
before starting school at a time when something like 90% of the general population in their parents' 
age group knew no Portuguese. 
Literacy and education 
The parental background of the education personnel is also not typical as regards literacy and 
education. Only just over a quarter of the sample came from a totally illiterate home at a time when 
about 90% of the population was illiterate. In a few cases one or more parents had learnt to read in 
their mother tongue through the church or as migrant labourers to neighbouring countries, (literacy 
not recognised in any census data until recently) but more than half were literate in Portuguese and 
had often completed at least the first level of primary education. The literacy of their mothers (17 
out of 37 including one case of a literate mother and illiterate father) is particularly unusual given 
the estimated 95% female illiteracy rate at independence. 
Gender 
Parental bias against girls' education, evident in the general population and still a grave concern in 
rural areas and in the northern provinces, appears not to have affected the women in the sample. 
Several women were trained as teachers with their parents' support in the colonial time. Several 
men in the sample also made a point of mentioning that their parents educated girls and boys alike. 
However, looking more closely at the women's background and recognising that they still only 
constitute a minority in this sample and in the education service as a whole, it becomes clear that 
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they are an even less typical group than the men. In all categories, and on all the criteria discussed 
in this section they are, with very few exceptions, from the more advantageous backgrounds (urban, 
Portuguese speaking, literate mother and father giving high priority to their education etc. ). In other 
words, without this parental commitment and family advantage it was more difficult for women 
than men to make it in education through the colonial and immediate post-war period. However, 
there is one very clear example of how the post-independence affirmative policy towards 
disadvantaged groups, did enable one daughter of a single illiterate rural mother (but with the big 
advantage of parental commitment) to succeed: 
(There were ) difficult phases of my childhood: my grandmother and mother didn't have the means to support 
me to go to secondary school - the annual payment of 3000 meticais. After three months, the deadline for 
paying, my grandmother came to the school to hand in mats she had made to pay for the boarding fees. After 
that I got help from the government through the school, as a child in poverty, they bought clothes and books 
etc. and I didn't have to pay fees. Category B. [f] 
Attitude to education 
As we have just seen, parental commitment to education could prove decisive when everything else 
seemed against the chance of an education. In the colonial period, the fact that parents secured 
education for their children, was itself an indication of commitment, given the discouragements and 
the cost. 
My parents gave a lot of priority to educating their children. They waited many years before building a house 
in order to pay the costs of education. 
Category A. Son of a bricklayer and a subsistence farmer. 
Post-independence, although primary education was free, parents, especially single parents, 
struggled to meet the other costs of keeping their children in school and at secondary level, did have 
to pay fees, buy books and in some cases meet lodging or boarding costs. There were indications of 
this parental effort in the accounts of six of the younger participants who started school after 
independence. 
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Economic status 
The economic status of the family was also critical for their children's education. None of our 
sample's parents were wealthy, but the majority (30 of the 37) had sufficient means to allow their 
children to study without prejudice at least to the completion of primary grades, without repetition 
or interruption. That is, though they no doubt did odd jobs and helped with work in the home, they 
did not have to work for their subsistence while at school. The majority of fathers were skilled or 
semi-skilled or in some position of responsibility and while few mothers were in paid employment, 
the majority were described as working a small holding (machamba) to feed the family or as 
peasant farmers. 
Seven (one woman and six men) seem to have been economically disadvantaged and although 
bright, as their subsequent careers show, repeated grades and missed school due to economic 
difficulties. Some, because they were 'good pupils' were eventually given financial support to 
continue: some by the mission where they studied and others after independence by the government 
or ruling party. 
Other social factors 
The loss of one or both parents was the most common cause of economic problems. Single parents 
had no margin to tide them over the difficult times. Single mothers or grandmothers raising children 
by subsistence farming or market trading lacked the back-up of a wage or another food provider. 
The single father in the sample was a skilled worker, but was simply unable to fund schooling and 
keep his son during episodes of unemployment. It seems that two productive parents were needed to 
see a child through school. Those who lost both parents simply stopped schooling until they could 
find outside help or were rescued by a relative. 
In 1976 my parents died in a train accident. After finishing grade 4I had one year out of school looking for a 
place and the means to live in the city. I made a representation to the FRELIMO party, which took me in and 
gave me lodging. I helped in youth work and went to work in a cooperative for 1000 meticais a month, which 
was enough to eat etc. Category C. [m] 
Apart from the effect of the war (discussed separately below) illness was the only other event that 
interrupted schooling for two women. Cases of frequent school moves, for example due to a 
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father's employment, or parents' divorce, seem not to have affected progress in education, as long 
as the parental means and commitment continued. 
Family connections and status 
Many families were able to improve their children's chances by taking advantage of their 
connections or status and this was particularly significant in the colonial period, when the 
prevailing government policy deterred Mozambicans from aspiring to much education. 
Assimilado status was a huge advantage in the colonial period and about one third of those whose 
childhood was spent in the colonial period came from families with this status. That is they come 
from a minority group that at the time probably accounted for less than 5% of the population. They 
spoke Portuguese at home and were able to immediately enrol in official schools or in the'common 
curriculum' courses at missions, by-passing the 'indigenous' system. 
Living near to and having close links to a mission, was a significant factor in gaining access to 
education in the colonial period especially in the rural areas. Five were closely associated with 
catholic missions, which in two cases supported their education beyond grade 4. Five others were 
associated with the protestant missions. Parents in these groups were either active members of the 
churches (several learnt to read the bible) or in some cases, employees. 
Parents and family members employment often provided opportunities or advantages for education. 
Most obviously, those whose parents or relatives were teachers. Two orphans, in particular, were 
helped by teacher uncles. Two other interviewees, whose parents worked as servants for Portuguese 
colonial employers, seem to have been assisted. Three of the sample had a RBgulo9 father who, 
though not necessarily educated himself, had the status to ensure education for his children. (in one 
case 30 boys and girls! ) 
The extended family was also an important back-up in the education of children. Grandparents 
played a significant role in a number of other cases beside that of the orphans already mentioned. In 
the south it seems to have been customary to send children to spend time living with grandparents, 
to secure their knowledge of their own culture and language and to spread the burden of raising a 
9 Traditional leader appointed as a local official by the Portuguese. 
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large family. In one case it was a grandfather teacher who organised the grandson's enrolment in 
school. Godparents played this role for a goddaughter and helped with funding her secondary 
education. Being able to stay with relatives in town made it possible for some others to enrol in 
secondary education. The alternative was the expense of paying for lodging, often shared with other 
older siblings. 
6.2.2 Schooling and professional training. 
The first general observation that can be made about the data provided by the education personnel 
on their schooling, professional and academic training and careers is that for the majority, career 
and education became inextricably linked, in some cases on the completion of primary education, 
but in all cases by the completion of secondary level. 
From that date my professional career began and academic and professional education were fitted in with 
work activities. Category A. [m] 
This reflects the age and time at which most completed basic schooling and the very limited access 
to higher levels which were controlled directly by government or its agents before and after 
independence. Academic study was facilitated, not for its own sake, but as part of the agenda of 
government: in the colonial period, as part of the regime's 'civilizing mission' and in the post- 
independence period, as a result of the priority given to extending access to basic education. We can 
therefore clearly see the hand of government (colonial and then national) in the individual career 
paths of our sample. 
Colonial policies and strategies 
The nature of the colonial education policies and practice have been discussed in Chapter 5. In this 
context, the parents and grandparents of our sample, as we have seen above, strove to extract some 
advantage for their children, but could only do so within the terms laid down by the regime's 
'indigenous' policy. 
Educational opportunities for their children could be enhanced by acquiring 'assimilado' status. 
However this advantage was bought at the price of distancing themselves from their own culture. 
My parents were assimilados, speaking Macua at home was forbidden. Category B [m] 
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My parents spoke Portuguese with the children - to each other they spoke Chuabo. For that reason I only 
speak Chuabo with difficulty. In the Zambeze valley colonialism penetrated deeply - even the poorest families 
spoke Portuguese - they preferred badly spoken Portuguese to the local language. Category B [fl 
They were assimilados -father was a Regulo. Father spoke Portuguese, but he couldn't read or write it - he 
could read and write Lomwe, (which he) learnt at the protestant church. Mother spoke a little Portuguese - 
she had difficulty in replying... but she understood. 
Category B. [m] from rural Zambezia. 
However, as discussed in the previous chapter, the Portuguese policy of assimilation was largely 
unsuccessful in creating a culturally Portuguese sub-class loyal to the regime. There is clear 
evidence of this in our sample: all but one of this group, who learnt later, had learnt their local 
language before they started school, either in the home (there were at least two bi-lingual homes, 
contrary to the rules) or in their'social environment'. In at least one case of assimilado parents, there 
was a deliberate strategy to ensure this. 
They spoke Portuguese at home... but from fear that their children would not be able to communicate with 
their grandparents... sent (me) for two years to live with my grandmother in the country to learn the language 
and culture. Category B. [m] 
The option open to those who did not qualify as assimilados, was the 'indigenous' education run by 
the catholic missions. As we have seen much of this especially pre 1966 did not go much beyond 
learning the catechism and some literacy and numeracy. 
You went before to play under the mango trees, to learn the catechism, social habits etc. Category A. [f] 
There were phases - first grade 'backward' under a tree to learn Portuguese and counting with an abacus, 
then first grade advanced. After that my father transferred me to the City of Inhambane, where I lived with a 
family and started grade one again in a nun's college - an 'indigenous' school - up to rudimentary grade 
three, then transfer to 'elementary' grade 3 up to completing grade 4. 
Category C. [fl 
Another option taken up by a number of the sample group were those protestant missions that were 
tolerated by the authorities. These were in many cases more 'progressive' in their methods and 
attitudes to the indigenous population, often working and teaching in their mother tongue. However, 
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they too promoted the brighter pupils in the hope that they would become religious leaders in their 
community. 10 
The mission in Chicuque, (United Methodist) because it was progressive, was viewed with suspicion by the 
authorities, who set up an official school next door in competition. My father thought it advisable to transfer 
his son to the official school to complete this level. (grade 4) 
Category A. [m] 
Whatever school the children attended, they could only obtain primary certificates and progress to 
teacher training or secondary education by passing an official exam in Portuguese. Reaching that 
point tended to be a long process. Those of our sample who followed this path took between five 
and nine years to complete grade 4. As a result, and due to starting school at an average age of 
eight, they were on average fourteen before they completed this level and under the colonial system 
mostly not eligible to continue. However, many at this stage found themselves under a national 
government with a different policy. 
In this group too there is evidence of taking advantage of the educational opportunities without 
taking on board the religious agenda. One participant, who was sent by the church to a seminary for 
secondary education, left before completing the final grade and worked in a factory, because he did 
not want'to go on to the priesthood'. The father of another participant was educated at a seminary 
and went into teaching in a mission school, but then used his qualifications to pursue his real 
vocation and train as a nurse. 
As we can see, although the education personnel are mostly those who managed to benefit from the 
colonial education system, it required considerable effort to overcome or circumvent the barriers 
built into a system designed to ensure that the majority of the Mozambican population continued to 
fulfil their role as a pool of rural labour. These difficulties are reflected in our sample by two 
statistics - the length of time it took to complete first level primary education, discussed above and 
the number of late school enrolments in the rural areas, due to the scarcity of schools (seven started 
at ten years or older). Children had to be old enough to walk the long distances to attend them or to 
lodge or board away from home. This legacy of the urban bias of colonial education was not easily 
10 As in the case of Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane, UN Diplomat and then first President of FRELIMO. 
Khambane and Clerc 1990. 
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turned around and continued to affect those of our sample who started school in the first years of 
the national government. For example, a woman who started school aged twelve after independence 
walked 8km to and from school in the province of Maputo. In Nampula in the last years of colonial 
rule and the first years after independence three of the men moved school two or three times before 
completing grade 4, each time further away from home, because the local schools in their rural 
homes did not teach more than the initial grades. 
The national education system: policies and strategies 
Primary schooling 
While the majority of the sample group had completed or were already enrolled in the first level of 
schooling before independence, two women and four men undoubtedly owed their access to 
primary schooling to the rapid expansion of schools in the rural communities by the national 
government in the first years of independence. Nevertheless, it still required some commitment to 
see it through. 
A primary school of the population, to grade 2 (it didn't give any more grades). Then in the mission at 
Malema (by then nationalized). I lived in the hostel. Then I completed grade 4 in a nearby national school. (I 
left the mission because of the bad conditions in the hostel). 
Category C. [m] started school aged 13 in the year of independence. 
The four younger teachers in our sample, still in their twenties, can also be seen to have benefited 
from reaching school age at a time when the SNE was sufficiently developed (though increasingly 
under attack in the rural areas) and offered them the chance to enrol (free) in their first school 
between the ages of five and seven, with the prospect of continuing to complete primary education 
in the same school or at least in the same district. Thus the schooling of those who enrolled after 
independence is generally characterised by an earlier start and more rapid progress than in the 
colonial indigenous system. Nevertheless, we should not forget, the continuing concerns (discussed 
in Chapter 5) about the quality of the system and the high repetition and drop-out rates of the less 
able and disadvantaged (our sample, after all are by definition the success stories). " 
it The parents' (Category D) comments on the comparison between their experience of colonial education and 
the experience of their children in the national system (see section 2.6 below) are of interest on this point. 
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In some cases, the participants' parents also benefited from the national government policy to 
promote adult learning: a father completed grade 4 in a workplace school (CFM, national railways); 
two mothers took literacy classes. 
Many more of the sample benefited from access to the second level of primary education (EP2) as a 
result of expansion of provision by the national government. As we have seen, progress beyond 
grade 4 for more than a few Mozambicans was considered inadvisable by the colonial authorities. 
For the national government it was the next priority after universal access to EP1, the final goal 
(only now beginning to be realised) being to provide a complete seven years of primary education 
in one local school. Over half the group completed this level after independence and at least nine 
from rural areas would not have done so in the colonial period. Four were directly assisted with 
boarding places by the government. One woman who was already teaching before independence 
with grade 4 schooling and 30 days preparation, eventually completed EP2 fourteen years later at 
night school. 
Secondary schooling 
This is the point at which many of our sample, were recruited into education and continued their 
education as part of their professional training or part-time while teaching. Only one category A and 
two category B participants had completed secondary education in the colonial period. Another 
three had started. 
As a result, it can be demonstrated that the majority of the sample had access to and completed 
secondary or secondary equivalent education as a direct result of national government policy and in 
most cases as a direct result of MINED capacity building strategies. Only a minority of the older 
age group were allocated some of the limited places available at fulltime schools immediately after 
independence. Academic ability and social disadvantage were the criteria applied. For example, 
one, an orphan, on completion of primary education in the south was given priority for a fulltime 
secondary place (although over 15) but initially sent by the government to take up a secondary 
vacancy in the north (Nampula) till a place later became available in Maputo. Several from rural 
backgrounds were `selected' to study in Cuba. In the younger age group, who are mostly still 
serving teachers, about half completed secondary education fulltime (though by that time subject to 
disruption caused by the war). 
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Night school study while working fulltime was the more common experience. Night school places 
(for those over 15 years of age) were also allocated by MINED mainly through quotas allocated to 
the different employment sectors (including of course education). Only a limited number were then 
available to the general public. Workplace schools also catered first for the capacity building needs 
of their employees, but often admitted many students from the general public. Most of those 
interviewed studied at night school after they had been recruited to teaching. For example, one man 
was first recruited into teaching as a pupil volunteer and then completed his secondary education at 
industrial night school, while employed as an unqualified teacher. A woman who was already 
teaching before independence but had completed only one section of the secondary certificate, 
completed grade 9 and pre-university in an intensive night school course organised by MINED, 
while working as a schools inspector. 
It often took people a long time to complete their general studies as they juggled work and home 
commitments and later coped with war. One woman started secondary education three times 
between 1975 and 1986 at commercial and then general night schools, finally completing grade 9 in 
1987. The interruptions were due first of all to being recruited to education (when she restarted it 
was as part of MINED's general education's quota) and then to childbirth. A man recruited to 
education in 1976 completed secondary education through night school eight years later. Two 
younger women, affected by the war, went into primary teacher training at this stage, which 
included further academic study at secondary level, but they both subsequently also completed 
grade 9 at night school, one in a ministry school and one at a workplace school, while teaching in 
war-affected districts. 
Many of the teacher group, never formally studied at secondary level but acquired further academic 
education through teacher training which they entered with a basic primary certificate. There were 
also two women who were already in the teaching profession at independence and so never 
completed formal secondary education. Neither had an opportunity for further education until the 
late 1990s: one, a qualified primary teacher, attended a pedagogical institute, the other, an 
unqualified teacher, finally completed academic secondary schooling as part of the distance course 
for serving teachers introduced after the end of the civil war. 
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Pre-university 
We finally come to consider the last level of formal schooling, pre-university general secondary 
education and equivalent levels of technical and professional education. None of our sample 
completed this in the colonial period. Schools that taught to this level only existed in major cities 
(Lourenco Marques, Nampula, Beira) and were attended by extremely few non-white students. '2 
One A group participant completed secondary education in 1974 at a school that taught to pre- 
university level and simply continued in 1975, (the year of independence) passing grade 11 in 1976. 
One can assume she would have done this anyway. There can be no certainty than any of the others 
in the sample could have done so. For example, one man who completed this level in 1976, had 
completed secondary education at a catholic college in Tete and taken the public exam in Beira 
some years before independence but had not continued with his studies. He seems to have taken, or 
been given the chance to study (at night school), by being appointed to teach in Nampula at 
independence. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, government priority for mass expansion of access to basic education led 
to pre-university study being suspended until 1981 and expansion of the number of schools teaching 
this level did not occur until the 1990s. So although all but three of our sample achieved this level 
of academic study, the majority did so while already embarked on a career in education and more 
than half did so through teacher training courses often after many years service in education 
(ranging from 2 to 30 years). Others completed the grade at night school while teaching or working 
in education administration, also generally after some years, since they had to be in one of the urban 
centres where this was possible. For example, two women, who worked throughout the war in rural 
districts eventually passed this level at night school after 21 and 11 years in education. 
Only six studied this level as fulltime general education pupils, one (group A) in a special course at 
the university during the suspension, the others in either Beira or Maputo, except for the youngest 
participant who benefited from the post war expansion of complete secondary schools and passed 
this level at a school on the Ilha de Mocambique in 1999. 
12 The author was informed in 1985 by one Mozambican who did complete this secondary level, that he was 
the only black pupil in his school who did. It is also worth noting that the provision of schools at this level in 
Portugal itself was scarcely more extensive. Information from CIDAC, Lisbon 1983. 
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6.2.3 The role of government in career development 
Recruitment 
As has already been said, following independence the national government intervened directly in 
the recruitment of those with education to serve as teachers to carry out its policy of expansion of 
access and to stop the gaps left by departing Portuguese teachers. Those in our sample already 
teaching and /or qualified as primary teachers (3 women categories A, B, C) were not only 
immediately reemployed but redeployed and in two cases, after rapid upgrading, given supervisory 
responsibilities. The majority of the rest of the sample was directly recruited into education careers 
by the government, using a mixture of inducement and dictation, for the benefit of the nation as a 
whole. 
An important factor in the early years (1975 to 1979) when twenty of the participants were 
recruited, was this appeal to social altruism for the building of the nation. Six participants first 
experienced teaching as pupil or student volunteers, teaching younger pupils or adult literacy. Many 
of the others who accepted being directed into teaching without complaint and even some who 
admitted to feeling personal frustration, came to see it as a necessary measure at the time. 13 
I was a literacy volunteer for children out of school when I was in grade 5. When they went to the school (in 
19 76) the parents called for me to go with them as their teacher. 
Category A. [m] 
I was a literacy volunteer, when I was studying in secondary school, in the factories and with the mothers (i. e. 
traders) in the market. 
Category A [m] 
In 1976, the crisis created in the schools by the departure of the overwhelming majority of the 
Portuguese and other foreign teachers contracted under colonial rule, led to more drastic measures. 
Nine of our sample were directly affected by the presidential decree suspending pre-university and 
university teaching and directing them into teaching. 
13 Of course, there were those, no longer in education, who resented the whole project, but the author in 
conversation with many former education personnel found that the majority saw their participation as 
necessary at the time and felt slightly guilty at having moved on to other careers. 
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In 1975 there was Independence and all that - the nuns abandoned the country and the college was left 
without teachers - the older pupils like me began to teach - it was a bit of a joke -I started teaching history 
but I didn't like it because I had never studied Mozambican history, so I changed to teach natural science - 
that's the same whatever the regime isn't it? In '76I had enrolled for pre-university but it was suspended. 
Category B [m] 
I was in the sixth year (grade 11 these days) when on the 8`" of March, by decree of the President, pre- 
university teaching was suspended and the students directed into teaching. 
Category A [m] 
Pre-university courses were restored in 1981, but the extremely limited number of places meant that 
the majority of graduates from the first level secondary schools had to leave school at this stage. 
They were asked their career preferences and wishes as to further study but only a tiny minority 
pursued the career of their choice. The reality was that the majority had to be allocated (by MINED 
staff 4) according to national priorities and that meant in most cases a stark choice between the 
teaching profession and military service. This gave rise to a common description of the 
compulsorily recruited teachers as 'mercenaries'. Seven of our sample entered the profession in this 
way. 
As mentioned already, by the participants themselves and in the context of colonial education, the 
opportunity to study had always provided a strong motivation to work in education and MINED has 
always used this as an inducement to join and remain in the profession. In particular the creation of 
the pedagogical institutes (IMP/IMAP) and finally the pedagogical university with strong technical 
assistance from the GDR (including higher education courses in its own higher education institutes) 
set up a model in which academic middle and higher level academic education was combined with 
professional training for the teaching profession. The offer of opportunities to study on scholarship 
or with leave to work part-time when following these courses, served the capacity building needs of 
MINED while giving great personal satisfaction to its staff. As with the other strategies, there was a 
14 The author attended a head teachers' conference in the 1980s at which they tried, with some distress, to find 
a fair and humane set of criteria for implementing this task. One of the A group responsible at ministry level 
remembers this as the most unsatisfactory phase in his career. There were of course, in such a situation of 
scarce resources, frequent accusations of nepotism in the allocation of places, which were not always 
unfounded. 
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strong element of dictation as well as inducement in the early years, whereas now the policy is one 
of incentives in the form of privileged access to places and exemption from fees. 's 
Several of the participants mentioned that they had originally been interested in other areas of 
study, but had either not been offered that option or had found it impossible to fund it. 
In 1985 I enrolled in the faculty of Veterinary Science, but only briefly, -I had financial problems and 
couldn't continue. 
Category A [m] who subsequently studied Chemistry at a higher pedagogical institute in Germany. 
My first choice was the Marine School -I did not want the teaching profession, but I had to accept what was 
indicated. 
Category B. [m] UP graduate in History and Geography. 
In the present economic conditions, the incentive of securing employment is an effective 
inducement as we can see in the case of the contracted teachers, three of whom would otherwise be 
unemployed. For them too, the fact that it may allow them to finally complete higher education is 
an important incentive, while two at least seem to have made a conscious choice to continue in the 
profession because they like it. 
Career development and capacity building. 
Recruiting personnel to education immediately required strategies for equipping them to teach. Of 
the twenty individuals recruited in the 1970s, when the imperative was to put those who knew 
something in a position to teach those who knew nothing, only one person (with a UEM Faculty 
BA) started her first job with an appropriate level of qualification. Over half simply started work 
without preparation, while those with some limited experience, emergency training or induction, 
tended to be almost immediately required to assume advisory or administrative roles as well as 
teaching. 
As the number and capacity of training colleges was rapidly expanded with technical assistance 
mainly from the GDR, and scholarship schemes to study abroad were operated, this situation was 
IS Considerable concern was expressed by some participants about education's ability to retain enough of 
these graduates in the present context of greater employment opportunities and economic pressures. Others 
felt that since education has by far the largest number of educated personnel it was normal that a proportion 
would move on and that they made a valuable contribution to the development of other sectors. 
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reversed and the change is reflected in the sample: all those who entered the profession in the 1980s 
and 1990s, were professionally and academically trained for their first job and were by then able to 
learn from more experienced colleagues, including foreign staff in the earlier years, before being 
promoted to more responsibility. The most recent recruits, however, the contracted teachers, though 
academically qualified and working with more experienced staff within the schools and in the 
revived ZIP system, nevertheless, like their predecessors in the early 1970s, have started work after 
only 30 days induction. The need to readopt this kind of emergency measure is in part due to a 
teacher shortage resulting from loss of staff and a slow down in teacher training in the last years of 
the war, combined with renewed public demand for expansion in the post-war period. 
Having recruited large numbers of staff with little or no initial training, MINED had somehow to 
provide opportunities to bring the majority of the teaching force up to minimum standards after they 
were already working, as well as providing further training for career promotion. As we have seen, 
a range of strategies were developed, with donor partner support, all of which are evident in the 
professional development of our sample. 
In group A, one started without initial training and others started after intensive or emergency 
training, but they were all later assisted to complete higher secondary and degree level courses part- 
time or in one case on a scholarship to the GDR. Three completed education masters degrees 
abroad and one a part-time PhD. They were assisted to develop areas of expertise by a combination 
of capacity building on the job (with inputs from foreign cooperantes) and specialist courses 
abroad. At least three were themselves involved in capacity building of other staff. 
In the B group too, two started work with no initial training and eight after completing emergency 
or accelerated courses. Four did start teaching after full training for the level they were to teach. All 
but one of this group, eventually (though in some cases after many years and at their own 
insistence) were assisted by MINED to study part-time or fulltime to complete middle level courses 
and/or higher education courses. 
The professional development of the B group was also furthered by in-service capacity building: on 
the job by cooperantes and Mozambican specialists; by short courses at various points in their 
career organised by MINED; by being sent on specialist courses abroad; in donor funded specialist 
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training in short courses (usually devised and taught by Mozambican staff). Three of this group 
provided capacity building for others after training. 
The careers of serving teachers, group C, were promoted, in-country through the Mozambican 
institutions created after independence, but with less consistency and sometimes after many years of 
delay. This is a reflection of the persistent incapacity to handle the training of teachers in sufficient 
numbers as much as the effects of the war (in only one case was delay directly attributable to the 
war). 
In this group too, many started without initial training or with emergency induction or accelerated 
training but the majority (10) were qualified for the level they were employed to teach before 
starting work. They were also able to up-grade their qualifications to middle level and/or higher 
level but in Mozambican institutions and while working, usually fulltime. The unqualified teacher 
who started work in the 1970s after 30 days induction and who eventually benefited from the 
distance course, is the only representative in this sample of the very large number of mainly rural 
teachers, who were still unqualified after the war in the 1990s. 
The new, contracted recruits without qualification also have a similar prospect of eventually 
developing their careers through the expanded higher education network or in the meantime 
through part-time teacher training. 
However, fewer of this group mentioned any experiences of capacity building on the job, short 
courses organised by MINED or donor funded specialist courses. Although, as described by one of 
the group, capacity building through the peer group in the schools and ZIPs with supervisory visits 
from advisers, was common practice until the worst days of the war and has been revived since, 
they may not have seen this as 'in-service capacity building'. The only member of this group to 
study abroad, did so as a refugee (see 6.2.5 below) and only one provided formal capacity building 
for others after training with ADPP (Danish People to People Aid). Again, school heads and ZIP 
coordinator's are of course responsible for informal capacity building. 
Those recruited in the first years after independence, were also 'sent' to teaching posts in different 
parts of the country to fill gaps and as part of the policy of promoting national integration. Three 
were sent to teach in the Mozambican schools in Cuba. One woman, a native of Maputo, sent to 
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teacher training in Tete (because there was no place available locally) was appointed to her first job 
there in a rural school. She made this comment: 
I was transferred (back) to the City of Maputo because I had got married (I had that advantage as a 
woman) others are still there to this day Category B [fj. 
Career patterns 
There is a striking homogeneity in the career experiences of the majority of the sample. Without 
exception established staff from all categories started their formal careers as classroom teachers, 
either at basic primary or secondary level. In the older age group this often followed experience as 
teachers in the colonial schools or as volunteer pupil teachers after independence. While some 
remained as teachers, others progressed to teaching posts with management responsibility and as 
their own education progressed, the tendency was also to teach at a higher academic level. At that 
point some were recruited into junior education management posts (Category B) at district, 
provincial or Ministry level. Senior management in the Provinces and Ministry (Category A) were 
then promoted from lower management as they completed their professional and higher academic 
studies. 
Thus the senior managers (Category A) spent an average of 13 years (minimum 6) teaching in more 
than one level of the system (primary, secondary, adult night school and in one case university) and 
simultaneously held either school or university management posts or worked as advisors, inspectors 
or in-service trainers. The two women were active in professional organisations: one as a secretary 
for the teachers union, the other as founder member of the Mozambican Association of Women 
Academics as a member of the Mozambican Association for Research in the Natural Sciences and 
as a member of the University Council (UEM). 
The B group of managers, apart from the two who worked in adult education (see below) spent an 
average of 9 years (minimum 3, maximum 20) in general teaching. This rather younger group (with 
better initial training) were more likely to remain teaching at the same level of the system, but like 
the A group took up various management roles as school heads and deputies, and in-service 
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education coordinators. The adult education staff were trainer organisers of literacy volunteers from 
the start. A woman in this group was a teachers' union secretary for many years. 
When they took up fulitime administrative work, either in MINED or a Provincial office, four of the 
A group completed an average of 8 years in junior and middle level management posts before being 
appointed to top management and the fifth came from a senior post (Director of Faculty) in the 
Pedagogical University. The B group managers had been fulltime administrators for an average of 6 
years (minimum 1 year, maximum 23). Apart from continuing their own education, a number of 
individuals in both groups continued to teach in night schools 
Many of the older teachers (Category C) initiated their careers in much the same circumstances as 
the other two groups and the group as a whole has been teaching for an average of 13 years, some 
for over 20 years and none less than three years. 16 Like the B group most have stayed teaching at 
the level they were trained for, but some have had experience in both primary and secondary 
teaching. Five have taught in adult night schools, often while completing part-time degrees. The 
sample deliberately included heads of all the schools visited but not surprisingly given the age 
sample, five others have held or currently hold positions with management responsibility. 
The more recent post-war recruits to the profession in the sample fall into two groups: the fully 
trained, like those who joined in the previous decade and those contracted under the emergency 
scheme introduced in 1999 to meet the teacher shortage, in a manner similar to that of the first 
recruits in the 1970s but with a higher academic entry. This last group includes two young 
secondary school graduates and three older men: two who were trained in agriculture in Cuba but 
on returning home found no work and another who had taught unqualified while studying in the 
early 1980s. 
6.2.4 The role of personal motivation and opportunity seeking 
All of the individuals in the sample clearly had to be personally motivated in their work and studies 
to achieve what they did but while some took advantage or made the best of what they were 
offered, others at various points actively sought or requested opportunities to study or change jobs. 
16 As discussed in relation to the selection of the quota, there was a deliberate bias in favour of those with 
long careers 
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It is these points in their careers as well as the 'significant moments' they identified themselves that 
give clues as to the nature of that motivation. 
In all groups and across all age groups the motivation to study is very strong, either for its own sake 
or because they felt they needed it to understand their work better. They appear to be all life-long 
learners! Nearly all had a next goal in mind or were actively pursuing it. 
Education should be throughout the whole of one's life. Category C [m] 
I didn't want to be without studying. Category B [f] 
I have always worked in order to study -in the colonial time as a servant and lots of other jobs. 
Category B [m] 
Just how strong their motivation has been is indicated by noting again the kinds of difficulties they 
had to overcome and the considerable periods of time they waited before being able to seize 
opportunities to progress to the next level of education. All of the A group, 11 out of 14 of the B 
group and 11 of the 18 teachers completed at least one stage of their secondary, pre-university or 
university education while working, often in very challenging circumstances. For example one 
woman in the B group completed her degree while full-time head of a failing school she had been 
sent to turn around and bringing up 4 children, three of whom were themselves at university by the 
time she graduated. 
There is evidence that most had a clear sense of where their career should go and pro-actively 
pursued it, particularly when they felt it was stalled or that they had earned the right to progress. 
Two women, whose chances for further education had been effectively put on hold by the war 
conditions, after the war went back to college 'at their own request. ' The younger staff are 
particularly active in pursuing higher education and when forced to wait have found other profitable 
ways to spend their time. The three men in Nampula whose (non-education) careers were 
effectively ended by the war had to be particularly resourceful in finding ways to survive and start a 
new career. 
Some had very clear preferences as to what they wanted to study. For two of the B group choosing 
to undertake the University course of their choice (not one funded by MINED) involved some 
economic sacrifice and a lot of patience. 
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I always preferred a course at UEM, not the UP, even though I had to pay the fees myself -I had to teach 
night classes and I'm still doing it. Category B [m] Doing a part-time literature degree at UEM 
I asked to give up the headship, because I began to study at the Catholic University (After finishing the course 
I advise the DPE on legal matters and (now as Head of Human Resources) I have knowledge of the teachers' 
rights. Category B [m] Recently graduated in law. 
Others made choices within the limited options, with a view to personal preference and future 
career. 
Special Education was not my choice. I wanted to study Pedagogy, but they (the Cuban education authorities) 
offered (only) two options. The other was education for work experience. Of these I chose special education 
because it was something new, which at that time did not exist in Mozambique. Category B [m] 
6.2.5 The effects of war on education and careers 
In addition to those who mentioned war experiences as significant moments in their development 
and careers, the participants described how their education and careers were interrupted or affected 
by the war at various points or indicated in their comments that it affected them psychologically. 
Since all the A group were already set on their career path before the war took hold, their career 
progress was not directly affected, it was already being promoted by MINED and they were located 
in places where they could continue their professional education while working. However, there 
were indications in their discussion of their careers and later their views on the war, that it did affect 
their professional attitudes. In at least one case, it strengthened commitment to work in education, 
several showed deep frustration at the effect the war had in holding back and even destroying the 
achievements in education, (in which they themselves had played a role). It was also seen as forcing 
them to rethink ideas about how the education system should function. 
All of the B group completed their primary schooling unaffected by the war, but the majority were 
affected in some way from then on. Two women were immediately affected at the next stage of 
their careers. The government strategy of allocating places on a nationwide basis to maximise 
opportunity was breaking down, because normal travel by road between provinces was no longer 
possible. 
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I was attacked when I studied in secondary school - they destroyed all the books and my notes... they killed 
and kidnapped other pupils. We had to sleep on the other bank of the river (only spending the day in the 
school) to be safe. I was (then) selected as the best student to go and do a course in Tete - accountancy, but I 
waited for three months to get a flight and ended up missing the year and so lost the course. Category B [f] 
Later got a training college place in her home province of Nampula. 
I then spent two years without studying. I had a place at the training college in Inhambane, but the war was 
bad by then and my parents were afraid to send me. 1 asked for another place. 
Category B [f] Later got a place in her home Province of Maputo. 
A clear consequence of the war, was thus to reverse the attempts to reduce regional and 
geographical inequalities of access. All the Nampula staff, and the woman teacher from rural 
Maputo quoted above, were affected by the halt in the expansion of pre-university (including 
teacher training) and university education and only completed these levels some time after the war. 
In fact one man never completed either of these and only managed to complete secondary education 
at night school after being transferred in the middle of the war to the city of Nampula. This in turn 
limited their career progress. Many remained for years in the same job. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, some sectors of the education system were not only affected directly by 
the war but also cut back as part of the financial restrictions imposed by structural adjustment. 
Teacher training, as we have seen was one and adult education another. The two B category staff 
working in adult education, one at national level and the other at provincial level, found that they 
were able to do little of the work they had been trained for. At the provincial level, their main 
clientele, the rural adult population, was the first target of the rebel movement. Any participation in 
activities closely associated with the FRELIMO government invited reprisals and in any case, the 
battle for subsistence took all available time and effort. At the national level, the DNEA (National 
Directorate of Adult Education) was dismantled in the last years of the war, as part of an exercise to 
'slim' the administration. The attrition of the war and its financial consequences eventually brought 
one of the key strategies for bringing education to the excluded masses, virtually to a halt. 
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It was during the years of the extinction of the DNEA -I was transferred to the documentation centre - but in 
practice, apart from studying I did almost nothing. Category B [f] Trained in radio programming for literacy. 
There were districts where literacy stopped - almost the whole system - we ended up only teaching about 
1000 people a year in the cities and in Nampula district up to a range of about 20 kilometres, and only by day 
My father was bayoneted to death because he had supported the work of his son in literacy. 
Category B. [m]. 
Like the adult education organiser quoted above, other B category staff working in the provinces, 
were affected by traumatic events that affected them personally or affected those with whom they 
were working (see Key Moments above). In at least two cases, it seems clear that they were obliged 
to leave the post they were in to recover from these experiences. " 
When it comes to the teachers group, Category C, there is more evidence of the war directly 
affecting their education, careers and working environment. This is because there are younger 
individuals in the group, who had not completed their schooling before the war and because as 
classroom teachers in the war years, they had to deal with the impact of the war on the schools and 
pupils. 
One of this group seems to have been affected from his infancy when he was orphaned. He grew up 
with his grandmother but only attended three years of school before having to flee to the district 
administrative centre. 
I was obliged to continue in the district centre for fear of continuing there - there was no longer a school -I 
was handed over to an uncle who was a teacher and completed grade 7. I spent some time (6 years) without 
studying. Category C. [m] Eventually trained as a primary teacher 1996-8. 
Another, whose experience of surviving an attack has already been quoted (see above Key 
Moments), lost a year's schooling as a result before being able to continue. Even those in the urban 
area could lose time at school as an indirect consequence of the war. One woman had to wait a year 
after completing primary education because there were no places in the overcrowded urban 
secondary schools. 
17 The author was aware while working in Maputo Province in the 1980s and in Manica in the last years of the 
war, that DPE personnel departments, were routinely moving staff from 'front line' jobs in the rural districts, 
for respite in urban jobs, with less responsibility, and often a chance to study. 
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Some traumatic event, probably while visiting his home province of Nampula, led to one young 
man interrupting his technical education in Maputo and finding himself as a refugee in Malawi. He 
had been an enthusiastic student and was already teaching full-time, though not qualified, but only 
returned to teaching as a contracted science teacher in 2001. 
In 1984 I had to stop studying in Mozambique -I had a scholarship for war refugees, financed by the UN but 
I didn't feel good in Malawi and came back to Mozambique in 1987.1 worked in Nampula as a dyer at 
Texamoque (textile factory). I worked self-employed and wrote poetry and school textbooks for basic 
secondary education. I wrote many things but lost them by the way - and at night - break-ins at home. 
Two other recently contracted teachers had their original career plans abruptly terminated by the 
war. They had both been given technical training for large-scale commercial agriculture, in Cuba. 
When they returned, the agri-business sector was no longer functioning. 
I came back in 1991 and straight away had to do military service. With the Peace Accord 1 managed to leave. 
I went to the Provincial Directorate of Agriculture but they said they had no certainty that the war had ended 
and so were not taking on new personnel.... In 2000 I went to the DPE to ask what subject I could teach and 
they decided chemistry (because of my specialization in the agronomy course). 
One of these saw that if he had taken the option to stay in Cuba and complete a degree, he would 
have had better career chances now, but he was anxious to return home as soon as possible, because 
of events described to him in the only two letters he received during his six years away from home: 
My brother was my correspondent (his parents were illiterate) - he informed me of the capture of our 
parents... they returned, but affected - my mother died afterwards. When I got back it was difficult to find 
where my relatives were. 
In all, five of this group were personally affected by traumatic experiences and another three by 
violence against their family or fear that they were in danger of violence or destitution. 
In Inhambane the effects were drastic - the fabric of the society was actually destroyed - you could not visit 
your family there - you were advised not to go. I still feel something of this. 
Category C. [m] teaching in Maputo. 
It seemed that for many, being a survivor carried with it some sense of guilt, a feeling that others 
who were just as innocent did not come through. 
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In fact the urban teachers were. in no way unaffected by the war. Apart from the practical 
difficulties in their personal lives (shortages, power and water cuts, sheltering displaced relatives 
etc. ) they felt the full brunt of the huge population migrations on a daily basis in the classroom. 
Seven of this group (six in Maputo and one in Nampula) specifically mention the impact on their 
teaching. 
Overcrowded classes - up to 80, with the people who had f ed - it didn't allow us to work properly 
... some with 
desks, some sitting on the f oor - we had to attend to all the children who appeared. 
Category C [f] 
Only two younger teachers in this group claimed not to have been affected by the war because they 
were too young and living in an urban area. However, they did of course'live it'. Matola, where one 
was living throughout her childhood, was subject for some time to nightly attacks that were 
certainly audible even in the relatively safer areas and of course they attended the over-crowded 
schools full of displaced children. 
I heard people talk about the war, and lived it but as a small child ... 
1 cannot say anything about it. 
Category C [f] 
6.2.6 The parents' view 
As already mentioned the parents interviewed had experienced similar moments in their own 
upbringing and education to the teachers, but they were in general from less well-educated homes 
than the teachers and a higher proportion of their parents were from rural peasant backgrounds, 
while only one family was assimilated (see Appendix 1). Nevertheless, their literacy and 
Portuguese language skills were greater than the average in the population and whether literate or 
not they were able to send their children to school. '$ Since these interviews (though less detailed 
than those with the education staff) collected data on three generations: the parents, their parents 
and their children, it was possible to get an impression of generational progress, and of families 
affected by the succession of events affecting their education. 
1e This is probably due to the bias inherent in the sample: the majority of the parents were associated with 
urban secondary schools and as class representatives, had been selected by, and agreed to represent, the other 
parents. They would be likely to be those with most knowledge of and interest in schools. 
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Of their total number of 25 children, 18 were in fulltime education (from primary to higher) and 2 
in professional training. Four had left education, one after completing higher education but three 
without completing secondary education. (A young woman responsible (encarregada) for her 
sister's education had a small baby. ) 
It was possible to see in six of the group of seven, that each generation had achieved a higher level 
of education than the last as a result of the same factors seen in the case of the education staff: 
parental concern and post-independence expansion of opportunities. Where grandparents were 
illiterate or had only basic literacy, parents completed primary education and the next generation 
secondary or higher. However in one case, though the parent himself had achieved more than his 
parents, only his daughter was matching his achievement and his two sons had dropped out of 
secondary education, because they had been switched to night school due to lack of places and then 
failed. 
Parents' means as well as commitment were significant in this group too. Loss of a father 
immediately terminated one parent's schooling and in the present generation a father, unemployed 
due to factory closures was very concerned that because his son had to work while completing his 
schooling at night he might not succeed. 
Asked to compare their schooling with that of their own children, the parents had mixed views. 
Those interviewed in Matola and their fellow school council members who joined them in 
discussion, tended to think that the schooling they had in the colonial time was better in terms of 
quality than that experienced by their children and they even had some rather happy memories of it. 
The teaching was much better compared to the present system - it was a happy youth - one learnt much 
easier... by grade three you could write a letter - you learnt good grammar and calligraphy. It was because all 
the teachers were qualified Sand the greater part of the population was not integrated in the schools- now the 
conditions don't exist to attend to everyone - there is a lack of teachers. 
However the two women, who had their own experience of schooling post-independence, had a 
slightly different perspective. One was very enthusiastic about her experience of returning to 
complete her primary education in 1976, not just on account of the academic study but also the 
19 This was of course not universally the case. The majority of colonial teachers in the indigenous system 
were unqualified monitors. Buendia G6mez, 1999: 65 and Golias, 1993: 59-60. 
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spirit of participation and purpose. She felt rather bemused by the curriculum changes and changed 
attitudes of the present schools. The young woman responsible for her sister's education, and still 
completing grade 12 herself, had quite a clear appreciation of exactly what had changed since her 
days in the same secondary school during the war. 
The material conditions have changed a lot -I studied here and it is now improved in terms of conditions... I 
started school in 1986... 1 had many difficulties - without books, without sanitation - but the teachers gave the 
lessons well. 
Like her fellow parents she saw the teachers now demoralised by their economic problems and 
open to bribery from better off parents. 
The two parents in Nampula, one a peasant farmer with a son at a rural primary school, the other, 
son of peasants, but a former teacher, president of the parents association of an urban secondary 
school, member of the provincial electoral commission and completing a law degree, shared a very 
different assessment of the relative merits of colonial and post-independence schooling. 
In that time ... the pupil who 
didn't go to school was beaten - the parents were afraid of the teacher - not 
many went to school, many were afraid - today they are not obliged, they go independently - the better school 
is the one of today - they are studying in peace, its not obligatory. 
Category D. Rural father. 
I consider that the present (school) is a transformation in terms of openness - the pupil is the subject, subs 
of the process of education - he participates. In the colonial system the participation was minimal - the 
syllabus was not related to reality (for example, we were made to learn geographical facts about Portugal not 
Mozambique) and the way of making us (do it) was to grab (us) by the ear - the pupil learnt from fear. On the 
other hand what we can see is that those teachers did have solid knowledge - spelling handwriting, tables 
etc.... In this teaching (today) the pupil is much freer, the teacher merely directs the process - it is more 
appropriate to a democratic system -but the teachers have some problems with discipline - it requires more 
pedagogical ability. 
Category D. Urban parent. 
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Though, as we have said, the parents group does not constitute a representative sample, their 
observations do serve to illustrate, the disparities in the colonial system and the key issues of 
quantity, quality and relevance, that have beset the post-independence drive for an inclusive and 
appropriate education system, as well as the enormous and lasting damage caused by the war. 
6.3 Discussion 
It is clear from the above accounts that while the institutional measures for training and capacity 
building provided by MINED, largely supported by donor funding and in the early years by foreign 
teachers and advisers (the 'cooperantes') were enormously important, in fact essential, other factors 
were probably decisive in ensuring that personnel were able to take advantage of these 
opportunities, especially to overcome the many negative factors that in some cases almost overcame 
them. The essential initial factor seems to be parental commitment, followed by personal 
determination. It is also clear that a minimum level of family subsistence or the material support 
from advantaged third parties was essential. However, it is also clear that governments played a 
decisive role in either encouraging or discouraging participation. Thus the post-independence 
government commitment to education as a basic right and a development priority was not only 
crucial in creating opportunity but also shaping personal expectations and ambition. Administrative 
measures to extend access and social welfare provision under this policy were clearly critical in 
opening the way for the most disadvantaged. 
The review of the participants' education and careers also gives us a profile of the personnel who 
now staff the Ministry of Education and largely determine its institutional character. There are two 
very striking conclusions to be drawn from the analysis of the family background and formative 
years of the education personnel. One is that they are for the most part, from a very special minority 
that grew up in the final years of the colonial regime and the early post-independence period. All 
except one, from an Asian family, came from ethnic groups in the majority indigenous population, 
but unlike the overwhelming majority of their compatriots, they, and most of their parents acquired 
a basic education, and even in some cases secondary or professional education. This difference 
from the general population is particularly striking in the case of the women in the sample. The 
second point is a corollary of the first: the homogeneity of the group. While there are some slight 
differences between the different categories of personnel and rather more disadvantage evident in 
the northern province, they share very particular experiences. 
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Shared experience is also evident in their careers which all started in the classroom. Those who now 
manage the education sector, have personal working experience of the teaching and learning 
activities that they administrate and have a network of personal contacts at all levels of the 
organisation acquired in their progress through the system. The pattern of their careers also 
demonstrates systematic capacity building policies on the part of MINED both to increase their 
professional skills and broaden their experience. These have clearly been successful in developing 
the different levels of management but much more difficult to sustain and implement 
comprehensively for the much larger teaching force. However, a general culture of proactively 
seeking opportunities for personal capacity building often seems to have mitigated the limitations of 
the system. 
The participants' evaluation of their own development suggests that first experiences, whether of 
schooling or of professional learning, have the most impact in developing capacity. Mid-career 
opportunities to study were seen as significant formative experiences only when they played a 
direct role in increasing knowledge and understanding of their specific area of professional work or 
in personal realisation. The prominence given to non-formal professional learning (through work 
experience, peer-group learning, in-service capacity building etc. ) should also be noted when 
considering the impact of capacity building measures. 
The participants' accounts also suggest that the imbalance between the development of higher 
levels of management and the teaching personnel can be attributed largely but not entirely to the 
effects of the war. The scale of the deficit in terms of teacher numbers at independence was such 
that it could not be rapidly overcome in terms of either quantity or quality before first developing 
the capacity to train teachers. The early progress in this endeavour is evident in the improved level 
of initial training and induction with which some of our sample entered the profession after 1980. 
The presence in the sample of recently recruited unqualified teachers as well as long-serving 
unqualified teachers, who had no upgrading for decades, reflects the impact of the war in setting 
back that progress. 
It is evident from the individual accounts analysed above, that the war left no one's life or career 
untouched. While all those interviewed had found ways to overcome or recover from its very 
negative impact on their lives, the general experience was of reversal, delay and frustration in 
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achieving personal and professional goals, as well as varying degrees of distress. Nevertheless 
within that scenario, the negative impact was clearly greatest at the local level and therefore 
disproportionately affected teachers, their pupils and local staff particularly in the rural areas 2° This 
continues to be evident in the accounts of the younger teachers and the parents of today's pupils. 
Though the violence and trauma have ended, shortages of teachers and financial resources, that are 
largely a consequence of the economic collapse provoked by the war, continue to frustrate the 
aspirations of both teachers and pupils. 
Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter 5 the education system had the institutional strength to 
survive the war and develop its own recovery strategies. The evidence from these personal histories 
gives us some clues as to how that was possible and goes some way to answering questions arising 
from the review of the literature as to the institutional strength of MINED. 
6.4 Conclusions 
In answer to the question raised at the end of Chapter 5, it seems clear that institutional capacity 
was developed as a result of the strong support for individual capacity building provided by 
MINED's partners. However it is very clear from the participants' accounts that the international 
contribution was made within the framework of a strong government policy for developing the 
education sector combined with the individual will of staff, parents and pupils. The capacity 
building work in education also took place within the wider social context of revolution, war and 
peace and the process was therefore also either facilitated or retarded by these events, which 
differentially affected the motivation and opportunities of different groups to participate. We can 
conclude therefore that the evidence from the participants' personal histories, confirms the 
generative model discussed in Chapter 4 (4.2.1. and Figure 4. ) because it appears that the 
development of capacity in the education sector was determined by the interaction between context 
(government policy and conditions of post-independence public euphoria, civil war and peace 
building) individual volition and the cumulative effect of the interventions themselves. 
MINED also developed a strong corporate identity in its staff and a sense of ownership amongst at 
least the more active parents. The very particular shared experience of colonial and revolutionary 
20 As already noted the sample, due to its urban bias, does not adequately reflect the huge backlog of 
unqualified and under-qualified teachers remaining in the rural areas. 
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education followed by war is probably the most significant factor in this though it has clearly been 
reinforced amongst the staff by shared career and professional learning experiences. 
The development of the MINED and all sectors of public administration from this tiny and still 
barely educated human resource is a lesson in just what can be achieved, in the aftermath of years 
of repression followed by violent regime change, with a combination of vision, determination and 
strategic allocation of opportunities and resources backed by international assistance. 
However, there is a question as to whether this sense of identity is permanent or will not survive 
beyond this very special generation. The evidence from the new `mercenaries' in the sample, those 
recently recruited because other employment opportunities are not available, is that they have `got 
to like it' and identify with it. As in the previous generation, some may stay and others may move 
on, but most will still be involved as parents. The role that former education staff are already 
playing as parents is demonstrated by the parent association president in Nampula. 
In answer to another of the queries raised in Chapter 5: on balance, we can conclude that MINED 
with its schools has proved itself a durable institution `in the political and social life' of 
Mozambique (see Chapterl. 1.1). Meanwhile, its main weakness continues to be the lack of 
capacity to respond in quantity and quality to the demand it has created. 
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CHAPTER 7. 
GOVERNMENT, CITIZENS AND INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION: DEVELOPING CAPACITY IN THE 
CONTEXT OF WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH 
Introduction 
After the participants had described and evaluated their personal experiences they were invited to 
reflect on three phases in the development of the education system: post-independence, the war and 
post-war recovery as a basis for discussing the roles played by government and international 
cooperation for the capacity building of the nation and the impact of the war on that process. As 
explained in Chapter 4, the intention was not to lay down a template but provide a guide as to what 
the researcher wanted to understand and then by means of the cue questions allow the participants 
to develop their ideas. This meant that participants discussed each question only to the extent that 
they were interested or able and they were not interrupted if they moved on to other topics. As a 
result they imposed their own timescales and personal emphases on the subject matter. 
The first thing that became clear was that the participants divided the time differently from the 
researcher and in some cases from each other. For most, even though the war had by then been 
seriously disrupting education for some years, the critical moment when the momentum of post- 
independence development and drive was halted came five or six years into the war in the mid 
1980s with the economic collapse, structural adjustment and advent of western and UN (mainly 
relief) aid. At this point the government also turned its attention from education to 'war and 
survival'. For those in senior management, the post-war recovery began in the early 1990s as the 
peace accord was being negotiated, while those on the ground only saw the government turning its 
attention again to education and enlisting donor aid to support its policies, after the peace. So too, 
some think that the recovery phase is now over and current problems are inherent in the process of 
development, others still see continuing effects of the war. 
Since they were free to do so, they also focussed their discussions differently. The parents and 
many of the classroom teachers were less inclined to make general retrospective analyses, but had 
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very decided views on present conditions and policies. They also tended to discuss general points 
by reference to their personal experience rather than in theoretical terms. Many who worked 
through the war, after describing its effects in a few words, immediately launched into describing 
how things were being restored without the researcher asking the final question. Others, who saw a 
continuity of purpose from the first phase to the last, ranged over the whole period in all their 
answers. 
In setting out their responses in this section of the interviews, I have maintained three divisions, 
without defining an exact time frame for each, because the participants did all see three distinct 
phases in the direction taken by education. In reality, though there was no doubt about the 
qualitative changes that had taken place, they overlapped and different actors became aware of 
change at different times. For example, the three Nampula teachers those whose lives were most 
disrupted by the war, tended to refer to two phases, one socialist and one 'of the market'. For them 
the war was something like a black hole in between in which they were not aware of any 
development. The policy-makers, on the other hand, had very precise dates for what they 
considered significant changes. 
7.1 Policies and strategies for the education and capacity development of 
the nation post-independence. 
7.1.1 The Role of Government 
The participants in all groups shared some key perceptions about the role played by the post- 
independence government in promoting education, though with different emphasis. The ages of the 
participants and therefore the times they remembered also influenced their views. However, the 
dominant image is that of a strong leading role by government in pursuit of objectives, which 
corresponded with key aspirations of the public. Participants in all groups frequently mentioned the 
same yardsticks as evidence of the government's commitment and success: the expansion of the 
school network and the adult literacy campaigns. These two key strategies were seen as directly 
aimed at reversing the closed and discriminatory colonial system, by promoting the inclusion of the 
previously excluded majority, especially in the rural areas, and those denied opportunities on the 
basis of age, gender or poverty. The government was also seen as recognising and starting to 
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redress the unequal geographical distribution of education opportunities between different regions 
of the country. The third key strategy that was mentioned by all groups was the drive to develop the 
necessary human resources to carry out the education policies: the many different schemes to 
rapidly train teachers and education cadres and to support them technically in-service. Enlisting 
foreign technical assistance and scholarship funding was seen as a deliberate strategy of the 
government in pursuit of this objective. 
There was also a fair degree of consensus with regard to the conditions in which these policies were 
pursued and the response and involvement of the public. It was generally agreed that there were 
enormous difficulties to surmount. Specifically, lack of technical capacity and qualified personnel 
were the main limitations. Lack of resources were also mentioned, but often not seen as critical in 
this phase except by the parents, who tended to see this as a problem besetting the whole post- 
independence enterprise to extend education to all. The response of the public was not mentioned 
by many of the group B administrators and teachers in group C, but those that did, agreed with the 
A group administrators and the parents (group D) that people were highly motivated to study and to 
participate in developing the schools and that there was a spirit of self-reliance and civic 
involvement. 
The Policymakers' View. (Group A) 
As we saw from their personal histories, this group were recruited at or soon after independence to 
work for education while still completing their own education and professional training. They were 
clearly deeply impressed by the experience and spoke about it at greater length than the others, 
speaking of the vision, leadership and political will of the government. On the other hand they also 
emphasised the almost total lack of technical capacity at all levels of government, in the Ministry of 
Education and in the schools. This was seen as the main development challenge for the country and 
the reason why the government 'dedicated' 18% of the meagre GNP to education 
The main thrust of government policy at this time was seen to be inclusion and equity and 
extraordinary results were achieved. This was attributed to the ability of the government to 
communicate with and inspire the public, who responded with enthusiasm and a spirit of self- 
reliance and patriotism, and to developing participatory forms of grass roots organisation for the 
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delivery and support for education. Participation and democracy' were thus seen as the means used 
to overcome the technical incapacity, although inevitably, when everyone was learning on the job 
mistakes were made. 
The second line of attack was seen to be a strong commitment to human resource development for 
the administration and delivery of education. In this case the necessary strategy for developing a 
qualified workforce was to enlist foreign technical assistance and funding for scholarships, to 
enable the government to implement its 'dreams' in the short term and progressively eliminate the 
need for foreign personnel or overseas study in the long term. 
How in these conditions did we achieve so much -from 96% illiteracy in '75 to a rate of school attendance in 
'81 of 93% - in five years! Although we didn't have experience, we had political clarity as to the importance 
of education.... and a strategy, in the absence of technical experience, to implement by means of much 
participation, especially in the communities. 
... money is not always necessary to get things done 
... a philosophy that came 
from the (independence) war to rely on one's own efforts - many mistakes were 
made but they were necessary mistakes so as not to depend on others 
... that 
fury of the independence - the political will with that fury of the population helped a lot - by 1981 we 
were almost achieving universal schooling, that was the big impact of that fury together with technical 
assistance. 
This group then, on the whole, experienced these years as positive and inspiring and as essentially 
participatory despite the highly directive leadership of the government at that time. 
The Administrators' View (Category B) 
This group also clearly saw the government as taking a leading role in the development of 
education and exhibiting political will and strength in this phase. However no one in this group 
referred to the shared vision described by the policy makers, but almost all described the 
government's 'concern' (preocupagdo) for inclusion and equity and referred to expansion and 
1 As other contributors also suggest, for many Mozambicans, this first experience of at least being asked to 
join in, if not yet to make government policy, was the starting point for democracy in their country. 
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growth of the school network as its main aim and achievement, often contrasting it with colonial 
'exclusion'. 
There was great concern on the part of the government that the whole Mozambican population should 
achieve basic level (primary education). They began to oblige people to go to school, without looking at age - 
at seven or fourteen they could (all) go into grade one. 
You only have to look before '75 to know that the government is making some effort. Before, the people didn't 
have the right (to education)... the government created conditions and interest in the school - everyone wants 
to study. 
The role of government? Very strong in this area in terms of captivating people to participate. 
The government played a very important role ... it's thanks to the government that today's cadres were 
formed: 
the majority of those who have higher and middle formation are products of this and the policy of the 
government for free education - everyone can study. 
The government has the plans and implements them with the means it has. 
It (the role of government) has been very great in the development of education -if it wasn't for this the 
country would not have achieved the level of education it has - the big expansion of the school network, 
although insufficient, not to mention the problems of migration to the cities - the contribution of the 
government in general was great - it did what it should have done. 
Clearly this group too saw the role of government in education in this phase as positive and broadly 
directed at meeting the needs and aspirations of the public. Indeed they often spoke with enthusiasm 
when describing the achievements. However, there is a detectable difference of perception about 
the relationship of the government and the public. While some mentioned the government's role in 
involving the public in education, their choice of words and the relationship they describe is one in 
which the government has the leading role and the public are either directed or persuaded to join in. 
There is no mention of grassroots 'fury' as in the A group responses. 
The Teachers' View (Category C) 
Only 11 members of this group of 18 participants felt able to discuss the post-independence period. 
5 were too young to have any personal experience and a further two had only slight recollection of a 
period when they were still children. 
As with the other groups, the 11 older teachers recalled the government's role in terms of strength, 
driven by 'concern' for education to which it gave 'great emphasis' or `importance'. Policies and 
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strategies that were mentioned included, nationalization (i. e. free education), literacy campaigns 
and developing international cooperation. As with the administrators' group, the overriding image 
of the government's action in this period was the drive for inclusion and equity through expansion 
and development of the education system often contrasted with the colonial system and sometimes 
compared favourably to the present. About a third of the group also specifically mentioned the 
government's role in human resource development. 
The government always concerned itself with the academic and moral development of Mozambican society - 
to pull the people out of the illiteracy in which it was submerged. The Mozambican government gave priority 
to all the people for education... this was the force of the government - the government plan for development. 
The great literacy campaigns with pupils often teaching adults contributed to reducing illiteracy rates. 
... it 
has little means and for that reason develops relations with others to give support. This government is so 
concerned that even the verypoorest goes to school free of charge. I reckon in other countries they pay fees? 
Portuguese colonialism was not interested in educating many Mozambicans ... the number of secondary 
schools was very limited With the nationalisations it rapidly increased .. especially where there were none 
before, outside the big cities. 
I can say that in the first years the government did a lot -free enrolment was introduced 
In the first period schooling was compulsory but it was a schooling that desired that all the people should 
study. 
Before, (i. e. in the post-independence phase) despite much crisis, education was given great importance 
The government ensured that the majority (of the staff) had the opportunity to raise their academic level. 
While the group was generally concerned to stress the great achievements in terms of access to 
education, one older teacher noted that there were downsides compared to the colonial school and 
another secondary head teacher saw that the concentration on primary education had resulted in 
neglect of secondary and technical education, the repercussions of which are felt in the schools 
today. 
The children became very badly behaved in the years after independence - people interpreted independence 
badly - the parents would not accept that the teacher could discipline their children 
There was great emphasis on basic education by the government and the cooperation as well. Now without 
abandoning basic education they need to begin to concentrate on secondary and technical education so as to 
create people capable of serving others. 
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Understandably this group of classroom practitioners tended not to discuss government policy in 
terms of global policy or vision, but the examples they gave based on personal experience reflect 
the same perceptions as the other two groups. The image is of a government positively directing 
resources to satisfy the main aspiration of the majority for access and inclusion. However, as in the 
account by the other practitioner group, the administrators, participation by the public is described 
as at the instigation or even at the command of the government. 
The Parents' View (Category D) 
As already explained, this topic was only discussed specifically in the two interviews in Nampula 
and with the Parents Association group in Machava and the tendency was to talk of the government 
role in the whole period since independence up to the present, often comparing it with the colonial 
system. However the view of the government's role in education in this phase, is broadly similar to 
that of the education staff. They recognised the government's commitment to education and the 
great efforts made since independence for inclusion and equity through expansion and development 
of the system, and they describe the public responding with motivation to study. 
The government concerns itself with expanding the school network (in the colonial time veryfew had access). 
The school is open to all the children of peasants- and it also concerns itself with the education of adults... The 
government understands that to resolve all the problems (of the country)... the human resource has to be 
developed. 
The government has made a big effort for education.... There is growth 
Nevertheless, they were almost unanimous in agreeing that the quality of education had deteriorated 
compared to colonial times (except in one respect referred to by both the Nampula parents, the 
removal of fear from the classroom. ) and this was directly attributable to the rapid expansion. 
In the past, before Independence, there was little schooling but the conditions were adequate - now the 
conditions to attend to everyone don't exist. 
As mentioned already, the parents were inclined to see everything from the perspective of present 
problems, which they nevertheless saw as longstanding and indeed they can be summarised as the 
three main difficulties seen by other groups as besetting the national education project from the 
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start: lack of technical capacity, lack of teachers and lack of resources resulting in an inability to 
meet demand. 
There were many problems after independence. 
... in our conditions, without experience - we were cut offfrom the scientific world. 
The policy of the government is made, it has great concern, but the problem is not having the means. 
Education does not secure its own cadres - they train lots of teachers but lose them because they can't secure 
them financially. 
As regards the issue of participation, the notion that parents should participate proactively in the 
management of the school, which according to the policymakers was one of the key post- 
independence strategies, has clearly taken root, to the extent that the parents (and head teachers) 
when describing the activities of the associations did not describe their role as new, but as what was 
expected of them. 
7.1.2 The Role of International Cooperation 
As discussed in Chapter 5, international cooperation in this phase was largely from socialist 
countries, though western NGOs (sometimes funded by their governments) and of course SIDA 
were involved and there was some cooperation with African countries on a very small scale. The 
broad picture was as one of the policymakers described it: 
Up to '85 it (cooperation) was done by the socialist block, especially GDR and USSR as well as Cuba, 
Bulgaria and others and cooperantes from progressive western organisations. 
The role of international cooperation was seen by the majority in each group as 'to support' (apoiar) 
the implementation of the government's plans and as being essential (indispensävel) for their 
realisation, of great importance (preponderante%ztremamente importante) or necessary because the 
government had limited financial means and particularly lacked human resources. As we saw 
above, the government was seen as proactively seeking out this support as a strategy to overcome 
its resource deficits and so in response to this question interviewees describe the aid as 'chosen' 
(escolhido) 'selected' (selecionado) and directed (dirigido) by government. In other words, the 
government was always visibly at the helm. 
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The majority of those who responded in all the staff groups saw the main input of cooperation at 
this time as various forms of individual capacity building, most citing their own personal 
experience. Little reference was made to providing material and financial aid other than the funding 
of these activities. 
In the early years there were large numbers of foreign secondary teachers, but as time went by and 
more Mozambicans qualified, the number was greatly reduced and technical assistance was 
generally used in higher education and at the administrative and policy levels. 2 This seems to be 
reflected in the very different levels of personal knowledge of the role played by international 
cooperation over this period. 
The Policymakers' View (Category A) 
This group were unanimous in seeing the involvement of international cooperation as a clearly 
directed government strategy. The type of input was chosen and carefully targeted and the role of 
the technical assistance was to enable the government to realise its aims. The huge deficits in 
human resources and institutional capacity meant that it was essential and the various inputs were 
seen to have been largely successful in rapidly overcoming the legacy of incapacity. 
There was a very clear vision of how Mozambique should use the cooperation - they chose partners for 
specific purposes - the Germans from the GDR to support the development of the philosophy of the SNE, the 
Soviets for maths and technical education... 
(in) MINED where the technical experts and internationalists helped to organize the Ministry, it was strictly 
directed towards the capacity building of the Mozambicans - and it worked 
Cooperation was and is fundamental to realise these dreams - technical assistance of specialists in various 
areas - the Faculty (of Education UEM) - almost all the teachers - the possibility to go out to many countries 
(to study) ... it was a good experience and it allowed us to open all the schools in a short time. 
The majority of teachers in the Faculty (UEM) were foreigners and they were good - not sent just for the sake 
of sending but selected. In the UP, the foreign staff - (there was) material support but also in conversation 
and morale - it supported the development of the institutions. 
There was a time when perhaps 60% of the teaching staff in the Pedagogical University were graduates 
(Licenciados) from the GDR. 
2 This was the situation when the author joined MINED at the end of 1983 
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It is clear from the comments of this group, (as well as their curricula discussed above) that they 
were the very Mozambicans targeted by the cooperation policy. That is they experienced the 
various capacity building strategies personally and were therefore fully aware of the significance of 
the contribution made by technical assistance and scholarship schemes. In all their discussions 
there was only the one passing mention (quoted above) of the provision of direct material aid and 
seen as of secondary importance to the personal contribution of 'cooperantes'. 
Clearly their perception was that at this time the government with the public was able, despite its 
limited means, to be largely self-reliant in the running and expansion of the system, but they were 
emphatic in attributing a major role to international cooperation in developing professional and 
institutional capacity, recognising that the government had neither the technical capacity nor the 
financial means to do this alone. 
The Administrators View (Category B) 
For the reasons mentioned above, fewer in this group had experience on which to comment 
although those that had, like the policymakers had direct contact with foreign personnel, mostly as 
teachers. They were for the most part very positive about their contribution and saw establishing 
cooperation partnerships as a government strategy essential to achieving its education goals. 
The combination of the effort of the government in defining policies with the support for implementation of 
the international cooperation. 
... the policy, the government 
had that, but they would not have succeeded because the financial part was 
missing -and in the first years they had to import teachers and others to train nationals who afterwards 
trained others. 
... when 
I entered secondary education, the international cooperation - there were many foreign 
teachers... they had a major role - the teachers from outside - Vietnam, Germany... South Africans who taught 
English (.. I guess they were refugees) while the government mobilized people to go to school. 
I evaluate this formation as extremely important as well as many who studied outside the country like for 
example our Provincial Director. 
As these comments show, this group also saw international cooperation making a major 
contribution to human resource development through capacity building, teaching and scholarships, 
and some noted the importance of the financial contribution. However there were also some in this 
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group who qualified their positive assessment of the cooperation recognising limitations in 
resources and in competence. 
.. it (aid) is useful but not sufficient. 
... there is a type of cooperation that I find (pause)- there were teachers from the GDR and Cuba that left after 
two years - without forming anyone. What was better was to come to form and leave capable people in their 
place as in the Faculty (UEM) with various foreign teachers. 
The reflections of this group seem particularly realistic, they recognised that a major contribution 
had been made by the foreign personnel, and understood the financial cost that represented, but also 
saw that on its own it was not sufficient. In the end foreign governments and organisations have 
their own limitations and it is government that has to direct policy and manage the support given by 
others. 
The Teachers' View (Category C) 
As in the discussion of the government's role in this period, only 11 of the 18 teachers were able to 
make any comment but the number with any direct experience was even fewer. However, those 
who could, painted a similar picture to the other two groups of education staff. 
... my own 
formation was thanks to the cooperation of foreign teachers from western and socialist countries, 
because there were no Mozambican teachers especially in secondary and higher education - (these were) 
secured by cooperantes in extremely difficult conditions - without material, with problems of language and 
culture, but they gave a big contribution. In the Faculty (UEM) I had teachers from England, Germany and 
Bulgaria - in secondary schooling Russians and Cubans. 
At that time we had a very rich international cooperation of teachers and technical staff from Africa, Europe 
and Asia etc... there were pupils who went to those countries as well - GDR, Cuba, Russia and some African 
countries as well like Tanzania. It was the policy of the foreign governments and that of Mozambique. All 
positive in that phase for a country without the means to do this - in fact the majority of the present cadres 
went through this formation. 
Before (the war) cooperation was integrated in the plan of the government and arrived where it was supposed 
to. 
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Thus these respondents reinforce the image of a major contribution to capacity building (despite the 
admitted difficulties) by foreign personnel filling the human and financial resource gaps of the 
government but working within its overall plan. 
However, for those working or studying outside secondary and higher education, or in the districts 
as the war began to affect the rural areas in the 1980s, there was little awareness of any 
international contribution. 
I have no experience of international cooperation - there was one time at the Jardim school (primary school 
in Maputo between 1978 and 1989) we exchanged letters with schools in Germany (but) projects, I know 
nothing about that. 
In '77 it (international cooperation) existed but you didn't notice it much -I do remember in Angöche (after 
1987) UNICEF supplied school materials to the secondary school 
I can't really recall international cooperation, just the food from WFP in the boarding hostel. 
It is worth noting that these respondents who had no awareness of international cooperation at this 
time (or in some cases at any time) had the same clear view of the government's role and policies as 
their colleagues and showed clear awareness of other issues, so we have to accept that they were 
simply not exposed to the work of the international personnel. (The implications of these two 
contrasting experiences are discussed below. ) 
The Parents' View (Category D) 
The parents also had very little to say about international cooperation, because as they said they had 
no direct experience of it then or now. Their view was however that it was necessary to support the 
programmes of the government. Only one parent who was a teacher in the colonial period and 
trained teachers up to 1986, when he left to work in industry, remembered UNICEF supplying 
materials and financial aid to the training college and Danish cooperation offering audio-visual 
equipment. Looking at these responses we have to conclude that for many citizens in this period the 
role played by international cooperation in education was remote from their experience in contrast 
to their very strong perception of the government's role in opening up education to them and their 
children. 
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7.1.3 Lessons learned about the policies and strategies for developing education post- 
independence. 
The participants in all groups were unanimous in seeing the post independence period from 1975 up 
to some time in the mid 1980s as one of dramatic expansion of access to education that was 
ideologically driven by government with the consent and participation of the majority of the public. 
The majority including the parents were aware that the government developed plans and strategies 
to achieve this objective, and saw this as its essential function. Education staff depending on their 
level of experience, were aware of some or all of the particular strategies employed, which fall into 
three categories: mobilization of public participation; developing participatory management 
structures in schools and local education services; enlisting international technical assistance and 
scholarship funding to develop human resources to manage and develop the system. 
In this scenario, international cooperation was seen as essential given the huge deficits of 
competence and very limited financial means of the post-independence government, but its role was 
defined as supporting the implementation of the government's plans and its principal sphere of 
action as capacity building with a view to developing Mozambican staff and institutions that would 
as soon as possible function without foreign personnel. 
While there was one suggestion that this did not always work in practice as some foreign staff 
simply filled a gap and returned home without contributing to the development of Mozambican 
staff, 3 and also recognition of the cultural difficulties, the general opinion of those who had direct 
experience of the contribution made by foreign personnel was that it was positive and the only 
solution at the time. A similar attitude was expressed in relation to studying abroad, it was the only 
possible option and so despite the difficulties, welcome. 
Many of the participants went on to conclude that the fact that by the end of this period, 
Mozambican schools, training colleges and higher education institutions were staffed by 
Mozambican graduates (including themselves) was proof of the efficacy of this strategy. 
3 From the author's observation and in the opinion of Mozambicans consulted in the late 1980s this was a very 
common scenario in other sectors, where the cooperante system was viewed with less enthusiasm. This view 
was expressed by Elisabeth Sequeira who was National Director of International Cooperation in MINED at 
this time (interview August 2003 see discussion in Chapter 6) 
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However, as we have seen, a significant number of teachers and parents and a few younger 
administrators did not have any direct experience of this international cooperation (though some 
admitted they were aware that it existed) and did not feel able to comment. 
So it is that in reviewing this part of the discussions, we are faced with two contrasting perceptions. 
On the one hand, there is a group of older and more senior education staff who are certain that the 
contribution of international cooperation, mainly from socialist countries, was crucial in enabling 
the government to rapidly develop the human resources necessary to expand and manage the 
education system to include the majority of the population. On the other, there is a group of those at 
the grass-roots who claim that they never encountered this international effort, while being very 
conscious of the leading role played by government in bringing education to even the poorest. Does 
this mean that the foreign assistance only benefited an elite or is it true that it was a successful 
strategy that unlocked education for the masses by focussing aid on the development of cadres? The 
answer lies in looking back at the curricula of our respondents (as well as the documentation and 
other sources discussed in Chapter 5). The same individuals who were hardly aware of international 
aid at this time were taught in secondary schools, training colleges and later higher education or 
were given in-service capacity building by Mozambicans like the senior members of the sample (in 
some cases actually by them), who were themselves taught or advised by the cooperantes or studied 
on scholarships abroad. It is therefore suggested that the government's strategy for developing 
capacity using international technical assistance was broadly successful for the education sector. 
In the first decade of its existence MINED had gone a long way to achieving its two immediate 
objectives: expansion of access to basic education and the creation of a public service institution 
staffed by qualified Mozambicans. However, before moving on to see how that institution was to 
cope with the growing catastrophe of the war, it is worth considering through the reflections of the 
participants, what kind of institution it had become as a result of the work of these early years. 
In addition to its great strength of purpose and growing capacity, some inherent weaknesses were 
already apparent. The drive for expansion had been achieved at the cost of the quality of the 
education delivered in the classroom, both in terms of academic content and socialization. As we 
saw from the histories of our sample, teachers were studying and learning professional skills while 
actually trying to teach pupils not much younger than themselves, or adults the age of their parents. 
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Administrators and advisors were similarly learning on the job, with the professional guidance of 
foreign staff, experienced in education but not in Mozambican culture. 
The opening up of the education system, the pursuit of inclusion and equity and the mobilization of 
public participation were huge strides in the direction of democracy, but there was not yet an equal 
partnership between the government and the public; issues of relevance and identity had yet to be 
addressed. Meanwhile a level of demand had been inspired that could not be fully satisfied. 
Prioritising basic education for all was the right choice for a country seeking to overcome decades 
of underdevelopment but it had been done at the cost of neglecting other levels of the system and by 
ruthlessly limiting the career options of those who were co-opted to serve the majority. All of these 
factors were to have repercussions later, but it is hard to see, given Mozambique's history and the 
enormity of the task they were attempting, how it would have been done differently. Perhaps the 
failures come under the heading of 'necessary mistakes' discussed by one contributor. 
7.2. The experience of war, its causes and impact on the development of 
education 
This was not an easy topic for the participants to discuss. Many were not keen to dwell on what had 
been a very difficult time in their lives and gave quite laconic answers. Their descriptions of the 
effects of the war on education were very similar, including their use of vocabulary. Of course these 
were seen to be overwhelmingly negative even by those few who were also able to see something 
positive coming out of it. 
When asked if they had any views on the fundamental causes of the war, the participants' reaction 
showed that this was unexpected, (including the A group who did not have this question in their 
preliminary questionnaire) many paused and collected their thoughts, a few gave short dismissive 
answers. Some claimed they were too young to have any idea or that they were out of the country 
when it started, some admitted they had tried and failed to understand it. However the majority gave 
considered answers carefully choosing their words. They also frequently prefaced their remarks 
with disclaimers: that it was a complex subject, that this was their personal opinion etc. In other 
cases they started by overtly or implicitly dismissing the 'received wisdom' of others before putting 
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their view. It seemed to the researcher that this was not a subject they commonly discussed but 
something about which they had reflected in their own minds. 
7.2.1 The Causes of the War 
As discussed in Chapter 5, in the light of the apparent popularity and success of the FRELIMO 
government, analysts have advanced a number of theories, depending on their ideological 
standpoint, to account for the civil war: destabilization by an alliance of neighbouring settler 
regimes and western interests in the context of the cold war; lack of democracy and espousal of 
Marxist utopianism; the inability to meet aspirations raised by the sudden advent of independence; a 
combination of all three of these. All of these are mentioned by at least some of the participants 
(sometimes in order to reject them as explanations) but the main causes are seen by the majority as 
much more internal to Mozambican society and in particular to the nationalist movement which 
achieved independence. Those citing only external causes of the war were a very small minority. 
Others, most amongst the policymakers and administrators, saw a combination of internal and 
external causes. The overwhelming majority (including the two parents who discussed this, over 
half the teachers and more than two thirds of the administrators) thought that the fundamental 
causes of the war lay in Mozambican society mostly within the leadership. 
The Policymakers' Explanation (Category A) 
External causes of the war were more commonly cited, and discussed in greater detail, by this group 
than any of the others. One expounded in some detail longstanding external factors, which would 
have inevitably led to the war, whatever the post-independence regime had been. 
To begin with this really difficult question - its a complex subject (pause) an ideological subject and for that 
reason everyone has their opinion - mine, my opinion is the following: whatever movement had fought for 
independence and succeeded in defeating the colonial regime and had serious intentions for self-development 
would not have escaped this war... Eduardo Mondlane... said that it makes no sense for a movement to fight for 
liberty and then create a system of government in favour of the oppressive regime it had just defeated. 
The international context: the cold war between the blocs - it was the socialist bloc that supported 
independence with logistics and formation ... Portugal was supported 
by arms sales etc. by NATO, that is 
NATO did not agree with the independence of Mozambique... the roots (of the war) come from far beyond the 
independence struggle. 
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Three others in this group who identified the same external causes of the war, nevertheless saw it as 
an internal conflict escalated by the external intervention. All four seemed to believe that internal 
conflicts of interest, or areas of dissent would not in themselves have led to war. 
A country following the socialist path and beside it a regime extremely opposed (South Africa) and our 
colonizer handed over by force, not willingly - these two looked for a way to create internal problems - 
without that there would not have been a war - the internal differences would have been resolved internally. 
FRELIMO went in for socialism so there was support for RENAMO. 
There was a contest of the great powers and between us and our apartheid neighbour there were always 
sparks - that was a motive for the war but there had to be some discontent to intervene ... and normally in a 
poor country it is very easy to create discontents and that served to feed many interests outside the country - 
it calmed down when the cold war of the great powers ended and there was no more nourishment. 
Only one of this group attributed the conflict to internal ideological differences and two specifically 
discounted this explanation for the internal or the external conflict: 
FRELIMO just by being independent and sovereign would have come into conflict with these countries... 
Mozambique had already been attacked by Southern Rhodesia by 1976, that is be ore 
the declaration of socialism in 1977. 
To say it was the system is not right - that could always have been discussed. 
However this last respondent saw the failure to discuss differences within the nationalist movement 
itself as the real underlying internal (and main) cause of the war, which was then exploited by 
external agents. This was a view shared by more participants in the other groups. 
(pause) its very complicated - probably it may have been the lack of dialogue between Mozambicans, there 
was no space for conversation, for this reason the war only ended when they sat down, with intermediaries, 
and discussed the differences. The opponents were almost all from the same house - they came out of 
FRELIMO for this reason it was because there was no space to hear their complaints. 
The other member of the policymakers group was one of those who expressed total 
incomprehension of the reasons for the war, but attributed it, obliquely to the internal political 
leadership. This was a view expressed by many in the other groups. 
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Only (those in) the political arena can reply (to this question) - Independence came, which was new to us, we 
were still getting to understand what independence was when suddenly this other war arose - the first (war) 
for independence we had understood but this one we were unable to understand - it destroyed much more 
than the colonial war (in that one) there were strategic objectives, not going and destroying a school, a 
hospital, infrastructure like the railway -I cannot understand how they destroyed schools and killed children. 
The Administrators' Explanation (Category B) 
A minority of this group identified the same external causes as the policymakers, three also 
identified internal causes and only one saw the war as entirely provoked from outside. The 
majority, more than two thirds, saw the main cause as an internal power struggle of the leadership, 
some specifically locating it within the liberation movement itself but most not mentioning this. 
The use of the term'civil war' to describe the conflict was a deliberate choice of words, emphasised 
or repeated by several respondents, which conveyed the message that they rejected the 
government's insistence that it was a 'war of destabilisation'. Similarly others rejected by 
implication, the opposition claim that it was a war for democracy. 
It was a civil war. When there was the FRELIMO war with the colonists, various organisations combined to 
fight together - there were agreements... but afterwards they were not kept and those who didn't have the 
position they wanted -one group- went into the bush. There was no foreign force - it was between 
Mozambicans. 
I believe the war was civil, a contradiction between nationals, a dissidence of one part that wanted a 
particular position ... and with external 
help managed to create this war -I believe it was a question of power 
- related to economic (interest) - being in power would resolve the economic problem. 
To make war there has to be a personal interest -there were individual interests that were not of the general 
population... like children that fight at home to have something. 
A power struggle - one wanted to be in the place of the other- economic power perhaps more than political - 
they can talk a lot about democracy etc. but at bottom it was power. 
But with or without RENAMO there would have been this transformation to multi-partyism -the introduction 
of PRE (structural adjustment programme), still in the time of Samora, that was the first step of the reform - 
except that RENAMO was violent - they fought for democracy - but it would have been slower. 
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Nevertheless, many in this group did see the resort to arms to settle these conflicts as due to a 
failure or incapacity to dialogue, contrasting it with the present more democratic culture. Several of 
the group also pointed out that the same conflict of interests exists today but is carried on verbally. 
In other words the war was always unnecessary. 
1 think the fundamental cause was the incomprehension between Mozambican brothers (pause) - lack of 
understanding (pause) if it was now, when we have understanding and respect between people, there would 
have been no need for war - we had not achieved diversity of ideas - each one thought that his idea was the 
only one 
... in the 
beginning no one took it seriously - now one knows that any opinion has to be considered - however 
small or illiterate the person is, it's as well to listen and not ignore it. 
It was a surprise to discover that it was necessary to talk to them - the population refused and distrusted the 
negotiations - but when they (RENAMO) accepted and the violence immediately ended, they understood that 
these people were controlled.... My father was assassinated with bayonets for supporting his son in literacy 
work - afterwards it's discovered that these men are controlled and not bandits, if that was the case why not 
negotiate?... It was because of ... an insistence 
by the party in power not to have a dialogue. What is done 
today should have been done before - not to say that the same thing does for all. 
... today it's 
by words, but it continues. 
... in the end there were neither winners or losers and we are all here with our (different) ideas developing the 
country. 
As well as the lack of democratic culture in the leadership, several in this group thought the 
ignorance of the general population allowed them to be seduced into participating in the violence 
which in the end only brought disaster. 
In my opinion whatever the motive there was no reason to rush to arms -I think it was the lack of 
understanding, incomprehension of the consequences... many people today regret it - they lost members of 
their family and their possessions etc. People very easily deceived themselves - by false promises etc.... after 
the war ... we were able to converse with the populations - we discovered that they 
had been isolated without 
understanding things. 
Like the policy makers, this group often prefaced their remarks with disclaimers suggesting they 
had insufficient knowledge or experience or that it was a complicated matter and there was one 
participant who was genuinely at a loss to comprehend what could have led to war on this scale. 
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Our ideas about this are influenced by the media (that is we don't have any other sources of information). 
At the time (i. e when it started, but not after 1982) I was in Cuba, so it's difficult to say... 
... there are events that are not explained -they are obscure -a 
lot needs to come out, there is no transparency 
(in other aspects of governance... but not in this). 
I can't understand how people were so discontented as to take up arms - it is difficult for us to understand 
how it happened - it started when I was overseas. After the war I made a journey by car from here to 
Nampula to see and understand but I still can't... it is difficult to explain. 
This group then was generally sceptical of the various political theories put forward by government, 
the opposition and foreign analysts to explain the war. For most of them it was a much more 
familiar question of basic human relations in a society that had yet to learn how to live with 
'diversity of ideas'. 
The Teachers' Explanation (Category C) 
In this group too the majority saw the main causes of the war as internal. Only three out of 18 
recognised the same external causes described by the A group and only one of these did not refer to 
internal causes. Once again a power struggle and inability to dialogue within the leadership was a 
common theme as well as the insistence on'civil' war and a rejection of an ideological contest. The 
main difference compared to the B group is the greater number, though still a minority, who 
distanced themselves from the subject, either by dismissive replies, saying it was to do with 'them' 
or the politicians or simply by saying they did not know. 
Those that provoked this civil war - that is how to describe a war between persons of the same people isn't it? 
- were people who abandoned the ranks of FRELIMO - they separated themselves and went into the bush (the 
same way as the Anglican Church, it is almost the same as the Catholic, but it separated itself) because they 
didn't get the position they wanted - it is difficult to please everyone. 
The expectations of some in FRELIMO were not satisfied and those in power did not manage to meet with 
them to resolve it - each one with his egoism. It was not socialism versus capitalism - nobody understood that 
- it was a struggle to occupy the place of the other. 
Ambition and greed.. Even if one talks of democracy that was done before with the Independence. 
... they all wanted to direct instead of correcting the mistake together - it was only when they noticed that the 
(survival of the) people was at stake that they stopped - the one who suffered was the child. 
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It is difficult for us the population to know the causes, we did not see any reasons for war - the politicians are 
the ones that have their reasons, it was entirely their affair. 
A number in this group however, saw the problems inherent in the post-colonial society as lying at 
the root of the problem: issues such as ignorance, lack of common culture, unequal distribution of 
resources and development and the difficult progress towards democracy. These respondents 
seemed less inclined to attribute blame, more inclined to see that the way people acted was 
conditioned by the circumstances at the time, including lacking the understanding that they had 
since gained. 
Illiteracy contributed, because the people who thought to take power wanted to live well without knowing that 
without science and technology nothing works. 
... they 
(RENAMO) didn't understand what belongs to society (schools etc. ) and what belonged to those in 
power - only at the end they understood and began to try to do education and so on. 
Lack of unity - the existence of the different languages contributed. 
The geographical distribution of the country - the Gaza empire has not ended - it doesn't have that title but it 
still exists - the development is all in the south. The mistake was to continue with the division of the colonial 
time. 
... the 
first elections that were held without any great international support were conducted from people's 
homes up to the People's Assembly - it was a single party with representation from the whole country but 
adopting Marxist-Leninism excluded groups of believers and others - this influenced the war. There were 
malcontents (Mozambicans) from the former Portuguese armed forces - it ended in a meeting with the 
President - some accepted conforming but others went back to RENAMO. With the droughts the government's 
acceptance by the (rural) populations diminished and then the war prohibited the work in the interior that had 
been done before. 
When we were studying (in Cuba) we had the history of other countries and we concluded that it was part of a 
process of restoring democracy (the socialist system left some discontented) but that everything that has a 
beginning has an end - in other countries it was like that. Our message was always to ask for peace in 
Mozambique. 4 
Finally there were two young teachers in this group, who were children during the war, and 
although they experienced it and must have heard explanations from adults, declined to express an 
opinion. From their curricula these two young women spent their formative years in urban contexts 
4 The students in Cuba made a number of demonstrations and sent collective messages to the government. 
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where almost nightly attacks could be heard. They had apparently decided not to try to examine that 
experience too closely. 
I heard it talked about and lived it, but as a small child ... 
1 don't know how to talk about it. 
I have no idea. I was not able to understand it. 
The Parents' Explanation (Category D) 
Only two parents in Nampula were interviewed on this subject. Both were very keen to discuss it. 
One, a peasant farmer, asked to speak at this point in his mother tongue and enlisted the help of the 
school's director as translator. The other is a member of the provincial electoral commission, 
studying as a mature student for a law degree and also a former teacher. However they both put 
forward the same account of the fundamental causes, though the second, while endorsing the power 
struggle as the immediate cause of the conflict, also like some in the teachers group saw that the 
legacy of inequality after colonial rule was inherently unstable and the government, despite good 
intentions, not experienced or capable enough to resolve the conflict without violence. 
This war was because of the lack of unity between them - they were not understanding each other .. 
Samora 
rose to power after the death (of Mondlane). Dlakhama was still in FRELIMO - each one wanted to make his 
programmes with his own objectives. When it started... the people asked why the fight? It was concluded that 
they were fighting for the leadership, even though they said they wanted peace. 
... there was unequal 
development between the regions, inherent in the geography - the neighbouring 
countries etc. and also a lack of connection because of the lack of roads north-south, no bridge over the 
Zambeze etc. There were privileges for the chiefs (opportunities for their children for example) and not for 
others - that led others to think of liberating these things - they felt excluded - it was also a question of power. 
Certain groups had more possibilities, for example the children of those in the south could more easily attend 
the University (living at home) than those from the north... Now because of democracy (it was always there 
but it is greater) there is the thinking to distribute equitably - opening universities in other places - the state 
universities are not yet consolidated - the private ones are taking up the challenge- that could have been one 
of the causes. It was not that the government did not care, it was simply not possible to solve all the problems 
at once. 
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While these two parents cannot be taken as representative, it is interesting that they like the 
majority of the teachers and administrators did not look for explanations of the war outside the 
country, but in their own society. 
7.2.2 The Effects of the War on the Development of Education 
The general description of the effects of the war on education given by all the groups was very 
similar especially in their use of vocabulary. All the participants in all groups (except for the three 
who were children during the war) described it as a 'reversal' (retrocesso). Other commonly used 
terms were 'reduction' and 'retardation. ' The activities of education were described as 'paralysed', 
'stagnated' or 'interrupted', 'halted'. Many things were 'destroyed', 'eliminated' or 'extinct'. In 
particular it was consistently seen across all groups as changing, redirecting or diverting 
government policy especially for expansion. There was seen to be a weakening, limitation or loss of 
control by MINED and the government including in the relations with international cooperation. 
The lasting legacy was seen to be the high levels of illiteracy and continuing lack of access to basic 
and other levels of education. Only seven of those who discussed the effects of the war saw any 
positive outcomes (including only one of the A group who were specifically asked to consider this). 
Civic and professional learning and political change were seen by this minority to have been a 
positive result of the war, but bought at a very high price. Others made a point of saying these 
changes were going to happen anyway. 
While there was this consistency in the general analysis by all the groups, each group described 
those effects, which had an immediate impact on their working lives in detail, while speaking in 
more general terms of other aspects. By putting the narratives together we get the detailed picture of 
what was happening at all levels of the sector. 
The Effect on Policy and Implementation 
This was naturally discussed in greatest detail by all the members of the policymaker group, but 
referred to in general terms by about half of the participants in other groups. A significant number 
refer specifically to the economic collapse and restructuring as well as the diversion of resources 
and effort away from education. Description by all participants of the 'reversal' of education at this 
time of course also refers to the negative impact of the war on the implementation of the post- 
independence policies. 
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The war was taking over large areas of the country and so the introduction of the SNE took place in difficult 
conditions - it prevented feedback and monitoring to be able to improve and adjust the process. (A) 
The policies and actions were effectively halted because you can't say that it went ahead while it was 
impossible to work in the countryside. (A) 
What threw (escangalhou) the system out of gear was the structural adjustment of the IMF - it weakened the 
capacity - the reduction in public expenditure led, for example to not training teachers. (A) 
Before the war, school was totally free now they have to pay something, although very little, some families 
can't manage it ... the war changed the policy of the socialist society 
for that of the market -I believe the 
pressure for this was external, the international community played hard for that, although there were some 
critical pressures internally. (B) 
After '86 the cooperation weakened what little capacity had been achieved. In a situation of weakness and 
vulnerability at the back of the opening up to the IMF came lots of organisations and NGOs in an 
uncontrolled manner. The war and the drought created a situation of emergency and almost total dependency 
on aid. The support and the intervention were not part of a coherent process or programme directed by 
MINED. (A) 
Apart from that the effort of the government was redirected to the war and survival. (A) 
The effort of the government suffered a blow - the war was destroying all its strength. (C) 
There were some years in which education was abandoned (C) 
The Effect on Human Resource Development 
This was felt in different ways at different levels. The most devastating, and lasting impact was 
seen to be in reducing the number of teachers: fewer were trained and many were lost, either killed 
or abandoning the near impossible working conditions. The professional training of senior staff, on 
the other hand, because it took place in Maputo or abroad, was seen to be little affected. 
The training of teachers... today there is a deficit of teachers in the schools, but many of the (other) 
professional training courses (such as mine) were not affected (A) 
Many teachers left the profession because they no longer had jobs and MINED had no money to pay them. 
(A) 
A number of teachers already trained were lost - killed, I knew some of them. Teacher training was also 
reduced - the rural training centres closed or paralysed. (B) 
The targets of RENAMO were the schools and the teachers. (C) 
... the paralysation of the development of teachers - there was no capacity 
building at that time - teachers 
kidnapped etc. (B) 
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You couldn't train people in the countryside because the access routes were closed and the schools closed or 
destroyed. (A) 
Adult education experienced paralysation throughout this whole time - the FACOTRAV (accelerated 
university admissions courses for mature students) for example ... was a great thing - now extinct. 
(C) 
The Effect on Education for the General Public 
The brunt of the war was of course, felt by the general public. This was seen in macro terms by the 
policymakers and in graphic daily detail by those on the front line: teachers, parents and local 
administrators. 
The greatest impact was on the policy of expansion of education and so very negative for the general public. 
(A) 
The levels of illiteracy rose again. Today in the most affected provinces - they have the highest levels until 
today. (A) 
There were many children who did not study because it was interrupted by the war and they never went back 
to study - the girls in premature marriage at 12 years. (B) 
... they 
destroyed schools and were against the teachers who had to flee and pupils fleeing - it paralysed 
education and some areas are only just restarting. (C) 
The time of the war the school did not function well - the pupils and teachers were afraid to go to school - 
many people did not study. (D) 
It provoked the f ight of the populations looking for places of safety -a great influx that created problems of 
access (to the schools) in those areas - many remained outside. (B) 
The war meant that many schools were closed. - persecution of teachers- there were cases in which it was 
understood that schools were part of the socialist system and so they destroyed the school materials... In the 
cities they couldn't take in all that fled from the countryside and so many gave up studying. (D) 
The General Impact of the War on Society and its Effect on Education 
The participants clearly saw that the suffering in the war left lasting negative effects in 
Mozambican society: changes in social attitudes, psychological scars and poverty. Several also felt 
that they not only lost the gains that had been made in social and economic development since 
independence but also the further gains that they could have expected. 
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... people also could not see the future, there was not much motivation. (A) 
After, there began to be a certain demoralisation - with the intensification of the war from '89 and the 
changes from single party to multiparty, people began to have more interest in earning a living. (B) 
... it retarded the 
development of the country - retarded the development of people's mentalities - the traumas 
of children etc. (B) 
More negative aspects - innocent lives - the blood of soldiers on both sides, I don't differentiate. (B) 
One lost colleagues and pupils travelling to Nampula - it was dangerous to fetch food (on the mainland) but 
there was none there (on the island where they were safe). (B) 
... the massive movement of the populations - people 
lived almost like animals in the bush, without hope - like 
nomads. (B) 
The populations until today have little confidence in strangers -a very big psychological scar in the 
population - lack of openness to others. (B) 
The war was a phenomenon that created a dual - it drove away the effective cooperation that we had - we are 
poor because of the war. (C) 
With the war we began to go backwards... it destroyed our human advance, culturally and materially -a 
reversal. Many abandoned their homes where they produced and stayed in the cities up to today - hence the 
poverty of today. If it was not for the war we would have been in a much more advanced situation. (C) 
It reduced the development that should have happened. (C) 
... after we had to spend money again for infrastructure and to train teachers etc. (D) 
Positive Outcomes. 
The majority of the participants strongly rejected any idea that anything positive came from the 
war. Even those in the groups who were not asked if they saw any positive outcomes, made a point 
of stressing that nothing positive could be attributed to it. 
Positive? (pause) Its difficult to find anything positive (A) 
... 
for me it is hard to find any positive aspect of this war (B) 
The impact of the war was totally negative. There was absolutely no advantage. (C) 
However as we saw in the discussion of the causes of the war a number of these did refer to what 
they considered positive aspects that had emerged in the post-war society such as developments in 
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democracy, that would prevent any return to the violence and this was the aspect that the few who 
admitted positive outcomes of the war most commonly cited. 
War is always a lesson for a people - we learnt to be tolerant, to respect the opinion of another - it 
helped a lot with the education system in the new books we introduced themes on peace, tolerance and 
democracy - without the war they would not have understood what peace really is. (A) 
Changes in the behaviour of the citizen - who learnt that war only brings disaster - no one can think any more 
of making war - it was a lesson for the Mozambican people. (B) 
I reckon one now knows how to hold conversations, arrive at an agreement and carry out agreements. It is a 
good thing because the international cooperation likes Mozambique - the two parts understood how to end 
the war - other countries have not done that - they go back to fighting. (B) 
Only one participant actually saw the war as having directly brought about a positive change in the 
political system (others as we have seen thought this was going to occur anyway or regretted it) but 
disapproved of war as a means to that end. 
One positive thing that arose - the single party government up to a point tied people up. Only the way it was 
done I do not agree with, but achieving multiparty government, yes. It was part of a world movement - the 
Berlin wall etc. (C) 
Two of the policy makers, who also saw many negative aspects of the international cooperation at 
this time, also saw that it had some positive aspects at the practical level. 
With the destruction of the war without the cooperation we would have been in trouble - we gained 
more from maintaining these relations than if we had remained closed.... One motivation of theirs 
was to help a people that suffered a lot, to help with necessities, even though there may have been 
other hidden or economic motivations. (A) 
There was a change after the Cold War. Before decisions about the nature of cooperation, down to 
the quantities of equipment to be received, were taken at the level of the politicians (between heads 
of state) without the participation of personnel in the ministries - and so often the aid and goods 
received were not the most appropriate. (A) 
213 
Finally, it is clear that individuals at different levels of the system were already preparing 
themselves to contribute to post-war recovery of education. 
One positive aspect of the halt in activities was to have time to reflect on how to reintroduce literacy in new 
ways. (B) 
(the war)... was the reason for always making an effort (in our studies) to see if we could recover the 
situation. (C) 
7.2.3 Lessons learned about the war 
The majority of the respondents believed that the fundamental causes of the war were internal to 
Mozambican society. Very few (but from all the education categories) believed that it was entirely 
provoked from outside. Even in the policymakers group, who gave most weight to external factors 
as the cause, the majority believed that there had to be internal problems, which could be exploited 
by external agents. That it was essentially a power struggle within the national leadership was the 
most commonly held belief expressed by the majority of administrators, teachers and parents and 
by two of the policymakers. The failure, or unwillingness to resolve these differences by dialogue 
was also identified in all groups as the principal weakness that either, as some saw it allowed 
external interests to escalate the conflict into a war or in the view of others led to the use of violence 
to achieve political ambitions. While none saw democracy as the conscious ambition of the 
opposition, several saw that the greater democracy that emerged from the peace process, meant that 
a resort to violence to solve conflicts would be unlikely in present day Mozambique. 
For a number of participants it was the colonial legacy of underdevelopment, inequality, ignorance 
and lack of experience of governance, on the part of both government and public, that made 
Mozambican society vulnerable to violent conflict. A minority, mainly those at the leadership level 
of the Ministry or who had studied abroad, also saw the wider regional and international context, 
which made it vulnerable to external intervention. 
Thus the testimony of the participants suggests that ironically, it was those very weaknesses in the 
post-colonial society that the new education system set out to redress that were the fundamental 
causes of the war that devastated the country and the education system itself, though its scale and 
duration were fed by external agents. 
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Two main points were made about the effect of the war on the role of government in support of 
education. First, the government resolve and ability to lead the development of education for all 
was turned back by the war. Those struggling to maintain the process from the top experienced 
frustration, while those in the classroom often felt abandoned. Secondly, the war, by destroying the 
government's economic independence, forced a change in the orientation of the economy, which 
also contradicted the post-independence philosophy for education. For the same reason, the 
government was seen to lose control over the international assistance it received and how and 
where it was delivered. 
It is also clear from these accounts that the two most serious human resource deficits felt today, the 
absolute shortage of teachers in terms of numbers and their inadequate level of professional skill are 
directly attributed to the war and the economic crisis it provoked. The drive to upgrade other 
professionals through adult education was also largely abandoned. However, professional training 
and higher education were less affected. 
The greatest loss of all was the hard won inclusion of the majority rural population in education. 
The rural school was the flagship of FRELIMO's education policy and so the principal target of the 
opposition forces, and it was the rural population that was displaced, impoverished and terrorised 
by the war. However, their flight to the urban areas created huge problems for the urban schools 
and diminished access and quality of education for all. 
However, although the education system was seen as severely damaged and the development of 
individuals and institutions as `reversed' or `stagnated, ' very few things were described as 
permanently destroyed and there is evidence of taking first steps to recovery even before the 
fighting came to an end. 
Nevertheless, the effects of the war were overwhelmingly negative, both materially and 
psychologically, and few were prepared to acknowledge any positive outcomes. Those that did 
described it as a bitter lesson in civic education and understanding of human diversity, though they 
could have wished that this social maturity could have been achieved by other means. 
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7.3 The post-war recovery and development of education. 
The participants spent much more time discussing this period than the two previous phases, about 
which they already had some clear general conclusions. They were clear that there had been a large 
measure of recovery from the war and further development as well as many positive aspects arising 
from the peace. However, not surprisingly, they did not present such a clear overall view of the 
present state of education, though they asserted that its core objectives were unchanged and 
generally supported. Each one was very much conditioned by their every day experience and the 
particular challenges inherent in their work. However, they are all clearly seeing the same picture, 
though from different perspectives. There are no markedly divergent views on the state of the sector 
and the institutional consensus evident in their account of the earlier phases is still evident. 
7.3.1 The Role of Government, its Strategies and Policies 
To a large extent, all groups saw the government in the post-war period assuming the same role as 
before the war. They describe the government in the same terms of effort and concern and as 
directing policy and of sharing a vision for education with the public. Its main efforts are still seen 
as directed at expanding the school network to increase access and equity and it is credited with 
largely restoring what was there before and now entering a phase of 'greater development. However 
there is greater recognition of the government's limitations and its inability to satisfy the demand for 
education, both in terms of numbers and of quality and particularly to keep well-qualified and 
motivated teachers in the classroom. 
The Policymakers' View (Category A) 
All the policymakers spoke extensively on the policies, strategies and vision of the government for 
post-war recovery, which they saw as being developed from the last years of the war as it became 
clear that peace would be achieved. Indeed rethinking education was itself part of the peace 
process. This meant that as soon as the accord was signed education was ready to roll out recovery 
and development strategies, with strong government and public support. 
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It was already clear (in 1990) that the principal objective for the country was to win the peace - that was the 
contribution of Chissano. 
From '90 to '92 the country began to think of a plan for post-war reconstruction ... 
before '91 technical 
commissions were set up in MINED (MINED staff with some foreigners) to study eight areas of the 
functioning of education. This was in the context of the readjustment of the law of the SNE and the redrawing 
of the constitution. The results informed the drafting of the master plans for basic education as well as 
secondary education and technical education. 
MINED was already (in 1992) designing the plan for recovery - how to attack the project of education again. 
However, an overarching vision or policy was lacking, and in fact had to be built in collaboration 
with the public and education staff at all levels. Thus the Education Sector Strategy Plan (ESSP) 
was developed over a number of years in a participatory process. Given the financial dependence of 
the country on aid this process had to be supported and the final outcome endorsed by donors and 
international financial institutions if it was to be implemented. This meant that MINED had to take 
back the initiative and exert all the diplomatic skills acquired during the difficult war years to 
achieve its aims. 
MINED understood that it must carry out a process of reflection on the direction which it should follow to be 
able to lead the process and not be led by the donors. The idea of assuming the leadership of the process took 
hold. 
The diplomacy had to be very strong from both sides (FRELIMO and RENAMO) to convince (investors) that 
no one would go back to arms. The elections in '94 - considered an example for Africa - convinced the 
international community and the Mozambican population. 
... 
following the rules of the IMF was also decisive in managing to convince international public opinion. 
From then on education began to grow. 
But in '94 we realised that something was missing - we had three separate plans (see above) but they needed 
to be integrated in a general policy. So in '95 when the new government was formed the first thing was the 
drawing up of a policy for education - the vision for the path ahead for education (like we had in '75) had 
been missing... After that we had to transform the vision into a strategic plan for implementation. 
The decision was to have a process, taking longer, but done by us (not by consultants) and so it was in '98 
after consultation at various levels and done as a capacity building process that we concluded the plan. 
It was already very clear what the role of cooperation should be in this plan (ESSP) - the purpose of the plan 
was to reduce the vulnerability of MINED in the face of the pressures of the donors - that MINED would 
indicate where they should work (not as they had been doing- informing that they had already started work in 
district x). 
217 
As discussed in Chapter 5, a key principle of the strategy plan was that it should be channelled 
through the public accounts and administrated by the relevant departments rather than being 
earmarked to specific projects or components of the sector plan. This was the hardest pill for the 
donors to swallow, but finally in 2003, as this research was being conducted it was being 
implemented in a limited way to the relief and delight of several in this group. 
The common fund (FASE) for the provinces has very clear objectives. I heartily agree with this methodology 
because before the government had no idea of the real cost of the running of a province - they will have 
meetings with NGOS to know what money is spent on education as a whole so that the (department of) 
finances know. 
Essentially, what the group are describing is a concerted effort to return to the education agenda of 
equity and inclusion interrupted by the war, but under new conditions. Literacy work is once again 
cited as a key indicator of that policy at work. However their reflections as the war ended also 
focussed on key weaknesses identified in the SNE since its inception. Of these, the group expressed 
most concern about progress towards institutional reform. Restoration and expansion of the school 
network and curriculum reform were seen to be proceeding on the ground but increased 
effectiveness was limited by the slow progress in decentralisation. 
The fundamental objective of the system is equity, apart from increasing numbers - to reduce disparities of 
gender, regional and between urban and rural. 
The school network is almost restored in the majority of districts 
They also returned to the literacy offensives 
The rate of growth is not yet satisfactory but there is growth... that is to say, the supply does not meet the 
demand 
We identified three key problems: a rigid and centralised administrative system; a restrictive and rigid 
curriculum; insufficient schools and teachers limiting access to education. 
In MINED what is at stake is the actual structure - MINED should occupy itself in defining policies and leave 
the execution to the provinces... At the provincial level we have managed to place some graduates... so that the 
execution passes to the provinces - we need to reinforce this more. 
... to fund the schools, decentralise the administration -for example there is not a single school in 
Maputo that is not managing its own budget. 
MINED is struggling to decentralise. What prevents it is this lack of technical competence. 
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The lack of qualified personnel is still an issue, but apart from some specific areas of competence, 
not at the central level, nor even in many provincial directorates. The key deficits were seen to be at 
the local level in districts and schools. 
Many people not qualified in administration and management of education... This is what holds back the 
process ... there are 
districts which don't manage to spend all their annual budget - they return money because 
of lacking knowledge of the procedures - they don't spend while there are big shortages of chalk in the 
schools. 
Personnel were lost (in the war) (but) MINED has been growing year by year with more qualified people. 
Recovered? No, most of the (secondary) schools are not in condition ... 75% of the teachers are not qualified 
apart from lack of teachers in terms of numbers. 
We are still not where we would like to be - many shortages of qualified staff. 
As before the war, the Mozambican public is seen as a positive force for development. 
Nevertheless as they re-established contact with the rural population there was no return to the 
euphoria of the post-independence period it was necessary to negotiate with a more vocal and 
cynical public. 
The Mozambican citizen: we're not a people of complaints, don't wait for someone to do it for us - don't need 
a commander - each one decides to find a solution to get out of the situation -for example the communities 
build schools and then ask for a teacher from education. We saw that MINED should open up a budget line to 
support this initiative and we managed it this year. 
The consciousness of the communities woke up to the importance of education - there are initiatives of the 
population to create schools... it was possible to negotiate the handing over of a plot of good farm land with 
fruit trees ... for the construction of a secondary school. 
... 
but the situation with the population was different - there were parties, we had to discuss with people about 
what is state and what is party (they said the school was FRELIMO's). 
The post-war conditions were also seen ambivalently. The fact of peace and greater financial 
security in the education sector as a result of the new deal with the donors, made it possible to work 
productively. However the wider economic conditions create new uncertainties: the impact of the 
free market on the national economy is seen to reduce direct and indirect support for education and 
foster petty corruption in the public services and there is continuing vulnerability to natural 
disasters, due to the continuing lack of investment in mitigation strategies. 
219 
... the 
fundamental factor is peace. 
Before one had to plan without any certainty of receiving (funds) now it (FASE) allows (us) to work 
with security. 
The country has no policy for growth of the national impresarial class - this influences the support they can 
give to the schools and for the employment of parents etc. 
Floods, natural disasters - we're unable to conserve water for the drought areas -annually we have to cope 
with situations of this kind 
Only one of this group commented directly on the change in the political system and with some 
anxieties about confrontational politics and uncertainty for long-term implementation plans 
A negative/positive (factor): learning democracy. The question of national unity, for us we cannot admit ideas 
of division, but some parties think they should provoke that to gain support. Then there is the problem with 
mandates - the plan is to introduce the new curriculum in 2004 but that is the year that this mandate ends - 
will the government deliver or not? People think of a horizon of 5 years, not for the long term. 
The picture that emerged from discussions with this group was of continuing commitment to the 
basic ideals of the post-independence period but with a greater awareness of complexity and the 
need to negotiate progress, whether with donors, politicians or the public. 
The Administrators' View (Category B) 
Like the policymakers, this group spoke most about the government's policies and strategies for 
post-war recovery and development of education, seeing it as the resumption of the pre-war agenda 
but with a new strategic framework. The promptness with which the government promoted the 
restoration of schools and resumption of literacy work was their first indication that education was 
once again a priority. 
... the government was always concerned to develop education... and it has not changed essentially. 
Straight after the Accord in Rome, the government, the first thing it did was to open schools, with or without 
classrooms - it was enough to have a teacher - the President etc. publicly opening schools and hospitals. 
After the war the government concerned itself with getting everyone to read and write - many were already 
adults and they promoted literacy work so that they might study. 
The strategies of today, like the strategy plan, could eliminate illiteracy. 
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It is interesting to note that the approaches that they single out for particular praise are those that 
build on the participatory and inclusive experiences of the post-independence period. LEC, 
promoting the equitable distribution of qualified staff and the participation of girls in education. 
They also continue to see enlisting international cooperation as an important government strategy 
for education. 
What helps education most is the philosophy of making the school the centre of the community whereby the 
populations feel themselves owners of the school - it helped us in the post-war times to re-implant education 
and improve the quality of teaching. 
The government has a scheme which is to be praised -from certain districts a quota of people can get places 
in the UP without (competing in an) exam - it is to encourage them to continue in the districts. 
The idea of the government is positive - there is government interest in mobilizing, (and getting the parents to 
understand) for the girls to study and to send teachers to the districts. 
The combination of the effort of the government in defining the policies and the support for implementation of 
the international cooperation. 
In general then, they describe the government positively in terms of its strength of purpose and 
strategic planning and they give it credit for largely recovering the education system after the war 
and beginning to achieve some of its long-term development goals, at least in terms of cover and 
access. 
Straight after (the war) there was an effort to restore the system - the restoration is now done - what is being 
done now is development - where I studied grade 4 in a single classroom is already an EP2 school with 
improved classrooms and has the prospect of secondary education. 
In all the provinces there are training colleges (even if not in equal numbers)... Higher education almost 
covers all the provinces - the others will have it soon. If this continues we will have a different image. 
They persuaded the parents to send the girls to school to complete the level without dropping out (speaking 
about) premature marriage of girls - and boys, girls and boys, involved in productive work and housework 
... a 
big effort at provincial level and the opening up of the provincial government - this with the arrival of 
(literacy) material supplied from the centre (national directorate) helped most. 
The strength of the government as it continues can promote study more and more - the government explaining 
and supporting, eliminating poverty. 
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Some of this group were also enthusiastic about a new sense of institution building and 
collaborative working. The following are examples from the central Ministry and a provincial 
directorate (DPE). 
The Director is very objective, analyses things, then takes a decision. The head of department is very dynamic 
and impulsive - the two complement each other. They always consult the collective (of the directorate) which 
meets every Thursday and there are meetings with the staff but not always, sometimes the section heads 
transmit the reports. 
We have recovered almost all the (adult) educators. The majority have come back to adult education and 
manage the activities of the volunteers at the level of the ZIPs. We have professional staff in all the 
districts... it was only possible through a dispatch from the DPE supported by the provincial government but... 
some now have two staff on their own initiative in order to meet the demand 
... education is not 
divorced from the reforms and the dynamic of the country - the general reform of the public 
sector. 
However, the group described a number of aspects of the implementation of education policies that 
were falling short of what could be expected. Like the policymakers they saw a serious failure in 
the first line of management for support and communication with schools and communities at the 
grass roots level. One participant attributed this directly to the slow pace of decentralisation. 
The strategy plan ... in 
MINED and in the provinces etc. yes it's there, but in the school you don't feel that 
they have any knowledge of this plan. 
The government has a lot of strength, it has good staff but at the grass roots it has no presence. 
... there in the district and in the villages there is no one. We're not at war now, they could work with them - 
we did that in the past (i. e post independence) with the OJM (youth movement). 
... there is too much interference 
from Plan and Finances (Ministry of Planning and Finance) from MINED 
and the DPEs. The DDEs (District Directorates) should have their own departments of finance, even the 
localities and large schools could have them. 
Others when discussing the government's failure to meet demand, were not attributing blame but 
trying to describe objective conditions that limited what it could achieve in the short term. 
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After the war many schools were constructed but they are still not enough because the population grew - one 
can't meet the demand. 
The big difference between urban and rural areas makes a negative contribution to harmonious development 
... 
but there is a reduction in the female participation in the levels from EP2 onwards- it has to do with 
premature pregnancies among other things - that is, there is a downward graph. 
The problem is that giving access to all the children to study grade 7, the secondary schools are few and 
focus is still on basic education -it creates a funnel - it is necessary to adjust the emphasis. 
The phase we are facing now is to remove the barriers - Between EPl and EP2 is already resolved by the 
introduction of complete schools, now the problem is to transfer from EP2 to secondary school... also for 
entry into the universities - all this is the result of the success of education. 
The same mixture of praise and frustration is evident in their comments on government treatment of 
staff. Admirable efforts for staff training are still not enough and meanwhile the inadequacy of the 
pay and conditions leads qualified staff to abandon the profession 
Positive factors - the government is much more directed towards staffformation, one already sees that - there 
is a concern to send existing staff to study. 
(more) distance learning is very necessary - the IAP distance course - in the districts of Memba and Nacaroa 
(rural Nampula) there are no longer category E (unqualified category) teachers due to that. 
The constant raising of the level of the teachers in order to improve the quality of teaching is important - its 
going ahead but it is a drop in the ocean - there is effort but it is not enough -the training centres are reduced 
in number and overcrowded in this province. 
... in all of MINED there are no 
institutions for the training of (adult education) cadres... former staff are 
working in every thing except literacy. 
They train many staff but do not offer them the conditions to work, they lose them and now we are going 
backwards recruiting people who don't know education. 
... there are many of my generation who are very good professionals 
but they are not in education because 
education did not create the conditions for them to continue - it does not cherish its cadres. 
While this sense of frustration is at times expressed as criticism of MINED, there is also a general 
recognition that the root cause of all these problems is that the education sector simply does not 
have the resources it needs. 
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The fundamental problem, the obstacle to carrying out many activities is the insufficient budget - resolving 
the teacher's (financial) problem would straightaway resolve other problems -a demotivated teacher affects 
not only himself but fifty pupils. The lack of budget is not just for salaries but also conditions. The salary 
scale is the same for all the public services but others have conditions, other privileges. 
The government is pushing every child towards education, but there is no one to receive this child - there is a 
lack of teachers - the extension of the (school) network is good but it requires more teachers than exist. 
The expenditure on education needs to be more because year by year the number of pupils increases, and for 
this reason the number of teachers tends to rise - it needs a bigger slice of the cake. 
Obstacles? Lack of funds... there is no capacity to meet the demand of the public - we have the knowledge to 
win people to (take part in) literacy, but the means to do more are lacking. 
Before (the war) we got books to all the locations and had the transport to carry them - today we don't have 
that. 
This objective lack of resources was seen by some to be exacerbated by poor governance and 
corruption. 
Difficulties for recovery - the main one is corruption. 
Poverty continues to be a great impediment, but not so much the lack of money. It is also knowing how to 
conserve and use the means we have, know how to be creative - poverty is not a lack of money - it is to work 
more and better for the public good - eliminate corruption. If the resources were well used they could be few 
but still be enough. 
Some of the participants in this group mentioned the wider political conditions in the country, on 
the whole positively. A secure working environment had been created as a result of peace and 
democratic resolution of conflict. Greater openness and the participation of other actors besides 
government were also welcome but, as in the policymakers group, there was some anxiety about the 
working of democracy in practice. 
The question now is to maintain the peace - respect the thinking of all. Up to now there has been success in 
this direction. In the parliament there are debates that could lead to fighting but at the end they approve and 
conclude - that is important - with a single party there is no one to say if you are wrong - better a war of 
words that a war of weapons. 
What helps most is the character of the Mozambican, who is very peaceful. 
From '92 there was an opening up to many groups - one noted it a lot - national NGOs also work with us. 
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Multipartyism makes for development because the one who is in power has to show he has done 
something... With one party there was development but only according to their ideas. 
What makes it difficult is that there are some political currents that are not yet well defined - they don't yet 
know what they want - this means that the populations too are not seeing their way forward - very often its 
individuals who do this, they don't know how to develop apolitical line. 
This group also saw the response of the public to education as mainly positive. 
The population is now responding - they already know people who have studied and the community leaders, 
the traditional ones, already collaborate and promote study. 
The response of the communities - the school councils -a partnership between the government and the 
communities- they build classrooms, teachers houses, encourage parents to send girls to school ... there is 
support from the leaders. 
But the honeymoon of the independence is over. The population that has survived the war is 
concerned with survival, less impressed by the educated and openly defensive of its values. 
That patriotism of the times when I started work, you don't feel that any more -its more ways of surviving. 
Society itself does not consider the teacher - when I started teaching I was queen - the population gave me 
fish and sauces and came for me to read and write letters for them. Now they have realised that the teacher is 
a pauper and do not respect (her). 
It is not enough to say to the public that the government is concerned. The individual wants to see something 
in his own suburb. 
I think we recovered a lot from the war, but there are still nomadic groups that wander from one place to 
another, selling charcoal and things. On the other hand there are populations that are very strong in 
defending their cultural values (i. e not accepting the culture of the modem society). 
In the rural environment the gender traditions lead to reluctance to send girls to school to "learn 
western/urban values" 
From a different standpoint in the institution from the policy makers, with less involvement with 
strategy development and more direct involvement with its implementation, this group nevertheless 
give a very similar account of the post-war scenario in education. They too see an essential 
continuity of purpose on the part of government and basically endorse the strategic approach 
adopted to promote it in the complex and difficult conditions left by the war. However they are 
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much more aware of the practical short-comings and huge resource deficits of the enterprise. They 
also seem closer to the public and the general political, economic and social context in which 
education has to work. 
The Teachers' View (Category C) 
As before the word concern is the term most commonly used in references to government. Fourteen 
of the eighteen teachers used this or other terms suggesting that the government has the political 
will to develop education. Many also referred to its strategic policymaking role. However, 
expressions indicating strength and leadership were much less common and for the first time a 
number of the teachers indicated doubts about the government's ability to deliver describing it as 
'trying' or 'not responding adequately'. 
Now a new life is starting and there is a lot of interest in extending the school network. On the part of the 
government, this is the concern. 
The government is generating greater effort for education to go ahead 
It is well planned - the plan of MINED for the development of education and we will implement it It helps the 
performance of the schools. 
.. the government does what it can and it can't do everything. 
In these last years there has been great concern to recover in some aspects: the schools have increased their 
levels, but the conditions and the infrastructure have not grown. 
The majority still saw the government's main actions concentrated on increasing access and equity. 
They gave it credit for considerable success in recovering and expanding the network, including 
now managing to increase access beyond first level primary (EP1), and the gender equity policy in 
particular, was commended by both women and men. 
.. the number of schools increased - the network extended - incidence of illiteracy reduced. 
Today there are schools where there never were before, even before the war - that it is to say as well as 
recovery there has been a notable development. 
There is more access to EP2 and secondary. 
The introduction of complete (primary) schools is good too because the child at least completes basic 
education. 
226 
Trying to have a balance, for example higher education is being introduced in all parts of the country - even 
if it is private, of the church. 
... now with the government and the organisations, girls education is being promoted - there is more 
enrolment - it's going forward. 
However, more than half of the group also mentioned failures on some specific issues of equity and 
quality in the education system, which have wider implications for the economic and political 
development of the nation. 
They developed general education but not technical education that would be another solution for finding a 
profession. 
Unqualified teachers working does not guarantee the quality. 
... pupils in EP2 are weak - the syllabus is extensive and talks about things that provide no 
basis for further 
learning. 
... there are many children out of school and those in the school are very weak in their ability to memorize and 
interpret and with poor concentration. 
There is a great concentration of cadres in Maputo, under-utilized, and in other places there are unqualified 
people teaching secondary education. Before they sent people - it was important - today they need to do the 
same but by means of incentives. 
... this 
is to redistribute what is in Maputo, reduce the focal points of difference. It would lead to consolidation 
of the unity of the country. 
The sense of abandonment of the profession, described in the war seems to have persisted amongst 
the teachers and they clearly felt that their role was not just insufficiently remunerated, which some 
recognise as beyond MINED's control, but also not valued by government (and some would say, by 
the public). These comments reinforce the view of the policymakers and administrators that the 
system is institutionally weakest at this key grassroots level. 
I don't feel we're very much supported. 
The government doesn't look to the teachers - they are not interested. 
They don't manage to keep... pedagogically trained teachers in education. 
I would like the government to look for a decent salaryfor the teacher. 
... even if the government 
does not have (money) it should make an effort to create incentives. 
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Similarly, only four mentioned opportunities for individual staff formation in a positive light and 
none described any capacity building activities as they did when discussing the post-independence 
period. Three others actually complained of failure and even lack of will in this area. 
A positive thing is that they allow for further education in the UP. 
It is good to train people but it is necessary to create conditions. 
The government is not allowing the teacher to continue to study with a scholarship. 
. it 
has the means, the country is not poor - we have mineral resources. 
Objectively speaking, of course, the opportunities are greatly increased compared to the war years 
and in terms of middle and higher education compared to the post-independence period, but what 
was then something they never expected, is now perhaps understood to be something to which they 
are entitled. 
It was clear as soon as the teachers began to describe their working conditions that this was at the 
root of their dissatisfaction. Adverse conditions were mentioned three times as frequently as 
positive conditions, though still only by slightly less than half the group and were overwhelmingly 
associated with lack of financial resources to enable the system to meet demand and improve 
conditions. 
The big difficulties are essentially financial: you can't attract teachers with the existing conditions, there is no 
money to increase the faculties in the UP and improve the conditions in the schools. 
... 
because more children are passing grades it increases the demand. The government ... 
builds schools but 
can't keep up with the growth in demand. 
There is a lack of adequate fencing - its damaged - the area is full of delinquents - even during classes the 
public circulate in the yard - now we have new classrooms but everyone sits on the floor before we were 
giving lessons under a tree. 
... it is necessary to 
have a good look at the situation of libraries and laboratories - Achievement of pupils in 
schools with libraries is higher - its to have conditions for investigation and creativity. 
There are delays in wages - waiting two months. 
The school is small and much sought after - 3000 by day and 1000 at night, an average of 80 pupils in a class 
because everyone wants to study and we cannot stop them. 
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For eleven of the eighteen it is the market economy and its attendant poverty that is contributing to 
both the overcrowding in urban areas and the number of children out of school. A minority 
attributed these difficulties to lack of commitment from government and corruption. 
The market economy gives no quarter - when they shut factories (referring to agricultural processing plants in 
the rural areas) people come back to the city. They lose their place and employment. 
... people 
don't direct the child to the school because of poverty - street selling etc. 
Today the school exists but it is expensive - it makes it difficult to study - they can't manage it - the parents 
complain about the level of the enrolment fee. (secondary level) 
I don't know if it is because they can't (pay better salaries) or don't want to 
... today's government is 
fomenting corruption in the school - the teacher cannot give classes to those that 
have eaten when he has not, so he asks (for money) from the pupils. 
Where does the money go? Abroad the government is well regarded, but for us here... I don't understand - 
I'm convinced that if we had this government before I would not have studied because of poverty - the poor 
don't study abroad today either. 
Human resource deficits, mentioned by nearly half, were the second most serious constraint and it 
was as much lack of competence as lack of numbers that contributed to the difficulties. For 
example, the administrative weakness mentioned by the other education professionals was 
highlighted by this group too. The lack of teachers is also seen as a failure to keep qualified 
professionals as much as an issue of numbers and again due to market pressures. 
The management of resources - bad management because of lack of preparation in administrative and 
financial management - there could be bad faith as well, in the midst of the disorganisation - that is a 
question of inspection. 
The main problem is the lack of properly qualified cadres - they are few. Many come to teach to earn money 
while they study and then as soon as they finish their course they abandon (teaching). I don't know how to 
resolve this problem... not managing to keep staf, pedagogically trained teachers -for example in grade 12 
we have eight maths teachers, only one is trained, the others are transitory. 
There are teachers but many who were trained are not teaching. 
Overloaded classes were also referred to as specific continuing effects of the war, which was why 
several stressed that recovery was ongoing. Others thought recovery was complete in their area and 
the current difficulties had other causes. 
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The country is - in recovery (emphasising choice of words) because the war held back development. 
Little by little we are recovering. It is easier to build something new than to recover something that has been 
destroyed. 
With the end of the war some went back (to the rural areas) but not many - we continue to have problems of 
large classes. 
One doesn't see any effects in Machava -a lot of time has passed, we're dealing with other problems now. 
We have already recovered. Today there are no children out of school. 
We recovered but it is not the same as before - the overcrowding of classes continues because of the 
increased demand. 
Apart from the general agreement that education had largely recovered from the war about a third 
mentioned some other positive conditions for education in the post-war scenario: peace allowing for 
a secure working environment, greater access and communication and the general development of 
the country. 
The principal factor is peace... Peace allows for policies of development in the whole country to diminish the 
great differences between regions. 
The education strategy allows us to work with great security. 
That they accepted meeting and that the conflicts are from mouth to mouth, not arms. 
Liberty of the press, radio etc. Access roads to all areas. 
There are many means of communication - television, radio etc they have positive and educative aspects, 
even the soap operas. 
... they are already 
building beautiful new suburbs. 
Mozambique has the capacity to carry out all the policies it likes (but should use it). 
Teaching is going on in a good state. I'm optimistic for the future. (new teacher) 
As before, the public response to education is referred to less than by the other groups and this time 
slightly more often in negative than positive terms. Public participation was mentioned by only 
three, self-reliance and motivation by two others. Several other teachers had a completely contrary 
view of the public attitude to education. 
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You will see that where there was no school today there is one - the population is collaborating well in the 
process. 
The Mozambican people now understands that it is necessary to study - that it can lead development and 
resolve some problems of the country - it's going ahead. 
... parents want to send their children to school. 
The pupils have no interest in studying. I don't know if the parents didn't inform them of the importance of 
education. 
The recovery that is lacking is an economy of self-reliance. 
I tried to ask for support from some companies but they weren't interested 
... they refused at 
first saying it was 'the government's' ( responsibility). 
The eleven who remembered the post-independence period made comparisons with the present and 
like other groups some saw that the approach to education was essentially the same and some 
recognised that the achievements of the post-independence period were now being overtaken by the 
expansion of the system. Rather more made unfavourable comparisons with the pre-war period and 
one at least was less than happy with political changes. 
The government continues with the same concern. 
Today, I reckon that the pace is maintained - the objective is always to develop the country. 
... today it is a football game, you can join in if you like- our children cannot study (due to poverty). 
... today they (the pupils) are very agitated because of the conditions outside the school. 
The course in the Faculty (UEM) gave a formation that was more solid than the present IMAPs which they 
enter with the same level (grade) but they don't have secure knowledge. 5 
From the introduction of multipartyism in '92, preceded by the economic rehabilitation which prompted the 
opening to the free market - there were new initiatives for individuality and NGOs - the change led to a new 
life for us but not without its reverses - reverses ... people don't send their children to school 
because of 
poverty. 
ss A senior member of the Pedagogical University Staff in conversation with the author (June 2003) 
commented for example, that the standard of a degree awarded in the UP could not be the same as a European 
degree in the present conditions because the students came into the University from a 'deficient' secondary 
education (due to the adverse conditions described by these teachers) while the few like him (and like those 
who went to the UEM Faculty) who had completed secondary education in colonial times had a much better 
grounding. That is that the deficits in quality of education from the primary level upwards, has repercussions 
for the standards in the training of the next generation of teachers, which in turn perpetuates poor standards in 
the schools. 
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This group then, paint the same fairly confident general picture of the present progress in education 
as the other education professionals. However, they are clearly experiencing many more frustrations 
in their daily work and personal lives due to considerable financial pressures. There is still 
enthusiasm for education in their responses but also a noticeable sense of grievance at not being 
valued for the effort they make. This is clearly more than the fact of low pay and difficult working 
conditions, which have been facts of life in Mozambican schools since independence. It is perhaps a 
loss of status as well as financial hardship in a new less egalitarian economic order in which others 
with their level of education are conspicuously better off: 
The Parents' View (Category D) 
There was a broad consensus amongst the parents that the government is concerned to develop 
education and that its vision which is shared by the general public, cuts across the political parties 
and is essentially the same as before. They see government as having a leading role in defining 
policy and developing new strategies but seem to pragmatically accept its limited capacity to 
deliver unaided because of its lack of means. It is now enlisting other participants and for the same 
reason the parents associations intervene on many fronts. 
The government has the will and tries to build schools. 
It will be an advantage to have the complete school (EP I and EP2). 
There has been effort to reconstruct the schools after the war. 
The policy of the government is genera l- of all the parties and the general public. 
The budget of the government is not enough to meet demand 
(The government) continues with this policy, but with more openness - allowing private education - the state 
is not alone. 
The actual installations are (pause) insufficient - very often the parents try to resolve the problem. 
We have students whose parents have no means - those children are supported by the school fund with a 
certificate of poverty passed by the local authority. 
Things are being improved in education... but it is not from one day to the next that you achieve everything. 
However the main thrust of their discussions was to describe the great difficulties of education and 
their own struggles as individual parents and as association members to support the work of the 
6 The teachers interviewed in the sample were much more cautious in their remarks than others met 
informally who expressed a strong sense of grievance, often saying they were reluctantly considering leaving 
teaching. 
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school in a difficult economic and social environment. The lack of means (both theirs and the 
government's) to support education is their key concern and seen as the root cause of most other 
problems in the schools. 
... the children pass the 
level without solid knowledge; it has to do with the precarious conditions- they go to 
study without eating, the school is cold with broken windows, without desks and they leave (home) early on 
foot. 
... 
for example this school could give pre-university if it had a laboratory. 
Look at ladies like this mother (one of the association members present studying in the night classes) they 
have to sit on the f oor to do the exam. 
There is a lack of teachers - lack of teachers and large classes. 
There are no teachers because of the salaries - the delays in payment - when they get other work they leave. 
As a bricklayer, I receive very little from the government if I do work for the school and 1 have to lay a bribe 
to get the contract - hand over a goat - if you have no goat you have no work. 
The teacher wants to eat twice -from the salary and from the pupil ... how can they not allow themselves to 
be 
corrupted when they earn a pittance. 
There are money problems, I have been unemployed since 1998, so my son has to work to pay for his 
studies... Unemployment is general - 50% of the population doesn't work. This has an influence on the 
capacity of the pupil - it destroys the child because his parents have no money to buy books. 
There were some criticisms of corruption and policy failures at the top of government, but these 
Mozambican citizens lived up to the policymakers' view of them, quoted above. They were not 
waiting for government, and even less for international aid, but finding their own solutions. 
.. the people at the 
head of things, ministers etc. complicate the process ... that is to say there is corruption at 
the central level. 
The functioning of government needs to be reviewed and there really has to be a policy for all workers not 
just those of the state. 
The parents are here to deal with the problems of the school because the budget of the government does not 
suffice to meet the demand. 
As described in Chapter 4, all the parents were members of their school parents association. Clearly 
the level of organisation, participation and effectiveness of the associations varied greatly. The 
secondary school association in Nampula City had already been hailed as a role model for the 
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whole country and is supporting every aspect of the school and helping to develop other 
associations. 
The school was praised in the meeting of MINED over this (functioning of the school council and LEC). 
CONCERN (Irish NGO) organised meetings to exchange experience between school councils and invited the 
council from 2 de Outubro to participate - traditional leaders also participated in these meetings. 
We have access to the school calendar and the work of the council is planned on that basis and drawn up in a 
planning frame. 
... with the participation of the council the 
little resources are well used, whereas before they disappeared in a 
short time from not being well applied. 
The payments (parents' contributions) are set in relation to the economic means of the parents. It is possible 
to raise funds because even in the city they have fields and sell the surplus to contribute to their children's 
education, even the unemployed. ' 
The periodic payments for repairs etc. come from the parents' fund 
A month ago they had notice boards made for the staff room - also the painting of the teachers houses. 
Some parents invite people to give lectures, on AIDS for example, or one of them can do it if they are from 
that line of work. 
The notice boards with newspapers - did you see them? -for reading - there is a contract with Noticias to 
supply them - that's by the parents. 
There is the experience of counselling students on how to behave and to give equal attention to all the 
subjects because they are all essential - (and) lectures on moral and patriotic education. 
There is an advice centre in the school made by the parents with video equipment etc. got through the blood 
donations given by the pupils. 
We make use of parents with experience in education to support the untrained teachers with pedagogical 
advice and counselling on discipline problems. 
The other two schools were perhaps more typical of the present underdeveloped state of the 
association movement. At the secondary school in Machava and the rural primary school in 
Nampula, new heads had clearly recently put some effort into revitalising and improving relations 
with rather inactive associations. Only 10 of the 44 class representatives were present at the 
Machava meeting and at the rural primary school in Nampula the interviews ended with the head 
7 See above, the school had 3000 day pupils in two shifts and 1000 at night, so contributions need not be very 
great to provide useful sums. 
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and a parent discussing the state of relations between the school and parents. The father seemed to 
be challenging the head to reaffirm the parents' right to involvement in the school. 
(New) Head: But this year it was different wasn't it? The school has changed its habits to socialize with the 
parents. 
Parent: I think they should participate to support the school. 
Nevertheless it was clear to the researcher that the LEC concept developed in the early years of 
MINED was once again coming into its own and generating creative grassroots solutions to the 
problems in the schools, fully justifying the comments on the public participation in schools by the 
policymakers and administrators. 
7.3.2 The Role of International Cooperation 
International cooperation in the education sector was still seen as a necessary and its basic role as 
essentially to support the implementation of government policy as before, but the areas in which 
that support was needed was seen to have shifted. The economic and political context was also seen 
as radically different from the situation after the war of independence. Most of the discussion of this 
topic came from the policymakers and administrators. The teachers on the whole had little to say: 
half said nothing and the others saw the donors as mainly providing material and financial aid 
rather than direct technical assistance, which some would still have appreciated. The parents said 
they had virtually no experience of it and spoke extensively instead of their own self-help measures 
to support education. 
The Policymakers' View (Category A) 
For this group there was no doubt that international cooperation was still essential for the 
development of education in Mozambique. Ideally it would take on a supporting role and should be 
chosen and directed by the government at the appropriate levels through general budget support for 
an agreed strategy plan. The group were relieved that this was beginning to happen. However other 
forms of cooperation can be less enabling even though individual projects have positive outcomes. 
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Cooperation when it is well integrated in the programme of the government has a very positive impact. 
Placing funds in the FASE (donor funding pool) ... in the provinces 
for immediate application - it is a 
common cake and known to finances but for immediate use ... it avoids that 
business of waiting for the budget 
title to come out and having to work half the year on the basis of loans. 
They should recognise and support what is ongoing... The World Bank arrived here to try and impose a form 
of economic projection which was not good for education and in MINED we already had our own projection 
that we were using. Why did they not ask, "How do you do this? " Secondly, the World Bank said it would 
support four things: infrastructure, teacher training, gender and HIV-AIDS- Just that! But we cannot look at 
the system like that - where are the trainee teachers to come from? -from secondary education which is left 
out. They don't look at the system as a whole. 
The programme of WFP in the schools (providing snacks for the pupils) - the children don't drop out ... and 
the achievement is higher. 
Now there is an engineer paid by the World Bank and we have created a construction unit with him to 
facilitate the work... when there is money now everything is ready (in advance) and the implementation goes 
ahead 
In other words there is a tendency to continue working in the same mode as during the war, based 
on projects and dictating programmes to a weakened administration. However the group recognised 
that there had been progress and effort on both sides to develop a genuine partnership. MINED had 
been determined since the early 1990s to use the strategy plan development and implementation as 
a capacity building exercise for the Ministry and the donors have to a large extent cooperated with 
this concept, though there has been great reluctance to take the final step of putting their money into 
a common fund and there is still lack of understanding of the exact role MINED would like them to 
play in capacity building. 
The functioning has not been easy, we can find problems on the part of MINED and the partners. For MINED 
the big difficulty is that the management of the cooperation absorbs a lot of time, because it's a transition 
phase from projects to programmes and we still have to discuss projects individually. 
They (the donors) were very concerned to expand the school network and benefit the pupil in the school. It 
was seen that it is necessary to develop the institutions and the ESSP helped a lot with that, but even today 
they work with different systems - it is proving difficult to have a common fund. 
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... the rhythm of change has 
been much slower than we wanted - it is only this year that the common fund was 
established and they are not all in there. 
The difficulties they have are with the Mozambican government which is in a process of general reform, so 
they want to wait till there is a common management system. In their own countries they have their domestic 
pressures - the population wants to see ... very visible projects where they can 
fix their fag - not put into a 
common fund with other donors. 
The relationship was seen to be moving towards a more genuine partnership, which when it worked 
was very good, but they admitted with some frustration that it was difficult to shift the culture of the 
donors and international institutions, though on the whole they thought the difficulties were due to 
lack of understanding rather than any hostile intent. 
One of the positive points is that they opened the barriers in their relations with us - we are having real 
partnership relations through the COPA and RAR (ESSP steering committee; Annual review meetings) 
It (partnership) exists but that does not mean it is equal for both (parties) - we don't benefit fully from 
technical assistance because it is still "tied to finance "... I always have to agree with the technical assistance 
I'm given - the margin of ability to decline is very restricted. 
I think the Bank is an example of a heavy bureaucratic structure that needs change - all the discourse speaks 
of change but when they come to a country - the functionary, even the consultant - they give orders... it is an 
important organisation... it makes no sense not to work with them, but you have to assume that we are in a 
process of constant struggle... of argument. 
The relations keep improving - even they are learning and they have the advantage of learning in other 
countries as well and contribute these experiences to us. 
Given this context of unequal partnership the MINED management have felt obliged to be quite 
defensive of their sovereignty in dealings with international cooperation. This has resulted in a 
complex system of parallel structures with core decision making reserved for Mozambican only 
committees. However another reason for the many joint working groups, which does not seem to be 
fully understood by the donors is to continue the capacity building of Ministry staff. 
The Technical Council (Central policymaking body composed of the Minister, National Directors and 
Advisors) is an organ strictly for MINED - only Mozambicans. 
These parallel working groups have to exist because they cannot participate in the councils and organs of the 
Ministry. 
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The (joint) working groups for thematic areas of MINED is a way of allowing for all the technical staff to 
participate in the implementation of the strategy plan ... (there was) a concern that all the processes of 
participation and capacity building (in developing the ESSP) should not be lost in the implementation. 
Capacity building and institutional development continue to be the main areas for which the 
policymakers were seeking donor support, but the days when any help was better than none, when 
non-specialist cooperantes in schools and colleges could make a difference because the level of 
Mozambican competence was so low, are now gone. 
Nowadays you feel it (international cooperation) more in financial terms - the use of foreign human 
resources has diminished a lot. 
There is still a need for technical assistance in some areas of MINED and much more need in the provinces 
and districts. We have to improve our vision over this. It doesn't mean just calling people in from abroad, 
from the North, but also using the existing internal capacity apart from other countries in the South and it has 
to be based on criteria (not just to provide people with employment) on the basis of needs analysis. It is still 
very necessary but it has to be linked to the capacity building of staff... to the strategy plan, not to the 
components financed by them, and at the choice of MINED. 
Operating in the context of global economic politics was seen as tough but the group showed some 
confidence that Mozambique had learnt how to play by the rules and turn them to their advantage. 
Following the rules of the IMF was decisive in convincing international public opinion, although at times it is 
difficult for the Mozambican population to swallow this measure. 
The debates at the level of the G8 for financing linked to the reduction of poverty have forced the rethinking 
of the model for development aid - it has to be revised on both sides and especially this question of technical 
assistance - the costs in relation to benefit have not been analysed. It is 60% of the aid but what is the part 
that remains in Mozambique and how much leaves? 
However, it is clear that `managing the international cooperation' to keep funding and technical 
assistance coming to the Ministry and the Provinces takes up a large part of their time and attention. 
The Administrators' View (Category B) 
This group gave much less time to discussing the role of international cooperation in this phase than 
the policymakers or than they themselves had done in respect of the post-independence period. One 
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of the fourteen didn't mention it at all in connection with this period, others were very brief or 
described what it `ought' to be. The majority referred to a supporting role, but rather less than half 
described it as necessary. 
The government is receiving great support to achieve its dream... Without these organizations I don't know 
how the government would manage. 
The support of the international community is necessary for the construction of durable classrooms. The 
parents are tired of building huts every year. 
The international community supports -some organizations build schools. 
Meanwhile the aid is still necessary but money needs to be allocated where it will be used 
The impact of the assistance seems to be quite patchy with some very effective support selected and 
targeted through government programmes and other cases where assistance is not well managed 
and even imposed rather than chosen. One very weary District Director described how she got 
around her huge rural district by hitching lifts while donor assistance (including transport) was 
concentrated on a few projects, in the most accessible places. 8 There is a sense that the assistance is 
only a partial solution. 
After the war I observed a lot of support from the foreign organisations (if it existed before it was not visible 
on the ground) and the distance learning, when the government decided to raise the level of the teachers in 
service, it was funded by them... That is to say it is all more visible. 
There is a lot of cooperation for education in this phase but... there is not a good monitoring of the activities 
done by the organisations ... there is no effective 
direction on the ground. 
Globalisation has its effects - as poor people measures are imposed on us, which are not appropriate for our 
situation... imposed reforms - we adopt models that are not ours. 
The (Provincial) Pedagogical Directorate wants to support but they are limited to circulating only in the 
districts, which have projects, for lack of their own financial resources. The projects are directed at district 
centres and within districts only certain ZIPs. 
OSWELA does training in cascade (training a few to teach others). Something is transmitted, but the whole 
message does not get through. 
International cooperation does what it can - you can't insist on what is offered 
8 Such as the school visited by the researcher! Arranging to visit any more typical school would have taken a 
major logistic exercise beyond the means of either the researcher or the DPE. 
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Nevertheless about half of the group thought the relations with international organisations were 
basically positive. Some spoke of their participation and others of concern and interest and of 
learning and improving their assistance. One thought that the context had changed rather than the 
basic nature of the relationship. In this respect it is worth remembering that at this level, donor 
cooperation is experienced through personal working relationships, rather than high-level 
negotiation. 
They have shown great concern within the working group (in MINED) - they participate and contribute. In 
the working group for literacy we discussed the plans with them before finalising. 
Brazil cooperated in the training of literacy teachers and we have a lot of support from the Cubans as before. 
Those are two countries with a lot of experience 
OSWELA... made a training programme and presented the proposal to education and after a discussion they 
implemented it through the education staff. (Provincial Directorate). 
... although the international politics have changed - the way of selecting (aid) has changed " but the objective 
is the same. 
However, international cooperation was much more commonly associated with financial and 
material donations, mainly through projects identified with particular organisations than direct 
capacity building or staff formation. 
The donors showed great interest in education and health. 14 schools were opened in Maputo this year (new 
and extended) with finance from the Japanese. 
Financing the projects of education, many NGOs that help us: the Embassy of the Netherlands work directly 
with the Centre in Mutuane, CL USA works with the peasant associations, the Catholic church and other 
religious people, CONCERN in mother tongue literacy. 
PASE is visible here - the purchase of school books for free distribution costs more than 2 million meticais a 
year. 
There should be more international cooperation to send people abroad where they complete higher education 
quicker because there are conditions for study... and teachers with method - it is a way to solve the problem 
of poor quality ... 
The (national) system does not foster the love of study it is learning by memory, it does not 
have a notion of developing what you learn ... 
International cooperation could inject a different 
vision... promote a culture of investigation... it should invest in public and private libraries. 
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Like the policymakers they also recognised that there were difficulties and faults on both sides 
limiting the impact of assistance. For example, in MINED it is not just the policymakers who find it 
difficult to make time to work with international staff. Meanwhile self interest and corruption exists 
on both sides. 
The working group is useful. (but) this year we haven't yet met as a weekly group - it's because of our work - 
we have veryfew staff and lots of work. 
Some like SIDA come in good faith, others just to make money. 
There are cases that lead a donor to abandon a project and this corruption is not just promoted by internal 
people! 
This group was aware of a lot of international support for education and most clearly thought it was 
on the whole necessary and useful so long as it was integrated in clear government strategies. 
Where this did not occur both government and the agencies themselves were held responsible. 
The Teachers' View (Category C) 
Nine of this group, that is half, did not mention international cooperation in response to this 
question unless prompted and saw little or no impact. One thought it was much reduced, clearly 
looking for the kind of technical assistance he had experienced in the early independence period. 
I don't know anything concrete. I saw work in the schools outside the cities on the television - out there, there 
is a lot. 
Today it doesn't make itself felt much... the coming of many cooperantes is greatly reduced -a consequence 
of the politics of globalisation which we cannot escape. 
Those that did discuss it saw it in a supporting role, about a third described it as necessary but an 
even smaller number saw it as being selected or directed by government and just as many thought it 
was not being managed to the best advantage. 
9 The interviewee cited a number of specific examples of both cases at this point, but asked for them not to be 
recorded. 
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What helps is the international cooperation of governments and NGOs. 
They support education in a number of projects.... It follows the same path as education, there are no 
differences they work well. 
Well-intentioned cooperation is always positive -a cooperation directed at the government for education 
programmes is also appropriate. 
Cooperation facilitates apart (of the needs) - it helps us. 
Cooperation helps in some cases. Latterly it is not being well used - before it arrived at its destination... it 
was integrated in a government plan and arrived where it should. 
They work in parallel. 
Before helping they should go to the field to know the problems and give support on the basis of what exists. 
More than half the group clearly saw financial assistance as the main role of international 
cooperation in this phase, in some cases contrasting it with what they had experienced before. 
You see it in the construction of schools 
Construction of schools - the majority was with the support of cooperation 
Today the influence is more in the area of infrastructure and providing scholarships, not in teaching. 
We don't have (cooperantes) in the schools, when we still need them to guarantee the formation and to 
introduce new methodologies and technologies. 
Now a large part of the (in-service) training is facilitated (meaning financed) by the international 
cooperation. The government makes the plan but could not carry it out without intervention. 
Like the administrators several talked of many different organisations involved in supporting 
particular projects or aspects of the government programmes and some commented unfavourably on 
this change in the way international assistance is delivered. 
The models of organization for literacy etc. of the former times have passed, organisations (NGOs and 
INGOS) turn up in numbers. Beside their production and construction projects they support education. At the 
international level - SADC and the Commonwealth there is sharing of experience and with UNESCO and 
other organisations. 
Support of the organisations - the promotion of girls - in this school the participation is approaching normal. 
At that time Mozambique was allied to the socialist bloc - the cooperantes received symbolic salaries 
compared to the extravagant ones today. 
The NGOs pay according to their way and there is a drain from education to them, very often the best 
teachers. 
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Two of the group thought the general public as well as government is instrumental in gaining 
international assistance, another indication perhaps of the development of the civil partnership 
between government and community. 
Cooperation comes because of the interest of the government and of the public - the community in the local 
area also demands schools. 
Cooperation - they give a lot of help - it is through this that many Mozambicans study and press the 
government to create these conditions. 
The Parents View (Category D) 
As already mentioned, the parents had little to say about international cooperation because they had 
had little or no experience of it. They tended to rely on their own efforts or, as for example, in 
Machava, appeal to local companies or the community to assist the schools. Like some teachers 
some were aware of it at a distance. 
If we are aware of international cooperation? We need help! 
We are not feeling the support of the international community in the community - it arrives up there, here we 
don't feel it. 
These organisations and the government concern themselves to provide adequate education - they contribute 
their methods with ours - there is a partnership - if it is good or bad, I don't know. 
These responses of the parents in the two urban secondary schools reflect the way aid is delivered: 
targeted at rural primary schools in particular locations because of the project culture and 
earmarked funding which largely neglects secondary education. Clearly as a result, much of the 
public is unaware of international inputs. Meanwhile the budget support that "arrives up there " no 
doubt does have some impact on their schools (not withstanding veiled hints at corruption) but it is 
not evident to them. 
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7.3.3 Lessons learned about the post-war recovery of education. 
The participants' responses confirm what the statistics have already told us, that there has been a 
remarkable recovery and further development in the provision of general education since the end of 
the war. However, the importance of their testimony lies in their shared perception that before 
anything else, the government and public recovered their vision of education and a determination to 
take charge of the process of developing the education sector. 
All groups believe that the government is committed to education and has in general adopted 
appropriate policies and strategies. It is credited with considerable success in recovering and 
expanding the number and level of schools and some limited success in achieving greater equity, 
but all groups identified major difficulties in meeting demand and ensuring quality. They attribute 
this to the combination of two main factors. First there is the actual legacy of the war, which has 
contributed directly both to the shortage and poor qualification of the teachers and to general 
poverty and lack of resources, exacerbated by the change in the economic order, which has reduced 
the government's power of decision. Secondly, there is the greatly increased demand for education 
from the public, not just in terms of numbers wanting to enrol (which is partly caused by population 
increase) but due to the success of the government in attracting people to education and raising their 
aspirations. Post-independence, merely to be admitted to grade 5 was beyond what most people 
expected, now they expect access to secondary and higher education. The current inability of the 
system to respond adequately can thus be seen literally as an issue of reduced supply and increased 
demand. On the other hand peace and the resourcefulness of parents in supporting education were 
seen as very positive factors. Once again, different groups and individuals emphasised different 
aspects of this scenario depending on their place in it. 
Not surprisingly the policymakers take a more strategic view of the challenges and how they are 
being met. The political and economic context at the macro level is seen as more complex than 
before, but they feel they have had some success in dealing with it. They focussed on the need for 
capacity building and institutional strengthening at the local level as their key concern, believing 
that the available level of resources could produce much more if effectively deployed by qualified 
staff. The administrators share this view but are much more conscious of just how difficult the 
conditions are for teachers and parents. Of all the groups, the teachers seem to have a sense of 
battling against a sea of difficulties, with no immediate solution in sight. The fact that they feel 
unsupported in this situation confirms the other two education groups' view that this is the weak 
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point in the institution. A sense of not being valued by the wider society is compounded by the 
feeling that they are also not regarded by their own Ministry. As we have seen, policymakers and 
particularly the administrators are keenly aware of the teachers' predicament, so too are the parents 
but with some exceptions, this is not translated into tangible expressions of support. 
As a result it is suggested that many of those recruited to serve in education post-independence, 
have long since abandoned teaching for other professions, However, the experience of the parents' 
association president and former teacher interviewed in Nampula, points to ways in which their 
knowledge still contributes to education just as their education skills have been usefully applied in 
other fields of national development. 10 
The commitment to education of the public, and the growing strength of the parents' support 
through their associations and communities is a continuing institutional strength of the education 
sector. It clearly has the potential to strengthen the performance of the schools and improve teacher 
morale by improving working conditions, but it needs to be matched by more effective local school 
management and improved remuneration. As we have seen, the institutional development of the 
education service was not halted totally by the war. The formation of higher education teachers and 
administrators went ahead and this was an important resource for planning and initiating recovery 
strategies. However, since it could not be matched by development and formation at the local level 
that lack of capacity is now holding back recovery. The fact that MINED does not have the 
financial means (or financial policy control) to reward them adequately is another legacy of the war. 
Despite all of these difficulties there has been a real `peace dividend'. The fact of secure working 
conditions, the confidence that there is a new culture of dialogue and recognition of diversity in the 
wider society and in the schools (with a new curriculum developed with the public ready to be 
introduced) is in itself an enabling environment, that seems to have generated confidence in the 
future even if the present is fraught with difficulties. 
10 The transfer of cadres to other ministries... it's a constant - it's normal that it should happen. A teacher is 
primarily a communicator and informant - these are characteristics suitable for doing other things. 
Education always trained many people ... and continues to 
have good staf. Elisabeth Sequeira. Former 
National Director of International Cooperation, MINED. Interview August 2003. 
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As for earlier periods, participants' views on international cooperation are very much influenced by 
the character of the particular interventions they have encountered. Nevertheless a general pattern 
can be discerned across the groups. 
The proper role of international cooperation, which it is seen to be fulfilling in many instances, is 
still seen as to support the programmes of the government. However, the radically different political 
and economic context, as well as the progress already made in developing the capacity of the 
education service, has changed the emphasis of aid from direct technical assistance to financial 
support and the relationship between the government and its international partners is not yet as clear 
as they felt it was in the post-independence period. 
While the financial assistance and some continuing technical assistance from the international 
community continue to be essential for the implementation of education programmes, this input is 
not being used to best advantage, because of the prolonged process of negotiating the switch from 
project to sector programme strategic support. MINED has taken back much of the initiative at the 
policy level since the war but aid continues to be delivered at the grass roots largely through 
projects. This means that although in most instances these are supporting national policies, at the 
provincial and district level where they are implemented, administrators' ability to allocate 
resources equitably or determine priorities is restricted. Meanwhile in the schools and amongst 
parents, there are few instances of a sense of participation and certainly no general sense of 
benefiting from international cooperation, though some individual experiences have been good. 
The MINED management has clearly succeeded in recovering much of the control over policy and 
implementation that they lost in the war years and developed a high level of negotiating skills. They 
recognise that the donors are also learning from their experiences and trying to change their 
operational culture, not without their own difficulties. However, the need to devote so much effort 
to relations with international partners, though it is bringing great benefits to the sector, is also 
clearly a drain on the institutional capacity of the central Ministry and placing constraints on their 
ability to respond to the concerns of their primary constituents in the schools and communities. 
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Thus the concentration of donor and policymaker effort at this top policy level is probably one of 
the factors inhibiting the institutional development through decentralisation that is so necessary. " 
Overall, the views on international cooperation in this phase are more ambivalent than those 
expressed in relation to the post-independence period. There is a sense that most international 
agencies and their staff are acting with good will and that much of what they do is useful or even 
essential, but there is an undercurrent of dissatisfaction, only occasionally voiced as direct criticism, 
with the relationship, which is essentially still one of dependence rather than partnership. 
However, while more dissatisfaction is expressed with both government and international 
cooperation, and considerably more frustration with conditions in education at this stage, we should 
be cautious in taking this to mean that the post-independence era was at the time free of such 
grumbles - the participants had the benefit of hindsight in assessing that time and were able to see it 
in general terms as a period of great progress, but as their curricula show it was also a time of 
personal frustration for many and continuing material hardship. Today it is clear that they have 
made good progress in recovering from the war and they are confident of the future in general 
terms, but understandably daunted by the scale of the challenges they face on a daily basis. 
7.4 General Lessons 
Having heard the participants' account of this long journey from colonialism, through two wars, 
dramatic political and economic upheavals in global politics, we cannot but recognise the creation, 
survival and development of the Ministry of Education in Mozambique as a great achievement. Not 
least when we recognise from the testimonies of the participants in this research, that throughout all 
these events, some as they acknowledge of their own making, both government and public, and in 
many instances international partners, have maintained a constant vision of its principal objectives 
and faith in its ability to ultimately achieve them. 
As one contributor asked at the beginning "How in these conditions did we achieve so much? " 
This question is important, not just for the sake of understanding the particular historical case of 
" In 1998 at the donor conference to appraise the ESSP, the then Minister of Education, Sr. Nhavoto, pointed 
out that work with the donors had prevented him for over six months from setting foot in a school. As already 
noted, the purpose of the strategy plan was to reduce the amount of time spent in this way, but this has so far 
not happened. 
247 
Mozambique, but to see if it provides any clues as to how other nations might approach the 
enormous task of recovery from repression, violent regime change, civil war and economic 
collapse, which in one form or another make up the history of so many other war-torn countries. In 
order to discuss this in our final chapter, it is necessary here to identify, not the details of the case of 
education in Mozambique, but the key factors that have led, despite many reverses and continuing 
difficulties, to a "success story". 
The account of the participants suggests that while there was huge technical incapacity, and 
inexperience of governance at independence, there was a vision of development that was shared by 
the revolutionary government and the majority of the general public: that the key to personal and 
national development lay in universal access to literacy and basic education. This vision had very 
particular roots in the nature of Portuguese colonialism, which consciously excluded the masses 
from power by means of exclusion from education. Access to education was thus seen as 
empowerment. In other societies, the principal instrument of exclusion may be land or resources, 
but the conclusion seems to be that a shared wrong can be the starting point for a shared vision and 
the case of education in Mozambique suggests that such a vision is a powerful factor for 
institutional development and survival. 
On this basis the MINED developed participatory strategies within their own staff and with the 
public, which compensated for lack of technical capacity, and mobilized resources. Nevertheless, if 
the system was to progress at a rate that could satisfy the aspirations of the public and beyond the 
provision of basic education it was necessary to enlist external technical assistance. It is quite clear 
from the Mozambican case that foreign technical assistance played a crucial role in building the 
capacity of the education sector up to the early 1990s and the end of the civil war. First of all by 
forming a first generation of Mozambican administrators, policymakers and teachers and secondly 
by assisting them to develop their own institutions. As a result they were in a position, despite the 
reverses of the war to take the initiative for planning the strategic recovery of the sector post-war. 
However, all the contributors were sure that this input was effective, precisely because it was 
enlisted by MINED in support of their programmes. When the war and economic collapse diverted 
government attention from this purpose and it lost the ability to direct the international assistance, it 
became fragmented, ineffective or actually debilitating. Recognition of this fact has led MINED to 
convince a majority of the donors to try to retrieve the situation by developing a form of assistance 
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through the strategy plan that puts government at the helm again, coordinating and directing 
assistance. However, the key difference compared to 1975, is that while their technical capacity for 
planning and management is highly developed, they are not as before, financially independent, and 
`free to decline' what they don't want. The MINED management is therefore in a constant state of 
negotiation with donor partners and fragmentary project approaches to finance and technical 
support persist at the level of implementation. This capacity limiting factor can be seen as a legacy 
of the war and consequent economic collapse. 
Of course, since education was such a crucial enterprise for the newly independent Mozambique, it 
was also deeply implicated in the long civil war, as a target of resentment and as a focus for keeping 
the vision of a better society alive. The participants' reflections on the internal causes of the war 
point to another key factor, which was necessary for the harmonious development of a public 
institution such as MINED. While the FRELIMO government was ideologically committed to 
democratisation, inclusion and participation, and their promotion of mass education was the 
flagship of that ideology, neither they nor the general public had any experience of such a culture of 
governance. The majority were on the whole, prepared to be `mobilized' for the sake of a common 
aspiration, but others felt excluded. Within the leadership itself there was `a lack of space for 
dialogue' and an inability to come to terms with `diversity of ideas'. Creating such a space, and 
realising that it is possible to collectively develop the country, while holding different ideas, are the 
two aspects of governance that had to exist for peace to be restored and the key to its sustainability. 
In the case of MINED this realisation has released the potential for the public to now participate 
fully in the development of education, through civil organisations like the parents associations. A 
flexible curriculum, which uses the many national languages and cultures is being introduced and 
universal inclusion is no longer at the price of uniformity. 
The point has been made in Chapter 5 that though weakened MINED survived organisationally, 
even though the number of schools was decimated and despite extreme practical difficulties for 
access and communication, and a drastic reduction in resources. It seems clear from the 
participants' testimonies that the Ministry retained the loyalty of its staff, especially the teachers, 
and the public who were the main targets of the violence. That is they remained committed to the 
vision they shared in the post-independence period. The other strength that can be seen as keeping 
MINED alive as an institution, is the fact that the formation and development of senior management 
and teaching staff continued almost unaffected, though their powers of decision making and means 
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of implementation were drastically weakened by the combined effect of economic collapse, 
structural adjustment and diversion of resources to the war effort. These two factors provided the 
essential ground for recovery, which was already being contemplated, even as they concentrated 
their efforts on managing and surviving the war. 
The above account clarifies many of the issues raised by the review of the secondary sources at the 
end of Chapter 5 about the development of the education sector: the institutional strengths and 
weaknesses of MINED and the conditions in which international cooperation and aid had most 
impact for capacity development. In particular, the participants' accounts support the view that it 
was the capacity building interventions in the post-independence period, which continued at senior 
management level throughout the war that had the most impact in developing the institutional 
capacity to initiate post-war recovery and take advantage of post-war assistance. Thus the drive to 
develop a unified sector approach was initiated by MINED but took advantage of international 
policy shifts. The final stage in this process, the common education sector support fund was a 
Mozambican objective from the beginning, but met with strong resistance from donors. 
The participant's reflections on the causes of the war and the conditions for peace, which they now 
believe exist in their society, also suggest that the Mozambican case does make the theory of a 
causal link between capacity development and good governance plausible. More specifically, their 
experience vindicates their consistent vision that it is the capacity of the governed through mass 
general education as much as the capacity of those who govern and administrate that is essential for 
harmonious development. 
However, the participants also detect some threats to that development in the present economic 
conditions. While the education system strives for inclusion and equity, the market economy is 
widening the division between advantaged and disadvantaged and fomenting corruption. This 
condition is seen as weakening the commitment of education's main participants: teachers, parents 
and pupils. 
In their account of this intense and often bitter learning process, the participants showed great 
consistency in their choice of terms to describe the strengths and weaknesses of government of the 
public and their international partners which demonstrate the criteria by which they judge and 
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monitor the quality of governance in their country, irrespective of the political system in place at 
the time. 
Their concept of good governance can be summarised as leadership and sovereignty on the part of 
government, participation (of public and donor partners), inclusion and equity, respect for diversity 
of ideas and dialogue (between government and public and within the ruling elite). All of these 
were aspirations of the revolutionary government in 1975, but their realisation has depended on the 
development of human capacity and resources. 
In the following chapter, these criteria are used to assess the quality of governance in the wider 
Mozambican society today, with a view to answering the final question raised in Chapter 5: whether 
the development of the education sector, as a form of national capacity building can be 
demonstrated to have contributed to good governance, peace and national development. 
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CHAPTER 8. 
POST-WAR MOZAMBIQUE: 
A STORY OF CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT SUCCESS? 
Introduction 
As the researcher prepared to return to Mozambique after an interval of four years, the first 
concern was to understand the context of the chosen case study (MINED): the society in which it 
now functions and that from which it has emerged. Questions arose such as "What factors should I 
look for as indicators of `good governance' or as signs of lasting peace? ". In Chapter 1 we 
examined notions of `good governance' within the international community. The dominant 
concept was a multi-party democracy combined with a liberal market economy, though different 
actors had divergent views as to how this should be interpreted in practice. Some emphasised 
managerial aspects others political aspects. All were based on the liberal democracy model 
evolved in developed Western nations (see Figure 6. ). 
The Peace Accord of 1992 had already committed Mozambique to the constitutional changes 
necessary for conformity with this model; however, as already discussed governance is `the 
manner of governing' not a particular form of government. It may be true that certain political 
structures facilitate good governance, but as discussed in Chapter 1, they do not guarantee it. 
Underlying rules of behaviour and pre-existing relationships (good or bad) will persist into the 
new regime and influence the way any new structures function. It seemed necessary therefore to 
identify indicators of good governance that are not tied to a particular political and economic 
system but might be considered universal. This was deemed particularly important when 
considering a society in the process of emerging from forty years of what has been generally 
agreed to be a very poor system of governance under the colonial rule of the Portuguese `Estado 
Novo'. 
8.1 Setting the criteria 
It was with this agenda in mind that the researcher began to assemble accounts of today's 
Mozambican society, first in a variety of published forms (the press, literature and statistical 
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information) and then through observation and interaction during the fieldwork. At the same time 
the interviews with the education staff and parents proceeded and began to reveal their concepts of 
governance and conditions for peace. At the end of this process, as we have seen in the previous 
chapter, the message from the participants in the interview research on the subject of governance 
was consistent and clear. When describing both the positive roles played by government, public 
and donor partners and their failings, they were essentially elaborating their concept of `good 
governance' and the factors that they felt were capable of sustaining peaceful development. 
Significantly, they did not think that these attributes were necessarily associated with a particular 
political system; different systems were seen to have different strengths and weaknesses as far as 
governance was concerned. They rather attributed improved governance to changes in the 
underlying political culture and the increased capacity of both public and political leadership, who 
they held jointly responsible for the quality of governance. 
The researcher adopted this set of ideas as revealed in the assembled data, as their `folk theory' of 
the development of governance in Mozambique (Pawson and Tilley 1997: 88 discussed in 4.4). 
Sovereignty, or the power to make decisions in the national interest, the ability to lead and share a 
vision of the future with the public and the technical capacity to develop effective policies and 
strategies were the attributes they looked for in government. Since governance is also the 
responsibility of the public, they expected citizens to be able to hold government to account, 
contribute to policymaking and assume responsibility for their own local services in partnership 
with government. Similarly, international organisations, whose assistance is still necessary, were 
seen to be most effective when supporting national strategies in a partnership relationship. Two 
key qualities for governance were also identified: inclusion was seen as the basis of a just society, 
provided equity was not pursued at the expense of respecting difference; dialogue was seen as the 
key to accommodating and learning to live peacefully in a diverse society, as well as being the 
mechanism for ensuring partnership, accountability and responsibility between government and 
citizens. The essential condition for achieving all of these criteria was seen to be capacity: the 
effectiveness of institutions and individuals and their command of resources. On that basis the set 
of indicators shown in Figure 5. were developed as the criteria for analysing the nature of 
governance in the present Mozambican context. 
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Figure 5. Indicators of good governance - based on the Mozambican perspective 
Sovereignty: 
" Power of decision 
" Leadership/shared vision 
" Capacity to develop policy and strategy 
Participation: 
Citizens: 
" Control 
" Delegated power 
" Partnership 
International organisations: 
" Support 
" Partnership 
Inclusion: 
" Equity 
" Respect for diversity 
Dialogue: 
" For reconciliation 
" For responsibility 
" For policy 
Capacity: 
" Effectiveness 
" Resources 
Meanwhile, since Mozambique is hailed by the international community as an example of 
successful post-war governance and peace, it was still necessary to see how it conformed to the 
international criteria and these are summarised in Figure 6. 
Figure 6. International yardsticks for good governance 
Economic growth 
Balance of payments 
Multi-party elections/political system ('democracy') 
Market-friendly policy and regulatory framework 
Rule of law guaranteeing human rights/freedom of expression/accountability 
Effective delivery of public services (as seen in human development indicators) 
It is also clearly necessary to have an institutional framework that makes it possible to apply and 
defend these principles in the daily affairs of the nation: 
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A Legal system based on mutually agreed laws and a system of enforcement (tribunals/courts, 
police, penal systems/prisons) that defend human and civil rights impartially, with authority to 
arbitrate in civil disputes and regulate economic activity. 
A Political system at the level of the whole society that allows conflicts between different social 
groups to be resolved by negotiation rather than violence. 
A public administration capable of carrying out and or facilitating the implementation of 
government policies in response to public requirements. 
The Mozambican participants in the research, and others with whom the researcher held informal 
conversations, felt that failure of the institutions to defend these principles in practice, whether 
from deliberate subversion or simple incapacity, constitutes the main threat to continued peace and 
stability. This is why the issue of capacity is as critical as that of political vision. As we have seen 
one key issue about which they feel great concern is that of equity and inclusion: the growing gap 
between the wealthy and the poor and the continuing unequal levels of development between 
different areas of the country and between urban and rural areas. They see this as a potential threat 
to peace despite believing that the government is addressing the issue, since it is conditioned by 
historical inequality and exposure to the global market economy. Another, related area of concern 
is that of high level corruption, since this is seen to undermine the effective application of scarce 
public resources to the implementation of government policies that are generally agreed to meet 
the aspirations of the public. In this case, both the existing legal framework and the institutional 
capacity to uphold it have often conspicuously failed to stand up to organised crime. Two 
indicators of failed governance were therefore added: 
Figure 7. Indicators of failed governance - based on the Mozambican perspective 
The use or threat of violence to achieve political or economic goals 
Corruption 
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8.2 Mozambique Today 
8.2.1 What the papers said 
The researcher reviewed the news items recorded by the English language Mozambique News 
Agency (AIM)' over a period of 12 months, including the total of four months when she was in 
Mozambique and supplemented these briefings by reading the daily and weekly papers in full. 
Initially they were appraised by applying the criteria of good governance and recovery used 
internationally (Fig 6 above. and Chapter 1). As the research progressed and in the analysis after 
the field work it was possible to look at these events in the light of the criteria defined as a result of 
the discussions with Mozambicans. However, it was the record of incidents and on-going 
processes of government, law and financial negotiations (as indicators of the state of governance, 
development and peace) that were the subject of this scrutiny rather than the journalistic opinion 
and often lively debates the press contain, though these obviously contributed to the interpretation 
of the results of the analysis. This strategy was adopted because despite a noticeable growth in the 
number range and diversity of the press in Mozambique and excellent legal protections (see 8.3 
below), which allow freedom of expression (as in Figure 6. ) and public debate, it cannot yet be 
described as `mass media' in the sense of reaching the masses. 
This case shows where the international yardstick may fail to reveal the reality of which 
Mozambicans are critically aware. Sociedade de Noticias, which publishes Mozambique's main 
daily paper and the important weekly "Domingo", has a print run of less than 13,000 for a 
population of 18 million. (AIM 22°d June 2003) and like all other papers is circulated in provincial 
capitals a day after publication, rarely being delivered beyond that. So even though newspapers are 
commonly read by a number of people, the majority of the population is excluded by illiteracy, 
poverty or location from access to this source of information. Television, despite the provision of 
sets in community centres and bars and the habit of visiting the neighbours to watch, caters for an 
even smaller urban minority, though it now has provincial services. Radio, which has broadcast in 
local languages as well as Portuguese since Independence is perhaps the only public information 
Agencia de Informacao de Mocambique www. poptel. org. uk/mozambigue-news/ issues regular AIM 
Reports based on a review of the Mozambican press and media as well as its own reporters twice a month, 
and additional special reports to cover important events. The Agency is publicly funded but has editorial 
autonomy. For the history of its ambivalent relationship with government since independence see Fauvet 
and Mosse (2003). 
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service that reaches something closer to the general public. In other words, media debates in 
Mozambique are only a tiny if prominent piece of the national discourse. 
Looking first at the international criteria, one reason for Mozambique being hailed as a success has 
been its consistently high rate of economic growth (even taking into account the temporary drop 
below double figures in the aftermath of the 1999 floods) and sound financial management. So for 
example, on IO' September 2002, the Minister of Finance Luisa Diogo presented an amended 
budget for 2002 to the Assembly of the Republic asking for an increase in government expenditure 
because tax collection had `surpassed expectations' and the growth in GDP was expected to be by 
12.2% rather than the target of 10% (AIM 239). In February 2003, the Governor of the Bank of 
Mozambique reported an annual inflation rate of 9.1 % and a depreciation of only 2.3% of the 
national currency against the US$, which meant that "overall we attained our objectives" of 
macro-economic stability to strengthen business confidence (AIM 247). In terms of the 
international criteria then, macro-economic management is seen to be a success. However, it is not 
the management of a healthy economy but the management of a slow climb out of crisis. There is 
still a gap of $648 million between state revenues and expenditure, which is being met by foreign 
aid and despite debt relief under the HIPC initiative a remaining total debt stock at $761.5 million 
(AIM 239 cited above). 
The numerous reports of new investments to reopen agricultural industries devastated by the war 
(sugar, rice and tea) or to set up major new industries such as the huge MOZAL aluminium 
smelter project 3 are evidence of efforts by government to address this situation. The particular 
merit of these efforts from the international point of view, is to improve the balance of payments 
and from the Mozambican point of view to create employment and reduce dependence. 
However, the impact of the market on the general public and the small Mozambican entrepreneur 
has not been an unmixed blessing, creating unemployment as well as employment and greater 
economic inequalities as the trade union leader Fanheiro commented on May Day 2002, "the 
growing chasm between rich and poor" is caused by "adjustment policies based on total 
liberalisation" (AIM 231). Meeting the international criteria of good economic governance is the 
2 AIM Reports: 231 May 2002,242 October 2002,243 November 2002,249 March 2003,252 April 2003, 
254 May 2003,255 June 2003. 
3 AIM reports: 211 July 2001,240 September 2002,246 January 2003,256 June 2003,260 September 2003 
257 
only option open to Mozambique, but at the same time it threatens their main condition for good 
governance: inclusion and equity. 
This then, is an area in which Mozambican sovereignty is severely limited; they have to learn to 
live with the global market, take what advantage they can and mitigate its worst effects. There is 
some evidence of learning both on the Mozambican side and that of the financial institutions4 and 
donors after two prominently reported catastrophes directly attributable to enforced `market 
economy' policies. The first was the rapid privatisation of the banks in the absence of a robust 
regulatory structure (Ratilal 2002: 290-291), which led to massive fraud protected first by 
corruption and then by resorting to the assassination of investigators. The second was the 
insistence by the World Bank in 1995 on a liberalisation policy that allowed the export of raw 
cashew. This was against the advice of those in the industry (owners and unions) and has all but 
destroyed an industry that was a key source of income in rural economies and an export earner 
(Hanlon 1996: 34-37). Both of these issues figured in the press reports of 2002-3. The first is 
discussed below. As for the second, in June 2002 (AIM 233) the European Union attempted to 
mitigate the disaster by injecting 6 million Euros into the production and marketing of cashew, but 
in October 12 cashew processing factories were reported closed "with investments of about $50 
million transformed into scrap metal... a considerable increase in poverty" in rural towns and 
"Once recognised as one of the major suppliers of cashew kernels, Mozambique has now 
disappeared from the market. " (AIM 241 quoting Kekobad Patel Chairman of the Mozambique 
Cashew Industry Association). 
However, press reports in 2002-3 revealed that the majority of investment and aid deals negotiated 
by the government now conform to some kind of `partnership' model of participation by foreign 
interests rather than the `token' manipulative relationships tying financial aid to the interests and 
development models of the donor. That is, the majority of deals either support sector programmes 
developed by government or are joint venture deals with investors in which the government retains 
a substantial interest. This can be seen as evidence of `ability to develop policy and strategy' and 
enlist international participation to support it, which the research participants cited as a key 
attribute of the role of government though, as one also reminded us - partnership does not 
° World Bank Director Darius Mans told a Maputo press conference in June 2003 that the World Bank's 
support will be "integrated into the government's planning and budgeting systems and use the government's 
own monitoring and evaluation system". (AIM 256) 
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necessarily mean equal partnership and there were also still instances of the overtly manipulative 
`token' participatory approach by the donors. 
The MOZAL project discussed above included a `Small and Medium Enterprises Linkages 
Programme' intended to improve the capacity of local business to bid for and carry out contracts 
as suppliers to the project. In June 2003 this was handed over to be run by the government 
`Investment Promotion Centre' to support Mozambican businesses in obtaining contracts in other 
major schemes financed by international donors and institutions (AIM 256). This scheme probably 
qualifies for the category of `less than equal' partnership given the financial assets stacked on the 
side of the external partners but is clearly aimed at long-term capacity building. The joint venture 
deal over the development of the Port of Maputo seems much more akin to a straight business 
partnership between a consortium headed by British Mersey Docks and Harbour Company 
(working in Maputo since the 1980s) and the government. In September 2003 AIM (Report 260) 
reported the head of the consortium explaining that the consortium expects to make high profits 
itself and something like $300 million for the Mozambican government. The 15 year concession is 
renewable for a further 10 years `if found to be profitable to both the Mozambican state and the 
consortium. ' 
The negotiations for the development of the Port of Nacala and the rail link to Malawi, on the 
other hand seem to be the subject of some rather heavy weight political pressures. The US 
government expressed its intention "to promote American private investment" and private sector 
involvement in general at an early stage of the negotiations in May 2002 (AIM 232). In October, 
it was reported that the consortium SDCN (of Mozambican, American and Portuguese companies) 
that had been seeking investment capital for the project was likely to get finance from the US 
government through OPIC (Overseas Private Investments Corporation). 5 In February the 
Mozambican and Malawian governments were negotiating the inclusion of Zambia in the scheme 
to transform the port and rail system into a "development corridor" for the three countries (the key 
aspiration of the African partners) (AIM 247). By March 2003 US investment through USAID in 
the port and rail system was officially confirmed (AIM 249) and in June 2003 the OPIC 
S There was also an unconfirmed report by Mediafax (a Mozambican investigative fax news sheet) that the 
deal was subject to US use of the Nacala air base, due after the war to be converted into a civilian airport, 
but the use or otherwise of the airbase was not on the public agenda. Mediafax also reported that leading 
members of the Government own interests in the Mozambican companies involved. (AIM 242) 
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investment was confirmed and the Transport and Communications Minister `said that privatising 
the management of the Nacala corridor is essential if the port is to take a leading place in the 
handling of container cargo in Southern Africa' (AIM 255), thus making it the only port and rail 
system in Mozambique in which the government has not retained a financial interest. This seems 
like the kind of deal discussed in Chapter 1, where inappropriate conditions are accepted for the 
sake of the financial resources. 
The continuing high level of poverty and lack of development in Mozambique mean that it 
continues to be vulnerable to natural disaster and endemic disease and is therefore still a recipient 
of humanitarian aid. This too is given in varying degrees of partnership. AIM reported on the 14`h 
July 2003 (Report 257) a straight donation of medicines to a value of $100,000 from India in 
response to a direct request from the Mozambican President and the conversion of $5 million of 
debt by the French government into financial support for the implementation of the national plan 
against HIV/AIDS. 6 In September the US donated $50 million but all `earmarked' for the funding 
of USAID programmes (AIM 261). As Prime Minister Pascoal Mocumbi speaking to the UN 21" 
March 2002 (AIM 228) stated `One US dollar of untied aid has more value than two or more of 
tied aid'. 
In the area of food aid the Mozambican government asserted some sovereignty, leadership and 
capacity in the drought crisis of 2002. First of all by identifying and monitoring the impending 
drought in the south of the country and correctly predicting a good harvest in the north, instigating 
the preparation of local contingency plans and allocating government funds to support them (AIM 
230,231,234). Secondly by lobbying for appropriate forms of international aid: in the short term, 
finance to purchase and transport the 100,000 tonne grain surplus in the north of the country to the 
south (the EU finally acceded to this request (AIM 238) after the WFP and the US had rejected it) 
and long term assistance from FAO to extend irrigation schemes and the development of drought 
resistant crops (AIM 236). In the meantime an unsolicited delivery of US food aid had arrived in 
the Port of Maputo and was diplomatically accepted. (AIM 234) However, the Mozambican 
government requested that all donations of genetically modified maize should be accompanied by 
information on the type of modification undergone so that the risk to indigenous agriculture could 
6 Compare with Italy and Britain and the US who in May and June 2002 cancelled all outstanding bi-lateral 
debt without linking it directly to aid negotiations and OPEC which was cancelling debt in stages, while also 
providing `soft' loans for development. (AIM 232,233) 
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be assessed. In the meantime all genetically modified donated maize arriving unmilled would be 
sent straight from the port to processing plants to avoid it being used as seed. (AIM 237 August 
2002) 
What the above analysis suggests is that the government is making progress on the criteria of 
sovereignty as regards power of decision and policy and strategic planning, but in a difficult 
international environment. There is also evidence of its leadership in succeeding in enlisting 
international support for its vision of development in direct response to a major concern of the 
public: regional equity and inclusion. The construction of a bridge over the lower reaches of the 
Zambezi was already identified as the key to unlocking the huge economic potential of the 
northern provinces in the colonial times and engineering work begun, only to be abandoned during 
the war for independence and never resumed as attacks by the Rhodesian air force during the war 
for Zimbabwean independence gave way to civil war in Mozambique itself. The lesson learnt from 
that war, by government, opposition and the public was that unless the legacy of 
underdevelopment of the north compared to the historically favoured South was reversed regional 
inequity would increase and once again threaten the peace. (In fact the statistical indicators 
discussed below show that that is already happening). In June 2003 ten years of lobbying 7 began 
to bear fruit: when the north-south highway was completed to both banks of the Zambezi and 
President Chissano could announce that most of the money to build the huge bridge was in place 
(AIM 256). In August tenders were launched to start the work in 2004 (AIM 259). 
Leadership on the international stage was demonstrated by the very successful hosting of the AU 
conference in Maputo in July 2003 at which President Chissano took over the chairmanship (AIM 
257). Immediately afterwards a major national event, the holding of the national school games 
(with over 2000 participants from all over the country in the northern `capital' of Nampula) was 
used by the government and the President as a vehicle for promoting social inclusion and 
knowledge of Mozambique's diverse cultures amongst young people. It also very consciously set 
out to demonstrate that the North too was capable of staging a major event. This and other news 
reports of speeches by politicians and officials revealed an awareness of the issue of unequal 
development as crucial for social stability and general development (Diärio de Mocambique July 
28`h, Domingo August 3`d 2003). 
7 As for example with the World Bank a year earlier in June 2001 (AIM 211) 
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For the international community, the visible indicators of democracy (another condition of good 
governance) are the holding of multi-party elections and a functioning parliament; this of course 
implies a degree of citizen participation and dialogue which are the main criteria expressed by the 
Mozambican research participants. On the first count, Mozambique has held three successful 
national elections with high public participation, suggesting that the National Assembly is valued, 
and without the results being invalidated by violence, fraud or intimidation, suggesting widespread 
respect for the electoral law. (RENAMO as a party has contested the conduct of elections but 
always through electoral law procedures, that have investigated but mostly rejected their claims. 
Their supporters at local level have at times resorted to violence (see below). The parliament thus 
elected is broadly representative (the gender balance at nearly 30% women MPs compares 
favourably with most European countries) and has sat for the most part peaceably to debate 
legislation and call the executive to account for ten years. However, from the international 
community's point of view, local democracy is so far a failure. Contrary to received wisdom that 
this is where democracy is 'learned's public participation at this level is distinctly lacking. Only 33 
municipalities have so far been included in the experiment that was largely promoted by the 
international community. 
In order to understand this contradiction it seemed necessary to examine evidence of how these 
institutions and procedures are working, rather than the mere fact that they do exist and function. 
For this purpose the Mozambican criteria of `dialogue' and citizen participation seem appropriate. 
Do these institutions in fact `create space for dialogue' rather than violence and do they allow 
citizens to participate in governance? 
We could first of all look at the extensive reporting of the proceedings of the Assembly of the 
Republic (elected with such a high level of public participation)- what is the quality of dialogue in 
the Assembly? The AIM reports of the proceedings in 2002/2003 reveal, especially in the 
protracted wrangling over the functioning of the CNE (National Electoral Commission) and the 
procedures for updating the electoral registers, which has led to repeated postponement of the local 
elections, that there were more instances of failure to resolve differences than successes - or it 
8 As for example the recommendation that democracy should be introduced in Iraq by beginning with local 
elections (ICG Middle East Reports 2003 No. 11: 32 and No. 17: p23) though this was not the view of the 
majority of Iraqis who like Mozambicans saw national elections as the priority. 
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might be that negotiating agreement is still a very slow process. ' For the most part, the 
opposition's tactics, in the face of the assured majority of the governing party and its greater 
experience in policy formulation, have been acrimonious debate and procedural obstruction, rather 
than the presentation of viable alternatives and there were two conspicuous failures of dialogue. 
In April 2002 (AIM 229) `The Assembly descended into chaos as members of RENAMO seized 
control of the rostrum, physically preventing anyone else from speaking' in order to obstruct the 
presentation of the report of a joint parliamentary commission of enquiry (which it had chaired and 
helped to set up) into the riots in Montepuez (see below). In December the scene repeated itself, 
when a number of RENAMO delegates brought the proceedings to a halt by noise and violence 
(though not against persons). However, observers blame not just RENAMO for the fact that 
parliamentary business was left uncompleted, but also `lax chairing' and the `habitual lethargy' of 
the Assembly. (AIM 246) When the Assembly reconvened in the New Year both sides made an 
effort to restore peace and get on with the business. Meanwhile the parliamentary standing 
commission decided without opposition that the culprits (recorded on TV footage) would be fined 
for the damage they had caused in the chamber. (AIM 248,249) 
Despite these well-publicised lapses, a scrutiny of the reports on the Assembly reveal that there 
were in fact many more instances of achieving consent on policy than of discord, especially on 
legislation of primary concern to the public such as the family law, passed in April 2003 (AIM 
253) or the draft anti-corruption law which was constructively debated and referred to the Legal 
Affairs Commission for redrafting (AIM 252). In fact much of the day-to-day business in the 
chamber and particularly in the parliamentary committees, out of the public gaze, is routine and 
constructive. Ensuring accountability of the executive and of public institutions appears from the 
reports to have been the Assembly's biggest area of success, in which the opposition parties can be 
seen to be fulfilling their function of parliamentary scrutiny and there were also instances of cross- 
party scrutiny as in the examination of public servants such as the Attorney General on his 
presentation of annual reports (AIM 227,250) or the presentation of the budget by the Minister of 
Financelo 
9 This issue was a constant source of conflict. From STAE's (Electoral Administration Technical 
Secretariat) first attempt to start the process in April 2002 (AIM 229) to the endorsement of the election in 
January 2004 (AIM 268) it generated more news items (16) than any other topic. 
10 Ministers in Mozambique are senior civil servants appointed by the President as his executive council but 
directly accountable to the Assembly. 
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This evidence suggests a legislative body that is on the whole functioning successfully, and though 
the main opposition party RENAMO still lacks political vision and at times resorts to bullying, it is 
ensuring greater accountability by a government that after nearly two decades in power is capable 
of both arrogance and complacency. At national level at least it has moved a long way from being 
the `armed opposition' it once was, though it still retains a token armed force in central Sofala, 
which from time to time threatens the local police and residents (AIM 212,261,278). " 
The local elections on the other hand have so far proved a failure from the point of view of 
participation of the public and political parties. RENAMO boycotted the first elections in 1998 
while making known its support for certain `independent' candidates. This was in protest at the 
government's restriction of the exercise to municipalities, in the majority of which it stood a good 
chance of winning. The extremely low turn-out of the public in these elections suggests that they 
saw little value in the process and research has shown that it was the prolonged wrangling and 
posturing between the political parties over the issue that has led to this deliberate rejection (Serra, 
1999). 
While that form of protest can be interpreted as a form of dialogue, the local rioting associated 
with the outcome of the national elections in 1999 in a number of central and northern towns and 
cities and the horrific response by the police in Montepuez was seen as another serious failure of 
governance, raising the spectre of return to past brutalities. It seems however that the horror led to 
a retreat from violence rather than an escalation and by 2002/2003 the legal system seemed to be 
handling the various prosecutions in a detached and professional manner (AIM 212). Nevertheless, 
it was the discussion of the report of the official enquiry, which triggered one of the moments of 
breakdown of dialogue in the Assembly described above. 12 
The municipal elections in 2003, after being postponed several times, at least this time counted on 
the participation of all the political parties and some genuinely independent candidates but still did 
11 For an account of that transition see Manning, 1998. 
12 On 9th November 1999 demonstrations by RENAMO supporters against the results of the elections, 
resulted in battles with the police in a number of places resulting in 41 deaths. In Montepuez the police 
reacted by rounding up anyone they thought to be involved and locking them in one overcrowded police cell, 
where 83 died of asphyxiation. (AIM 211) 
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not induce more than a quarter of the electorate to participate 13. The conclusion must be that 
`democracy' at this local level still fails to meet the criteria of dialogue and citizen participation. 
Isolated, but significant outbursts of mob violence associated with elections or other local concerns 
show just how profound that lack of dialogue and mutual knowledge can be. For example in early 
2002 an mob armed with machetes, clubs and stones attacked the town of Nipepe in the remote 
northern province of Niassa in an attempt to kidnap the administrator, accusing the authorities and 
health workers engaged in preventive hygiene of deliberately spreading cholera. (AIM 225) 
These incidents have to be set against the general low level of violence in the country. Destruction 
of mines (AIM 249) and recovery of weapons continue, but only account for a small percentage of 
the estimated six to ten million weapons unaccounted for at the end of the war (AIM 261). 
However the availability of weapons has not been reflected in widespread gun crime. 
As well as these local events, the bank privatisation scandal and the unsolved murders associated 
with it show that the `rule of law' criteria of the international community are frequently not met 
and neither the Mozambican public nor its parliamentarians are satisfied with the performance of 
the legal system. In the debate on the Attorney General's 2002 report cited above, the FRELIMO 
deputy Teodata Hunguana describes the public's `despair and powerlessness' in the face of `the 
inadequacies shown by those directly involved in the fight against crime. ' The institutions of 
justice, courts police and prisons are seen to perpetrate injustice and inhumanity, both by allowing 
themselves to be corrupted and from sheer incapacity. There are huge backlogs of pending cases, 
suspects detained for longer than the sentence they might expect if convicted and prison conditions 
that amount to inhuman treatment (AIM 227,259. In short, the legal system fails the criteria for 
good governance of public services mainly from both lack of competence and lack of human and 
material resources. 14 
Thus the initial failure by the police and judiciary to act in the case of embezzlement of the 
equivalent of $14 million associated with the privatisation of the BCM bank, the murder of the 
bank's investigating auditor, attempted murder of an investigating lawyer and actual murder of an 
13 `Depressing though this figure is, it is a marked improvement on the first municipal elections, in 1998, 
when less than 15 per cent... voted' AIM 268 January 2004 (Incidentally this is about the level of 
participation in local and European elections which has caused so much concern in the UK since 1999, see 
The Electoral Commission, 2004 Delivering Democracy? The future of postal voting. ) 
14 The historical origins of this situation are discussed below (8.3) 
265 
investigating journalist, was the most conspicuous and publicised failure of governance in post- 
war Mozambique. On the other hand it also revealed some extraordinary strengths of civil 
governance as dogged and courageous investigation by Mozambique's leading journalist, Carlos 
Cardoso who was himself assassinated, led to a civil campaign to insist that the perpetrators be 
brought to justice. The trial of those hired to commit the murder of Cardoso and their immediate 
paymasters was carried to its conclusion during 2002 - 2003, (AIM Special Issue November 2002, 
Report 244,14`'' and 31$` January 2003) despite the `escape' (and subsequent equally convenient 
`recapture') of the main suspect from a top security prison, attempts to bribe and intimidate the 
judge, the chief of police and key witnesses. Under these conditions and as the trial of the accused 
also became a public test of the judicial system itself, after initial reluctance the presiding judge 
Paulino agreed to the proceedings being broadcast live, charging the media with conducting the 
coverage responsibly. 's The fact that the trial was held at all and that it succeeded in delivering 
justice was rightly seen as a triumph of good governance and the rule of law but it was only the 
opening round of the battle against corruption. The bank fraud case still has secrets to reveal. The 
hired assassins, corrupt prison guards and financial middlemen are in jail, those they worked for 
have yet to be called to account. Some are foreign nationals who already left the country others are 
nationals who so far think they are `untouchable' and whether the President's son Nyimpine 
proves to be implicated or not16, are extremely powerful. However a blow has been struck against 
`despair and powerlessness' with the realization that "All of us together, society united, will defeat 
any criminal-no matter how influential, how important, how wealthy, they may be" (Lucinda 
Cruz lawyer for the Cardoso family AIM January 14`x' 2003). 
In February 2003 another milestone of justice was achieved in respect of `the worst violation of 
human rights in post-independence Mozambique' when the government decided to provide 
funding to make it possible for approximately one thousand remaining deportees of the infamous 
"Operation Production" (discussed below 8.3) to return home. (AIM 248) 17 
15 Lucinda Cruz the Cardoso family lawyer concluded "These broadcasts were the way for the media to pay 
tribute to... the most courageous and outspoken journalist Mozambican society has ever known". (AIM 14th 
January 2003. ) The researcher observed broadcasts of the trial of police complicit in the escape of the chief 
accused later in this year and concluded that they were `responsible' and a contribution to transparency. 
16 The President himself has scrupulously avoided comment that might influence the court and urged the 
? ursuit of justice. (AIM Special Issue November 2002) 
7' Armando Guebuza, now elected as Secretary General of FRELIMO and therfore probabale presidential 
candidate at the next election when Chissano steps down was mainly responsible for this debacle as Minister 
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Corruption is not only a threat to legality, but to other aspects of good governance. Assistant 
Attorney General Isabel Rupia, who narrowly escaped assassination while investigating the 
murder of Provincial Treasurer Josefa Afonso, whistle blower in another corruption case, stressed 
that `corruption and poverty are mutually reinforcing. Corruption led to skewed distribution of 
resources ... contributing to poverty'. 
The poor then `adopt corrupt tactics in order to survive' (AIM 
253), a view close to that expressed by the parents who participated in this research. The AIM 
reports contain many more instances of corruption as well as the views of political leaders who 
have begun to see, as the public do, that corruption is a threat to stability and development and of 
course to the hard won donor confidence in Mozambique's integrity and `capacity'. '8 Meanwhile 
public participation was invited by the Attorney General's Anti-Corruption Unit (headed by Isabel 
Rupia) which provided confidential phone lines for the public to denounce corrupt activity (AIM, 
255). 
This duel between integrity and corruption in public life is played out in many much older and 
more stable democracies than Mozambique (as for example the ENRON scandal in the USA) 
without calling the fabric of society into question, because the weight of civil society can be 
mobilised to demand accountability, and this is what is beginning to happen in Mozambique. As 
the research participants understood, good governance is the responsibility of the public as well as 
government. `... in this there are no owners of the peace and the democracy except the people, and 
one cannot only hold the state responsible for social stability. ' (Mazula, 2000: 69)19 
This leads us to examine some of the other evidence of public participation in governance for 
example in decision making (assuming responsibility) or in developing policy as well as requiring 
accountability. In particular, how do average citizens, as opposed to the educated classes who 
pursued the Cardoso case, participate in governance, given that the majority of the population does 
not read the press or participate in local elections? 
of the Interior. He later redeemed his reputation with his role in negotiating the peace accord. (AIM special 
report 8`s June 2002) 
18 Guebuza, speaking in Beira declared war on corruption (Diärio de Mocambique July 25th 2003 AIM 258) 
The Prime Minister and the trade unions added their voices to the debate (AIM 259) and the Assembly of the 
Republic as we have seen began processing an anti-corruption law with all party support. 
19 Translation by the author of this thesis. 
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One example of successful participation reported in this year was the round of negotiations for the 
setting of the minimum wage, a process in which the government had normally taken a leading 
role. However this time it merely rubber-stamped a deal already reached by unions and employers. 
We might consider this an example of participation through delegated authority. Where these 
kinds of processes have not resolved disputes, increasingly Mozambicans have taken to strikes and 
street demonstrations, which have often been violent or the police response to them has been 
violent. May Day 2002 was an example of this when violent protest by `majermanes'2° completely 
disrupted the event. (AIM 231). 
However, in 2003, the May Day rally was held in the industrial city of Matola (one of the author's 
research locations) and run by the unions, not the government, as a peaceful protest against 
unemployment (AIM 253). Meanwhile the `majermanes' began to protest weekly, peacefully, 
down the full length of one of the main streets of the capital with clear public support2t and low 
key policing. The government has been forced to first admit the justice of their case, then account 
for how it has used the social funds transferred for them by the German government (accountably 
for other public spending as it turns out but of course illegally) and finally start making payments 
though the amount is still in dispute (AIM 238). In Nampula the researcher observed a similar 
weekly protest and public sympathy in support of workers locked out of the failing textile 
company Texamoque (a casualty of the combination of poor management and the global market 
economy referred to by President Chissano) (AIM 269). 
Finally, to complete our view of governance in present day Mozambique we need to consider the 
delivery of public services (as in the international criteria, Figure 6. ) or its capacity in terms of 
effectiveness and resources (Mozambican criteria Figure 5. ). Adelino Cruz, former Secretary 
General of MINED and now head of the Public Sector Reform Unit, noted "a dissociation between 
words and acts in some sectors of activity" (AIM 254). This should make us cautious in reviewing 
the reporting of government programmes and projects, bearing in mind that the press tends to 
report `events' such as the initiation or completion of projects or crises due to failure to deliver, 
20 Former 'guest workers' in the GDR demanding payment of social security contributions made in Germany 
and refunded to the Mozambican government after reunification. 
21 The researcher observed on more than one occasion that passers by stop and turn respectfully to watch the 
demonstration go by. In one case a woman street trader got up to dance in front of the column, which 
includes a band, cheered by her colleagues and generally applauded. The police bringing up the rear in a 
patrol car seemed similarly sympathetic. 
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rather than consistently good or poor performance. In fact AIM reports many more cases of 
projects and programmes initiated than completed but also a few failures. Lack of resources 
especially human resources is frequently reported, often as a cause for failure. Similarly instances 
of corruption are commonly reported, but only a few conspicuous demonstrations of integrity. This 
certainly reflects grave public concern that corruption is compromising the delivery of public 
services (as several research participants suggested) but it perhaps also suggests that professional 
integrity is still considered to be the norm. Cruz also does not suggest that poor governance is the 
norm, but suggests that `the negligent attitude of some civil servants and the dishonesty of some 
leading officials' is hindering performance and in particular reform. However he did not think the 
effectiveness of the public services was determined by either too many or too few staff, but by 
"attitudes to work and attitudes to the public... and the way we value or fail to value honest staff' 
(a view close to that expressed by the research participants) that is, a question of governance not 
resources. 
However, the government's extensively reported diligence in seeking aid and investment deals, is 
without doubt an indication of a real lack of financial resources, while the regular reports of the 
successful initiation of government programmes with donor funds, suggest a fair degree of 
competence when resources are made available. 2 On the other hand there are examples where 
successful implementation is hindered by enforcement problems such as the collection of social 
security contributions, where some companies deduct the payments from wages but do not pass 
them on to the social security institute (AIM 230) or the struggle to control borders against 
contraband goods that are for example prejudicing the recovery of the sugar industry (AIM 253, 
256). Other cases of failure are due to the combination of incompetence and dishonesty described 
by Rupia and Cruz, as in the case of the post-flood resettlement scheme, which also seems to have 
suffered from `inappropriate' recruitment of young people to administer food distribution by the 
NGO involved (World Vision) (AIM 230). There are also several reports of the suspension and 
removal of officials, such as the district administrator of Panda, who was both incompetent and 
dishonest (AIM 232) and a case of district education officials absconding (it is assumed) with the 
22 Examples of successful implementation include, inauguration of a new urban water supply (AIM 212) 
restocking of livestock (AIM 229,231), increased grain harvests, effective working of the food security 
early warning system (AIM 255) progress in rebuilding the Sena railway line with own funding while 
negotiating investment finance (AIM 258) and reducing the overcrowding in prisons by fast-tracking the 
cases of people detained for minor offences. (AIM 259). 
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payroll (AIM 236). There are also from time to time, examples of total financial failure of state 
entities such as the post-office (AIM 261). 
The picture this paints is of a public administration with considerable capacity, and for the most 
part the will to deliver, marred by significant but not generalised poor governance and often 
frustrated by lack of means or imagination to reward staff, thus creating vulnerability to 
corruption. 
8.2.2 What the numbers say 
Before reaching a verdict on the state of governance in Mozambique after ten years of peace, we 
can look briefly at another type of indicator, the statistical records, which provide a measure of 
change that can be related to international yardsticks for human and economic development. 
Economic growth equity and inclusion 
Growth in GDP23 and the improving balance of payments are recorded in the annual government 
statistics on macro economic performance (INE Statistical Yearbook 2001 Section 5.4.4. 
Macroeconomic aggregates) but the same summary of indicators also record falling levels of 
private consumption (see Figure 8. ) even when GDP rises. Even more alarming is the 
simultaneous drop in consumption of own products (from subsistence agriculture). Here the 
numbers are confirming what the research participants and the press reports have indicated: macro- 
economic success is not matched by micro-economic development leading to the inclusion of the 
majority in growing prosperity. 
23 The downturn after 1999 reflects the effects of the flood disaster in the south in that year. An upturn was 
evident from the middle of 2001: Diogo reporting to the National Assembly August 2002 AIM 237. 
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Figure 8. Decline in private consumption 
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In 1999/2000 the first Agricultural census since independence was conducted and revealed that the 
roughly 80% of the population that make a living in this sector work small family farms which 
average 1.26 hectares and produce mainly food crops, including 95% of the country's grain (much 
of which is for their own consumption) without access to credit or any kinds ofagricultural inputs 
or use of irrigation. The majority keep small livestock, but in numbers that again suggest home 
consumption. This is the pattern of poverty that lies behind the filling consumption in Figure 4. 
Families can only purchase non-food items from sales of crop surpluses in good times and have no 
financial or other reserves to make up for crop failures and so consume less. '`' 
The figures in the 2001 Statistical Yearbook (INE Q2.6.1,2.6.2) for registered unemployment 
reveal further hidden areas of poverty, inequity and exclusion. A first glance at the table shows a 
gender imbalance: far fewer women are unemployed than men. This is not of course an indicator 
of advantage but a reflection of their continuing low participation in the formal economy which is 
recorded in the figures for new appointments, registered below. Registered unemployment records, 
of course only log those unemployed from the formal, mainly urban, industrial sector. As 
24 This is why Nrakash Ratilal, see below, argues so strongly for investment in agriculture as the key to 
poverty reduction and economic and social equity. 
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elsewhere women are prominent in the informal and subsistence economy and for the most part 
invisible in the figures (Waring, 1988). 
The figures also reveal inequities hidden by the aggregated data for each province. The highest 
level of unemployment in relation to population is found in the southern Province of Maputo, 
which accounts for 20% of the national unemployed but only 5.5% of the general population. Yet 
the province also has the highest per capita GDP and HDI after the capital Maputo (see Appendix 
2 and UNDP, 2000: graph 2.6). The day-to-day reality of living in this condition of relative 
deprivation and its effect on ability to take up education, was reflected in the interviews with 
parents in the industrial city of Matola (Chapter 6) where most of the industrial unemployment in 
the province occurs. 25 
Human development 
When it comes to expenditure on social services the same contradiction occurs. The rate of 
expenditure is rising and it is also rising as a percentage of government expenditure in line with the 
poverty alleviation policy PARPA but it is declining as a percentage of GDP (Diogo, 2002: 214- 
219 and AIM 273,2004). That is, in line with the model promoted by the international financial 
institutions, levels of pubic spending are tied to market forces rather than need and public priorities 
and therefore vulnerable if, as predicted, GDP growth slows. The figures for public service 
provision, especially in education show that this level of spending is not enough to both eliminate 
the backlog of deficits created by the war and meet the rise in demand fuelled by population 
increase and increased expectation of service. 
The figures for population and social indicators (INE, 2001: Section 2) reveal progress in HDI. 
School enrolments increased significantly in the five years from 1997 but if the aggregated data is 
broken down and compared with school age population levels it is clear that this big increase is in 
first level primary education, where if it were not for the backlog of older children starting school 
late, access would be near universal at something like 98% of 5 to 9 year olds. However second 
level primary schools, secondary and technical schools are only catering for about 16% of children 
in the 10 -14 age group (despite increases in provision of 69.6% EP2 and 85% in secondary 
ZS Another 20% of the country's unemployed are registered in Nampula (another of the research locations) 
where 19% of the country's total population live but mainly in rural areas. Unemployment amongst the city 
population is probably similar to that in Matola. 
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enrolment) so that in fact only about 60% of children of school age are in school. This is the 
`funnel' in the education system described by the teachers and parents interviewed. The teacher 
shortage in relation to demand and the huge classes are reflected in the statistics of high 
pupil/teacher ratios, which had increased in EP1 over the five-year period in all but one province 
to levels well above the statutory maximum class size of 50. At this level there were variations 
between provinces with the worst ratios in some central and northern provinces, but higher than 
average in some southern provinces too. However, at secondary level the historical regional 
inequity discussed by the research participants was very evident. Nampula with a population of 
3,337,000 had only 9601 pupils enrolled in grades 8-10, while Maputo City with a population of 
1,031,000 had 21785 secondary pupils. Sofala with a similar population to the capital had only a 
third of that number (7020). The numbers confirm the research participants' view that the 
government is making a serious effort to redress inequity and exclusion but that they are still a 
reality. 
The same concern for equity and universal cover is evident in the health statistics. Provision of 
services (such as natal care, vaccinations, mother and infant care, and outpatient consultations) 
increased from 1997-2001 (INE 2001: Table Q 2.3.1) and there is evidence of a significant 
reduction in provincial inequalities in functioning healthcare facilities (buildings, staff and 
equipment) as a result of targeted actions to increase the numbers of health centres (requiring at 
least one fulltime doctor and qualified nursing staff) and by upgrading of health posts (staffed by 
one nurse) (1NE 2001: Table Q 2.3.2). However, inequalities in actual health (conditioned by 
social and economic factors) are still evident in the key indicator of low birth weight which has 
remained constant at just over 12% for the whole country and shows both regional variations and 
variations within regions. Thus the central and northern regions have indices above the national 
average (13.2% and 13.5%) but some provinces within those regions are below average and some 
such as Zambezia (15.5%) considerably higher. Tellingly, the City of Maputo, with a per capita 
GDP six times the national average, (UNDP 2000: 24) has an incidence of low birth weight above 
the national average (12.5%) and much higher than the southern region as a whole (the next 
nearest figure is 9.6% in rural Gaza). This is another indicator that economic exclusion and 
inequity is growing as GDP grows despite the "concern" shown by government to remove them. 
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Despite these destabilising factors, the statistics for reported crime"b suggest the response to 
economic inequality is reflected in theft ('crimes against property') rather than violence ('crimes 
against persons' and 'crimes against public order and tranquillity'). Theft has increased generally, 
but decreased significantly in four rural provinces. Violent assaults have decreased overall, but 
increased in 6 provinces, perhaps in part due to increased reporting in areas formerly controlled by 
RENAMO and suspicious of the police. Public disorder crimes, which the police themselves 
generally witness and record have also generally decreased with significant exceptions in places 
where there have been incidents of riot or violent protest, such as the cases mentioned above. The 
most striking statistic is that the City of Maputo (with a population of just over 1 one million, just 
under 6% of the population) accounts for about a third of all reported crime, particularly against 
property. (INE 2001: Tables Q 2.5.2., 2.5.3) 
The statistics for the functioning of the law courts to redress these crimes illustrate the crisis that 
was debated in the National Assembly. The huge numbers of pending cases increased despite the 
fact that fewer new cases were brought to court, perhaps as a result of the public 'despair' described 
by Hunguana quoted above. Instead the increase is apparently due to the fact that in 1999 very 
few cases were completed and even in 2000 completed cases had not reached the levels achieved 
in 1998 (INE 2001: Table Q2.5.4) 
The National Human Development Reports produced annually from 1998 under the auspices of 
the UNDP set out to examine the relationship between macro-economic recovery and actual 
human development in particular the key issue for Mozambicans of continuing and perhaps 
widening inequity and differing levels of inclusion. The Mozambican researchers therefore 
adapted the UN indicators and methodology to reflect conditions in Mozambique by 
`disaggregating the HDI, in order to estimate differences in the levels of human development in 
the various regions of the country. '(UNDP, 2000: 17-18) 
This exercise has confirmed, what was already implicit in the regular national statistical returns 
examined above. The HDI figures debated in the Assembly in August 2002 (AIM 237) revealed 
rising HDI from 1998 - 2000, in which the rise in real GDP per capita and increased life 
26 These figures have to be used with the caveat that reported crime is also conditioned by levels of 
confidence in the police, freedom from intimidation etc. Much petty crime in rural areas is also dealt with by 
traditional leaders without recourse to the police. 
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expectancy, suggest general improvement in conditions. The sharp rise in the HDI between 1999- 
2000 was almost entirely due to the rise in adult literacy since the 1997 census. While some 
commentators suggest this could be partly due to the fact that the census figures will always have a 
lower margin of error than the sample surveys on which the HDI are based, it is also true that this 
period coincided with the recreation of the National Directorate of Adult Education and the huge 
increase in adult literacy participation referred to by the research participants as a key indicator of 
the government resuming its role in education. 
Thus the aggregated data supports the international perception of Mozambique as a `success 
story'. However the wisdom of disaggregating the data is confirmed by the `huge regional 
imbalances' revealed, essentially `an enormous gulf' n economic activity and growth between the 
City of Maputo and the rest of the country. Only four of the eleven provinces showed any 
significant growth (in one case, Maputo Province, this was due entirely to the huge MOZAL 
project, while as we have already seen, the province has the highest unemployment rate in the 
country and even wealthy Maputo City, contains strata of deprivation and poverty). Five other 
provinces actually showed a decline in economic growth. 
When it comes to other areas of inequality such as gender, the pattern is the same. The GDI 
(Gender-related Development Index) is rising, though it remains one of the lowest in the world, 
but the gap between the GDI and HDI (throughout the world GDI is generally lower than HDI) has 
hardly changed: political and administrative power remains largely in male hands. The prominence 
of women in government and administration at the national level (including the Finance Minister 
Luisa Diogo herself, presenting the HDI findings to the National Assembly, where nearly a third of 
deputies are women) has impressed the international community but it masks a much bleaker 
situation in the country as a whole. The numbers of women in decision making roles declines from 
the national to the provincial and from the provincial to the district level, where they account for 
less than five percent of administrators and directors. Thus the HDI report confirms what we 
learned from the curricula of the research participants: those women that get a head start from their 
home background or as a result of government measures to support inclusion can prosper and 
make it to the top. The obstacle to participation in governance in general and for women in 
particular is getting started on the educational ladder in the first place and then remaining in 
education long enough to complete basic education. Once again there is a geographical dimension 
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to the inequity: fewer women are educated in the rural areas than the urban, fewer in the northern 
and central provinces than the south. 
Thus the numbers are telling the same story as the research participants and as the press reports: 
there has been enormous progress on many fronts, but it is necessary to look beyond the macro- 
economy and the national scene to understand that Mozambican society is still grappling with the 
same potentially destabilising social ills that have bedevilled its development since independence: 
social and regional inequalities, which can generate feelings of exclusion and powerlessness. 
8.2.3. `Ten years of Peace' 
In 2002 the Mozambican NGO CEDE27 published a collection of reflections on the ten years since 
the peace accord, that included academic papers by economists, linguists social researchers, 
`depositions' from leading figures in society (including those involved in the war and the peace 
process and some significant foreign actors in the events) and `testimonies' from members of the 
public apparently approached ad hoc in different parts of the country. (Mazula ed. 2002) These 
diverse contributions reflect a broad cross section of the educated (Portuguese speaking) classes 
and discuss all the key issues for peace and governance so far identified in the examination of the 
author's research data. 28 
Italian friends closely involved in the peace process, Aldo Ajello (Representative of the UN 
Secretary General after the Peace Accord: 323-6) and Don Mateu Zuppi (Community of Santo 
Egidio, mediators of the Accord: 341-4) expressed admiration for what had been achieved through 
political will and dialogue, (the negotiators insisting on resolving rather than shelving the most 
difficult issues). Zuppi in fact sees Mozambique as an example to the world that `peace is possible 
and that dialogue is the only way to a peace'. 29 
27 CEDE-Center of Studies for Democracy and Development, established in 1999 as a result of one of the 
main recommendations made in June 1997 by those involved in the experimental participatory research 
ýroject WSP-Mozambique (part of the wider War Tom Societies Project) 
8 Page numbers in this section unless otherwise stated refer to Mazula ed. 2002 10 Anos de Paz.. 
Translations of the text are by the author of this thesis. 
29 He pointed out that such was the detail and clarity of the Peace Accord that the opposing armies were able, 
without outside supervision, to maintain a ceasefire with only minor infringement during the four months 
delay before the UN managed to get peace keeping forces on the ground. 
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The Mozambican contributors clearly felt some satisfaction at achieving 10 years of peace and a 
measure of economic and social recovery. They too saw the `secret' of this success in the ability to 
dialogue: `Dialogue, frank, open and sincere, but tempered with a strong dose of political will' 
(David Alone RENAMO Deputy: 335); `Knowing how to learn-to dialogue on a permanent basis 
is also an act of intellectual courage' (Ratilal, Former Governor of the Bank of Mozambique : 285); 
`The permanent dialogue of the politicians and the civil society' (Nhangumele, Provincial 
RENAMO Party Administrator, Gaza: 464). Several contributors also expressed pride that `we are 
pioneers of peace and reconciliation in this world' (Roga-Pai `writer' in Zambezia: 486). Thus this 
key indicator of governance identified in the research with education personnel is widely 
recognised in other areas of Mozambican life and amongst international mediators. 
Another key point, also made by the research participants, is that for both the foreign and 
Mozambican commentators, it was the Mozambican people, more than their leaders who had 
achieved peace and would guarantee its continuation. Ajello, (326) recognised that a full 
democracy had not yet been achieved in Mozambique (de Tollenaere: 227-252 expounds this in 
detail) `but I am convinced that the leadership and people of Mozambique have the wisdom to 
find the right path'. The country's political and religious leaders are unanimous in referring to the 
crucial role of the Mozambican public in this volume and elsewhere: `the profound wish for peace 
of the whole Mozambican people' (Guebuza, chief FRELIMO negotiator in Rome: 328) `the 
maturity of the collective feelings of the people, who accepted the end of the conflict without 
feeling the need to settle scores' (Raul Domingos, chief RENAMO negotiator in Rome: 376) `The 
secret of the 10 years of peace... lies in the Mozambican people. ' (Don Jaime Pedro Gonsalves, 
Archbishop of Beira: 339). A businessman in Sofala spoke of `the great popular will to live in 
peace' (Gabriel de Oliveira: 475). A University lecturer referred to 'the courage of the people to 
"forget" the past and reconcile in a spirit of brotherhood' (Antonio Muagerene: 459). Laura Joao 
Head of the Department of Culture in Niassa (491) in her very brief statement, perhaps indicates 
an important motive for this pacific attitude: `I saw horrors during the war that will remain with 
me for always. For that reason, today, all the difficulties that affect us... are nothing compared to 
what we already suffered. ' 
Nevertheless, all the Mozambican contributors were fully aware that Mozambicans' legendary 
patience has its limits and examined at length those aspects of contemporary society that still had 
the potential to destabilise. Not surprisingly, the twin problems of exclusion and inequity were the 
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chief concern. `Our incipient democracy will encounter serious obstacles in the near future, as long 
as we are not able to confront the causes of poverty, injustice and exclusion with honesty and 
sincerity, in the same way as we confronted the causes of our armed conflict' (Raul Domingos: 
379). Like the research participants, contributors to this volume cited regional and social 
`asymmetries' between the poor majority and the rich, and often corrupt, few as one of the main 
challenges to the peace. 
The issue of economic exclusion and inequality is tackled in two long articles by leading 
economists Luisa Diogo and Prakash Ratilal, both with practical experience of trying to find a way 
to meet the internal needs of the of the Mozambican public, while satisfying the demands of the 
macro-economic norms of the global market. Both put tackling poverty as the highest priority and 
look to strengthen internal capacity to that end. Diogo (207-226) while describing the frustration of 
limited resources imposing choices that leave important issues `pending', advocates (contrary to 
market norms) operating `redistributive policies' and strengthening the state to deliver social 
services to the public while strengthening public participation and initiative by `deconcentrating 
and decentralising' government and public administration. Ratilal (253-297) urges investment 
and support for Mozambican enterprise and initiatives with priority for the agricultural sector 
where the majority earn their livelihoods because `only by working on the micro-society and on 
the micro-economy will we see serious growth in this country' and because `economic stability is 
profoundly linked to social stability and to political stability' 30 
Another crucial form of exclusion, that of language, is discussed by Armindo Ngunga (linguist and 
Director of Faculty at UEM: 3-15). In Mozambique's multi-lingual context language can be `a 
vehicle of democracy' but can also be `an obstacle to the development of democracy and a threat 
to peace. ' He points out that a Mozambican who speaks no Portuguese will have no access to vital 
information, for example about AIDS, and so little prospect of access to treatment. He urges that 
30 In this article he also refers to `Agenda 2025' a national debate launched to formulate a vision of how the 
country should develop. In 2003 he published a series of long articles in the Sunday press (Domingo: 
fortnightly June to August) on the issues of rampant accumulation, corruption and absolute poverty in 
Mozambique as it is exposed to the global economy. Readers' letters and emails were invited and received to 
add to the debate. 
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the consolidation of democracy must be inclusive and that `no one should be turned into a 
spectator just because they don't speak Portuguese'. " 
Opposition politicians and their supporters among the public contributors also reveal the depth of 
the feelings of exclusion and lack of respect for identity, that fuelled the war, and which are still 
clearly felt. They speak particularly of `social exclusion'. Dhlakama (315) refers to `injustice and 
marginalisation'. Alone (335-7) speaks of the `club `spirit' of an elite that excludes the majority 
from prosperity and power so that `There is a long road to follow to a real and effective 
reconciliation' not just `a fictitious peace for the diversion of the international donors'. In these 
bitter remarks there are several references to `humiliations' and human rights abuses in the past. 
Jose Nicolau in Manica (487) notes that there are no longer ' public executions... reeducation 
camps-forced communal villages' there is freedom and `our traditional authorities, who are one of 
the bases of our culture have been reintroduced' if this progress continues the future will be bright 
if not ' the future itself will tell'. Manuel Nogueira in Nampula (496) recalls that `Traditional 
values of family and social structure, religion, work discipline etc. were all ridiculed. ' These 
interventions show the importance of `respect for diversity' in the new governance as suggested by 
the research participants. 
On the other hand some FRELIMO supporters, especially women, think that `inflammatory 
speeches by some politicians threaten the peace and democracy'. (Celina Cossa, Director of the 
General Union of Cooperatives: 466) and `the fact that speeches threatening a return to war and 
division of the country are still heard, provokes distrust and creates instability in the population' 
(Clara Pugas Organisation of Mozambican Women (OMM) Sofala: 468). One contributor 
(Rodrigues Joao, a lawyer: 510) suggests that the lack of political vision in the opposition parties 
does not favour `a balanced exercise in political debate' and accounts for their `permanent state of 
irritability'. (The same conclusion was drawn from the accounts of the proceedings of the 
Assembly discussed above). 
This national stocktaking exercise, as well as confirming the analysis made so far of the 
achievements and continuing areas of concern in contemporary Mozambican society, also reveals 
a capacity for transparent dialogue and genuine quest for solutions. In these personal testimonies, 
31 The long road to recognising and introducing the national languages in the school curriculum is traced in 
Chapter 5. 
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there is much less political posturing and more openness than in the Assembly debates and less 
concealment than in press announcements (always made with an eye to the international as well as 
the national audience). There is also clear evidence, despite continuing antagonisms, of an 
underlying consensus about the key issues of national governance that need to be tackled if the 
country as a whole is to prosper. This book, as has been said, represents the views of the educated 
minority, however, the contributors also acknowledge that despite all the limitations to their full 
participation (lack of means of expression, deficient local democracy etc. ) the Mozambican people 
through their will for peace have exercised a powerful control in shaping the governance of the 
country, but it cannot be taken for granted. As Ngunga points out, while full participation in 
society continues to be conditioned by knowledge of Portuguese, `it is not necessary to know the 
Portuguese language to be a danger to national peace. '(14) 
8.3 The birth pangs of a nation 
In the first two sections of this chapter we have examined the contemporary context represented by 
the second part of our model (Chapter 4 Figure 4) that is, the context already transformed by the 
interaction between interventions, actors and events. Without trying to carry out such a detailed 
exercise retrospectively, (there is no point in recounting details of history that have already been 
examined by other authors and summarised in Appendix 1) it is necessary to consider the first part 
of our model, the context into which the capacity building interventions were introduced and with 
which they interacted: to ask, `How did Mozambique arrive where it is today? ' To do this, we can 
again rely on the perceptions revealed in Mozambican testimonies. The RENAMO leaders and 
supporters who contributed to the 10 Anos de Paz volume, revealed a continuing bitterness over a 
number of specific examples of abusive governance by the revolutionary government, which were 
also hinted at by the research participants when they talked of lack of dialogue and respect for 
diversity of ideas. However many also credit the revolutionary government with a genuine concern 
for equality and inclusion, a belief in participation and even for taking the first steps in democracy. 
It seems we must look in the historical context for both good and bad governance. 
As we have seen in previous chapters, colonial governance was characterised by exclusion on 
grounds of race, religion, language and culture, while the uneven development between urban and 
rural areas and between different regions, combined with an economy of coercive extraction rather 
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than capital investment and development, also left the majority of the population in poverty and 
ignorance. Both colonial governance and traditional society generally discriminated against 
women. This very poor governance was mitigated by access to education and a wider culture for a 
few (including some women) mainly through the church missions whose moral code also inspired 
compassion for fellow citizens and a desire for social justice. However, when peaceful demands 
for change were brutally suppressed, independence was won by war. Thus political ends were 
achieved by violence because dialogue had proved impossible. 
Nevertheless, even during the war the revolutionary movement began to develop and practice 
ideas of good governance in the liberated zones and within the armed movement and carried these 
experiences of governance into the post independence period. The new government was aware of, 
and took every opportunity to denounce, all forms of discrimination and exclusion and devised 
policies and strategies to `eradicate' them. Samora Machel claimed `we had no hesitation in acting 
against tribalists, racists and regionalists. We killed the tribe to give birth to the nation' (Munslow 
1985: 77). The history of the civil war in which, in contrast to the majority of post-colonial 
societies in Africa, ethnic and regional identification never became the dominant vehicle of the 
conflict, suggests that this uncompromising policy which had its roots in the liberation movement, 
did in fact have considerable success in reversing the racism and tribalism fostered by the colonial 
regime and forging a sense of nationhood and the contemporary scene confirms this. 32 The same 
uncompromising attitude was adopted in `fighting the archaic tendency to discriminate against 
women or young people' thus not only attacking colonial attitudes but the sexism and ageism of 
traditional society (Munslow 1985: 18). The constitution declared the emancipation of women `one 
of the State's essential tasks'(Isaacman and Stefan 1980: 18) leading to the creation and promotion 
of a grass-roots women's organisation (OMM). Inclusion of the whole population in a learning and 
social transformation exercise (a kind of mass capacity-building) as we have seen, was the core 
concept for national development and the aim was to lift everyone out of poverty and humiliating 
discrimination: `A socialist society means the welfare of all: the right to work; the right to 
education and health without discrimination... to decent housing ... to be decently dressed ... 
for all 
32 Contemporary research reveals that while racial and ethnic prejudice exists in the popular discourse, most 
people are optimistic that racism can be avoided, refuse to make generalised accusations of racism against 
privileged groups and conversely accuse some members of their own group. They do however see unequal 
distribution of wealth as related to expressions of racism. (Carlos Serra et al 2000: 61) 
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to have laundry soap to keen clean' and not be dressed in `a skin, a loincloth... jiggers in the toes' 
(Samora Machei in Munslow 1985: 91). 
This vision also included a keen awareness of the uneven development between rural and urban 
areas and different regions of the country and strategies to combat these ills were part of the 
revolutionary agenda, giving priority to rural primary education over urban secondary schools and 
preventative rural health care over the development of expensive curative medicine in urban 
hospitals. It was an approach to governance that produced remarkable advances in human 
development and steady economic growth to 1982 (when the effects of the civil war began to be 
felt). Even the choice of statistical indicators to monitor development in the first ten years after 
independence are indicative of aspirations to equity and inclusion. For example, before the 
development of the international HDI, literacy was a key indicator, while environmental health 
was monitored through the number of families with latrines and access to a clean water supply. 
Social inclusion was measured by those owning a radio33 (DirecgAo Nacional de Estatistica 1985). 
How was it that this vision of an inclusive and more humane society to replace the legacy of 
colonial oppression and the zeal with which it was pursued, gave rise to the deep sense of 
exclusion and actual human rights abuses described by today's opposition? A number of factors 
may have contributed: the sense of mission of the leadership of a revolution, that undoubtedly 
enjoyed majority support for its main aims, at times led to the assumption of being the `sole 
guardian of the truth' (detentor exclusivo das verdades Ratilal 2002: 285). This when combined 
with the legacy of years of passive resistance rather than open dissent adopted by the public in the 
context of a complete denial of civil liberties under colonial law, was not conducive to the learning 
and debating environment of the revolutionary rhetoric and was compounded by linguistic and 
cultural difference. There was also a legacy of bitterness against those individuals and institutions 
that were seen to have `collaborated' with the colonial regime. Despite an early attempt at `truth 
and reconciliation' in which those who were not criminally implicated could be reconciled by 
admitting their past and making a public commitment to the revolution, many individuals were 
humiliated and abused34. While official discrimination against non-Catholic religions and beliefs 
ended, revolutionary discourse denigrated religion as `obscurantist' along with all aspects of 
traditional custom and belief. On the ground this was translated into abuse. Nationalisation of 
33 As already mentioned, local radio broadcast in local languages from the earliest days 34 Coelho (1998: 81) sees these humiliations as one of the contributory factors to the civil war. 
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church schools and hospitals can be seen as a fair policy since under the accord between the 
Catholic Church and the colonial government, they had been built largely with public money. 
However there was also illegal appropriation of churches and priests' housing and acts of 
vandalism that were not controlled35. 
The traditional leaders, many but not all of whom held office as `regulos' under the Portuguese, 
were similarly marginalised and `ridiculed' by the new order campaigning for women's 
emancipation and an end to the autocratic rule of the elders both male and female. In this the 
enthusiasts were like some of their modern NGO counterparts campaigning on `gender' issues, 
well-intentioned but often deeply offensive to those they aimed to help 36 
Thus two main aspects of the failure of governance in this period were intolerance of divergence 
of ideas and incapacity (lack of understanding) at the implementation level to introduce change 
through dialogue. 
This was compounded by a directive and at times coercive culture of governance that permeated 
society stemming, it is suggested, from deeply imbedded behaviours from the colonial period. 37 
Mozambicans under the colonial rule of the Estado Novo had only experienced the governance of 
coercion and this combined with the absence of a functioning legal system was the origin of much 
misrule and abuse of power by local authorities and an unreformed and uneducated police force at 
the local level 38 The barbarity and destructive rage of the RENAMO tactics in the civil war and 
their resort to forced cultivation enforced through the tribal chiefs, can probably both be laid at the 
same door. (Vines 1996) 
35 For example a Muslim student described to the author in 1984 acts of vandalism against Catholic churches 
in which he participated immediately after independence in a spirit of rage against many years of 
discrimination during colonial rule. 
36 Mothers and female elders in the rural areas of Sofala where the author worked after the war, were 
reluctant to send girls to schools run entirely by male teachers partly from concerns about sexual harassment 
but more fundamentally because the traditional education of girls is the exclusive prerogative of women. 
They also had no concept of any career other than 'prostitution' that school education in Portuguese (a 
language they themselves could not speak and which they associated with urban mores) might lead to. 
37 'When we analyse the kinds of abuses... carried out ... 
in the defence and security forces it is easy to 
detect... the social and cultural origin of the culprit. Whipping and tying up prisoners... (are) what they saw 
the chief and the native policeman do... But torture, the humiliation of prisoners, arrogance and racism are 
marks of the town. ' Speech by Samora Machel December 1976 (Munslow 1985: 198) 
38 The Portuguese colonial power "left almost no legal system worthy of the name. Not only had they trained 
no jurists but the laws we inherited were not in line with our reality". (Chissano reported AIM 269) 
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In this regard, it also has to be recognised that the liberation movement which came to power when 
the Portuguese state collapsed, despite its aspirations for civil and participatory governance, was 
still a military organisation with a tendency to command and 'mobilize' through palavras de 
orden, slogans which exhorted universal inclusion, sacrifice and effort. As we have seen this 
inspired remarkable willing participation in programmes such as literacy and vaccination 
campaigns that were understood to be beneficial, but where there was unwillingness to participate 
by significant dissident minorities whose culture or interests were threatened (including the corrupt 
and criminal), these were often overruled by force rather than persuasion or due process of law (as 
described in the RENAMO members' testimony above). In these cases the abuses of power were 
officially sanctioned or even inherent in the policies being pursued and the motivation more 
complex than mere bullying or score settling. 
We can best understand this phenomenon by looking at the case of the communal villages so 
deeply resented by the opposition in central Mozambique where the armed resistance began and 
was quickly exploited by the Rhodesians. Communal villages were a key strategy designed to 
improve the lives of the rural majority by increasing production through cooperative agriculture 
and the provision of social services and infrastructure. The policy was clearly born of a desire to 
include the rural population in the benefits of a modern society especially to give access to health 
care and education. For some communities especially in the southern provinces, already exposed 
to a modern economy and living in close proximity to neighbours, it made sense. In other areas of 
the country it was perceived as deeply threatening. For example in Manica, where a highly 
sophisticated system of land use adapted to local topography had been developed by family groups 
living in isolated farmsteads39 it was culturally and economically inappropriate to introduce the 
concept without dialogue and adaptation. However a combination of zeal to promote social change 
combined with the military imperative to control the population in a border province at war with 
Rhodesia, led not to dialogue but coercion. Those that did not accept removal to the villages were 
forcibly removed and their homesteads burnt. To the author, visiting the area in 1985 it was clear 
that access to schools was valued, to this end some family members stayed in the villages so that 
children could attend school, but other family members secretly returned to cultivate the family 
39 Personal information Mike Froude, Zimbabwean Agricultural Extension Advisor to GTZ Mozambique 
1992 
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lands around their ruined farmsteads 40 This suggests that there was a predisposition to take up the 
benefits of the new society. With good will on both sides and without threat of war, a practical 
solution to the conflict between the location of ancestral homes and livelihoods and the need to 
concentrate scarce services could have been resolved. Indeed it is being resolved now, twenty 
years later. Once again we have to conclude that there was no capacity or experience in 
governance to achieve this. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, the FRELIMO government was 
neither the first nor sadly the last organisation to try to apply quick-fix solutions to deeply 
embedded social problems. 41 
The very worst example of this kind of authoritarianism was Operation Production, already cited 
above, which in 1983 involved the mass deportation of `unproductive' citizens from the southern 
cities (mainly Maputo) to unexploited but potentially productive agricultural land in the extreme 
north (Niassa). The very concept was an abuse of human rights but it became even more grossly 
unjust and inhumane as a result of the incapacity to manage its implementation with a minimum of 
competence. Not only petty criminals and black marketeers but many completely innocent people, 
simply without demonstrable means of support, such as many single women accused of 
prostitution and the unemployed, were removed from their homes by the decision of local 
committees often acting on the basis of denunciations by jealous neighbours, personal grudges and 
prejudices. On arrival in Niassa, they found themselves without shelter or other means of survival 
as a result of logistical failures. Thus the operation combined all the types of poor governance 
already cited: a misguided social engineering policy driven by the desire for `the greater good' of 
developing the country and the need to find a quick solution to urban unemployment and crime, 
carried out by force with inhumanity and administrative and legal incompetence. Habitual 
criminals quickly found their way back to Maputo, many other deportees became willing recruits 
to RENAMO, others did manage to make a life for themselves in Niassa, but as we have seen a 
significant number of the most vulnerable were still stranded there in 2003. 
If Operation Production was the extreme low point of governance in post-independence 
Mozambique the evolution of the Family Law is an example of the triumph of good governance 
based on the criteria suggested in Figure 5. It also illustrates the dilemma faced by the FRELIMO 
40 Personal information and observation by Charles Hooper 1985 Advisor to IFLOMA forestry company on 
low cost housing and community outreach. 
41 For a detailed analysis of these issues through the communal village programme in Tete see Coelho 1998 
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government in trying to apply its ideal of equality and non-discrimination to the diversity of 
Mozambican society. The constitution adopted on the eve of the declaration of independence 
aimed to sweep away the discrimination practised by the colonial regime proclaiming that all 
citizens `enjoy the same rights and are subject to the same duties independently of their colour, 
race, sex, ethnic origin, place of birth, religion, education, social position or occupation. ' As Sachs 
and Honwana Welch point out, this provision was also taken to mean that there would be a single 
unified legal system with no exceptions allowing for local customary or traditional law to govern 
marriage and land use, as is common in other African countries. This was principally because 
those traditions were discriminatory against women and did not adequately protect the rights of 
children and young people (for example against premature marriage or exploitation of their 
labour). However, this posed the question `how is it possible to have a uniform court system 
applying a uniform set of rules to families constituted according to a multiplicity of different 
systems? '42 
Although the revolutionary government condemned the payment of bride price and the practice of 
polygamy as part of its agenda for the liberation of women as `a fundamental necessity... and the 
precondition' for the triumph of the revolution, those working to develop the law had the wisdom 
to recognise that, `Though exhortation and mobilization have their role, the main way in which 
people alter their consciousness is by doing, by practice' and 'the objective is never seen to be that 
of destroying the old, but of transforming it, of developing those aspects that are positive and 
eliminating aspects that are negative'. (1990: 64-85) 
It was in this spirit that throughout 1984 a nationwide participatory exercise in debate, enquiry and 
consultation was carried out by the OMM with government and party support to find out about 
existing family and gender relations and how people viewed them. It was indeed 'a popular 
movement of women and men of all ages who participated enthusiastically in the meetings, in the 
debates and in the surveys. ' (The General Resolution of the Extraordinary Conference of the 
OMM Noticias 10.11.1984: 3 ) as eye-witnesses confirmed to the author at the time. 
42 These were found to include a range of matrilineal and patrilineal forms of marriage, child custody and 
land holding, combined or not with forms of religious marriage by both Muslim and Christian practice; both 
polygamy and monogamy were practised; payment of bride price was customary in patrilineal society and 
despised by matrilineal groups; marriages were normally arranged or at least sanctioned by family but some 
young people made 'new' marriages by mutual choice; civil marriage was now possible but many urban 
families were constituted without any formal ceremony; children in many of these forms of marriage had 
little protection though the rights of the child were also enshrined in the constitution. 
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The culmination of the process was the Extraordinary Conference of the OMM43where the results 
of the debates and surveys were discussed. Two aspects of their conclusions stand out. First, the 
recognition that traditional marriage (and the preparation for marriage in initiation rites) was the 
way the majority of families were constituted and while in general it did perpetuate the inequality 
of women it had positive aspects such as family solidarity and social cohesion that should not be 
lost. Second, the belief in gradual transformation that would largely be fostered by social and 
economic development and in particular the education of women, both formally and in the home. 
Thus, the practice of polygamy was condemned as `a form of family organisation based on the 
economic exploitation of the woman as cheap labour and as a symbol of the wealth and prestige of 
the man' but no measures against it were proposed because it was already clear that 'the... dynamic 
of socio-economic and cultural development' would lead to its reduction. 
It was from this inclusive starting point that through further research and practice Mozambican 
family law was developed from the principle of first recognising every `de facto' union in law, 
giving ` practical solutions to practical problems' and not using the penal law `to outlaw traditional 
practices' while arriving at a consensus on `a single set of rights and duties' applicable to all 
(Sachs and Honwana Welch op. cit. ). The final stage of this process was when the Family law was 
passed onto the statute book in 2003 (see above). This progress from diversity of practice without 
legal status to a framework of law that respects diversity, protects human rights and promotes 
inclusion and social cohesion is a spectacular example of the kind of participatory governance that 
Mozambique was capable of even in the first ten years after independence. However its final 
formulation was dependent on a long process of learning and capacity building within the legal 
institutions and its application is still, as we have seen, often frustrated by the continuing 
incapacity of the courts. 
Further evidence if that were needed, that there are no quick fixes for societies emerging from 
repression and violence is provided by two other aspects of governance that have had a positive 
but very slow evolution governed by the pace of emerging knowledge and capacity as well as 
constraints on resources. The first is the long road to teaching in national languages in schools 
43 As one participant commented, extraordinary in two senses: a special conference to debate the issue of the 
family but also an extraordinary event after only 10 years of independence to see women (traditionally silent 
in public) queuing up to speak in the plenary sessions. Personal comment Teresa Veloso then National 
Director of Adult Education 1984. 
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which is only now beginning to address the problem that much of the public is excluded from 
information and participation in national life by language. The second is the evolution of the press 
as a medium for civic information and debate. Universal access to this too is not yet achieved and 
dependent on the continuing development of an inclusive education system. 
Nevertheless the press in Mozambique has made a long journey from official censorship under the 
colonial regime to a legal framework and culture of governance that has enabled a free media. Its 
history is another example of how recognising a problem of governance and declaring a reform 
does not immediately result in real change. FRELIMO, having suffered from colonial censorship, 
was averse to any form of official censorship once in government; however, it did expect 
journalists to exercise self-censorship and fundamental support for the aims of the revolution was 
assumed, so that `the most experienced journalists were fighting, not for the freedom of the press, 
but for the right to criticize' aspects of governance, such as performance and integrity (Fauvet 
2003: 61-89). Party leaders and Ministers remained ambivalent, at times welcoming criticism44 at 
other times trying to reign it in. Thus the relationship between journalists and political leaders was 
one of personal negotiation rather than legally defined roles. It was in this context that the 
journalists' association decided to seize the opportunity of the drafting of the a new constitution in 
1990 in advance of the peace accord, to ensure that it contained specific protections for the 
freedom of the press, not just the general principle of freedom of expression, so that there would 
be an objective legal framework governing the media. The strength of the Mozambican instinct for 
good governance through dialogue, but also the personal nature of relations within that 
governance, was demonstrated by the fact that the journalists' proposal was debated by a 
delegation of journalists and President Chissano, `until dawn. ' With the President convinced, the 
final outcome was the inclusion of clauses in the constitution that met the journalists' demands. 
They are also some of the most liberal in the world (Fauvet, 2003: 287-292). From this point the 
main constraints on the diversification and expansion of the press have been the lack of resources, 
and the limited readership. Creative solutions such as the fax newssheet Mediafax and its 
provincial imitators were devised to overcome the lack of print and distribution capacity and 
provided a crucial source of independent news during the transition from war to peace and the 
44 As for example the relationship that Graca Machet describes between her husband Samora and the 
journalist Cardoso `they had a strong intellectual relationship even when they disagreed'( Fauvet 2003: 99) 
(The original text is in Portuguese, translation of the quotations is by the author of this volume. ) 
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establishment of new weekly papers has followed, but, as we have seen there is no capacity to 
even extend the readership of the two existing daily papers: mass readership is still in the future. 
Finally, what of the research participants' claim that democracy began with independence? As we 
have seen, the government's intention was democracy and participation, but actual governance 
often did not live up to this aspiration. Nevertheless, for the first time, all Mozambicans were 
called on to elect representatives to participate in government and just under 30% of those 
representatives in local assemblies and over 12% in the national assembly were women by 1977 
(Isaacman and Stefhan 1980: 35). The `democratic centralism' system did not involve direct 
elections to a national assembly (local communities elected local deputies who elected the 
provincial assemblies which sent representatives to the national assembly) and there was only one 
party so that, as in the case of journalists, criticism was encouraged to ensure accountability, but 
dissent from the political system was not contemplated and voting was by public show of hands. 
Other aspects of local governance, cooperatives, tribunals and mass organisations such as the 
OMM were organised on a similar basis. To what extent was this a real experience of democracy? 
Clearly it favoured the dictatorship of the majority and intolerance of difference. It also, in the 
author's experience, led to petty abuse of power by manipulation and intimidation. On the other 
hand it inculcated the conviction that ordinary people had the right to challenge these abuses and 
call those in authority to account, and on the whole those that sought to exercise these rights were 
backed up from the highest level4S Imperfect though they may have been, these first experiences of 
participation in governance were creating a culture and capacity for participation that contributed 
to the evolution of democracy and the government played a part in trying to increase the capacity 
to participate. Many of the elected local deputies, party secretaries, members of tribunals and even 
central committee members shared the general lack of basic education of those they represented, 
but they were given priority to attend accelerated adult learning courses, though this still left them 
at a disadvantage compared to the tiny minority of qualified individuals. These in turn often ended 
up `accumulating tasks' (a constant source of complaint at the time) thus blurring even further the 
`separation of powers' between, party, state and judiciary. Once again, the pace of progress to 
as Central government frequently sent out `brigades' to trouble shoot abuses and disputes in response to 
direct complaints by members of the public to Ministers, Central Committee members or other national 
figures. A satirical short story by Mozambican author, Mia Couto(1990: 71-76) The Tale of the Two who 
Returned from the Dead captures this reality. The researcher witnessed a similar local struggle against 
corrupt appropriation of goods from a rural consumer cooperative in 1984. 
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what we would recognise as good governance was determined by the capacity (knowledge, 
experience and resources) to govern and to participate in governance. a6 
8.4 Conclusion 
The project of nation building in Mozambique took place in a context of mass poverty and 
ignorance with an inherited culture of discrimination, exploitative relationships and authoritarian 
rule enforced by violence. Regime change was also brought about by violence, but with a vision of 
achieving universal inclusion and equity through participation in governance. In that context, 
failures of governance created fertile ground for external interests to promote civil war but they are 
attributable not to a failure of political will, but to various forms of incapacity. On the other hand 
advances in governance can be linked to human development as a result of capacity building 
interventions by government supported by international cooperation. There is also a third factor, 
that of time: the process of learning and adapting to change even when change is deeply desired 
cannot be hurried without inflicting trauma. Unfortunately, `The agents of change... once they have 
negotiated a politically viable proposal, become impatient to implement it. '(Marris 1987: 156). 
Mozambican capacity for governance, that has resulted in 10 years of peace can also, as many 
suggest, be attributed to learning from the devastating failure of governance in the civil war, how 
to introduce change through dialogue. 
46 Several local deputies were students at the CFAT centre where the author worked in 1984. A central 
committee member that she met in Niassa in 1988 had also completed basic education this way. However he 
still felt that his capacity to participate fully in government was limited by his educational level. He 
described his inability to fully understand monetary and fiscal proposals from the Ministry of Finance, 
saying he had to resort to assessing the probity and personal competence of the civil servants as his only 
means of vetting financial governance. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
The starting point for this study was the observation on reviewing the literature that capacity 
development is seen as the core activity in the reconstruction of war-tom societies, largely because 
it is believed to be the key to establishing collaborative governance and sustaining peaceful 
development. However, the actual impact of such interventions in war-tom societies has not been 
researched. A causal relationship between capacity development, good governance and peaceful 
development has merely been assumed on the basis of circumstantial experience. The next 
observation was that there was no existing body of proven research practice for evaluating the long- 
term social impact of development interventions in general or of post-war reconstruction in 
particular. This led to the definition of two research objectives: the first was to develop a research 
design and methodology that could reliably assess the impact of capacity development on the 
recovery of social institutions in war-torn countries; the second was to test the plausibility of the 
assumption of a causal link between interventions for capacity development and the recovery of 
good governance and sustainable peaceful development in war-torn countries. 
This concluding chapter therefore reviews the conclusions reached in respect of these two 
objectives and looks beyond them to some unresolved questions that remain to be answered by 
further research. The first section (9.1) considers the extent to which the first research objective was 
achieved by reviewing the rationale, design and implementation of the research. It concludes that 
the method was successful in this case and is likely to be more generally applicable to the 
evaluation of social impact. Section 9.2 examines the findings in respect of the crucial case study of 
education in Mozambique suggesting that it confirms the plausibility of a causal relationship 
between capacity development, national governance and peaceful development in the Mozambican 
context. 9.3 presents some general lessons for practice that might apply to capacity building for 
post-war reconstruction in other contexts as well as specific conclusions for education development 
as a recovery strategy in war-torn countries. 9.4 then presents the general conclusions with regard 
to the second research objective. This can also be deemed to have been largely achieved, since the 
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research was able to confirm the likely causal link between capacity development, improved 
governance and peaceful post-war development and also points to the contextual conditions in 
which this process can occur. The chapter concludes (9.5) by recognising that the research though 
successful within the limited parameters that it set itself, left a number of contexts and issues that 
could be profitably investigated. 
9.1 The rationale, design and implementation of the research 
The study began by examining the concept of capacity development, which until recently was 
articulated in both academic and practitioner literature as two related concepts: capacity building 
and institutional development. This revealed a general consensus that capacity development leads to 
good governance, which in turn ensures sustained peaceful development in war-torn countries. 
A number of issues were noted in respect of this assumption. The first was that common definitions 
of good governance are not ideologically neutral but linked to a particular concept of liberal 
democracy and market economy, which may not be consistent with concepts of good governance 
within the war-torn societies that are the subject of interventions for capacity development. 
It was then observed that there is a contradiction between actual development practice and a 
consensus in favour of an additive learning process approach to capacity development for good 
governance, despite the fact that it is based on a several decades of experience, mostly of the failure 
of alternative approaches, but also of a minority of proven successes. This contradiction was 
observed to be most evident in post-war reconstruction practice, which is largely externally driven 
and governed by short-term expediency rather than restorative development. 
This pattern of behaviour is attributed to a number of imperatives that inhibit the application of 
recognised best practice: the strategic interests of intervening powers; the conditionality imposed in 
aid deals; the organisational culture of donor and financial agencies; the imbalance of power 
between devastated recipient nations and the international aid community, which makes it 
impossible for them to set their own conditions and agendas in open mutually beneficial 
negotiation. This loss of sovereignty is at its most extreme in the case of war-devastated societies, 
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due not only to their huge objective needs but also as a result of their loss of human capacity and 
institutional weakness. 
Thus it is that, whereas current understanding is that capacity for governance is a fundamental 
prerequisite for sustainable peace as well as recovery, which would suggest the need for developing 
capacity through the learning process approach, it is war-tom nations' lack of capacity, combined 
with the donors' perception of high risk of failure and strategic anxieties, that lead to the continuing 
practice of donor dominated short-term recovery approaches. These tend to be subtractive rather 
than additive and therefore unlikely to lead to sustainable outcomes. 
In the course of this review of literature and practice, it also became clear that the very assumption 
that capacity development leads to good governance (however that may be defined), though widely 
believed has not in fact been tested. This is because evaluation practice while it has developed 
effective methodologies for fulfilling the purposes of accountability and performance assessment of 
individual interventions has no body of practice for assessing long-term social impact of 
interventions, such as capacity development, on the achievement of general social goals such as 
good governance. 
It was concluded that the crucial evidence for the evaluation of the long-term social impact of 
capacity development interventions has to come mainly from personal recall. Outcomes are not 
attributable to individual interventions but cumulative and diffused and baseline information may 
be scarce or no longer relevant after many years. It is necessary therefore to instigate a reflective 
process to obtain a present-day perspective on a historical process through the participation of those 
who experienced it. This was seen to require a mainly qualitative and participatory methodology, 
which would also need to be enhanced by other complementary investigations in a `composite' 
approach. Since the long term impact of particular interventions is diffused and subject to other 
unforeseen variables it would be necessary to look at a broad spectrum of inputs to a particular area 
of social development rather than particular interventions by single agents. 
It was then necessary to develop a plausible model for describing the assumed relationship between 
capacity development, good governance and sustained peaceful development. A simple linear 
causal model or even a linear model acknowledging intervening variables was rejected for a 
generative model based on Pawson and Tilley's concept of interaction between context, subject and 
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intervention (Figure 4, Chapter 4). This was thought to be a more appropriate representation in the 
light of the review of development experience and it was decided to test it by examining the case of 
the Ministry of Education in Mozambique as a most-likely crucial case for confirming its 
plausibility. 
The research then adopted as its core methodology a retrospective participatory enquiry, which was 
combined with research of secondary, mainly Mozambican sources. The scope of the enquiry was 
limited by the fact that (unlike typical evaluation research) it was carried out by a single researcher, 
rather than a team with complimentary skills and attributes. Nevertheless, the implementation of 
this methodology in the field demonstrated that the approach was capable of recovering the 
evidence necessary for testing the research model and assessing the impact of capacity development 
for the institutional development of the education sector and the wider society. As such it could 
profitably be used to examine a wider sample of Mozambican society and should also be generally 
applicable in the evaluation of long-term social impact in other contexts. With this conclusion, the 
first objective of the research was deemed to have been achieved. 
9.2 Conclusions from the study of the crucial case 
The study of the development of education in Mozambique through the secondary, (mainly 
Mozambican) sources in Chapter 5 first of all confirmed the choice of MINED as a most-likely case 
of the application of the learning process approach to capacity development in a war-torn context, 
which had led to sustained peaceful development. It also showed that MINED's relationships with 
international partners were subject to the same shifting agendas and contradictions as those 
recorded in the literature reviewed in previous chapters, but suggested that nevertheless the long- 
term cumulative impact of their mainly well-intentioned interventions was positive. 
The participants' accounts of their own capacity development (Chapter 6) revealed that it was a 
product of the interaction between their social context, the volition, of first their parents, and then 
themselves and strategic interventions by government, supported by international partners, thus 
confirming the generative model developed in the research design, whereby development occurs as 
a result of interaction between subject, context and interventions designed to build capacity. 
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Institutional development was similarly revealed as a product of a shared vision between public and 
government arising from the post-colonial social context, the homogeneity of the core group, which 
constituted the initial human resource for its development and the technical inputs of donor partners 
with associated funding, thus also conforming to the model for change in the research design. 
The discussion of this process in general terms revealed that the learning process approach adopted 
and led by government in the early years and reasserted post-war was the driving force for capacity 
development but that its success depended on a three-cornered partnership between government, 
public and international support which we can equate with the concept of collaborative governance, 
advocated in post-war reconstruction literature. 
Where this gradual, evolutionary approach failed due to lack of capacity for governance and under 
the pressure of external destabilisation, there was a resort to tactical expediency and pursuit of 
models of development that did not have universal public acceptance which fuelled violence and 
the descent into war and economic collapse. This in turn changed the balance of power in the 
relationship with aid partners. International cooperation was seen to be additive when integrated in 
the strategic plan of the government and supported by the public, but became subtractive, 
fragmented and driven by external agendas when government leadership and public participation 
foundered. 
Nevertheless, the case clearly illustrates, by its failures as well as its overall success, the plausibility 
of a causal relationship between donor support for capacity development and the development of 
institutional good governance for the development and delivery of a public service. However it also 
clearly demonstrates that the context in which that support is given (particularly the nature of the 
relationship with national government and public) is a conditioning factor. 
The next issue to be considered was whether the institutional development of the education sector 
contributed to the governance of the society as a whole, and therefore to sustaining peaceful 
development. Mozambique embarked on its strategies for mass education in the belief that this 
would be the outcome. They retained this vision despite the war and reasserted it in their post-war 
reconstruction strategy. To what extent is this conviction vindicated? 
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The research participants indicated their criteria for good governance as they reflected on the role of 
education in their country's post-independence history as well as the underlying causes of the war. 
The focus of these criteria is significantly different from the criteria for good governance commonly 
adopted by the international community, which are concentrated on macro-economic indicators and 
the existence of particular organisational forms of governance (multi-party elections, framework of 
law, public service delivery). The participants' criteria are concerned with the nature rather than the 
structure of relationships, thus their concepts of governance are not seen as inherent in particular 
political or economic systems but in the capacity of government and the governed. Thus they cite 
leadership and sovereignty on the part of government, genuine participation on the part of the 
public and donor partners, inclusion and equity, respect for diversity of ideas and above all dialogue 
as the ingredients of sustainable and peaceful governance, and they hold both government and 
public responsible for the quality of that governance. Like their international partners they also see 
that achieving this kind of governance requires the development of human capacity and control of 
the necessary resources. 
It was possible to demonstrate in chapter eight that on the basis of the participants' criteria as well 
as those of the international community, Mozambique is a case of emerging good governance. The 
testimony of the participants and of other contemporary sources in Mozambique also suggests that 
the evolution of the education system, with its growing inclusiveness and cultural relevance has 
been crucial to the growing capacity for participatory democracy, efforts to redress economic and 
social inequity, acceptance of diversity and national dialogue as well as the ability to learn from the 
bitter lessons of the war. These are the positive factors which are seen as sustaining and 
consolidating peace and driving development in the face of the negative and distorting effects of 
sudden exposure to the global market economy and continuing incapacity of governance, such as 
corruption, illegality and incompetence. 
In the light of this analysis we can conclude that the development of the education sector in 
Mozambique confirms the plausibility of a causal relationship between capacity development, 
national governance and sustained peaceful development. The critical context for such a 
relationship appears to be that in Mozambique a vision of education as the motor of national and 
personal development is shared by government and public. This vision has remained constant in all 
groups of society, despite conflict over strategy and content and in the face of violent conflict, 
changing external alliances and aid regimes and economic and political restructuring. It enabled 
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Mozambique to enlist the assistance it needed in support of its goals despite shifting policy norms 
and financing conditionalities of donors and international partners. Under this condition, it was 
possible for capacity development to lead to improved governance in the education sector itself and 
in the wider society. Conversely, when focus on the vision for education faltered, due to war, 
economic crisis and loss of sovereignty, the donor interventions were fragmented and had little 
impact. 
9.3 Some lessons for practice 
The research conclusion, described above, that the success of interventions for capacity 
development is conditioned by their cumulative interaction over time with the subjects of the 
intervention in their particular context, has some clear implications for practice. The design of any 
capacity development intervention has to be based on an understanding of the particular context and 
in response to the volition of the subjects. A learning process approach, involving both facilitators 
and subjects as full participants, is therefore indicated so that the scope and nature of the capacity 
development activities evolve to meet the particular needs of that society. Skills and policy transfer 
in any sector needs to be an interactive process in which the subjects of intervention are able to 
select what is appropriate in their conditions from informed knowledge of the options. 
There are also some practical lessons to be learnt from the case study about the approach to 
implementing the concept of education as a capacity development strategy for post-war 
reconstruction. These too can be seen as contextual pre-requisites for such development. 
" An integrated national strategy that includes mass general education for adults as well as 
children is the foundation for capacity development in war-torn countries where universal 
access to education has been denied. 
" The implementation of such a strategy requires simultaneous development of the capacity 
of policy-makers, administrators and teachers to build and create the permanent institutions 
for general capacity development. 
" The existence of even a very small minority group of minimally educated personnel 
recruited to support the capacity building agenda is sufficient to initiate the process. The 
educational level in Mozambique in 1975 (5% literacy) was probably at the lowest extreme 
likely to be encountered (Afghanistan for example after similar experiences of prolonged 
civil war had about 25% literacy and many more graduates than Mozambique. ) 
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" The key to compensating for lack of qualified personnel is the adoption of participatory 
working methods and the promotion of a mutual learning culture. Both of these mitigated 
the lack of capacity and created the necessary context for rapid capacity development in the 
first years of Mozambican independence. 
" In an extreme case of human resource deficit such as Mozambique in 1975, international 
technical assistance is essential for capacity building, but is only effective if used 
strategically within the policy framework coordinated by government. In the early stages 
non-specialist, including voluntary personnel can make a quick impact to fill skills gaps but 
should not be more than a stop-gap and never substitute national decision-making 
functions. Technical assistance should from the start be principally directed towards 
building national capacity and at the policy and planning level needs to be both selective 
and targeted at developing specific institutional capacities. 
" As the institutional and personnel capacity grows (or in countries where the initial deficit is 
not so extreme) so the amount of external technical assistance should be less in numbers 
and time (short consultancies and backstopping replacing full-time long-term contracts) and 
should be highly specialised and selective. For example, technical assistance personnel do 
not necessarily have to be foreign or exclusively from northern highly developed countries, 
simply because that is where the funding comes from. Criteria of selection should be the 
relevance as well as the quality of professional competence in relation to the particular 
capacity deficit. 
" Meanwhile, continuing capacity building needs at the operational/grass-roots level (which 
are likely to be very high after prolonged conflict) should be delivered by national staff 
with donor financial support if necessary. 
" Providing educational opportunities in donor countries can also be a valuable assistance, 
especially during armed conflict or to kick start capacity building when internal 
institutional capacity is still minimal. However, it should be directed strategically at 
providing qualified personnel to develop internal institutions for education, professional 
training and administration. As the internal level of development increases (or in the case of 
already more developed countries) so certain levels of external course provision become 
inappropriate (for example the overseas secondary education and teacher training was 
necessary in early stages for Mozambique, first degrees were appropriate up to early 1990s 
but now perhaps only specialist courses and post-graduate levels may be useful). 
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9.4 General conclusions 
If we now relate the case study to the research model, we see that the social context in Mozambique 
evolved from the aftermath of the overthrow of colonial rule to the present emerging good 
governance and stability. There were from the start negative and positive components of that 
context - war and violence, ignorance and incapacity on the one hand -a vision of good 
governance and a will to develop it on the other. For the FRELIMO government and many 
Mozambicans who contributed their views to the author over these years, the main mechanism for 
transformation (thinking again in terms of our model) was the education of the nation. For the many 
international agencies and individuals who contributed to support that transformation, the means 
was the institutional development of MINED largely through the capacity building of its staff. 
These were the ideas that underpinned the creation and development of MINED. 
The conclusion that can be drawn from the Mozambican experience with the education sector, but 
which is likely to be more generally applicable in other sectors and contexts, is that developing a 
national consensus (vision) for a particular policy and forms of collaborative governance for its 
implementation creates the necessary context within which international assistance for capacity 
development can have a sustainable and developmental impact despite its own inconsistencies and 
shifting condionality. Conversely if the national policy consensus and collaborative framework is 
missing, externally devised capacity development interventions are likely to have little long-term 
impact. 
On the particular role of education in conflict and post-conflict contexts, the research suggests that 
denial of access to education, which is culturally relevant and values diversity while opening minds 
to world knowledge, can be one of the root causes of failure of governance and resort to violent 
conflict. This was clearly the case in Mozambique and is likely to be the case in other contexts 
where access to education has been restricted by underdevelopment and repression. Post-war 
education reform and development in such contexts is therefore not simply a public service 
requirement or a social project that can be left to one side until recovery has been accomplished, but 
a fundamental prerequisite for peaceful development through national dialogue in which all are 
enabled to participate. This is particularly true in a multi-lingual and multi-cultural society such as 
Mozambique. 
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The research also indicates that the reconstruction of a nation recovering from repression and war 
requires capacity development for all levels of the society, not just the administrative elite. 
Developing an inclusive, comprehensive and national education system is therefore likely to be a 
core strategy for building general capacity. It also seems clear that in this context, donor support for 
capacity development can be seen to make an impact for good governance and sustained peaceful 
development. 
9.5 Some areas for further research 
As explained in the introduction the scope of this research was limited for two reasons, one 
practical and one methodological. Resources for individual doctoral research are necessarily limited 
and, more importantly, both the methodological approach and the area of study were untried, so that 
the research was necessarily exploratory. Although the author chose to limit the study to one crucial 
case, which could be studied by her in sufficient depth to yield valid results, this does not rule out 
the need for comparative study, both within Mozambique and in other war-torn contexts. The scope 
of such studies could also be increased both in terms of cover and of expertise if they were carried 
out by small teams of researchers rather than one individual. 
Having demonstrated the reliability of the methodology and the plausibility of the hypothesis in 
respect of one key public sector in Mozambique, it would be appropriate to carry out comparative 
studies in other sectors to determine the extent to which they followed the same pattern of 
development. As already suggested, personal experiences of the author and some Mozambican 
informants, suggests that there were differences of intervention and outcomes as well as 
similarities. Agriculture as the principal economic activity of the majority of the population might 
be one and Health, which was and is the second most significant public service sector after 
education and one that attracts more donor attention, would be another. The essential condition 
would be to entrust the work to researchers with the kind of background of understanding that the 
author had in the education sector, whether nationals or foreigners. 
A key limitation of the research was that it did not involve a representative sample of urban parents 
(ad hoc meetings were held with association representatives) and the rural parents were, with one 
exception, unrepresented, since the researcher felt that this could only be carried out by researchers 
speaking to respondents in their mother tongue and with an understanding of their cultural identity. 
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It would be a valuable exercise therefore for Mozambican researchers to extend this study of the 
education sector to a sample of rural contexts in different areas of the country. The study might also 
profitably include further urban contexts with representative samples of parents. 
In a similar way it would be useful if researchers with the necessary cultural understanding, whether 
nationals or foreigners, could apply this methodology to evaluating the impact of capacity 
development assistance in other countries recovering from war, both those that present a similar 
post-colonial history overshadowed by the cold war (Vietnam for example) and those where the 
pre-war development was greater and the nature of the conflict very different, as for example in Sri 
Lanka, where nevertheless conflict over education and language triggered the violence. 
It would also be useful to apply and refine the methodology as a tool for general use in the 
evaluation of the long-term social impact of post-war reconstruction interventions including the 
difficult issue, discussed in Chapter 2, of evaluating long-past and comprehensive `nation-building' 
exercises following defeat and invasion by occupying forces. 
In fact, the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which prompted that interest, also raise another 
issue. The rationale for those interventions was not to develop but to transform those societies in 
line with a particular western model of governance and strategic interest. This research has 
vindicated the opposite approach, the application of Korten's learning process to capacity 
development. However, that process, though ongoing, was initiated in a particular historical 
context. The research participants and other contemporary commentators identified a number of 
threats to it in the present context: the inequalities created by exposure to the global market 
economy and the pressures to conform to internationally determined models of development. Some 
questioned whether the national capacity development that occurred in Mozambique could have 
been initiated in today's conditions. There is therefore a need for research to assess the impact of 
globalisation and pre-emptive interventions (whether by force or by financial manipulation through 
debt relief schemes) on initiatives for post-war capacity development and to identify strategies for 
applying the lessons learnt from this research in this new context. 
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APPENDIX 1 
THE MODERN HISTORY OF MOZAMBIQUE' 
1.1 Mozambican states and mercantile penetration 
The earliest written references to Mozambique occur in Persian and Arabic documents in the 10`h 
and 11`x' centuries and refer to gold and iron being obtained from Sofala. Arab trading centres were 
functioning along the coast for the next five hundred years until Portuguese traders arrived in 
the IOh century and began first to take over the established Arab trading centres along the coast and 
then extend inland along the Zambezi valley and south to the shores of the large natural harbour of 
the Delagoa (Maputo) bay. By the end of the century they had made contact with the empire of the 
Muenematapa, which extended over much of present day Zimbabwe and central Mozambique, 
converting its rulers to Christianity and gaining concessions of territory and mines in exchange for 
military assistance to bolster their waning power against the rebellion of client kingdoms. Having 
gained this foothold, Portuguese traders established and defended a trading network in the 
territories of present day Mozambique and eastern Zimbabwe as part of their trade with India, 
whose traders also penetrated the rural interior and dominated the ivory trade. It was only in the mid 
18`h century that these concessions and trading posts came officially under direct administration 
from Portugal and even then the ability of the Portuguese crown to exact taxes and regulate the 
concessions was always tenuous. After the initial trade in gold and ivory, by the second half of the 
18th century the main trade was in slaves and despite attempts by the Crown administration to 
abolish the trade in 1836 and again in 1842 and the formal abolition of slavery throughout the 
Portuguese territories in 1869, there is evidence of both continuing into the early 20`h century. Thus 
prior to the late 19`h century, although the Mozambican economy, its governance and culture were 
subject to powerful foreign influences, particularly from the Portuguese, it had not been formally 
colonised. To a significant extent there had been a mutual transformation of the indigenous society 
and the foreign trading interests but no effective military and administrative colonisation. The 
(This historical outline is based on the following published sources: Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994; AIM 
Reports 2000-2005; Armon, Hendrickson and Vines 1998; Capela 1988,1993; Christie 1989; Departamento de 
Histöria da UEM 1982,1993; de Sousa Ferreira 1977; Fauvet and Mosse 2003; Hanlon 1986,1991,1996; 
Isaacman 1978; MacQueen 1997; Mazula (ed. ) 2002; Munslow 1983,1985; Newitt 1995; Sachs and Honwana 
Welch, 1990; Synge 1997; United Nations Department of Public Information 1995; Vines 1996. 
These are supplemented by contemporary eyewitness accounts news reports etc. to which the author had 
access during the years 1983-1989 and 1992-1998 in Mozambique. 
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Portuguese `prazeiros' (concessionists) and traders became significant players and participants in a 
society that was still structured along African lines with regional empires ruling uneasily over client 
kingdoms and controlling the trade from the interior. There was also significant cultural 
assimilation through local marriage and overlordship. 2 
1.2 1885 -1930 The Treaty of Berlin and its aftermath 
The Congress of Berlin and the signing of the Berlin Act in 1885 forced Portugal to embark on the 
military annexation and direct administration of the territories it claimed or lose them to other 
European powers. In fact they lost out in most of the territorial disputes with Britain, losing control 
of what are now the eastern provinces of Zimbabwe as well as Malawi but managing to defend their 
key province of Tete along the upper Zambezi. However, not having the capital base from which to 
exploit these territories in the same way as their more powerful rivals, they then proceeded to 
concede large regions of the country to the administration of charter companies largely owned by 
foreign capital. The pressures that this transition imposed led first to the overthrow of the 
Portuguese monarchy and later to the demise of the republic that replaced it, at the hands of a 
military coup. In Mozambique military and civil resistance to the occupation continued throughout 
this period from both the indigenous states and populations and the Afro-Portuguese military states. 
1888 
Company of Mozambique founded in central Mozambique with mainly British shareholders. 
The warlordship of the da Cruz family in Massangano finally defeated by the Portuguese. 
1891 
Company of Niassa established (after a military campaign) in the north of Mozambique with 
financial backing from South African mining interests. 
Widespread peasant revolts in the Zambezi region. 
Further military campaigns in the Zambezi fail to control the independent `prazos. ' 
1892 
2 As for example the powerful Afro-Portuguese families in the Zambezi and Shire valleys who were to oppose 
the occupation at the end of the century(Newitt 1995: 305-8,345) and the well documented case of the 
concession territory of Manganja da Costa which declared itself an independent republic and defended itself 
against annexation from 1862-1898 in defence of the hereditary rights of a mixed race family, descendants of 
one of the legendary `Zambezi heiresses'. (Capela, 1988. ) 
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Establishment of the Zambesia company by British interests but it sublet many of the prazos back to 
the existing occupiers or other foreign consortia. 
1894 
Railway from Lourenco Marques (now Maputo) to the Transvaal operational. 
1895 
Start of the military campaign against the southern state of Gaza. The ruler Gungunhana captured. 
1897 
Gungunhana's general Maguiguane defeated and killed. 
First migrant labour contracted to South Africa. 
Beira to Umtali (Mutare in present day Zimbabwe) railway functioning. 
1898-1912 
Military occupation of most of the northern territories by the Portuguese and/or the Zambesia 
company completed. 
1910-1911 
Revolution in Portugal overthrows the monarchy and establishes a Republic. 
The new constitution also reorganises the administration of the colonies including regulating 
`indigenous' labour. 
1914-18 
During the first world war 12,000 African soldiers and 90 thousand workers recruited. 
Peasant revolts against the occupation and strikes in Lourenco Marques which were to recur 
throughout the 1920s there and in the northern and central concessions. 
1920 
Final military campaign by the Niassa company against the Maconde in Cabo Degado. 
1920-1925 
Emerging nationalist associations centred on the publication of `0 Brado Africano' the `Gremio 
Africano' in Lourenco Marques and Quelimane. 
1923 
Start of extraction of coal by Societe Miniere Geologique du Zambeze (largely Belgian capital). 
1926 
The Portuguese republic overthrown by a coup d'etat led by army generals. 
1928 
Professor Antonio Salazar co-opted into the government to manage the economy in response to 
growing economic crisis. 
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1.3 1930 -1961 The New State and the Zenith of Colonial rule 
By 1930 Salazar and his associates were essentially in control with a veto over all departmental 
budgets. They set about producing a new constitution based on an ideological structure that was to 
control the affairs of the Metropole and its colonies for the next forty years. Their vision was of a 
social order in which the rights and freedoms of individuals were to be subordinated to the needs of 
the state. The perceived incoherence, chaotic administration and disorder of the republic and its 
dependence on foreign economic dominance were to be replaced by national autonomy, a society 
founded on Catholic principles and sound economic management. Colonial administration was to 
be reformed; social control was to be promoted by funding the Catholic missions and taking back 
the concessions from foreign companies. Salazar also quickly moved to develop a personality cult 
as the strong wise leader. A pervasive and highly effective system of censorship and informers 
backed eventually by a ruthless secret police force prevented overt dissent and inhibited the 
organisation of opposition in both Portugal and the colonies. Although this regime shared many 
characteristics with the rising fascist states in Germany and Italy, Salazar's rule, though ruthlessly 
autocratic was more ideologically pragmatic and consciously founded on support from the army, 
the bureaucracy and the big business corporations. Monarchism, the aristocracy and the extreme 
Catholic right were afforded little influence. It was on this basis that the New State transformed the 
administration and development of the colonies, essentially to the benefit of the elite classes in 
Portugal from which the regime drew its support. 
1930 
First government funding of Catholic missions. 
The Colonial Act: removed the privileges of the concession companies; established labour 
regulations for `natives'; established the first training college for `native' primary teachers; 
established a centralised administration of the colony including state monopoly of taxation. 
1931 
The hut tax (mussoco) levied on every native household accounted for between one fifth and a 
quarter of the fiscal revenue from Mozambique. 
1933 
The `Instituto Negrbfilo de Mocambique' split from the `Gremio Africano de Lourenro Marques'(a 
division encouraged by the colonial interests). 
Strikes in the port of Lourenco Marques and of salaried workers in Beira. 
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1938 
Cotton Export Council set up. 
1940-41 
Concordat between Portugal and the Holy See led to the Missionary Statute conferring special 
privileges and responsibilities on the Catholic Church. In particular it was to assume responsibility 
for `indigenous education' directed explicitly at preparing the indigenous population for its 
prescribed role as manual labour for the exploitation of the natural resources of the colony. In 
return, both Portuguese and foreign missions were to be regulated directly by the Portuguese state. 
Getting the indigenous population to fill the `labour shortage' in the colonial enterprises was a key 
concern of the colonial authority which progressively strengthened labour laws. 
1942 
New tax laws enforced the collection of the hut tax, while recognising the difficulty of collecting it 
from rural subsistence farmers. No exceptions on grounds of poverty were accepted though a 
'reduced tax' category was introduced. Those without monetary means were required to cultivate 
cash crops to meet tax obligations; migrant labourers contracted through the colonial authority to 
the mines in South Africa were paid on return to Mozambique after the deduction of tax. Failing all 
of these, payment was exacted in the form of forced labour. 3 
1945 
As the Second World War came to an end, Portugal was obliged under international pressure to 
ameliorate its harsh colonial labour regime. Wage levels and social provisions for workers were 
increased. 
1947 
The `Regulos', traditional leaders co-opted as colonial tax collectors and law enforcers, began to 
receive monthly payments from the government and were rewarded with masonry houses. 
1947-1948 
Strikes in Lourenro Marques and Gaza met with brutal repression: 49 deaths and 200 hundred 
arrested, the majority being deported to Sao Tome. 
1949 
Portugal joined NATO. 
3 An adult literacy teacher in Gaza recounted to the author in 1984 how she was sent to work on road building 
shortly after giving birth to her second child, who she carried on her back as she worked. Her husband, like 
many other migrant workers, had absconded from the mines and remained illegally in South Africa and she 
had been unable to meet the rice cultivation quota due to her pregnancy. 
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1950 
The number of Portuguese settlers in Mozambique was recorded as 49,000. Mozambicans with 
`assimilado' status (with some privileges such as exemption from hut tax) as 4,349. The 
overwhelming majority of Mozambicans were classed as `indigenous' and subject to specific laws 
of control. 
1951-4 
Portugal responding defensively to the international pressures for decolonisation, introduced new 
constitutional and policy reforms to present a modernising image to the outside world. The colonies 
were transformed into `Overseas Provinces'. Development plans were drawn up for specific 
development areas. Wages increased again, but the rises were matched by tax rises. 
1955 
Portugal joined the United Nations. 
242412 `indigenous' pupils were attending `rudimentary schools' 
1956-1957 
Despite its more liberal image, the regime in Portugal and the colonies relied on repressive laws and 
law enforcement. Signs of unrest such as the strikes at the docks in Lourenco Marques continued 
and in 1957 the PIDE (secret police force) was set up in Mozambique. 
1959 
`Adaptation' schooling replaced the rudimentary school. There were now 392796 pupils but only 
6982 made the transition to primary schooling. 
1960 
While 17 African nations achieved independence, there were now 90,000 Portuguese settlers in 
Mozambique. Once again wages for indigenous workers were raised, but many grievances 
remained and dissent was met with repression. 
The `massacre of Mueda' when peasant farmers on this northern plateau, having been allowed to 
convene to present their grievances to the authorities, were surrounded and fired on by colonial 
troops, is seen as the symbolic event which triggered the decision to resort to armed resistance, 
faced by the futility of trying to negotiate with the Salazar regime. 
1961 
Two events alarmed the Portuguese authorities and led to the usual twin strategy of increased 
repression and concessions on conditions of work: 
Armed uprising in Angola. This led to the hasty revoking of the labour laws, although forced labour 
continued in practice for some time. 
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Newly independent India annexed the Portuguese colony of Goa. In Mozambique the authorities 
reacted by interning the Indian population in concentration camps. 4 
1960-1961 
In these years three Mozambican nationalist movements were founded: UDENAMO, MANU AND 
UNAMI. 
The recipe of repression and appeasement was repeated: the PIDE stepped up its operations with 
the creation of the `Psychological Action Service' and wages were once again raised. 
Eduardo Mondlane, the future leader of a united nationalist movement, returned from exile to visit 
the country against the wishes of the authorities, by virtue of his status as a UN diplomats 
1.4 1962-1974 The struggle for Independence 
Following the unification of the various nationalist movements in the Front for the Liberation of 
Mozambique (FRELIMO) with Mondlane as President, the internal debate focussed on the choice 
of strategy for achieving independence. Many initially favoured seeking to negotiate independence 
as had been done in former British colonies. This became untenable in the face of the intractable 
position adopted by the Portuguese regime. Hope of bringing about an early collapse of the regime 
under the combined pressure of liberation wars in Angola, Guine-Bissau and Mozambique was also 
dashed when it became clear that the Portuguese regime was prepared not only to commit a large 
part of its national resources (including the eventual conscription of a quarter of all Portuguese men 
of military age) to retaining its colonies but was securing military assistance through its 
membership of NATO and economic resources by once again opening its territories to foreign 
capital under favourable terms. FRELIMO therefore prepared for a protracted guerrilla war, which 
they realised would need to secure the support of the Mozambican people especially the rural 
communities. Strategies for communicating and demonstrating the social changes that 
independence could bring therefore went hand in hand with the recruitment, training and 
deployment of fighters. Basic education and health provision in the liberated zones and the 
education of cadres as well as military commanders were core FRELIMO strategies from its 
formation. When after ten years of fighting the burden of colonial wars on the Portuguese public 
4 Ricardo Rangel, 1994 Photographe de Mozambique Ricardo Range! Centre Culturel Franco-Mozambicain/ 
Editions Findakly (Paris): 46-7 
s His movement was officially restricted but he was able to `disappear' into the interior and meet many 
Mozambicans. The fact that he had a doctorate (Salazar made a point of being addressed as Dr. ) when most 
Mozambicans were treated as 'ignorant' and was able to defy and outwit the authorities, sent a powerful 
message that independence was possible. Information from an eyewitness, who met Mondlane in Inhambane 
in this year, recounted to the author in 1989. 
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and serving soldiers provoked a military coup to overthrow the dictatorship in Portugal, FRELIMO, 
while still mounting sabotage and undercover actions in the Portuguese controlled areas, had in fact 
only carried the war to the northern provinces where about half the land area, mostly in the interior, 
was under their control. The important northern province of Nampula, the coastal areas and ports 
and the southern provinces were still under Portuguese rule. FRELIMO military strategists 
calculated that a further ten years of war would be needed to liberate the whole country while the 
preparation of qualified cadres for administration and government and the evolution of social 
development strategies were still at an early stage. Nevertheless, the overthrow of Caetano's regime 
and the unstable political conditions in Portugal following the coup, meant that FRELIMO, as a 
single united movement, demonstrably capable of continuing the war to eventual victory, was able 
to determine the terms of its independence and a short timetable of one year for the full transfer of 
power. Thus Mozambican independence was characterised by both a greater degree of self- 
determination and sovereignty than the majority of post-colonial African states and at the same time 
considerably less capacity for governance. 
1962 
A second `massacre' this time of sugar plantation workers at Xinavane in the south. 
The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) formed (uniting separate nationalist 
organisations) and held its first congress at which Eduardo Mondlane was elected President. 
1963 
Strikers in the ports of Lourenco Marques, Beira and Nacala imprisoned. One of the leaders, Paulo 
Balöi died in prison. 
In Tanzania FRELIMO founded the Mozambican Institute in Dar-es-Salaam to provide secondary 
education for young Mozambican nationalists and in Bagamoyo the military training camp to 
prepare guerrilla fighters. 
The first contingents of fighters (amongst them Samora Machel) were sent to Algeria for further 
military training. 
FRELIMO established its first foothold in the north of Mozambique. 
1964 
The armed struggle was launched in September in the north with some success but attempts to open 
up other fronts met with setbacks. 
The Portuguese authorities had stationed 35,000 troops in Mozambique and with the help of South 
African, Southern Rhodesian and British police succeeded in preventing the flow of recruits to 
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FRELIMO in the south, uncovering the underground network and arresting 1500 young 
sympathisers. 
1965 
Repression against all manifestations of nationalism was stepped up. Writers such as Jose 
Craveirinha and artist Malangatana Valente, condemned and imprisoned. 
1968 
FRELIMO held its Second Congress at which the ideological battle over the future governance of 
an independent Mozambique was won by the revolutionaries, led by Eduardo Mondlane. 
Salazar suffered a stroke and was succeeded as head of state by Marcello Caetano. 
1969 
Mondlane was assassinated by a parcel bomb delivered to his headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam. 
Suspicion fell on both members of one of the minority nationalist groups (whose members were 
forced to flee) and the PIDE who were almost certainly the instigators. 
1970 
After an internal power struggle, Samora Machel was elected the next FRELIMO president. He was 
also the movement's military commander. 
1972 
FRELIMO now controlled most of the northern provinces of Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Tete. These 
`liberated zones' were essential to the war effort which depended increasingly on their agricultural 
production to feed the guerrillas and to raise funds from exports. However, this was done 
collectively. Fighters and activists worked the increased areas of cultivation with the peasant 
farmers who hosted them. Despite continuous Portuguese air attacks, these were also areas in which 
FRELIMO evolved and tested new forms of social organisation and strategies for rural 
development and community education that were to be the starting point for national strategies 
post-independence. 
The Zimbabwean guerrilla movement (ZANLA) began operations against the minority settler 
regime in Rhodesia from bases in these FRELIMO controlled areas of Mozambique. 
1973-4 
The war advanced into Manica province where the interior came increasingly under FRELIMO 
control. Operations continued against the Portuguese hold on Nampula and Zambezia. 
1974 
A military coup in Portugal by junior officers brought to power a government determined to end the 
devastating colonial wars by negotiating independence. A transitional government was formed in 
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Mozambique headed by Joachim Chissano representing FRELIMO and serving as prime minister to 
prepare for the hand-over of power. 
During this year Samora Machei made a triumphal journey from the liberated zones in the north of 
the country to the capital in the south with the purpose of preparing the population for 
independence. 
1.5 1975-1987 Independence under FRELIMO rule, destabilisation and civil war, economic 
collapse and humanitarian crisis. 
The Independent government formed by FRELIMO came in with a radical and idealistic agenda, 
forged by its experience of waging a guerrilla war from bases in the rural peasant society (described 
as `liberated zones') where they had undertaken social and economic development programmes. As 
a result, the new government's broad goals and vision of social justice undoubtedly reflected the 
aspirations of the overwhelming majority of Mozambicans. In searching for ideas and relevant 
models for that development, the leadership had been drawn to the adoption of a socialist ideology 
through its links to other liberation movements in Africa and elsewhere, especially in the other 
Portuguese colonies, as well as intellectual contacts with the underground socialist movement in 
Portugal. They naturally also looked to the models of socialist development in the independent 
African countries from which they had launched the independence war, Algeria and Tanzania and 
to the political-military ideas of leaders of peasant revolutions in Asia such as General Giap in 
Vietnam and Mao Zedong in China. Ideas came too from Latin American socialism and Freire's 
pedagogy of the oppressed. FRELIMO when it came to power was therefore essentially a guerrilla 
movement. That is, although it did have a highly developed political ideology and practical 
experience of social mobilisation and development at community level it was nevertheless still 
organised along military lines. It therefore faced the task of both transforming itself and the wider 
society for civil governance, but under very inauspicious circumstances. On the one hand while 
pursuing its commitment to establishing civil governance, it had simultaneously to maintain the 
military capability to defend the country against hostile neighbouring states in the wider context of 
the Cold War. On the other, the collapse and rapid departure of the colonial administration left 
virtually nothing in place on which to build such governance either in terms of institutions or of 
personnel to fill them. The history of the first years of Mozambique's independence is therefore 
shaped by both ideological and pragmatic decisions and by changes of direction dictated by internal 
and external pressures as well as genuine dialogue and learning from mistakes. 
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For example, the nationalisations were a deliberate policy aimed at securing universal access to 
education, healthcare, housing and use of land for livelihoods and subsistence as basic human rights 
but taking abandoned industrial and agricultural enterprises into state ownership was an emergency 
intervention that only occurred when these had been abandoned by their foreign owners 6. A belief 
in the virtues of collective effort and fair distribution led to establishing communal villages and 
cooperatives but at the same time a conscious effort was made to stimulate the emergence of small 
businesses by allowing returning migrant workers to repatriate hard currency. The communal 
villages were welcomed in some areas but resisted in others where it was incompatible with local 
settlement and farming practice and despite a commitment to change by participation, in practice 
villagisation was enforced by military governors especially where border defence and control were 
at stake. Similarly, the police force was purged but not dismantled from fear of disorder, a 
compromise that perpetuated the culture of brutality prevalent in colonial times. On the other hand 
the colonial legal system was deemed totally inappropriate and in any case could not be 
administered in the total absence of qualified lawyers. `Popular' justice was therefore built from 
scratch from the bottom up. 
1975 
Mozambique declared independence on June 25`x'. Samora Machel was sworn in as President and 
appointed leading members of the FRELIMO central committee to ministerial portfolios already 
negotiated during the transitional year. Notably, Chissano became Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Grata Simbine (who married Machei after their arrival in Maputo) was nominated Minister of 
Education. 
On July 24`h, `the day of nationalisations' schools, health facilities, rented housing and land were 
taken into public ownership.? 
1976 
March 8`h by Presidential decree, secondary and higher education classes were suspended and 
students given emergency training before being deployed to fill the teaching gap in primary schools 
left by departing Portuguese teachers. 
6 Thus, for example, although the large sugar estates were mostly taken over, the estate in Xinavane in the 
Province of Maputo remained in private ownership 
Land was nationalised in the sense that its commercial sale and ownership were outlawed while the right to 
use was enshrined. 
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Mozambique closed its border with Rhodesia in support of the UN sanctions endorsed by the 
British government against the illegal Smith regime'. With FRELIMO support ZANLA continued 
to operate out of bases established in Mozambique and growing numbers of refugees from Rhodesia 
were accommodated. 
1977 
FRELIMO at its Third Congress, declared itself a Marxist Leninist vanguard party seeking greater 
support from the USSR, the GDR and Eastern European socialist countries, but also maintaining 
cooperation with China and Socialist countries in the developing world such as Cuba. 
Internationally it positioned itself with the Non-Aligned Movement and maintained relations with 
India and most Western governments, receiving significant aid from the Nordic countries and Italy 
as well as non-governmental assistance from solidarity organisations in Europe and the Americas. 
The Congress affirmed the commitment to expanding access to basic education, health, housing and 
land use for the whole population as well as the right to participate in governance. 
The first national elections were held throughout the country, resulting in the creation of 1,000 
local, district and provincial assemblies and the national `Popular Assembly' on a `democratic 
centralist' one party system in which delegates elected at each level, elected delegates to the next 
level. 
MMR later RENAMO was established by the Rhodesian regime in collaboration with former 
agents of the Portuguese colonial regime and recruited the internal leadership from Mozambican 
dissidents (some from the ranks of FRELIMO, others associated with the colonial apparatus). 
Operations began to destabilize the Mozambican state: cross-border air raids and sabotage as well 
as attacks on the ZANLA bases inside Mozambique. 
1978 
July Yd: launch of the first national literacy campaign by President Machel. 
ANC operations against apartheid South Africa were also being planned and executed from within 
southern Mozambique and military figures in the South African government adopted a policy of 
destabilizing the `Front Line' African states on its borders in a effort to coerce them into economic 
cooperation and denial of support for the ANC. Direct commando raids were made over the next 
years on Mozambican economic infrastructure and terrorist attacks on `ANC targets' in the 
8 Britain was later to accept liability for rebuilding key Mozambican infrastructure bombed by the Rhodesian 
air force. However the Crown Agents charged with these projects were prevented from completing them by 
the escalation of the war in Mozambique. 
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Mozambican capital. 9 Restrictions were also placed on the recruitment of Mozambican migrant 
workers, though this was resisted by the mining companies. 
1979 
The Lancaster House Agreement, which ended the war for Zimbabwe, was brokered with the 
assistance of Mozambique. 
The first national meeting of communal villages held in the southern province of Gaza recorded 
1000 established villages nationwide. 
Meanwhile, the internal war continued in the central provinces of Mozambique, fuelled by peasant 
resistance to enforcement of the villagisation policy, but still directed by external agents. 
The first leader of RENAMO, Andre Matsangaissa, was killed by government forces and after a 
violent power struggle, Alfonso Dhlakama became the new leader. 
The Land Law was passed abolishing private ownership of land. It removed the right to sell or rent 
land but established the right of all Mozambicans to work the land, regulating permanent title and 
other forms of tenure for its use. '° 
1980 
The first comprehensive census of the national population was successfully carried out. 
Zimbabwe became an independent state after Robert Mugabe won a multi-party election under 
British and international supervision. 
Control of RENAMO was transferred to the South African Defence Force, which began to build up 
its capability. 
The first meeting of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) was 
held in Maputo to promote regional economic cooperation in response to South African ambitions 
for economic hegemony. 
1981 
9 As for example the attacks in Matola and Maputo in 1981 (Hanlon, 1986: 136-139) or the car bomb which 
seriously injured the prominent South African lawyer, Albie Sachs (then working for the Mozambican 
Ministry of Justice) and killed a passing Mozambican civilian in 1988. 
10 In 1992 when the issue of land tenure was debated in the context of the general review of legislation, there 
was still widespread ignorance of the actual terms of the law, especially amongst rural farmers, the 
procedures for registration of land holdings and other administrative procedures for implementing the law 
were totally inadequate. Extra: a questäo de terras June 1992 CFA Ministry of Agriculture. Nevertheless, the 
general principle of not allowing the commercialisation of land as a commodity, but conferring and protecting 
rights to use has been upheld by all parties in parliamentary votes since the end of the civil war. 
Colonial census data was distorted by the fact that rural populations and illegal migrant workers avoided 
enumeration to evade the hut tax. The escalation of the war ruled out any repetition until 1997. 
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The war escalated in the central provinces where the rebels began to target symbols of the 
government's success: schools and health clinics. 
1982 
The war spread to the southern provinces, where RENAMO targeted the civilian population (largely 
pro-FRELIMO) displacing large numbers of people and causing famine. The Nacala and Beira 
transport corridors from Malawi and Zimbabwe were paralysed, prompting Zimbabwe to send 
1,000 troops to secure its access to the Port of Beira. 
1983 
The Fourth Party Congress of FRELIMO reviewed the first years of independence and the growing 
crisis in the rural areas calling for significant policy shifts: decentralisation of planning; less 
emphasis on state-run farms; concentration on family farming and peasant-based development. 
However, the escalation of the war prevented the general application of these decisions in most 
areas of the country. 
The bill establishing the National Education System (SNE) passed into law. 
FRELIMO launched `Operation Production' to move tens of thousands of urban unemployed to 
underdeveloped rural areas, mainly in the northern province of Niassa. 
By the end of this year tens of thousands of Mozambicans, particularly in the southern province of 
Inhambane were estimated to have died of famine. Mutilation and other `punishments' of civilians 
who were later released as a terror tactic and the kidnapping of 'recruits' (largely children and 
young people) were adopted by the rebels systematically from this time. 12 
1984 
The war was affecting the whole country, seriously threatening the development gains made since 
independence. 
The first moves to negotiate an end to the war were made: 
12 The author (and many other expatriate workers) heard eye-witness accounts on arrival in Maputo in 1983 
and subsequently heard similar accounts throughout the country. However, media coverage of these practices 
was almost non-existent in the early years. Mozambican journalists were reluctant to feed an international 
stereotype of 'African savagery' and the international media had not yet taken in the extent of the 
humanitarian disaster unfolding in the country. 
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The Mozambican government signed the `Nkomati Non-Aggression Pact' with South Africa13 and 
at the same time tried unsuccessfully to negotiate directly with RENAMO 
The Mozambican Christian Council (CCM) set up its Peace and Reconciliation Commission and 
began to look for openings for dialogue. 
The nationwide consultation on family law culminated in the Extraordinary Conference of the 
OMM (Mozambican Women's organisation), which delegated an advisory committee to assist the 
drafting of the law. 
1985 
As the war escalated: RENAMO now held large rural areas (often sparsely populated) under its 
control, which it `taxed ' to support its military operations, reinstating the colonial methods of 
enforcement through the `Regulos' traditional (or often appointed) leaders. This system 
compensated for the loss of external support. The government meanwhile continued to control the 
main centres of population and launched a diplomatic round to secure military support. 
Zimbabwe increased its troops in Mozambique to 10,000. 
1986 
Malawi under pressure from the Front Line States, expelled RENAMO forces operating from its 
territory. Meanwhile the escalation of violence in the Northern provinces, provoked a mass 
movement of refugees into Malawi. 14 Large numbers of refugees were already being received in 
Zimbabwe and Swaziland. 
The FRELIMO government signed new military agreements with Zimbabwe and Tanzania. 
Significant military aid continued to be supplied by the Soviet Union and officers from government 
forces were given British military training in Zimbabwe and at Sandhurst. 
Returning from the Front Line States summit, the Presidential plane was decoyed over South Africa 
where it crashed killing Samora Machel and a large number of government officials and other 
leading advisors. Proper investigation of the crash was obstructed at the time by the South African 
government. This and other circumstantial evidence suggests South African complicity, but the 
13 It was clear that the SADF had no intention of abiding by this agreement. For example, in the southern 
province of Maputo where the author was working, air drops of armaments increased dramatically in the run 
up to the signing so that RENAMO operations could continue uninterrupted. After a pause of several months 
they were resumed. The Chief of Staff of the Mozambican army, Mabote, speaking to a public meeting in the 
area at the time suggested that the Accord was the 'diplomatic offensive' while the `military offensive' still 
had to continue. A year later documents captured in a joint Zimbawean and Mozambican raid to capture the 
RENAMO base in Gorongosa, confirmed that SADF, with or without official endorsement by the South 
African government as a whole, had continued to supply and train RENAMO without interruption. 
14 These movements were often negotiated locally between community leaders in both countries. (Eyewitness 
accounts from returned refugees to Sofala 1995. ) 
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evidence also suggests that fairly senior Mozambicans in Maputo had to be involved. The truth of 
the matter has never been ascertained. 
The presidency and the leadership of the ruling party passed without challenge to Joachim Chissano 
(there had been previous South African attempts on Machel's life and it appears that a contingency 
plan for such an event was almost certainly already agreed within the Central Committee). 
1987 
As the economic and humanitarian crisis deepened, Mozambique was ranked as the poorest country 
in the world and the UN raised US $330 million in emergency assistance for it. 
A joint RENAMO/South African offensive in Zambezia province aimed at dividing the North of the 
country from the south was repelled by Mozambican government forces supported by Zimbabwean 
and Tanzanian troops. This was probably the point at which it became clear to both sides that the 
war could not be won by either side and that the human and economic cost was insupportable. 
At this point the government finally introduced its own structural adjustment programme which 
nevertheless fulfilled the main demands of the IMF and World Bank and satisfied the donors whose 
assistance had become essential for the survival of the Mozambican population. 's The immediate 
consequence was to shift the emphasis from social development and sustaining livelihoods to relief 
and aid dependence. 
1.6 1988-1992 On the road to peace 
As the second decade of Mozambique's independence progressed, while the internal humanitarian 
situation and economic dependence on external assistance became increasingly desperate, the real 
opportunities for peace were in fact opening up. Not only the general public but the main 
protagonists and importantly their forces on the ground were looking for a way to end the war. At 
the same time the external actors who had fuelled the war in pursuit of their own strategic interests 
withdrew or were neutralised by global political change. Both the end of the Cold War and the 
negotiations for an end to Apartheid rule in South Africa were significant in creating space for a 
free dialogue between the Mozambican parties. The humanitarian crisis had also raised the 
awareness and prompted the engagement of the international community in supporting a settlement. 
15 Mozambique had sought since 1983 to find a middle way between its development strategies (which had 
produced economic growth up to 1982 and the onset of the war, while devoting a high proportion of GDP to 
education, health and social programmes) and IMF doctrines. It had been recognised before the death of 
Machel that they would have to concede most of what the IMF wanted. Hanlon (1991) examines this process 
and its consequences in detail. 
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Thus extremely negative conditions of dependence and loss of sovereignty on the one hand 
combined with greater scope for political self-determination on the other. 
1988 
The CCM continued its contacts with RENAMO and these were finally publicly endorsed by 
President Chissano. 
Publication of the report by R. Gersony of the US State Department's Bureau for Refugee 
Programmes (Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related 
Experience in Mozambique. Report submitted to Ambassador Moore and Dr. Chester A. Crocker) 
which recorded the scale of atrocities committed against civilians and confirmed that more than 
90% were committed by RENAMO forces as a systematic policy. Acts of violence by government 
forces were by comparison sporadic and isolated incidents. 16 This marked a turning point in US 
policy leading eventually to support for the negotiations in Rome. 
The South African government affirmed its pledge to abide by the Nkomati Accord. 
1989 
Kenyan and Zimbabwean facilitators set up meetings between the CCM and RENAMO. 
The Fifth FRELIMO Congress dropped its designation as a Marxist-Leninist party and opened the 
way for constitutional reform allowing for political pluralism. A document outlining `12 Principles 
for Dialogue' was issued as the basis for direct talks with RENAMO. 
The final stage in the construction of an independent legal system, which began from `popular' 
justice in lay tribunals at community level followed by the training of judges and establishment of 
Provincial Courts, was completed with the inauguration of the Supreme Court and appointment of a 
Procurator General. 
The collapse of the GDR and reunification of Germany affected many Mozambican students and 
guest-workers in Germany as well as German technical assistance programmes in Mozambique. 
After a period of uncertainty, the German Federal government assumed responsibility for the 
outstanding commitments of the former GDR in respect of Mozambique. ' 
1990 
The first direct negotiations took place between FRELIMO and RENAMO delegations in Rome. 
Both parties had independently approached the Sant' Egidio Community asking them to facilitate 
16 This pattern was clearly evident to the author and other foreign personnel, from eyewitness accounts in 
rural districts in different parts of the country from 1983 onwards. However the Gersony report was based on 
a large-scale survey of refugees conducted under controlled research conditions. 
17 The subsequent changes in Russia and the break up of the Soviet Union had a less direct impact on the 
Mozambican population. 
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the dialogue. They jointly confirmed their common interest in ending the war. The US began from 
this point to urge Dhlakama to continue to engage in the talks. President Kaunda joined the African 
heads of state in urging the same. 
The draft of a new constitution was first circulated for public discussion and in November adopted 
by the National Assembly. The reforms included provision for a multi-party political system, an 
independent judiciary, freedom of the press and a market economy. 
In December a partial ceasefire was established with a Joint Verification Committee and authority 
for the ICRC to carry out humanitarian operations in the whole country. 
1991 
Successive rounds of talks were interrupted by disengagements and recriminations by both sides 
until the Mozambican churchmen, expressing the sentiments of the general public accused both 
sides of prolonging the war and human suffering. 
Two protocols were signed establishing mutual political recognition, a role for the UN in 
monitoring the implementation of the peace accord while giving sole authority to the government to 
organise the elections. RENAMO was to be free to begin party political activity as soon as the 
accord was signed. 
Drought which had already been affecting the central and southern regions and neighbouring 
countries continued and increased the pressure to achieve a settlement. 
1992 
The rounds of talks continued in Rome. International actors pressing Dhlakama to agree to a 
ceasefire and settlement were joined by `Tiny' Roland of Lohnro. In the eleventh round of talks 
France, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States and the United Nations were granted 
observer status. 
In May the revised Law of the National Education System (SNE) was passed in the National 
Assembly. The principal revision was to allow for the creation of non-government (commercial, 
religious and community) schools to function along side state schools within the overall framework 
of the national education system. 
In August Dhlakama and Chissano met for the first time but talks in Rome later stalled over the 
composition of the new army. A second meeting, arranged in Botswana by Roland with the support 
of Robert Mugabe, settled the outstanding issues and the UN was asked for financial support for 
returning refugees, demoblisation and the formation of the new army. 
The General Peace Accord was signed in Rome by both leaders on October 4'h. 
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1.7 1992-2004 Implementing the peace accord: the establishment of political, social and 
economic pluralism. 
Mozambique in the years following the signing of the General Peace Accord has been hailed as an 
example of successful post-war recovery. On the political front there has been sustained peace and a 
remarkable transformation from a single party to a multi-party political system, so that three general 
elections have been held successfully, with only localised incidents of disruption and violence and 
political conflict is now acted out in the civil arenas of the parliament and the media not on the 
battlefield. On the economic front there has been sustained economic growth, which has reduced 
aid dependence. This with negotiated debt relief has provided the basis for implementing recovery 
and development programmes. However, though the general picture is positive and there is reason 
to be optimistic for the future, the post-war process has not been free from contradictions and 
threats to the hard-won peace. The underlying threats to stability have largely been, and still are, 
related to economic conditions of poverty, debt and economic dependence, resulting from the war 
but also from global economic developments and financial conditionality. Limited sovereignty over 
its economic affairs and sudden exposure to the global market economy in the early years after the 
war increased economic inequality, encouraging rampant (often corrupt) accumulation by a 
minority in the capital Maputo in the south, while hindering attempts to invest in geographically 
and socially inclusive development programmes. Greater autonomy has grown as the economy has 
grown and there is now scope for these imbalances to be addressed, but they are still potentially 
destabilising. 
1992 
Following the signing of the General Peace Accord there was immediate disengagement throughout 
the country. During November and December the joint government and RENAMO Supervisory and 
Monitoring Commission was set up to oversee the implementation of the Accord. 
The UN operation (ONUMOZ) was formally established with a mandate to separate the warring 
parties, oversee demobilisation and the holding of elections scheduled for October 1993. 
When it was clear that ONUMOZ troops were not going to be immediately deployed, RENAMO 
agreed to the Zimbabwean forces continuing to police the Beira corridor and Malawian troops also 
remained in the North. 
In the days and weeks following the Peace Accord the three-year drought broke and normal rains 
held out the prospect of getting a harvest. As the ceasefire held, displaced rural populations returned 
to clear their lands of forest, planting the main maize crop and building houses (often still of a 
temporary rather than permanent nature). 
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Humanitarian agencies were also able to operate in the former war-zones for the first time. 
A donor conference in Rome pledged US$ 400 million to support the peace process. 
1993 
UN peacekeeping forces were not effectively on the ground until April (6 months after the accord). 
Zimbabwean and Malawian troops then withdrew and the demoblisation process was initiated. 
In the meantime, the ceasefire held and communities gained confidence in re-establishing their 
activities. " 
RENAMO leaders meanwhile pressed for more financial aid and political concessions, stalling the 
implementation of the peace process. A UN trust fund was set up to facilitate the transformation of 
the movement into a political party. 
In the light of the slow progress in deploying the ONUMOZ forces and the continuing tensions 
between the Mozambican parties, the elections were postponed until October 1994. 
UNHCR began assisting the return of some 2 million refugees from neighbouring countries. 
1994 
Elections in South Africa led to majority rule. 
Demobilisation of both armies was completed despite numerous incidents of riots, provoked by the 
slow pace of the process. The new army was also formed during this process. The officer core was 
easily recruited from both sides in the civil war and successfully integrated, but it proved difficult to 
recruit enough rank and file soldiers to make up even the greatly reduced numbers envisaged in the 
peace accord. 
The majority of the refugees had returned by the middle of the year, either with UNHCR assistance 
or on their own initiative. However, not all returned in time to register for the election. 
The first multi-party general election was held in Mozambique. A last minute boycott by RENAMO 
leader Alfonso Dhlakama was skilfully headed off by the UN representative Aldo Ajello backed by 
members of the diplomatic core and for the most part ignored by RENAMO supporters on the 
ground. The delay of one year allowed for careful preparation and had in fact ensured a high turnout 
(5.4 million or at least two thirds of all Mozambicans over 18 years of age) with orderly and 
peaceful conditions throughout the country. Chissano was re-elected as President with 53.3% of the 
vote, the RENAMO leader, Dhlakama received 33.73%. FRELIMO was returned as the majority 
18 In the Provinces of Sofala and Manica, many rural communities had used the timber cleared from their land 
to build school classrooms and were requesting the relocation of teachers so that they could bring their school 
age children home from the urban areas. (Research carried out for the Provincial Education Directorates in 
March/April by the author) 
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party in the national assembly but with only 44.33% of the vote. RENAMO received 37.78% and a 
third opposition party the Democratic Union, 5.15% (other parties did not gain a big enough share 
of the vote for representation in parliament). The result was clearly a personal endorsement of 
Chissano. He nevertheless interpreted the voting pattern as: `the Mozambican people voted for 
peace' recognising that many deliberately split their votes, voting for the FRELIMO leader as 
President but for RENAMO candidates for parliament to ensure that the main protagonists in the 
war would be obliged to continue to negotiate the governance of the country. 19 23% of the elected 
members of the National Assembly were women. 
1996 
Under pressure from the IMF and World Bank the privatisation of the state owned commercial 
banks was initiated by the sale of the BCM (Commercial Bank of Mozambique). It took place 
without proper audit of the existing assets in order, it has been convincingly alleged, to facilitate 
corrupt appropriation. 
At the same time financial observers around the world began to seriously criticize the application of 
IMF structural adjustment measures in the case of Mozambique. Despite strict adherence to the 
IMF rules, inflation was not curbed, nor poverty reduced and Mozambican enterprises were being 
bankrupted and taken over by foreign investors. Mozambican economists began to seriously look 
for alternative strategies and were increasingly backed by its bi-lateral donors. 20 
1997 
The second national census since independence was successfully carried out in the whole country. 
The Popular Development Bank (BPD) created post-independence by FRELIMO to assist rural 
development, was privatised and bought by the Malaysian Southern Bank Berhard in partnership 
with Invester SARL in a corrupt deal thought to involve President Chissano's son Nyimpine. It was 
renamed Austral Bank. 
1998 
The Joint Appraisal (Donor partners and Government of Mozambique) endorsed the Education 
Sector Strategy Plan. 
Municipal elections were held for the first time in a limited number of locations with a very low 
voter participation. 
19 This was a clearly expressed objective of many voters that the author had contact with at the time. Synge 
(1997) also supports this interpretation of the results. 
20 A detailed account of this policy debate is given by Hanlon (1996). 
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1999 
Catastrophic flooding following a cyclone affected the southern provinces with greatest severity 
along the course of the Limpopo, where Xai-Xai the Provincial capital of Gaza and the important 
rice-growing areas were devastated. This disaster led to a temporary downturn in the economy and 
reliance on international relief aid. 
The second general election was held with a similar turnout and result as the first but marred by 
local incidents of violence as opposition supporters rioted against the result. In the district of 
Montepuez opposition violence was met by extreme brutality on the part of the local police. 
Women increased their share of parliamentary seats to 30%. 
2001 
Mozambique reached the `completion point' of the enhanced HIPC debt relief programme, which 
held out the prospect of funding education and health programmes as key `poverty reduction' 
strategies. 
The journalist Carlos Cardoso, who had been actively investigating the fraudulent sales of the 
commercial banks, was assassinated. 
2002 
Bi-lateral debt cancellation agreements `in the spirit of HIPC' began to come through: Italy, Britain 
and OPEC in May, US in June. 
2003 
After protracted wrangles over the electoral register and functioning of the electoral commission the 
delayed second municipal elections were held with a slightly increased turnout. RENAMO put up 
candidates this time and several independent candidates stood especially in Maputo. 
Mozambique hosted the African Union Summit at which Chissano took over the chairmanship. 
Chissano was due to step down as President of Mozambique, under the terms of the constitution 
and internal elections were held within FRELIMO from which Armando Guebuza emerged to 
succeed him as party leader and Presidential candidate. 
2004 
The third general election was held in December. Guebuza was elected President and FRELIMO 
gained a third electoral victory with an increased majority, due mainly to a lower turnout of 
RENAMO supporters rather than an increase in the FRELIMO vote. 
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APPENDIX 2 
SAMPLING 
The Sampling Strategy 
The sampling strategy was based on a combination of two concepts for a quota sampling approach. 
Firstly, Paul Thompson's 'stratified community sample, in which the aim is not to secure a mirror of 
its broad distributions, but to ensure the representation of all significant social layers within it' 
(2000,151). Secondly Pawson and Tilley's three institutional levels: 'policy maker, practitioner and 
participant' (2001,209). In this way the education sector was viewed both in its community aspect 
as a social institution with different layers of participation and as the formal organisational structure 
of the Ministry with its different levels of responsibility and functions: 
" policy makers : senior management of the MINED 
" practitioners: education management staff and teaching staff 
" participants: former pupils and students (all those interviewed at the other levels fall into 
this category) and parents. 
In operational terms this involved selecting quota samples (covering for example, age, gender, war 
experience, geographical location) from each of these levels. There was however, one limitation on 
the representativeness of the sample. The author, decided not to attempt interviews with non- 
Portuguese speaking populations in the rural areas, both from lack of knowledge of local languages 
and culture and the risk of bias from the use of interpreters. 
The Choice of Provincial Settings 
I had from the start intended (on the basis of well documented historical, ethnic, political and 
economic differences) to select one northern and one southern province. Nampula., was an obvious 
candidate from the start in view of its underdevelopment in relation to potential and status as the 
capital of the north. A review of new data in the Statistical Yearbook 2001 and the National Human 
Development Report 2000 as well as its recent political history confirmed its suitability (see below). 
My initial choice in the South was a comparable large agricultural province, Gaza. However, it was 
the province most badly affected by the floods and probably overwhelmed with outsiders doing 
research or base-line surveys for projects etc. As I began to understand, from conversations, 
literature, press, statistical data etc., the enormous imbalance in economic development that has 
opened up between the metropolitan area and the rest of the country, I began to consider working in 
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the metropolitan area, and its hinterland in the Province of Maputo. I tested these suggestions in 
preliminary discussions with the Director of Planning who thought the reasoning was sound for 
both provinces and that each had excellent staff who could support the project. Conveniently, one 
of the directors was a woman and one a man. There was an additional practical advantage in 
working in both the City and Province of Maputo. It meant that I could combine it with continuing 
work with MINED staff and donor representatives. 
Analysis of the two Provincial settings' 
NAMPULA 
The principal northern province. 
A large geographical area (82,606 Km2). 
The most densely populated rural province (41 per Km2) with the second largest total population 
(3,337,000). The majority of the population are Macua, the largest ethnic group in the country, but 
concentrated in the north. 
Mainly rural (54.8% of GDP from Agriculture) and very fertile (one of the Provinces with a grain 
surplus in 2003 (AIM report) but also includes the country's 'third city'. 
Per capita GDP ($159) is less than but approaching the national average of $204 
Human poverty index (1997 census) at 63.0 is above the national average of 55.9 
HDI (human development index) in 1999 (third lowest) was below but also close to the national 
average. 
HDI includes educational indicators which are the second lowest in the country due to very low 
female participation and low adult literacy: 
" children in school 22.3% (16.6% of girls) below the national average of 31.4% (25.8%) 
" illiteracy of adults 71.7% (national average 60.5%) 
" illiteracy of women 85.9% (national average 74.1%) 
The North has historically always had lower indices of school attendance especially of girls than the 
South. In the past the gap was much greater, hence the greater imbalance in the adult population. 
1 Statistical data from the National Institute of Statistics in two publications Statisitcal Yearbook 2001 (INE) 
and Mozambique Education and human development: Trajectory, lessons and challenges for the 21st century. 
National Human Development Report 2000 UNDP 
Electoral history: de Tollenaere, M. 2002' Democracia e eleicöes em Mocambique. Teoria e pri; tica' in 10 
Anos de Paz B. Mazula ed. Imprensa Universitäria (Maputo) 
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Politics: in the first two post-war elections the Province was divided and several districts switched 
parties from one election to the next, but RENAMO maintains a majority (de Tollenaere, 2002). 
MAPUTO PROVINCE 
The most southerly rural province and the smallest geographical area (25,058 Km2) 
Includes the industrial city of Matola (part of the Maputo conurbation) 
The second smallest total population (969,000) but a higher than average density (37 per Km2). 
Made up of mainly Changane (majority ethnic group in the south) and Ronga (a related people, the 
original inhabitants of Maputo) 
Per capita GDP ($230) is the highest provincial GDP. Although it is historically a developed 
agricultural area only 11.8% of GDP is from that source and only 10.8 % from industry. 
Construction, transport and communications and commerce are the main earners (i. e. part of the 
metropolitan economy). 
Human poverty index is the second lowest after Maputo City at 36.0 
It also has the second highest HDI after the City and 40% above the national average with high 
levels of education and adult literacy: 
" children in school 51.1% (47.7% of girls) 
0 illiteracy of adults 34.3% 
illiteracy of women 45.9% 
Greater access to education in the South dates from the colonial period. Despite a narrowing of the 
gap post-independence, the influence of the metropolitan area continues to maintain the advantage. 
Maputo compared to the other provinces is an exceptional case in terms of GDP and HDI since the 
other provinces are grouped around the average on these indicators. 
Politics: in both post-independence elections 100% FRELIMO candidates returned. 
MAPUTO CITY 
The capital and administratively, a separate Province, but economically and culturally the City and 
the rural Province are closely interlinked. 
The smallest geographical area (300 Km2) Urban with some peripheral 'green zones' producing 
food crops (1.1% GDP). 
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Third smallest population (1,031,000), highest density (3438 per Km2). As the capital city it has a 
very mixed population. Ronga and Changane are the biggest groups followed by groups from 
Inhambane, another southern province. 
Highest per capita GDP ($ 1,137) (includes instances of extreme wealth). 
Commerce contributes 31.1%, construction 20.7%, industry 18.9%. 
Human poverty index 17.1, less than half the national average. 
Highest HDI with high scores on all indicators but especially the educational ones: 
" children in school 61.7% (58.6% of girls) 
0 illiteracy of adults 15% 
9 illiteracy of women 22.6% (men only 7% due to urban migration of male workers? ) 
Politics: in both post independence elections returned 100% FRELIMO candidates. 
The quota sample interviewed 
Category A policymakers/dirigentes 5 
Category B education managers/tecnicos 14 
Category C teaching staff/docentes 18 
Category D parent representatives/mAes e pais de turma 7 
MINED 
National Director of Planning (the standard interview in two sessions and an additional final 
interview with additional questions) (A, male, mid forties) 
National Director of Basic Education (A, male, mid forties) 
National Director of Secondary Education (A, female, mid forties) 
Head of School Management, Secondary Education (B, male, mid forties) 
Responsible for Adult Education Media (radio programmes, newspaper) (B, female, mid forties) 
Directorate of Education - Maputo Province 
Provincial Director (A, female, early fifties) 
Head of the Pedagogical Department (B, male, early forties) 
Supervisor of Distance Education for Teachers (B, female, late thirties) 
Head of School Management (B, male, early fifties) 
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District of Matola - Maputo Province 
District Director (B, male, early forties) 
Primary teacher (C, male, mid forties) 
Emergency primary teacher (C, female, mid twenties) 
Primary teacher (C, female, late forties) 
Primary school head (C, female, early fifties) 
Secondary school head (C, male, mid thirties) 
Secondary school deputy head (C, female, late thirties) 
Secondary teacher (C, male, late thirties) 
Secondary teacher (C, female, late twenties) 
Parent/responsible adult for secondary pupil (D, male, mid fifties) 
Parent/responsible adult for secondary pupil (D, female, forty) 
Parent/responsible adult for secondary pupil (D, male fifty) 
Parent/responsible adult for secondary pupil (D, female, late twenties) 
Parent/responsible adult for secondary pupil (D, male, late forties) 
Directorate of Education - City (Province) of Maputo 
Provincial Director (A, male, mid forties) 
Head of Personnel Department (B, female, early forties) 
Responsible for School Management (B, male, forty) 
Head of Secondary and Pre-University School (B, male, mid forties) 
Deputy Pedagogical Director (B, female, late thirties) 
Pre-university Teacher (B, male, late fifties) 
Directorate of Education - Province of Nampula 
(Interview with the director rescheduled twice, but proved impossible. Deputy seriously ill in 
hospital) 
Head of Personnel Department (B, male, late thirties) 
Head of Planning Department (B, male, early forties) 
Responsible in the Personnel Department (B, female, mid thirties) 
Responsible for Primary Education (B, male, late forties) 
Responsible for Adult Literacy (B, male, forty) 
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(Rural) District of Nampula 
District Director (B, female, mid forties) 
Primary school head (C, male, mid thirties) 
Primary teacher (C, male, late twenties) 
Primary teacher contracted while training (C, female, early twenties) 
Primary teacher (C, male, early thirties) 
Parent of primary school pupil (D, male, late thirties) 
City of Nampula 
Secondary school head (C, male, early forties) 
Secondary contracted teacher (C, male, early forties) 
Secondary contracted teacher (C. male, mid thirties) 
Parent Representative (President of the Parents Association) (D, male, early fifties) 
Validity/representativeness of the sample. 
Parents (Category D) 
The sample was selected on an ad hoc basis and as such was not representative. It was not 
representative of all levels of schools (all but one were secondary), more parents were interviewed 
in the south and only one rural parent was interviewed. All the urban parents were elected 
representatives of parent associations. As those chosen by other parents, and willing, to represent 
them, they can be expected to be both more educated and more interested in education than average. 
The rural parent was also untypical as he could speak Portuguese. As explained, the rural 
population was 
The age and gender representation was the same as in the education personnel sample: 
Age: minimum 27 (sister of pupil) maximum 55. The same range and similar average (44) as the 
education personnel. Female representation (28%) is also the same. 
Education Personnel (Categories A, B, C. ) 
Occupations and types of institution 
One gap in relation to the sampling plan was a missed interview with a pre-university teacher in 
Nampula, otherwise the different levels and occupations were successfully sampled. 
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North/South Representation 
The failure to interview the Nampula Provincial Director did not seriously affect the validity of the 
sample. He was recently appointed there from Maputo and had the same educational background as 
the Director of the City of Maputo who was interviewed (Diplom graduate in the GDR). 
Otherwise the sampling was representative as planned. 
Rural/Urban Representation 
The sample covered one rural and one urban primary school. It would have been interesting to also 
compare a secondary school in a rural district in the north with the one in an urban district in the 
south. However since it was only practicable to visit two schools of each type, comparing two 
schools in the urban periphery of a Northern and a Southern city was also useful. 
The author also felt that the under-representation of teachers presently serving in rural schools was 
not significant for the analysis of the historical periods because from her experience of working 
with them over many years, she was aware that they belong to the same core social group as those 
interviewed, many of whom also spent much of their working life in rural areas. However, not 
obtaining a their perspective on the contemporary context was a lacuna. 
Age 
For category A and the quota of school directors, no age criteria were applied. In all other cases (B 
and C) the researcher asked school heads and provincial directors (or those acting for them), if 
possible to invite mainly those with longer careers but also some younger people. In the south this 
was successful in achieving quite a balanced sample. In the north, less so. 
All categories: 
Age range: minimum: 23, maximum 57. 
The groups with administrative responsibility were on average older than the simple teachers. This 
is not surprising, as the usual route to these jobs was via an established teaching career. 
Category A: Average age 46 (minimum 43). 
Category B: Average age 42 (minimum 35). 
Category C: Average age 38 (minimum 23). But the average age of heads and deputies: 41. 
Gender 
Overall f/m ratio: 14: 23. That is, women made up 60% of the sample. 
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Ratio in North: 3: 10 (30%) (Categories B and Q. 
Ratio in South: 9: 10 (90%) (Categories B and Q. 
Category A: 2: 3 (67%). 
In putting the quota sample together all those involved were aware of the need to include at least a 
representative number of women in the sample. In the south this was not a problem and they appear 
in the different categories in numbers more or less consistent or in excess of their numbers in 
different levels of the institutions: more women than men (3: 1) in primary teaching, 50% in 
secondary and pre-university, 3: 5 in group B and 2: 3 in group A. In the north, DPE staff made 
conscious efforts to include women but had to admit there were few in the B category. In fact 
interviewing 2: 4 was an over-representation. The district director was probably the only woman in 
that post and while she insisted there were more women teachers in the particular primary school 
selected, data on female participation in education in the province suggest that (more by accident 
than design) the sample (1: 6 or 14 % female) did at least reflect the gender ratio in the province. 
In 1998 the percentages of serving female teachers in the three provinces (Derived from annual 
statistical tables in MINED, July 1998 Estatistica da Educacao. Levantamento Escolar 1998. ) were 
as follows: 
City of Maputo: 
Level 1 primary: 60% 
Level 2 primary: 35% 
Level I secondary: 24% 
Level 2 secondary: 30% (two schools) 
Province of Maputo: 
Level 1 primary: 47% 
Level 2 primary: 23% 
Level 1 secondary: 9% 
Level 2 secondary: 12% (one school) 
Province ofNampula: 
Level I primary: 13% 
Level 2 primary: 13% 
Level I secondary: 15% 
Level 2 secondary: 13% (one school) 
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The percentage of women training to be teachers, however was much higher: 52% in Nampula and 
65% in Maputo Province in training colleges for first level primary; 19% in Nampula, 28% in 
Maputo Province and 58% in Maputo City in IMAPs for second level (MINED statistical tables as 
above) while women graduates from the UP were 29% of the total by 1996 (Walker, B. 1998, 
Mainstreaming Gender in the Education Sector Strategic Plan 1997-2001 MINED pp. 9) so the 
proportion of women teachers must now be somewhat higher even allowing for higher drop-out 
rates for women. In the same year women made up 34.5% of MINED staff and 6.02% in the DPEs, 
while at the top management level the percentage was 23% (Walker op. cit. ) but again efforts have 
since been made at all levels of the administration to appoint women when this is possible. 
Use of additional Mozambican key informants ( key persons, former colleagues, etc. ) 
The author took advantage of as many additional contacts as possible with Mozambican key 
informants, some of whom are from the same groups as the quota sample. The reasoning was that 
this, combined with study of secondary literature and data, would enhance understanding and 
ability to interpret the results of the quota study. They included current and former national 
directors, academics and education staff. Most were engaged in conversation about the research but 
the former National Director of International Cooperation gave an informal interview. 
Donor representatives 
Formal Interviews: 
Education Programmes Coordinator SIDA Mozambique 
Director British Council Mozambique 
Health and Education Advisor DFID Mozambique 
Informal discussions: 
Regional Education Advisor, SIDA (Southern Africa) 
Information Manager, British Council, Mozambique. 
Advisors on HIV/AIDS public education campaigns and District Administration Capacity Building 
(GAS, Nampula - Swedish NGO) 
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APPENDIX 3. 
BRITISH COUNCIL SCHOLARSHIPS 
Analysis of data from the British Council Archive in Maputo. 
Total individuals assisted 1983-2003: 907 
1983-1989 BC based in Harare. Set up in Maputo in 1989. 
End of 1989: collapse of DDR and other socialist scholarship schemes coming to 
an end. 
Total students assisted: 272 
Women: 109 = 40% (but see types of courses) 
Men: 161 
Unspecified: 2 
Courses: 
Duration/level by gender 
Short 80 women 46 men 2 unspecified 
Certificate/diploma 4 women 34 men 
Professional non-qual. 5 women 17 men 
HND///advanced prof. 2 women 4 men 
Bachelor Degree 1 woman 5 men 
Post-graduate. 
(most PG diploma or 
Masters 
17 women 55 men 
(I PhD) 
Categories 
N. B. Distribution determined by requests from Mozambican institutions (and individuals) through 
donor partners (especially British FO and ODA) based on CB needs assessment, assessment of 
relevance of professional training offered and availability from other donors, but also British 
funding policies (ODA and Foreign Office). (see funding sources analysis) 
In this period 50% of courses were English Language Training related (direct training 
outnumbered teacher training by about 4 to 1) 
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English Language training: as preparation for other study in UK; special purposes such as 
secretarial or banking: 112 
English Language Teacher Training: 25 (18%) 
Education: none before 1988 (see importance of DDR in the 19980s for education development) 
Also coming in at a specialist level: Masters/Advanced diploma and short course on distance 
learning: 5 
Health: advanced nursing/nursing education; surgery; medical specialism; health management; 
primary health care; public/environmental health: 22 
Food and Agriculture: agronomy, plant science, veterinary science, fisheries, agricultural 
economics, beekeeping, remote sensing for crop monitoring etc.: 15 
Information systems and technology: telecommunication, computer sciences, IT, aeronautical 
information systems etc.: 9 
Media: radio broadcasting, news reporting, journalism: 8 
Management: business and finance, transport (especially ports and railways see British aid for 
rehabilitation of Ports): 24 
Engineering and technology: civil, electrical, low cost technology, textiles, transport, water, 
marine, chemical, mining and mineral resources exploitation: 16 
Policy research, development and planning: development studies, economics, policy research, 
national resource management etc.: 13 
Law, diplomacy, politics: 3 
Language: linguistics/language studies; translation and interpretation: 18 
Military: 1 
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Location of Courses: 
Institutions in the UK: 67% 
Regional: 33% (89 studentships mostly short professional) 
Harare: English and secretarial skills: 70 women and 11 men 
University of Zimbabwe: BA in Shona. 1 man 
Tanzania: Beekeeping course 2 men (and undated) 1 woman. 
Zambia: course on rural water supply 2 men 
SADC (various) Railway maintenance courses: 3 men 
Officer training (location unspecified but probably at least partly regional) I man. 
1990-1992 Period of preparation for post-war recovery. 
Total students assisted: 247 (a large number in a short time - also coinciding with return 
of graduates from socialist countries- both significant for post-war 
recovery) 
Women: 71 = 29% 
Men: 148 
Unspecified: 28 
Courses: 
Duration/level 
Short 50 women 52 men 28 unspecified 
Certificate/diploma 7 women 22 men 
Professional non-qual. 2 women 12 men 
HND/Advanced prof. 0 women 3 men 
Bachelors degree I woman 27 men 
Post-graduate 11 women 32 men 
Categories: 
48% English language training related (direct training and training for teaching English In 
similar proportions) 
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English language training: 63 
English language teacher training : 56 
Education: 6 (2 BEds and one diploma - i. e. basic higher ed. ) 
Health: 15 
Food and Agriculture: 14 
Information systems/tech.: 3 
Media: 0 
Management: 32 (port and transport still major part - e. g. short courses by Portia Liverpool) 
Engineering: 19 
Policy/planning: 5 
Language: 3 
Law/diplomacy/politics: 0 
Applied sciences: 1 
Location of courses: 
UK institutions: about 2 thirds as before 
Includes 2 women taking distance MSc from Wye college (i. e. actually done in country) 
Regional: about one third (28%) 
Harare (ELT) 32 women, 12 men, 20 unspecified 
Kenya (ELT) 1 woman 
"various port authorities" probably SADC and UK 1 man. 
1993-2003 10 years of peace 
Total students assisted: 360 (proportionately less - greater internal provision using 
national resources? ) 
Women: 66 = 18% (reason for drastic difference? More opportunities 
in country for ELT and basic professional? The proportion of PG 
students is slightly higher) 
Men: 269 
Unspecified: 25 
Generally lower numbers of students : due to increased higher ed. provision in Mozambican 
institutions? 
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Courses: 
Duration/level 
Short 10 women 63 men 16 unspecified 
Certificate/diploma 2 women 11 men 
Professional non-qual. 3 women 13 men 
HND/Advanced prof. 2 women 0 men 2 unspecified 
Bachelor degree 
Brazilian Licenciatura 
7 women 
2 women 
57 men 
9 men 
2 unspecified 
Post graduate 
PhD 
32 women 
3 women 
111 men 
5 men 
4 unspecified 
I unspecified 
Categories: 
" English language training related 18%. Majority (65%) now for teacher training and 
management of ELT and only a minority for direct training. Result of development of 
in-country language training through the Language Institute (BC Institutional 
development project) and returning TEFEL graduates to improve English leaching in 
schools and staff private language schools etc. 
0 Big increase in bachelor degrees and in education courses - replacing DDR provision? 
More Mozambicans with pre-university qualification? 
" Health virtually stopped - other donor support? 
English language training: 23 
English language teaching: 43 
Education: (BEd, Masters, special courses on curriculum and distance learning) 36 
Agriculture and food: 43 
Health: 1 (psychiatry) 
Information systems/ tech.: 9 
Media: 6 
Management: 46 
Engineering: 37 
Policy/planning: 31 
Language: 2 
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Applied science: 2 
Social sciences: (sociology, anthropology, history, social work) 10 
Environment: (environmental sciences, and management) 14 
Location: 
UK Institutions: 83% 
Including Wye College distance degrees: BSc I man, MSc 5 men. 
Regional: 4% 
Malawi: short, 2 men 
Zimbabwe: short, 2 men, 2 unsp. 
South Africa: (1995) MSc 2 men 
Zambia: MSc I man 
Kenya: short, 1 man, diploma, I man 
Bank of Mauritius: short, 2 men 
Other external: 6% 
Brazil: Advanced prof. I woman, Bachelor degrees 4 men, licenciatura 2 women 9 men, masters 1 
unsp. 
New Zealand: MScI man 
New Zealand/Bangor UK MSc 1 man 
Dublin: short 1 man. 
In-country: 7% 
Short courses mainly management and professional for CFM and ports particularly. 11 men 13 
unsp. 
BEng. (aeronautical)1 man (distance? or part distance? ) 
Unrecorded dates: 
Total students assisted between 1983 and 2003: 28 
Women: 6 
Men: 19 
Unspecified; 3 
Courses: 
Duration/level 
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Short 1 woman 11 men 
Certificate/diploma 2 women 0 1 unspecified 
professional non-qual. 0 6 men 
bachelor degree 2 women 3 men 
Brazilian licenciatura 0 1 man 2 unspecified 
Post graduate 1 woman 7 men 
Categories: 
English language training: 2 
English language teaching: 1 
Education: 1 
Agriculture and food: 8 
Health: 2 
Information systems/tec.: 1 
Management: 8 
Engineering: 5 
Policy/planning: 4 
Environment: 1 
Locations: 
Majority at UK institutions: including: Wye college distance MSc I woman and 2 men 
Others: 
Tanzania: beekeeping course 1 woman (almost certainly with the others in the 1980s) 
In country: short 1 man 
Brazil: licenciatura (see above) 3 
FUNDING 
British Government funding (64%) : 
1983-1985 All scholarships awarded by ODA 
1986 -1989 TCT and ODA awards 
1989-2003 ODA/DFID, TCT, Chevening, Hornby and BC awards 
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British Council is listed as the funding body for all ODA, TCT, Hornby and own BC awards, 
although the funding comes from the overseas development budget. 
It also funded scholarships awarded through Mozambican institutions: Language Institute, ISP, 
MINED, SETEP but all of these were connected with the development of English Language 
teaching, which was a BC project. 
SADC awards were mostly funded by BC but 2 listed as CFT (see below) 
British High Commission is listed as the funding body for Chevening scholarships, which are 
Foreign Office funded and awarded on direct application of individuals. 
Other funding (36%): 
Listed as CFT - i. e cash transfer by'clients' of BC - and was presumably donated by the 
organisations awarding the scholarships from their own funds or other sources. (All these awards 
except a short language course funded by the British NGO Christian Aid in 1987 were awarded 
from 1992 onwards. ) 
The funding bodies include: 
Mozambican state institutions: 
CFM (state-owned company) 
Ministries (Planning and Finance, Commerce) 
Donors, UN Agencies, Banks. 
There were also two cases of individuals transferring their own funding. 
SCHOLARSHIP AWARDING BODIES. 
Note: some short course awards were for groups 
British Awards: 
Award Number/dates Types 
Chevening 35: 1989-2000 Mixed disciplines some indication of concern 
for governance. Mostly post grad. one PhD. A 
number of short courses for advanced 
journalism and radio broadcasting BBC 1 
Horeb 2: 1997,1998 TESOL --d 
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ODA (later DFID) 180: 1983-1989 mixed disciplines and duration; English 
124: 1990-1992 Language courses and teacher training 
130: 1993-2000 predominate 
9: undated 
TCT 70: 1986-1999 mixed disciplines, all types of duration/level 
British Council 8: 1987- 1997 ELT related 50% and mixed subjects; higher 
and post-grad., short professional. 
Other Scholarship Awarding Bodies 
Category Awarding Agent Number/dates Types 
Banks ADB 1 -1998 Post-grad. Agriculture. 
World Bank 2: 1994,1996 Post-grad. management, 
marine engineering 
Bi-lateral Donors DANIDA 2: 1996,1997 Post-grad. agriculture 
FINNIDA 1- 1993 Post-grad. agriculture 
NORAD 17: 1993-1997 Higher Ed. Post-grad. 
PhD. fisheries related 
and mixed. 
SIDA (ASDI) 2: 1993,1999 Post-grad., diploma. 
economics 
Sweden 2? professional non-qual. 
agriculture 
Companies/corporate CFM 10: 1992-2002 short courses with Portia, 
Liverpool. BScs Brazil 
Beira Corridor 1-1995 professional non-qual. 
transport management 
International Agencies SADC 9: 1988-1996 short courses, Portia for 
port development; Llcen. 
Brazil social work, 
development studies 
UNDP (PNUD) 1-1991 ELT 
UNICEF 3: 1994-1996 MEds (see 15 In 
interview notes at 
Exeter) 
Mozambican Institutions Escola Nautica 1- 1995 Post-grad. marine 
science 
Fundo de Fomento 1- 1998 Post. grad. development 
Pes ueiro finance 
Instituto de Linguas 2: 1994,1995 BEd for ELT 
ISP 2: 1994 Post-grad. for ELT 
STEP (SETEP? 2: 1994,2003 Post-grad. for ELT 
Ministries MIC (Industry & corn. 1.1992 ELT 
MINED 3: 1992-1996 Post-grad. Bachelors, 
professional non-qual. 
for ELT 
Min. Fin. Plan 1- 1998 BEng aeronautical 
NGOs/Foundations Christian Aid 1-1987 ELT 
Ford 7: 1993-1995 most post-grad. Inc. PhD, 
diploma. politics, int. 
studies, development 
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finance 
Ottobenecke 1-1995 BA design 
? Satim (Finland) 1- 1998 Post- grad. edldev 
Private 2: 1997 BSc business economics. 
Dip. development studies 
53 other awards are unattributed. 
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